FBI MISCONDUCT / SECURITY BREACHES AND 911 COMMISSION COVERUP
|
THIS WEBSITE IS LISTED ON THE MAIN WEBPAGE http://www.freewebs.com/govwebsites WEBSITE CREATED and DESIGNED BY JEFF H WILLIAMSON/DJ BLAZE Open Letter To Thomas Kean – Chairman Of The 9/11 Commission - From
FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds (SEE LAWSUIT FOLLOWING 10 PAGE LETTER)
August 1, 2004
Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
Dear Chairman Kean::
It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on
September 11; during which time we, the people, have been placed
under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in
our daily lives. Your commission, the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was created by law to
investigate “facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001” and to “provide recommendations to safeguard
against future acts of terrorism”, and has now issued its “9/11
Commission Report”. You are now asking us to pledge our support for
this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these
recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our
security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously
flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I
am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the
commission, I made you aware of. Thus, I must assume that other
serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner omitted
from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your
report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations.
Considering what is at stake, our national security, we are entitled
to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for
clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the
report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American Citizen, a former FBI
translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States
Congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the
Department of Justice Inspector General investigation, and a witness
for your own 9/11 Commission investigation, request your answers to,
and your public acknowledgement of, the following questions and
issues:
After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at
the FBI’s largest and most important translation unit, were told to
slow down, even stop, translation of critical information related to
terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States
Congress with a record of ‘extensive backlog of untranslated
documents’, and justify its request for budget and staff increases.
While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking
leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its
language units to provide them with needed translated information,
hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative
supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up ( please
refer to the CBS-60 Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and
provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue
has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee ( Please refer
to Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy’s letters during the summer of
2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This
confirmed report has been reported to be substantiated by the
Department of Justice Inspector General Report (Please refer to
DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you
prior to the completion of your report). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and
the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. ( Please
refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided
to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since
this information has been confirmed and made available to our
government, the administrators in charge of language departments of
the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information
front lines of the FBI’s Counter terrorism and Counterintelligence
efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this most serious
issue, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and your
recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when
left un-addressed will have even more serious consequences. This
issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to
exclude this information and this serious issue despite the evidence
and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and
resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can
the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “ Intelligence Czar”, in
its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after
September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most
sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the
Bureau’s investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret
Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough
background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a
semi-legit organizations that were the FBI’s targets of
investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with
two individuals who were FBI’s targets of investigation. For months
Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to
these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her
husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of
documents related to these targets as ‘ Not Pertinent.’ Melek Can
Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these
documents important to the FBI’s investigations and our fight against
terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct
supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret
sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown
recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct
supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to
certain 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and
reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain
in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive
intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret
clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and
administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau if
this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made
public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen’s case (FBI spy
scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate
Judiciary Committee ( Please refer to Senator Leahy and Grassley’s
letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley’s
statement on CBS-60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your
investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident
received major coverage by the press (Please refer to media
background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004).
According to Director Mueller, the Inspector General criticized the
FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage report regarding
Melek Can Dickerson ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds
and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your
report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific
account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this, and additional documents. ( Please refer to
tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported
to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was
confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press,
these administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and language
departments in the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of
translation quality and translation departments’ security. Melek Can
Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the
United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated
criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal
conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to
supervising Arabic language units of the FBI’s Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these
significant incidents, has foregone any accountability what so ever,
and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this serious
information security breach and highly likely espionage issue. This
issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The
translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals
with loyalties to our enemies. Important ‘chit-chats’ and ‘chatters’
are being intentionally blocked. Why did your report choose to
exclude this information and these serious issues despite the
evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address
and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How
can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “Intelligence Czar”, in
its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11
terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who
had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided
two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a
terrorist attack being planned by Osama Bin Laden. This
asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in
Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts
in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was
planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting 4-5
major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some
of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already
in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried
out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information
reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of
Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office,
by filing “302” forms, and the translator translated and documented
this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent in Charge,
and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to ‘keep
quiet’ regarding this issue. The translator who was present during
the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported
this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the
Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this
incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21,
2004 stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information
was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted
an aide to Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the
Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the
hearing ( Please refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21,
2004). Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on
February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, location,
witness names, and the contact information for that particular
Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information
( Please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your
investigators during a 2.5 hours testimony by Mr. Sarshar on February
12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific
account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I
had seen. ( Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by
Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General
with specific information regarding this issue ( Please refer to
DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you
prior to the completion of your report).
After almost three years since September 11, many officials still
refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the
terrorists’ plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo,
received months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ
of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities
against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks
the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information
regarding the ‘ use of airplanes’, ‘major US cities as targets’, and
‘Osama Bin Laden issuing the order.’ Coleen Rowley likewise reported
that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this
information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington,
DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet, your
report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence
could be gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence
failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information
regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of
missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not
mentioned; despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses
provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly?
Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by refraining from asking
him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during
your hearing ( Please remember that you ran out of questions during
your hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please
do not cite a ‘time limit’ excuse)? How can budget increases address
and resolve these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level
bureaucratic management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of
a new bureaucratic layer, “ Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed
from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Over two years ago, and after two ‘unclassified’ sessions with FBI
officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director
Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine
regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of
translating high level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at
least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given
a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he had failed all
FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand
or speak even elementary level English. He had failed English
proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target
language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other
qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI
Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost
everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office
knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task of translating the
most sensitive terrorist related information, and he was sent to
Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for
all Turkic language detainees (Turkish, Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.). The
FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding
possible future attack plans from these detainees, and yet, the FBI
knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this
information. Further, these detainees were either released or
detained or prosecuted based on information received and translated
by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator
Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen’s case (
Please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your
investigators in January-February 2004). CBS-60 Minutes showed
Kevin’s picture and stated his name as one of the unqualified
translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by the
FBI ( Please refer to CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your
investigators). Department of Justice Inspector General had a
detailed account of these problems ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report
Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the
completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a
detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other
witnesses willing to corroborate this. ( Please refer to
tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).
After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen’s case was publicly
confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes
broadcasted Taskesen’s case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position,
as a sole Turkish and Turkic language translator for the FBI
Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not
qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive intelligence
and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in
charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those
individuals in the FBI’s hiring department and those who facilitated
the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are
still in those departments and remain in their positions. Yet, your
report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems within
the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI’s hiring and
screening departments. The issue of accountability for those
responsible for these practices that endangers our national security
is not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as with
others, is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to
exclude this information and these serious issues despite the
evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address
and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and
incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the
addition of a new bureaucratic layer, “ Intelligence Czar”, in its
cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11
attack, an agent from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a
certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could
be re-translated. This Special Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of
investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues
involved, the original translation might have missed certain
information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of
terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI
Washington Field Office and retranslated verbatim, the field agent’s
hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain
information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for
skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal
activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle
East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the
re-translation was completed and the new significant information was
revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern
languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated
information to the Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this
supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the
translation was reviewed and that the original translation was
accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate
translation would hurt the original translator and would cause
problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting
the retranslation never received the accurate translation of that
document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific
account of this issue, the name and date of this particular
investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this. ( Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony
by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11,
2004). This information was also provided to the Department of
Justice Inspector General (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel
Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion
of your report).
Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11; while
many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and
information, and to investigate those responsible for the attacks,
those with possible connections to the attack, and those who might be
planning possible future attacks; the bureaucratic administrators in
the FBI’s largest and most important translation unit were covering
up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and
jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The supervisor
involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain
important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field
Office, and had a record of previous misconducts. After this
supervisor’s several severe misconducts were reported to the FBI’s
higher-level management, after his conducts were reported to the
Inspector General’s Office, to the United States Congress, and to the
9/11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBI’s Arabic language
unit under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali,
remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a
language unit receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat
system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information
regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in
preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no
references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current
investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security
and our lives for their career advancement and security. This issue,
as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report
choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite
all the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your report
adamantly refrain from assigning any accountability to any
individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can
budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts committed
by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition of a new
bureaucratic layer, “ Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed from
the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of
sharing information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and
between intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been
told of intentional blocking of intelligence, and has not been told
that certain information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties
to terrorist related activities, is not given to or shared with
Counterterrorism units, their investigations, and countering
terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to 9/11, and
remains in effect after 9/11. If Counterintelligence receives
information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and
illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist activities; and
if that information involves certain nations, certain semi-legit
organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political relations
in this country, then, that information is not shared with
Counterterrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In
certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited ‘ direct pressure by the
State Department,’ and in other cases ‘sensitive diplomatic
relations’ is cited. The Department of Justice Inspector General
received detailed and specific information and evidence regarding
this issue ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of
this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this,
and the names of certain U.S. officials involved in these
transactions and activities. ( Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5
hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on
February 11, 2004).
After almost three years the American people still do not know that
thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of ‘
protecting certain foreign business relations.’ The victims family
members still do not realize that information and answers they have
sought relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the
unspoken decisions made and disguised under ‘ safeguarding certain
diplomatic relations.’ Your report did not even attempt to address
these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed
under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding
these unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your
full awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct that
connects to certain terrorist related activities, committed by
certain U.S. officials and high-level government employees, you have
not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct, although
under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can
budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of
them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can
a new bureaucratic layer, “ Intelligence Czar”, in its cocoon removed
from the action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken
practices incompatible with our national security?
I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation
cannot be brushed off as minor problems among many significant
problems. Translation units are the frontline in gathering,
translating, and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of
the next terrorist attack may, and probably will, come in the form of
a message or document in foreign language that will have to be
translated. That message may be given to the translation unit headed
and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even
stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for
his department, who has participated in certain criminal activities
and security breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up
failures and criminal conducts within the department, so it may never
be translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen,
or another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated
correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer
within the language department; so it may never be translated fully,
if at all. That message may come to the attention of an agent of a
foreign organization who works as a translator in the FBI translation
department, who may choose to block it; so it may never get
translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been prevented
by acting on information in that message, who will tell family
members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could
have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because
we do know.
I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the
FBI’s translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain
problems and cases within the Bureau’s language units, and in light
of what has already been established as facts. As you are fully
aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by
NO means based upon personal opinion or un-verified allegations. As
you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found confirmed
by a Senior Republican Senator, Charles Grassley, and a Senior
Democrat Senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials
with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice Inspector
General’s report on my allegations, ‘ none of my allegations were
disproved.’ As you are fully aware, even FBI officials ‘ confirmed
all my allegations and denied none’ during their unclassified
meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However,
neither your commission’s hearings, nor your commission’s five
hundred sixty seven-page report, nor your recommendations include
these serious issues, major incidents, and systemic problems. Your
report’s coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief
microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet, your commission is geared
to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement
your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and
deficient report.
In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In
order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take
into account all visible symptoms. Your Commission’s investigations,
hearings, and report have chosen not to consider many visible
symptoms. I am emphasizing ‘visible’, because these symptoms have
been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and
have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing ‘visible’
because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter
have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many
hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to
unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your
Commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and chose
not to include them in its five hundred and sixty seven-page report.
Now, without a complete list of our failures pre 9/11, without a
comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our
intelligence system, without assigning any accountability what so
ever, and therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your
commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems,
and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like
attempting to put a gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply
decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first treating the root,
and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.
Respectfully,
Sibel D. Edmonds
CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
CC: House Government Reform Committee
CC: Family Steering Committee
CC: Press
|
|
The Enron pipeline connection to 9/11 |
FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FBI JOHN P. O'NEILL IN CHARGE OF NUMEROUS TERRORIST INVESTIGATONS RESIGNED FROM THE FBI AND RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC THE BUSH ADMINISRATION WAS SLOWING DOWN AND STOPPING TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS. JOHN P. O'NEILL BECAME THE HEAD OF SECURITY AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO 9/11 AND WAS KILLED IN THE SEPTEMBER 11th ATTACKS.JOHN P ONEILL BECAME A MAN WHO KNEW TO MUCH
An email report, written by Al Qaida's head of military operations, Mohammd Atef, describes Al Qaida's view of ongoing secret pipeline negotiations between the US oil companies and the Taliban to build a pipeline through Afghanistan.
This Atef report was almost certainly reviewed by the late John O'Neill at the time of the Embassy bombing, shortly after the Al Qaida report was written. At the time, O'Neill was the FBI agent in charge of the Embassy bombing investigation. The shocking pipeline information may explain why O'Neill became fixated about the Saudi-Taliban-Al Qaida relationship for the few remaining years of his life.
After O'Neill's investigations were repeatedly shut down by his superiors, O'Neill allegedly began making discreet inquiries to French intelligence using two reporters as cut-outs. Both reporters were known consultants for French intelligence and are specialists on both the oil industry and terrorism.
It is plausible that the French Government was upset at being shut out of the Caspian Basin deal, and may have been helping O'Neill behind the backs of his superior's in Washington. It does seem that the more that O'Neill learned, the less he was alowed to do with it.
The last straw was Cheney's refusal to follow up on O'Neill's request to pursue the leads in the Phoenix memo in April 2001. After resigning from the FBI in disgust, John O'Neil spoke candidly to several people, including the two French authors, whom he met again in July.
They have now written about the pipeline deal in "The Forbidden Truth." The book, not yet translated into English, quotes O'Neill as saying that his Al Qaida investigations were blocked to protect the Saudis. The Caspian Basin pipeline issue is discussed at length as the motive for the coverup.
I do not think that the French authors have the Atef document or they would have released it in their book. The Atef memo may indeed be a smoking gun, but I need to see the exact text to be sure before I release it to Congress.
This Al Qaida document may be the first hard evidence to break the Enron pipeline cover-up apart. I need your advice and confidential assistance in making a discreet collection of all Afghan pipeline research for a memo to present to Congress.
Here is my investigative hypothesis which needs to be greatly fleshed out and footnoted before I go to Congress. I have presented my thoughts by topic, rather than in chronological order.
Back in the 1970's and 80's, Saudi intelligence (not the CIA as has been reported) funded the early Taliban faction and later Al Qaida as part of the insurgency to throw the Russians out of Afghanistan. A few years afterwards, US energy companies (Enron, as the Afghan pipeline consultant for UNOCAL) used the Saudi intelligence connection to the Taliban to begin negotiations for a pipeline across Afghanistan.
