JAFU 2    

By the spring of 1940 Germany had become the predominant continental power in europe. The luftwaffe built in just six years from virtual nonexistence had grown to a force almost one half million men and more then three thousand combat aircraft ! the air forces had proven their worth in active combat from the spanish civil war to the fjords of northern Norway . Blitzkrieg or lighting war, became a household word and with it came the justified fears of aerial bombardment and the growing reputation of the Stuka dive bomber. The German propagandist reveled in the seemingly endless successes of their military. Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France had all fallen to the sword. By late summer, few in the world would have disputed that the fate of England could be any different on the eve of what was to become known as the.

BATTLE OF BRITAIN

 Jafu 2 Stab JG 51 - The Jagdfliegerfuhrer had headquarters at Wissant under the command of Colonel von Doring, and consisted of thirteen Day-Fighter Groups in five Wings and one Zerstorer Wing . The job for jafu 2 in hand was to escort bombers in to britain with there  Me 109E .

From 24 August onwards, the battle was essentially a slugging match between Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and Keith Park's 11 Group. The Luftwaffe concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the next two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each, Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. No less than seven attempts were made against Eastchurch, which was not a Fighter Command aerodrome but was believed to be by the intelligence-starved Germans. At times these raids knocked out the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system. Emergency measures had to be taken to keep the sectors operating.

These were desperate times for the RAF, which was also taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft but replacement pilots were barely keeping place with losses, and novice flyers were being shot down in droves. Most replacements had as little as nine hours flying time and no combat training. The Luftwaffe referred to these pilots as "cannon fodder". At this point the multinational nature of the RAF came to the fore. With many pilots from the Dominions already serving in Fighter Command—Australians, South Africans, New Zealanders and Canadians—they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovakian and Polishsquadrons. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Palestinian pilot serving amongst the squadrons.

The RAF at least had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their shot-down aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bail out over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer and kanalkrankheit or 'Channel Sickness' – a form of combat fatigue – began to appear amongst the German pilots. The replacement problem was even worse than the British. Though the Luftwaffe always maintained its numerical superiority, the slow appearance of replacement aircraft and pilots put increasing strain on the resources of the remaining attackers.

And yet, the Luftwaffe was winning this battle of the airfields. Another fortnight of this pounding and the RAF might have been forced to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. This was not clear to the Luftwaffe command, which had watched its bomber force start to waste away and had grown desperate to deliver on the original timetable. They could not understand why the RAF hadn't yet collapsed, or how they were always able to get fighters to the place they were needed, no matter how many raids were sent. Something needed to be done to force the RAF into a decisive battle.

On 4 September Hitler ordered to bomb London, following RAF raids on Berlin on the night of 25 August/26 August, itself a reprisal after London was bombed by accident. The Berlin raid had hurt Göring's pride, as he had previously claimed the British would never be allowed to bomb the city. Kesselring seized his chance and proposed a strategy change. In the face of Sperrle's arguments that attacks on the airfields should continue, Kesselring persuaded the Reichsmarschall to attack London. The raids would either panic the British population into submission, or it would force the "last fifty Spitfires" into the sky where they could be annihilated. This attack was no longer seen as a prerequisite for Seelöwe, but was meant to be decisive in itself.

Overall the Battle of Britain was a significant British victory. Though the battle was small in terms of combatants and casualties, had the Germans triumphed the war would have taken a very different path. The British victory marked the first failure of Hitler's war machine. It also signaled a shift in American opinion at a time when many Americans believed that the UK could not survive, a view perpetrated by Joseph Kennedy, the US ambassador in London.

Modern military historians have suggested the battle was unwinnable for the Luftwaffe. Their numerical majority was not sufficient to achieve superiority. Dowding's and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force was totally vindicated.

The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of public morale, were undone by British defiance in the face of the day and night Blitzes. The switch to a terror bombing strategy allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. Even if the attacks on the 11 Group airfields had continued, the British could have afforded to withdraw to the Midlands out of German fighter range and continued the battle from there. Post-war records show that British aircraft were being replaced faster than those of the Germans; the RAF maintained its strength even as the Luftwaffe's declined. In terms of losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew the battle was a blow from which the Luftwaffe never fully recovered.

The terror strategy in itself could not force the British to surrender. Even though the Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, they could not destroy the British industrial potential. But hindsight does not disguise the fact that the threat to the RAF was very real and for the participants it seemed as if there was a "Narrow Margin" between victory and defeat. The victory was as much psychological as physical. It turned a tide of defeats and heartened the enemies of Nazism.

The British triumph in the Battle of Britain was not without heavy cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were 23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids occurring on December 29, 1940, in which almost 3000 civilians died.

Winston Churchill summed up the effect of the battle and the contribution of the RAF in the immortal words: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" (speech to the House of Commons on August 20 1940). Pilots who fought in the battle have been known as The Few ever since.

September 15 is celebrated in the United Kingdom as "Battle of Britain Day", marking the climactic battles above London in daylight.

In British military tradition, the Battle of Britain is remembered with at least as much pride as Waterloo and Agincourt. In addition, the battle has entered popular legend around the world as an inspiring story of how a small island, standing alone against Nazi tyranny, managed to defeat a powerful enemy.

Most importantly, the end of the Battle of Britain allowed the UK to rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allies stronghold. Great Britain later served as a base from which Operation Overlord, aka the Battle of Normandy, was launched against Nazi forces in Europe.