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Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf
This section contains brief reviews of recent books
of interest to the intelligence professional and the student of
intelligence.
Cees Wiebes. Intelligence and The War In Bosnia
1992-1995. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003. 463
pages, index.
In 1994, a battalion of Dutch troops arrived in eastern Bosnia on a
peacekeeping mission as part of the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR). The Dutch area of responsibility included the nearby town of
Srebrenica that was controlled by the Bosnian Muslim Army. On 6 July
1995, Bosnian-Serbs captured Srebrenica while the Dutch, who had no
resources or mandate to stop them, stood by. Then the Bosnian-Serbs
expanded their invasion and began eliminating Muslims--ethnic
cleansing--while the Dutch, again, watched and thousands died. After
peace agreements were signed in Dayton, Ohio, the Netherlands Institute
for War Documentation (NIOD) initiated a study to determine what might
have been done to prevent the massacres. One of the central issues
raised concerned the role of the various international intelligence and
security services, including the Dutch Military Intelligence units. NIOD
tasked Dr. Wiebes to analyze the role of these intelligence elements and
to determine what was known, when, and by whom.
At first glance, the task seemed straightforward: talk to the
participants; find out what they knew and what their orders were; then
write the report. But in the UN, things are not that simple, which
becomes immediately clear as Dr. Wiebes considers the related question:
how does the United Nations acquire and disseminate intelligence for its
peacekeeping operations? The answer is that, since it has no organic
intelligence collection elements, it must rely on input from cooperating
nations, none of whom want to reveal sources and methods. Once this is
recognized, the real problems of intelligence and the war in Bosnia are
apparent even for those who have not been there.
Dr. Wiebes' study examines the UN intelligence function; the roles of
the Western intelligence community and Dutch intelligence elements; the
complications introduced by secret arms suppliers and multiple covert
actions; the problems of SIGINT and imagery collection; and the
difficulties associated with dissemination and use of the intelligence
product. The final chapter addresses the question of intelligence
success or failure in Srebrenica. Each of these topics is treated in
considerable depth. To accomplish this, the author has relied on open
and non-attributable confidential sources, because most intelligence
services refused to comment for the record. He finds that a warning of
the attack on Srebrenica was ignored by the Dutch units, American and
German intelligence services, and UN elements, to name a few of the
players. There is plenty of blame to go around, most of it reflecting
the fact that the UN has not solved the intelligence problem--voluntary
cooperation cannot be relied on.
This book is not easy reading. The names are strange, the acronyms
profuse, the political alignments complex, and the geography often
confusing. A few maps would have helped the reader grasp the complex
situation. These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is an important
work--the most thorough treatment of the topic to date--that makes
unequivocally clear a problem that must be dealt with if the UN is to
play a more successful peacekeeping role in the future.
Corinne Souza. Baghdad's Spy: A Personal Memoir of
Espionage and Intrigue from Iraq to London. Edinburgh, Scotland:
Mainstream Publishing, 2003. 238 pages, bibliography, photos, no
index.
This book begins and ends with letters written by the author to the
then-Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Sir Richard
Dearlove, in which she complains about the treatment of her father,
Lawrence de Souza, during his service as an SIS agent that did not end
well. She accuses SIS of "appalling personnel management and racism" and
of unwanted attempts to recruit her as an agent. In the second letter,
her somewhat distorted assessment of her father's unique value is
exposed when she states that:
I have not the shadow of a doubt that, had my father been alive,
he would have heard rumors concerning what was about to happen to the
World Trade Centre...[he] had contacts within al-Qaeda, the Islamic
world in general, as well as key law enforcement agencies...had the
authority to ensure the Americans were warned...and the forcefulness
to guarantee that his warnings were acted upon.1
In between these letters, she uses diaries kept by her father and her
memory to tell of the life of an Iraqi who married a British woman and
who worked two decades for SIS, first in Iraq and later in London, while
running his own business.
At some point--probably when a teenager, though she is not clear on
just when--she was told of her father's dual life. She came to know many
of his case officers whom she describes and criticizes at length. Not
surprisingly, there is little detail about just what information her
father provided about his Arab business contacts. She does say that he
came under suspicion from time to time, used safe houses for his work,
and had several pseudonyms. So the value of the book lies not so much in
its operational qualities as in the descriptions of an agent's family
life and the strains that family members must endure. The author argues,
unrealistically, that the father should have been made an SIS staff
officer and judges his treatment on that basis. Things were made even
more difficult because the daughter's political views were far to the
left of her father and his SIS handlers. Why she was told as much as she
was about her father's activities, under the circumstances, is not made
clear. Still, despite her politics, she claims that the SIS pressured
her to work for them as her father had done. And, with one exception,
she tells how she avoided doing so at the cost of her job lobbying in
Parliament. As to reliability, most of the important assertions by the
author remain unsupported. The few end-of-chapter citations do not
include page numbers, further complicating verification.