Prince Turki, chief of Saudi inteligence, has publicly admitted making several trips into Afghanistan to negotiate a peace mission with the Taliban. My sources say he was the pipeline mediator for Enron. Prince Turki was fired as head of Saudi intelligence immediately after the pipeline discussions collapsed in August 2001.
Prince Turki is allegedly close to the Bin Laden family which was allegedly promised the construction contract in return for a percentage to the Saudi Royal family. This is a common business practice initiated by the Carlyle Group's contracts in Saudi Arabia.
As the Republican IPO magazine, Red Herring, confirms, President Bush' father was business partners in the Carlyle Group with the Bin Laden family during this period . This company is a Who's Who of former Democratic and Republican intelligence and political officials, whose specialty is acting as super-lobbysists at the highest levels of government. They are also suspected of arranging construction kickbacks to the Saudi royal family in return for discount oil sales.
Red Herring alleges that during a visit to Kennebunkport, Bush senior lectured his son on placating the Saudis, especially with regard to Israel, and even called the Saudis in his son's presence to reassure them that he had told his son their point of view.
Apparently, the deeply angered President Bush mentioned the private meeting with his father to a close friend, who leaked it to Red Herring. Shortly afterward, another Republican newspaper, the Boston Herald, ran a scathing expose on the number of White House officials with investments in Saudi oil, calling it an "obscene conflict of interest."
It should be noted that President Bush at first semed to reject his father's advice about Israel quite strongly, and secrtely ordered all American troops to begin a total withdrawl from Saudi Arabia. White House sources began a steady drumbeat of leaks about Saudi involvement with terrorism, and even authorized long-delayed raids on the Saudi charities in Virginia that served as a money laundry for terrorist operations against Israel.
Suddenly, President Bush made a sudden and startling switch to adopt a more pro-Saudi view. The documents seized in the Virginia raids are barely being translated, let alone investigated.
Nevertheless, the Israelis have been privately informed that criminal cases against the Saudi-financed terrorists in the US like Sami Al Arian, are being dropped for "lack of evidence" before the evidence has even been collated.
The State Department's recent report on Global Terrorism is being denounced as a blatant white-wash by Republicans and Democrats alike.
A plausible explanation for the dramatic policy reversal is that someone (allegedly Cheney) told President Bush to call off the dogs at CIA and FBI, because if the Saudis went down, they would take his father down with them. I think our President has a good heart, but is completely boxed in and does not know how to get out from under his father's legacy.
The Israeli government is angered and bewildered over the sudden switch, and has begun to release documents showing prior US knowledge of Al Qaida operations as well as Saudi support for terrorism. As Crown Prince Abdullah's visit to both Bushes in Texas showed, a modus vivendi has been reached.
The simplest explanantion is that both Crown Prince Abdullah and President Bush can blackmail each other over the Taliban pipeline. Both sides have agreed to pretend that they have always been allies in the war against terrorism, and that Iraq is the real enemy.
Mutual blackmail makes a bit of sense. The Saudi intelligence connection was the key to get the Taliban pipeline negotiations going without the CIA or FBI finding out. The Enron political connection to the Bush and Clinton administrations was key to keeping the CIA and FBI off of the Saudis' backs while the negotiations were underway. Messy little details about terrorism were swept under the rug for the sake of the big picture.
The truth is already starting to leak out. It has just been discovered that Enron had purchased huge tracts of land in the Caspian basin, especialy in Turkmenistan, which property is allegedly still on their books. The acerage is enormous, and worthless.
But, if the Taliban pipeline had been built, Enron might have owned some of the most valuable oil exploration sites in the world, and rescued itself from insolvency. Any White House insider who helped Enron would have gotten rich, filthy rich.
When Bush's son came into office, Enron allegedly approached Cheney in late January and told him veguely about the secret Saudi-Taliban pipeline negotiations, and how important it was to America's energy policy for generations to come.
Like an idiot, Cheney agreed to keep the lid on any Saudi-Taliban investigations for a while. For the sake of the Caspian Basin pipeline, Cheney passed the word inside the beltway not to allow anyone in the Government to connect the dots.
All across America, ongoing Saudi-Taliban investigations were hindered, obstructed, or closed down, just as the Clinton administration had done before them.
What no one did was check Enron's accounting. The pipeline deal made little economic sense in view of Russian cooperation. To Enron's horror, the pipeline deal collapsed in August. Then came 9/11. Then came the Enron collapse. Then came the Cheney coverup.
Cheney's biggest problem is the two fairly senior intelligence officalls who rebelled and became whistleblowers: Robert Baer of CIA and John O'Neill of FBI. The rest of the FBI and CIA higher ups have kept their mouths shut, although a lot of lower level people are now coming forward to question their superior's strange behavior. The two rebels, Baer of CIA and O'Neill of FBI, were of course, driven into retirement.
Much of the Saudi information was blacked out of Baer's book by CIA censors, but enough remains to thoroughly document the brazen avarice of senior Clinton NSC officials for a Caspian Basin pipeline.
Baer names a few names, but he was driven into retirement before he could learn too much. Still, he learned that both Republican and Democratic officials were involved with the pipeline coverup to the great detriment of American intelligence.
The worst condemnation ever written of the financial corruption in the Clinton administration can be found in the last chapters of Robert Baer's recent book, "See No Evil", where he blames the pipeline coverup for substantially contributing to 9/11.
Baer's book makes a strong case, as do O'Neills friends in France with their book. The explanation is raw and blunt. No partisan politics, just greed. A crooked handful of high level officials in the Clinton and Bush administration were clearly obsessed with the Caspian pipeline plan.
Cheney was not the first to block the investigations, but he is probably the last to be involved with the coverup. That could explain why he is resisting Congress on both the Enron and pre-9/11 intelligence documents. If Congress ever connects the two investigations, the whole house of cards will collapse.
Most of my sources say that Bush and Rice may have been deliberately kept out of the loop by Cheney. For example, it was Cheney, not Rice, who saw the Phoenix memo before 9/11. It is, however, theoretically possible that the President may have known about the pipeline deal from his own sources.
President Bush's father was the leading lobbbyist for the Saudis and may have been told everything by his Carlyle Group partners, the Bin Laden family, who were supposedly in line to get the Taliban pipelne construction contract. But it is doubtful we will ever know what Bush senior told his son while the pipeline negotiations were underway.
In terms of the upcoming Congressional investigation, the Al Qaida document is the first direct written evidence to confirm the existence of secret pipeline negotations with the Taliban. Moreover, it confirms that Al Qaida was informed of these negotiations from the earliest stages.
This raises an interesting question. The Al Qaida author, Mohammed Atef, must have known that his report had fallen into American hands when his operative's computer was captured by the FBI. Atef may have been surprised that his pipeline report was never made public to embarrass the Taliban.
Atef may have suspected merely from the surprising silence that the CIA and FBI were not being allowed to pursue or reveal their Afghanistan investigations while the pipeline negotiations were under way. The Saudis could certainly have tipped off the Taliban that the fix was in. It is hard to believe that the Bin Laden construction company did not learn anything from their Carlyle group partners about the pipeline.
