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on business decisions and conduct. Topics covered in other sections include the creation mandates and the Great Commission, absolutes in a situational environment, and the distribution of wealth.

This is not light reading. Nevertheless, it is not esoteric reading. Theological jargon has been minimized, and the chapters are generally very readable. None are excessively long, and Chewning's introductions, summaries and reflections help to crystallize the important points made by each author. Understanding the implications of each author's position for business, and the differences between authors' positions is not always easy, but that is due to the difficulty of distilling Scriptural principles into principles for real-world situations which can be printed in a book, rather than to any shortcoming of the authors or the editor. While the book is targeted at businesspeople, it should be of interest to anyone who is interested in how the theological issues discussed influence relations between Christians and the larger community.

Reviewed by William E. Hamilton, Jr., Staff Research Engineer, General Motors Research Laboratories, Warren, MI 48090-9035.


Moss was formerly assistant director of public affairs at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York. He received his doctorate from Stanford University and currently teaches science writing at the New School for Social Research in New York City. This book is a completely revised and updated edition of his previous book, The Cancer Syndrome, which was published in 1980 after he was fired from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center due to a laetrile controversy. He recorded this episode fully in this book.

This book has four parts: part one is "Proven Methods (That Often Don't Work)," part two is "Unproven Methods," part three is "Prevention," and part four is "The Cancer Business." Moss sets out to expose the flaws of the entire cancer industry and to show why America is losing the war on cancer, what went wrong, and where we go from here.

In part one, Moss summarizes the current status of three proven methods: surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy. He claims that they don't work well and produce too much profit for the cancer industry, including pharmaceutical companies, treatment centers, and cancer physicians. He also quotes a study which showed the age-adjusted cancer mortality rates for the U.S. decreased 8.7 percent in the 20-year period between 1962 and 1982 and concludes that the U.S. is losing the war on cancer. However, he does not discuss the possibility of competing risks in explaining the increase in cancer mortality. Cardiovascular disease is the number one killer in the United States. It is gradually coming under control. Those people who used to die of heart disease are now dying of cancer. The increase in the cancer mortality rate is not due to a lack of improvement in cancer treatment. Regarding the high cost of cancer treatment, this is generally true of all medical care in the U.S. Solving this problem depends on legislation and possibly a revamping of health insurance systems.

In the second part, Moss presents cases for several unproven methods including Coley's toxins, laetrile, hydrazine sulfate, vitamin C and other nutrition supplements, Burton's immuno-augmentative therapy, Livingstone's immunization, and Burzynski's antineoplastons. Here he gathers all the preclinical and early clinical data to show that these innovative treatments are good, and argues that, even if they are not good, patients should have their right to choose.

To this reviewer, Moss ignores the established scientific method of clinical research. In order to prove a medical treatment is useful, scientists have to do animal studies to look for activity and long-term safety, then do human clinical trials to determine a safe dose and preliminary effect, and finally do at least two randomized controlled clinical trials to show that the new treatment is better than a placebo or equivalent to an active control. A medical treatment has to go through these rigorous tests in order to qualify as "proven." All the treatments discussed by the author are either too new to judge their effectiveness or have been proved ineffective by randomized controlled clinical trials. Admittedly some of these innovative approaches did break ground for new avenues of research, and some compounds are still under active research (e.g., hydrazine sulfate, vitamin A). However, the way some mavericks charge large sums of money for their unproven methods is unethical. As to the patient's right to choose, recent developments have led to easier access to experimental medicine for AIDS patients. However, better access might interfere with the formal research of proving the efficacy of a new drug. Its long-term effect still remains to be seen.

In part three, Moss charges that the American Cancer Society, the National Cancer Institute, and the Food and Drug Administration have not done enough to promote cancer prevention. However, preventive measures need to have support from good research data. Prevention research depends on long-term follow-up and is still full of methodologic problems. Nevertheless, Moss agrees that the effort to prevent cancer has increased in recent years.

The author makes his major thesis clear in part four, that the suppression of unproven methods, although it takes place mainly at an objective level, is an outgrowth of underlying economic and social trends. This point of view seems to be consistent with the popular theory about the history of science, that scientific development is not very objective, but is influenced by cultural background and subjective factors. This reviewer still thinks that science is quite objective, and in the long run the social-
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economical factors only play a small part in discovering what is true.