Whatever the source, the early date of the Atef report shows that the highest levels of Al Qaida certainly knew about the pipeline secret from the beginning. The pipeline coverup could have convinced Atef that Al Qaida could expoit the lack of coordinated intelligence against them.
In addition to the usual inter-agency bungling, the Enron cover-up was the real reason for the black hole in US intell about events in Afghanistan, and plausibly explains why no US agency was allowed to connect the dots. Moreover it explains why honest officials like Baer and O'Neill were driven into retirement.
Bottom line: Baer and O'Neill were right. There was a pipeline coverup and it very likely contributed to 9/11. The Atef report raises the founded suspiscion, based on specific articulable facts, that AL Qaida might have piggy-backed on the Enron secrecy blackout to launch their surprise attack, confident in their knowledge that US intelligence had been deliberately blinded by Enron's cronies in Washington.
PLEASE REVIEW WEBSITE click on here: Cached - Similar pages
SENATOR BOB GRAHAM: BUSH BLOCKED INVESTIGATIONS
Sept. 8, 2004 | As the Senate Intelligence Committee chairman during the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks and the run-up to the Iraq war, Sen. Bob Graham tried to expose what he came to believe were national security coverups and manipulations by the Bush administration. But he discovered that it was hard to reveal a coverup playing by the rules. Much of the evidence the Florida Democrat needed to buttress his arguments was being locked away, he found, under the veil of politically motivated classification.
Now, as he prepares to retire after 18 years in the Senate, the normally cautious former governor of Florida is unleashing himself in a new book, "Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia and the Failure of America's War on Terror."
In his book, Graham asserts that the White House blocked investigations into Saudi Arabian government support for the 9/11 plot, in part because of the Bush family's close ties to the Saudi royal family and wealthy Saudis like the bin Ladens. Behind the White House's insistence on classifying 27 pages detailing the Saudi links in a report issued by a joint House-Senate intelligence panel co-chaired by Graham in 2002 lay the desire to hide the administration's deficiencies and protect its Saudi allies, according to Graham.
| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
|
ELLEN MARIANI, Individually, as )
61. Plaintiff, with the assistance of other concerned Americans are actively involved in assisting with the production of facts and circumstances to set a prima facie case proving Defendant GWB knew of and failed to prevent the "911" attacks. The following "Pre-911" facts and circumstances provided by independent researcher Allan Duncan, a Citizen of the State of Pennsylvania are hereby provided verbatim to support Defendant GWB's pre-"911" knowledge the attacks would take place:
A. Explicit warnings from foreign sources
(1) 1999. The U.S. was warned by British intelligence two years prior to "911" that terrorists were planning to use airplanes in unconventional ways, perhaps as bombs
In 1999, Britain's intelligence agency, M16, warned the U.S. in a classified report that al Qaeda was planning to use airplanes in an unconventional manner to attack U.S. interests. No targets were specified. The Times of London quoted a British senior Foreign Office source saying, "The Americans knew of plans to use commercial aircraft in unconventional ways, possibly as flying bombs." (cited in AFP 6-9-2002)
(2) April to May 2001. U.S. government received 'specific' threats of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets or interests
Condoleezza Rice admitted that the U.S. government had received "specific" threats that "al Qaeda attacks against U.S. targets or interests…might be in the works. There was a clear concern that something was up, … but it was principally focused overseas. The areas of most concern were the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula and Europe." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11") She did not elaborate on where the intelligence originated, but the Independent of London, reported that the information had been relayed to Washington by British intelligence sources. (Bennetto and Gumbel 5-18-2002)
(3) June 6, 2001. German intelligence warned CIA
The German intelligence agency, the BND, warned both the CIA and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists were "planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture." This intelligence reportedly came from Echelon, a high-tech electronic surveillance system used by the intelligence agencies of several nations to glean through electronic communications for certain keywords. It was first reported by the German daily newspaper, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung on September 13. Its sources were reportedly from the BND itself. (Stafford 9-13-2001; Thomas 5-21-2002) According to Gordon Thomas (5-21-2002) of Global – Intel, the original source of information actually came from Israeli Mossad agents operating in the U.S. who had infiltrated al Qaeda. According to his account the Mossad also informed British and Russian intelligence about the attacks, who then in turn notified the CIA. Thomas's sources are allegedly informants within the Mossad itself.
(4) July 16, 2001. British intelligence sent a report to Tony Blair warning of imminent attacks. The report was also sent to Washington
The British Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) sent a memo authored by the heads of British intelligence agencies, MI6, MI5 and GCHQ, to Tony Blair and other cabinet ministers, warning that al Qaeda was in the final stages of preparing for a terrorist attack. The memo suggested that the attacks would likely be aimed at American or Israeli targets. The report did not indicate however that the agencies had any knowledge with regards to the "timings, targets and methods of attack." According to the Times of London, the warning was "based on intelligence gleaned not just from MI6 and GCHQ but also from US agencies, including the CIA and the National Security Agency, which has staff working jointly with GCHQ." [Emphasis added] The newspaper added, "The CIA sometimes has a representative on the JIC. The contents of the July 16 warning would have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall confirmed." (Evans 6-14-2002)
(5) June 23, 2001. Arabic News Network reported that bin Laden had predicted a 'severe blow' to the United States.
"According to the June 23rd AirlineBiz.com report, the Arabic satellite television network MBC claimed that 'the next two weeks will witness a big surprise.' An MBC reporter who had met with bin Laden in Afghanistan on June 21st predicted that 'a severe blow is expected against U.S. and Israeli interests worldwide. There is a major state of mobilization among the Osama bin Laden forces. It seems that there is a race of who will strike first. Will it be the United States or Osama bin Laden?' " (Grigg 3-11-2002)
(6) Summer 2001. Jordan's General Intelligence Division (GID) warned Washington of an attack planned on the U.S mainland using aircraft.
According to John Cooley (5-21-2002), author of the book, Unholy Wars: America, Afghanistan, and International Terrorism, Jordan's intelligence agency, GID, intercepted al Qaeda communications indicating that a terrorist operation, code-named 'Al Ourush al Kabir' or 'The Big Wedding,' was being planned for within the U.S. and would involve aircraft. Cooley confirmed the validity of this warning. (see also Bubnov 5-24-2002)
(7) Summer 2001. Iranian man warned U.S. authorities of a planned terrorist attack during the week of September 9, 2001
Online.ie reported "German police have confirmed an Iranian man phoned US police from his deportation cell to warn of the planned attack on the World Trade Centre" during the week of September 9. He reportedly called several times. Very little information was given about the 'Iranian man' other than the fact that he was 28-years old. No other news agencies independently reported the incident. (Online.ie 9/14/01; cited in Anova 9-14-2001; Ruppert 11-2-2001; 11-24-2001; 4-22-2002)
(8) August 2001. Moroccan intelligence warned Washington about "large scale-operations in New York in the summer or autumn of 2001"
According to reports published in November 2001 by a French magazine and a Moroccan newspaper, Morocco's royal intelligence informed Washington that one of its agents, who had penetrated al Qaeda, learned that bin Laden's organization was preparing "large operations in New York in the summer or autumn of 2001." The agent, who is said to be presently in the U.S. helping its intelligence agencies, also informed Moroccan intelligence that bin Laden was 'very disappointed' with the first WTC bombing which failed to bring the two towers down. John Cooley (5-21-2002), who reported this in the International Herald Tribune wrote that as of 5-21-2002, he had not independently verified this warning. (see also Bubnov 5-24-2002)
(9) August 2001. Israel warned U.S. about large-scale attacks on the U.S. mainland
"Israeli intelligence officials say that they warned their counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent." (Jacobson and Wastell 9-16-2001; Davis 9-17-2001; Stafford 9-13-2001; Serrano and Thor-Dahlburg 9-20-2001; Martin 1-5-2002; Martin 1-16-2002) According to Gordan Thomas (5-21-2002), this information was based on intelligence gleaned from Israeli Mossad agents who had penetrated or were spying on the al Qaeda operatives. Thomas's sources are allegedly informants within the Mossad itself.
(10) August 2001. Intelligence sources warned Argentine Jewish leaders of imminent attacks
According to Argentine Jewish leaders, the Jewish community in that country "received a warning about an impending major terrorist attack against the United States, Argentina or France just weeks before September 11." Forward quoted Marta Nercellas, a lawyer for the Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas, or DAIA, Argentina's main Jewish representative body: "It was a concrete warning that an attack of major proportion would take place, and it came from a reliable intelligence [source]. And I understand the Americans were told about it." [Emphasis added] (Forward 2-5-2002)
(11) August 24, 2001. Russian intelligence warned of possible hijacking
Russian intelligence warned the CIA that 25 terrorist pilots were specifically training to crash airliners into planned targets. This was reported by the Russian Izveztia on September 12 and translated for From The Wilderness Magazine by a former CIA officer. (cited from Ruppert 11-2-2001; see also Ruppert 11-24-2001; 4-22-2002; Martin 1-5-2002; Martin 1-16-2002) According to Gordan Thomas (5-21-2002) Russian intelligence received this information from the Israeli Mossad.
(12) August 31, 2001. Egyptian president warned U.S. that something was brewing
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak warned the U.S. that "something would happen" 12 days before the terrorist attacks. (AP 12-7-2001; MacFarquhar and Tyler 6-4-2002; Martin 1-5-2002). Egypt had also warned the U.S. on June 13. (Martin 1-16-2002). The U.S intelligence denied that they had received this information soon before the attacks and instead alleged that the only warnings that had been given to them from Egypt occurred between March and May of 2001. (MacFarquhar and Tyler 6-4-2002)
(13) September 1, 2001. Russian intelligence warned the U.S. again about 'imminent attacks'
"Russian President Vladimir Putin orders Russian intelligence to warn the U.S. government 'in the strongest possible terms' of imminent attacks on airports and government buildings" (We do not have a reference to the original source. See Ruppert 11-2-2001; 4-22-2002 based on MS-NBC interview with Putin, September 15. See also Martin 1-16-2002; Thomas 5-21-2002) According to Gordan Thomas (5-21-2002) Russian intelligence received this information from the Israeli Mossad.
(14) Early September 2001. Mossad chief warned CIA of possibility of attacks
According to Gordon Thomas (5-21-2002), Mossad Chief Efraim Halevy warned both the CIA and FBI of the possibility of near term attacks. George Tenet presumably thought that it was "too non specific."
(15) September 5-6, 2001
Commenting on the U.S. intelligence failure, the French Le Monde reported: "The first lapse has to do with the processing of intelligence items that come out of Europe. According to our information, French and American officials did in fact hold important meetings in Paris from the 5th to the 6th of September, that is, a few days prior to the attacks. Those sessions brought representatives of the American Special Services together with officers of the DST (Directorate of Territorial Security) and military personnel from the DGSE (General Overseas Security Administration). Their discussion turned to some of the serious threats made against American interests in Europe, specifically one targeting the U.S. Embassy in Paris. During these talks, the DST directed the American visitors' attention to a Moroccan-born Frenchman who had been detained in the United States since August 17 and who was considered to be a key high-level Islamic fundamentalist. But the American delegation, preoccupied above all with questions of administrative procedure, paid no attention to this 'first alarm,' basically concluding that they were going to take no one's advice, and that an attack on American soil was inconceivable. It took September 11 for the FBI to show any real interest in this man, who we now know attended two aviation training schools, as did at least seven of the kamikaze terrorists." (cited in Ridgeway 5-28-2002)
(16) September 7, 2001. Mossad chief warned CIA a second time of possible attacks
According to Gordon Thomas (5-21-2002), Mossad Chief Efraim Halevy sent another alert to the CIA warning of possible terrorist attacks. The message was received in Washington on September 7.
(17) September 3-10, 2001. Anonymous caller informed a radio talk show that Osama bin Laden's organization would be launching imminent attacks against the U.S.
"MSNBC reports on September 16 that a caller to a Cayman Islands radio talk show gave several warnings of an imminent attack on the U.S. by bin Laden in the week prior to 9/11." (We do not have a reference to the original source. See Ruppert 11-2-2001)
(18) September 10, 2001.
U.S. intelligence intercepted conversations from al Qaeda that were extremely specific. USA Today, reported "Two U.S. intelligence officials, paraphrasing highly classified intercepts, say they include such remarks as, 'Good things are coming,' 'Watch the news' and 'Tomorrow will be a great day for us.' " [Emphasis added] This information was contained with 13,000 pages of material from the National Security Agency that was handed over to the Congressional 9-11 inquiry. It is unclear when these intercepts were reviewed by U.S. intelligence. They may not have been reviewed until after 9-11. (Diamond 6-3-2002)
(19) September 11, 2001. Employees at Odigo Inc, received warnings predicting the attacks hours before they happened
The Israeli company, Odigo, Inc. was apparently warned two hours before the attacks. Odigo CEO Micha Macover told the Ha'aretz that 'two workers received the messages predicting the attack would happen.' The FBI was quickly notified but it is presently not clear if U.S. authorities are still investigating the incident. The company's offices in Israel are located suspiciously near the Israeli Institute for Counter Terrorism which broke story of the insider trading scam on 9-11. (McWilliams 9-28-2001; Seberg 9-28-2001; Ruppert 2-11-2002; 4-22-2002)
B. Evidence that U.S. authorities were concerned
(1) 1994. FBI videotaped an informant being recruited as a suicide bomber by two men, one of whom was linked to Osama bin Laden
Summarizing a letter written by former FBI Special Agent James Hauswirth, the Los Angeles Times wrote, "The 27-year FBI veteran said in the letter reviewed by the Los Angeles Times that the Phoenix office had evidence of Islamic potential terrorists operating in the region as far back as 1994. That year, two men were videotaped by FBI agents recruiting a Phoenix FBI informant as a suicide bomber, the letter says. One of those men, according to a source, was linked to a terrorist in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing." ( Los Angeles Times 5-27-2002) |
(2) 1996-2001. The FBI was investigating suspected terrorists enrolled in flight schools
In 1996, after the Philippine police had discovered the 'Bojinka' plot (see above), US officials began investigating al Qaeda terrorist suspects who were training in U.S. flight schools. "Since 1996, the FBI had been developing evidence that international terrorists were using US flight schools to learn to fly jumbo jets. A foiled plot in Manila to blow up U.S. airliners and later court testimony by an associate of bin Laden had touched off FBI inquiries at several schools, officials say." (cited in Fairnaru and Grimaldi 9-23-2001; Martin 1-16-2002; Shelon 5-18-2002)
(3) 1996 or 1997. FBI Counter terrorist specialist John O'Neil warned of terrorist capabilities
Soon after the late John O'Neil had become head of the FBI's New York unit, he warned, "A lot of these groups now have the capability and the support infrastructure in the United States to attack us here if they choose to." (Loeb 9-12-2002) John O'Neil, who was described as one of the FBI's 'most pugnacious' agents, resigned from the FBI shortly before 9-11. He subsequently took a position as head of the WTC security, where he is believed to have died on the day of the attacks while attempting to rescue other people in the towers. September 11 had been his first day on the job. (Loeb 9-12-2002) John O'Neil had complained that the Bush administration had impeded his investigations into suspected Saudi terrorists. (Brisard and Dasquie 2001in Godoy 11-16-2001; Marlowe 11-19-2001)
(4) 1997. FBI was investigating Middle Eastern flight school students in Phoenix
Summarizing a letter written by former FBI Special Agent James Hauswirth, the Los Angeles Times wrote: "In 1998, the office's international terrorism squad investigated a possible Middle Eastern extremist taking flight lessons at a Phoenix airport, wrote Hauswirth, who retired from the FBI in 1999."