As a whole, this book provides some interesting information about both orthodox and unorthodox elements of the total cancer research enterprise. The reader should beware of the author’s bias due to his unfortunate experience at Memorial Sloan-Kettering.

Reviewed by T. Timothy Chen, National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, MD 20892.


The author is Professor of Philosophy at the College of Notre Dame in Baltimore, Maryland, and this book is based upon his Ph.D. thesis. He tackles the ancient question of how moral and natural evil can exist in a world created by a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. He is clear at the beginning to state that he provides no simple answer.

A major portion of the book is taken up with critiques of traditional answers that have been already offered. He offers three major criteria for an acceptable response to the problem: (1) it “must be true to the tradition from which the problem originates,” (2) it “should be one that is logically consistent,” and (3) it “must take the individual sufferer seriously.” One of the purposes of the writing is to show how difficult it is to find any position that is consistent with all three criteria.

The book is often hard reading on a hard subject, but it appears to be extremely thorough. Bearing the marks of being a Ph.D. thesis, every chapter ends with notes, giving a grand total for the book of over 400, the bibliography included at the end is 23 pages long, and the style of the presentation involves extensive quotes (over 200 of them, many a full page in length) from other authors. Since the argument is detailed, intricate and complex, the reader would be helped immeasurably by a more ordered structure of presentation, rather than simply a complicated set of cross-references between disagreeing authors. The book has five chapters: the first describes various forms of theodicy, the second produces a clarification of terms, the third analyzes traditional theodicies, the fourth deals with seeing God as the answer to the problem of suffering, and the last proposes a “prolegomena” to Christian theodicy.

The flavor of the book, as well as an excellent summary of much of its content is best given in the following extended quote:

In chapter three we attempted to make a distinction between theodicies prohibited by reason and those allowed by reason. We have discovered that in the first group we find the punishment and warning theodicies: retributive justice and the free will defense; the unreality of evil theodicies: the amount of evil is insufficient to create a problem, evil is an illusion, and evil is privation of good; and the evil is logically necessary theodicies: certain versions of the free will defense and the contrast perspective. Because of one or more logical flaws, all of these responses fail as logically consistent answers to the problem of evil.

Those theodicies that are allowed by reason include both the classical Hindu and Hinayana Buddhist versions of monism, the dualistic responses to the problem of evil offered by Plato, Zoroastrianism, process thought, and limited God theories such as that offered by J S Mill and the various possibilities suggested by David Hume in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. We have also seen that despite some logical problems, John Hick’s version of the teleological theodicies can be numbered among those responses to the problem of evil that are allowed by reason. All of the members of this second group are logically consistent and therefore possible candidates for the job of answering the question: “Why does evil exist?” p. 208.

These have all been discussed only with respect to the second criterion of logical consistency; they must yet be tested by the first and third criteria.

In chapter 4 of the book, the author takes a detailed look at the Book of Job in order to lay a foundation for the proposal that he is to advance in the final chapter. He concludes that “Job is not left with particulars of a philosophical theodicy. In the end, what he does have is trust that God does have a teleological view by which evil will be overcome” (p. 199). Such a position is found to be consistent with the three criteria.

In chapter 5 he starts with the fundamental Christian assumption “that our teleological theodicy is somehow bound up with the incarnation and atonement of Jesus Christ. These are certainly not empirical propositions. But they are foundational principles on which the Christian faith is based” (p. 267). Then he becomes more specific, saying, “That God had to die on the cross becomes for the Christian the problem of evil, and this realization totally recasts the way in which the victim approaches theodicy” (p. 279).

What, then is Vicchio’s conclusion?

The experience of “seeing God” leads the victim not in the direction of a theoretical theodicy that answers all our questions about natural and moral evil, but rather it sets the sufferer in a new life and provides the basis for a practical response to the problem of evil. As Forsyth puts it, the Christian theodicy he is advocating is “not really an answer to a riddle but a victory in a battle” (pp. 279, 280).

At the heart of the Christian message we must find a God who identifies himself so thoroughly with his creatures that he becomes one of them... We must trust that at bottom level the prima facie Christian paradox of evil is merely apparent. (p. 281)

This is clearly a book for detailed and careful study, with much taking of notes, cross-checking of conclusions,