(5) 1998. The FAA issued a warning that al Qaeda may attempt to hijack commercial airlines
In 1998, Federal Aviation Administration warned airlines to be on a 'high degree of alertness' against possible hijackings by members of Osama bin Laden's organizations. (AP 5-26-2002). May 18, 1998. FBI memo observed that an 'unusually' large number of Middle Eastern men were attending flight schools. The memo revealed that an Oklahoma FBI pilot had warned his supervisor "that he has observed large numbers of Middle Eastern males receiving flight training at Oklahoma airports in recent months." The FBI pilot further observed, "This is a recent phenomena and may be related to planned terrorist activity." Washington 5-30-2002)
(6) 199? – 2001. According to anonymous sources it was widely known that important warnings were being ignored
The New American magazine interviewed three federal law enforcement agents who confirmed that the FBI had foreknowledge of the attacks. They spoke only on conditions of anonymity, although two of them told the magazine that they would be willing to testify to Congress. One agent stated that it was widely known "all over the Bureau, how these [warnings] were ignored by Washington... All indications are that this information came from some of [the Bureau's] most experienced guys, people who have devoted their lives to this kind of work. But their warnings were placed in a pile in someone's office in Washington...In some cases, these field agents predicted, almost precisely, what happened on September 11th. So we were all holding our breath…hoping that the situation would be remedied." [Emphasis added] (cited in Grigg 3-11-2002)
(7) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 2001 report
The New York Times reported, "The Federal Aviation Administration published a report called Criminal Acts Against Aviation on its Web site in 2001 before the hijackings that said that although Osama bin Laden 'is not known to have attacked civil aviation, he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so.' It added, 'Bin Laden's anti-Western and anti-American attitudes make him and his followers a significant threat to civil aviation, particularly to U.S. civil aviation'." (Martin 1-16-2002; Sanger and Bumiller 5-17-2002)
(8) Early 2001. Court proceedings revealed that al Qaeda operatives were training in
American flight schools
In early 2001, the trial of four men accused of being involved in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania revealed that members of bin Laden's network had received flying lessons in Texas and Oklahoma. (USA vs. Usama bin Laden et al.; Foden 9-13-2001; Martin 1-16-2002)
(9) January-February 2001. Case of Hani Hanjour
During his attendance at an Arizona flight school, Hani Hanjour arose the suspicion of flight instructor Peggy Chevrette, who felt that Hani both lacked the skill and English for the pilot license he already had. She repeatedly called FAA authorities, who sent one of their inspectors, John Anthony, to look into her concerns. In spite of the fact that FAA guidelines clearly stipulate that fluency in English is required for a U.S. commercial pilot's license, the FAA inspector, according to Chevrette, suggested Hanjour be provided with a translator. Even after Anthony had visited the school, the flight instructor continued calling the FAA twice more with concerns that he didn't have the skills needed to have a license. Hani Hanjour left the school before completing the program. (MSNBC 5-10-2002) The flight school, JetTech, closed after September 11. Sources did not explain why. In addition to the suspicion that he arose at the flight school, he also caught the attention of an FBI informant. Aukai Collins told ABC news that he was an FBI informant for four years. He claims that in 1996, he provided the FBI with very specific information about Hani, including "his exact address, his phone number and even what car he drove." While the FBI admitted that Collins had been an informant, they 'emphatically denied' that he had tipped the agency off to Hani Hanjour. (ABC News 5-23-2002)
(10) February 2001. Warning from George Tenet: bin Laden and al Qaeda are the most serious threat to the U.S. and they intend to inflict mass casualties
In February of 2001, CIA Director George Tenet warned that bin Laden should be considered the "most immediate and serious threat" to the U.S and added, "As we have increased security around government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out 'softer' targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11"; Cornwell 5-25-2002)
(11) Summer 2001. Former chief investigative counsel warned U.S. Justice Department that FBI believed terrorists were planning to attack lower Manhattan
(a) David Shippers, a Chicago attorney who had been the chief investigative counsel in the attempted impeachment of Clinton, warned the U.S. Justice Department that a massive terrorist attack had been planned for lower Manhattanbased on what FBI agents from Chicago and Minnesota had told him. His warning was shunned by officials, one of which stated, "We don't start our investigations at the top." (cited in Grigg 3-11-2002)
(b) During an October 10, 2001 radio interview, he revealed that he had warned "Attorney General John Ashcroft and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert that he had proof from a credible source (that he has still not revealed) about a plot to use hijacked commercial airliners to ram the White House and Capitol." (Chin 5-19-2002)
(d) On May 30 2002, one of Shipper’s sources in the FBI, Special Agent Robert Wright disclosed in a testimony broadcasted on C-SPAN that FBI officials and other agents had 'stymied’ his own investigations into suspected terrorists. (Horrock 5-30-2002)
(12) Summer 2001. The 'threat assessment’
On July 26 2001, CBS News reported that Attorney General John Ashcroft was no longer using commercial airliners to travel – even for personal business – because of a "threat assessment" issued by the FBI. Instead Ashcroft was using a chartered jet that cost taxpayers $1,600/hr to fly. The news network further reported: "Neither the FBI nor the Justice Department, however, would identify what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it." (CBS News 7-26-2001)
(13) June 2001. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) June circular
According to ABC sources the FAA distributed a circular in June of 2001 that stated, "Although we have no specific information that this threat is directed at civil aviation, the potential for terrorist operations, such as an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the U.S. remains a concern." (ABC 5-17-2002; Hersh and Isikoff 5-27-2002) According to Newsweek’s sources, 10-12 such circulars were issued to U.S. airports between June 11 and September 11 (Hersh and Isikoff 5-27-2002). One of the circulars reportedly warned of possible hijackings on flights originating from East Coast airports. (Salant 5-26-2002)
(14) June 9, 2001. Internal FBI memo
Special Agent Robert Wright wrote a memo on June 9 warning the FBI that the Bureau’s failure to take decisive action against known terrorist suspects operating within the country would likely result in the loss of American lives. Parts of the memo read, "Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are transferred from the FBI, I will not feel safe. The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI's International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected international terrorists living in the United States. Unfortunately, more terrorist attacks against American interests - coupled with the loss of American lives - will have to occur before those in power give this matter the urgent attention it deserves." (cited in Johnson 5-30-2002)
(15) July 2, 2001. FBI memo
FBI issued a memo stating, "There are threats to be worried about overseas. While we cannot foresee attacks domestically, we cannot rule them out." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11")
(16) July 3, 2001. Federal investigators learned significant intelligence from Ahmed Ressam, and al Qaeda operative who had planned to bomb Los Angeles Airport
Newsweek reported, "After he was convicted in the spring of 2001, Ressam started giving investigators detailed information on Al Qaeda’s designs in the United States. He left no doubt that U.S. airports were a prime target "because an airport is sensitive politically and economically," as Ressam said in Court on July 3. (Hirsh and Isikoff 5-27-2002)
(17) July 10, 2001. Internal FBI memo warned that men with suspected ties to terrorist groups were training in Arizona flight schools
(a) On July 10 of 2001, FBI agent Kenneth Williams in Arizona sent a memo from the Phoenix FBI office to the radical fundamentalist anti-terrorism unit (which was aware of the Moussaoui case -see below) in the Bureau’s Washington headquarters warning that several Arab men with suspected ties to terrorist groups were training at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona. (Solomon 5-3-2002; Risen 5-4-2002; Johnston 5-15-2002; Hersh and Isikoff 5-27-2002; Johnston and van Natta 5-21-2002; Cornwell 5-25-2002; Lumkin 5-25-2002)
(b) Interestingly, the memo mentioned Osama bin Laden by name and speculated that his organization may be attempting to infiltrate the U.S. aviation industry with pilots, security guards, and maintenance workers. (Johnston 5-15-2002). Williams had associated the flight school students with al Qaeda based on a link he had established between several of the students and the London-based militant Muslim group, al-Muhajiroun, whose leader was an open supporter of bin Laden (Seper 5-23-2002; AP 5-23-2002). One Senator who had read the memo told reporters, "I will tell you, though, that although he didn't come up with the exact Sept. 11 scenario, what he presents in that memo was so close to the fact pattern that emerged on Sept. 11 that, as you read it, it just takes your breath away." (De la Garza 5-23-2002). William’s concerns were spurned in part with interviews he had conducted with the Arab students who had demonstrated extreme anti-American views (Johnston and van Natta 5-22-2002; Mitchell 5-22-2002).
c) The memorandum also made some suggestions about possible recourses of action. It stated, "Phoenix believes that the F.B.I. should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country. F.B.I. field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. F.B.I. HQ should discuss this matter with other elements of the U.S. intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix's suspicions." No action was taken. (cited in Solomon 5-3-2002; Risen 5-4-2002)
(18) July 18, 2001. FBI memo
The memo stated, "We’re concerned about threats as a result of the millennium plot conviction....There’s no specific target, no credible info of attacks to U.S. civil aviation interests, but terror groups are known to be planning and training for hijackings, and we ask you therefore to use caution." (cited in CNN 5-16-2002 "Timeline: Events leading up to September 11")
(19) August 6, 2001. Memo ("The Smoking Gun RICO Act Obstruction of Justice Claim")(emphasis added).
(a) On August 6, President George Bush received an intelligence briefing, titled "BIN LADEN DETERMINED TO STRIKE IN THE U.S." that warned that bin Laden may attempt to hijack airplanes and that the Saudi millionaire’s terrorist organization wanted "to bring the fight to America." This information was relayed to Bush after he had previously been supplied with intelligence of a more generalized quality that had indicated that al Qaeda was planning to attack the U.S or U.S. interests abroad. (Eggen and Woodward 5-18-2002; CBS News 5-16-2002; Boncombe 5-19-2002).
(b) An intelligence officer told CBS News (5-16-2002) that a hijacking "was among the many things that we talked about all the time as a potential terrorist threat. But when we talked about hijackings, we talked about that in the traditional sense of hijackings, not in the sense of somebody hijacking an aircraft and flying it into a building. We talked about concern about the general noise level about al Qaeda planning and we were trying to figure out what they would do. We never had specifics about time, place, MO (method of operation)."
(c) Dan Eggen and Bob Woodward (5-18-2002; see also Buncombe 5-19-2002) of The Washington Post revealed that according to their sources, the August 6 briefing had been a result of Bush’s request for "an intelligence analysis of possible al Qaeda attacks within the United States, because most of the information presented to him over the summer about al Qaeda focused on threats against U.S. targets overseas." Furthermore they noted that the content of the memo, as described by their sources, "was focused primarily on a discussion of possible domestic targets." This stands in stark contrast with what Condoleezza Rice had told reporters when she said that the memo had focused primarily on threats to U.S. interests abroad. Additionally, the two reporters questioned the truthfulness of a statement given by Ari Fleischer. Whereas The Washington Post’s sources insisted that the title of the memo was "Bin Laden determined to strike in America," Fleischer had stated that the title was "Bin Laden determined to strike America." The source of the terrorist threats contained in the August 6 memo reportedly came from British intelligence. (Bennetto and Gumbel 5-18-2002)
(d) Commenting on the disturbing revelation, The New York Times pondered, "It was not clear this evening why the White House waited eight months after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington to reveal what Mr. Bush had been told." (Sanger 5-16-2002)
(20) August 2001. The Case of Zacarias Moussaoui
(a) In August of 2001 the FBI was warned by a flight instructor in Oklahoma that an Arab student he was training could be a terrorist. The FBI responded to the lead only after receiving repeated calls from the instructor. He was arrested, but not intensely investigated until after 9-11, at which point it was discovered that he would have taken part in the 9-11 hijackings had he not been arrested.
(b) During the summer of 2001, Zacarias Moussaoui enrolled in a Pan Am flight school in Eagon, Minnesota. He paid his $6,300 tuition in cash. (Eggen 1-2-2002; Martin 5-27-2002) After a short period of taking flight lessons at the school, it became obvious to the instructor that Zacarias had little hope of becoming a pilot. Additionally, the student’s odd behavior arose suspicions. He was notably unfriendly and insisted on training to fly a Boeing 747 despite the fact that he had little experience with even small planes. (Eggen 1-2-2002; Barnett et al. 9-30-2001; Martin 1-5-2002; Martin 5-27-2002) The instructor notified the FBI, conveying his suspicions that Moussaoui might be a terrorist. It is not clear how quickly and competently the FBI responded because the accounts vary.
|
|
At this very moment, Defendant NORAD was grossly negligent in failing to inform their boss, Defendant GWB that a national emergency just developed. To date, no NORAD member has been official charged with dereliction of duty, a court martial offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UMCJ). Even more astonishing, Defendant Rumsfeld and his subordinates NORAD and NEADS were several days into a semiannual exercise known as "Vigilant Guardian." Senior officers involved in Vigilant Guardian were manning NORAD command centers throughout the United States and Canada, available to make immediate decisions to respond and intercept the hijacked airplanes that could have prevented the absolute destruction of lives and property on "911."
Plaintiff herein is challenging the honesty and forthrightness of Defendant GWB due to his present refusal to cooperate with the "911 Commission" and believes Defendant GHB's long term involvement in her government as CIA director from (1976-1977), his terms as Vice President (1980-1988) and President (1989-1992) and his subsequent business relationships hold the answers and will provide additional basis for her RICO Act claim against Defendants.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SIBEL EDMONDS,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
J~USTICE, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil ActionNo. 1:02cv01448 ~W)
DECLARATION OF MARK CORALLO
I, Mark Corallo, declare as follows:
1. I am the Director of the Office of Public Affairs, United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ"). I have held this position since September, 2003.
2. The Office of Public Affairs ("OPA") is responsible for ensuring that the public
informed about the Department’s activities and about the priorities and policies of the Attorney
General and the President with regard to law enforcement and legal affairs. My office also
advises the Attorney General and other Department officials on all aspects of media relations and
communications issues. My office coordinates the public affairs units of all Depm’tment
component organizations.
3. My statements in flais declaration are based on my personal kmowledge and on
information provided to me in my official capacity.
4. I have been advised that pursuant to the Court’s order of April 26, 2004, the
Department has been directed to submit to the Court in this matter "any unclassified documents
or other unclassified information in its possession that has been presented to the United States
Senate or any other forum or individuals which is relevant to the substance of Sibel Edmonds’
potential deposition testimony by May 10, 2004." I have reviewed the sixteen (16) topics for
which Ms. Edmonds’s deposition is sought.
5. I have been advised that the following steps were taken within the Department to
respond to the court’s order:
a. My office conducted an electronic search of our records to locate any
documents released by my office, on behalf of the Department, that contained the name "Sibel
Edmonds." That search located only one document, which I attach hereto as Attaclmaent A.
b. The Department’s Executive Secretaria~, under the direction ofKathie A.
Harting, conducted an electronic search of its records fi’om January 1, 1985, through May 4,
2004, to locate any documents released by the Department that contained the name "Sibel
Edmonds." The Executive Secretariat is the Departmental office responsible for processing
correspondence for the Offices of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the
Associate Attorney General and the Office of Legislative Affairs. This office also maintains the
official records of the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
and the Associate Attorney General. That search located three documents, which I attach hereto
as Attachment B.
c. The Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs ("OLA") is responsible for,
among other things, articulating the views of the Department, including its components, on
leNslative matters. OLA also coordinates the appearance of Department witnesses and the
interagency clearance of Department views on legislative matters. OLA records do not reflect
may production by that office of additional unclassified documents to congaessional staff
regarding Ms: Edmonds, beyond those identified in Attaclmaem B. Faith Burton, Special
Counsel in OLA, did accompany representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to two
congressional briefings, on June 17 and 25, 2002. Ms. Burton did not independently provide any
unclassified information regarding Ms. Edmonds during those briefings. I have been advised that
the nature of the discussions during those briefings will be described more fully by declarant
Eleni P. Kalisch.
5. To the best of my lmowledge, no one in my office was authorized to speak to the
press regarding Sibel Edmonds’s allegations, and I am not aware that anyone did so.
6. I understand that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is conducting a separate
search of its records for responsive information.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is tree and
correct.
Executed this ~.r~ day of May, 2004 in Washington, D.C.
MARK CORALLO
Director, Office of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice
EXHIBIT A
#605:10-18-02 STATEMENT OF BARBARA COMSTOCK, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC ... Page 1 of t
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2002
SVWW.USDOJ:GOV
AG
(202) 616-2777
TDD (202) 514-1888
STATEMENT OF BARBARA COMSTOCK, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
REGARDING TODAY’S FILING IN SIBEL EDMONDS V. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
"To prevent diSclosure of certain classified and sensitive national security information, Attorney
General Ashcroff today asserted the state secrets privilege in Sibel Edmonds v. Department of Justice.
This assertion was made at tbe request of FBI Director Robert Mueller in papers filed today in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. The Department of Justice also filed a motion to dismiss the
case, because the litigation creates substantial risks of disclosing classified and sensitive national
security information that could cause serious damage to our country’s security.
"The state secrets privilege is well-established in federal law. It has been recoN~ized by U.S. courts as
far back as the 19th century, and allows the Executive Branch to safeguard vital information regarding
the nation’s security or diplomatic relations. In the past, this privilege has been applied many times to
protect our nation’s secrets from disclosure, and to require dismissal of cases ~vhen other litigation
mechanisms would be inadequate. It is an absolute privilege that renders the information unavailable in
litigation."
02-605
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2OO2/October/O2_ag_605.htm 05/05/2004
EXHIBIT B
Department sf Justice
O~ce of Legisintive Affairs
August 21, 2002
The Honorable Patrick L Leahy
Chahman
Committee on the indiciery
United States Senats
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable Cherles E. Cu-aasley
Commbttee on the ludie’tary
United States Senate
Wasldag.to~, DC 20510
Dear My. Chairman and Senator Grassley:
This responds to your letter, dated August t3, 2002, which expressed your concern about
the investigation into allegations by a former contract linguist with the FBI about security and
integrity in the FBI’s linguist program. These allegations currently are under investigation by the
Department’s Inspector General.
We appreciate your interest in th~ matter and want to a~sure you that the Department wi~
cooperate ful/y with the Inspector General’s investigation. Your letter has been referred to the
Inspector General and the Department w’fll provide any assistance that he requests with regard to
the particular concums you articulated and any others that he may raise in connection with his
investigation.
I hop~ that th~ informatinn is helpful Pis~s do not hesitate’to contact me if you wou|d
like additional assistance regarding ~ or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Assistant Attorney Geoeral
cc: The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
Ranking Minority Member
05/04/2004 16:25 FAX 2025144507 DOJ EXEC SEC.
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
~003
Washington, D. C. Z0535.0~0!
May 3, 2002
Honorable John Warner
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Warner:
This is in response to your April l, 2002, letter on
behalf of your constituent, Sibel Edmonds, which was forwarded to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), for review.
Mrs. Edmonds’ allegations were presented to the
Office Of the Inspector General (OIG), Department of Justice.
After a review of the information provided by Mrs. Edmonds, the
QIG has assumed the responsibility for this investigation.
I hope the above information is of assistance to you in
responding to your constituent. Thank you-for your continued
cooperation in this and other matters,
Sineerel Y yours,
Unit Chief
Internal Investigative
Unit II
Office of Pro~essional
Responsibility
U. S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General
April 29, 2003
The Honorable John Warner
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Attention: S. Berry
Dear Senator Warner:
Your January 17, 2003, letter to the Department forwarding concerns
raised by your constituent, Sibel Edmonds, was for~varded recently to the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG), We are investigating several of the
allegations raised by Ms. Edmonds regarding security violations at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Please feel free to contact the OIG again if you have questions.
Sincerely,
Paul K. Martin
Counselor to the Inspector General |
BY JEFF H WILLIAMSON/DJ BLAZE
|
|