In the end, her real complaint is that her father--a kind of Arab
Peter Wright--did not receive the SIS recognition or pension he
deserved. She hopes to correct the former with this book, and the latter
through legal remedies.
David T. Lindgren. Trust But Verify: Imagery Analysis
in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 222
pages, bibliography, photos, index.
For those who served in National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC), this book will hold no surprises, but it will bring back some
exciting memories. David Lindgren, a remote sensing specialist at
Dartmouth College and one-time consultant to the Central Intelligence
Agency, tells the story of the U-2 and Keyhole satellite imaging
programs from their inception until the end of the Cold War. Using names
many never expected to see in the public domain, Lindgren shows how
imagery played the key role in monitoring Soviet progress in weapons
system development and deployment. Many will recall the Soviet violation
of the Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) Treaty when they built the "early
warning radar" at Krasnoyarsk, where it was not supposed to be. Imagery
analysts did not find it until it was well along in its construction.
But when they did, the evidence was persuasive and the Soviet Union,
under Gorbachev, agreed to scrap the facility. Similarly, when Air Force
Chief of Intelligence Maj. Gen. George Keegan pointed out the massive
Soviet air raid shelter program, it, too, was abandoned. Lindgren also
tells how imagery monitored the Chernobyl reactor disaster, leaving
Gorbachev no recourse but to publicly acknowledge the accident.
Other examples of imagery analysis show how, from time to time, the
judgments of analysts differed among elements of the Intelligence
Community--the mission of the so-called Tallinn complex being one such
case. The Central Intelligence Agency concluded it was part of an
anti-aircraft system, while the Defense Intelligence Agency designated
it ABM related. In the end the CIA was correct, but DOD did not give up
until the signing of the ABM Treaty.
A continuing theme in the book is how imagery intelligence affected
political decisionmaking. Lindgren tells of its impact on each president
from Johnson to Clinton. Also included are the scandals that beset the
National Reconnaissance Office. While not a consequence of imagery
exploitation, they did have an effect on the organizations established
to accomplish the imagery mission, including attracting more
congressional scrutiny. DOD was finally to wrest the satellite mission
from the CIA, and, with the formation of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA), a singular achievement of Director of Central
Intelligence John Deutch, the era of CIA contributions to the nation's
satellite programs came to an end. Lindgren makes clear he does not
agree with this decision.
While much in this book has appeared elsewhere and Lindgren is
careful to cite his sources in the narrative, it is the first time that
the role of imagery analysis has received such attention in one book by
someone familiar with the details. And as most imagery analysts--and
many of their former adversaries in the Soviet Union--will testify,
Lindgren and President Reagan have the issue backwards: the more prudent
approach is verify then trust.
Richard L. Holm. The American Agent: My Life In The
CIA. London, UK: St. Ermin's Press, 2003. 462 pages, photos,
index.
How does someone join the CIA? What qualifications does a person need
to become an officer in the clandestine service, to recruit and handle
espionage agents, and to serve overseas, all while raising a family?
There are no pat answers to these questions, but one can get a good idea
from the experiences of those who have written about their careers in
the Agency. Dick Holm's book is a particularly good example because it
shows what happens when talent mixed with perseverance overcomes
adversity.
Holm was a Boy Scout from the midwest who attended Blackburn College
in Carlinville, Illinois. After graduation he joined the Army and was
assigned to military intelligence in France, where he learned the
language and the tradecraft of espionage. He liked the profession. When
his military obligation had been met, he applied to the CIA and was
accepted. After training for the clandestine service, he was assigned to
Southeast Asia for several years. Then it was on to Africa, where he
nearly died in a plane crash that left him scarred for life. After years
of rehabilitation with impressive support from friends and the CIA, he
returned to the Directorate of Operations where, overcoming great odds,
he had a distinguished career serving as chief in the Far East and in
Paris.
The details of his experiences along the way--how he managed to raise
a family, the importance of learning languages, how the Agency treats
its employees, the impact of mixing intelligence operations and
politics, the CIA's counterterrorism program--provide unusual insight
into the life of a clandestine service officer. The reader will
experience some frustration--tales of secret operations often lack
detail and Holm's story is no exception. But to learn what it takes to
be a CIA operations officer in all stages of a career, The American
Agent is a great source and an enjoyable read.
Colonel Paul Paillole. Fighting The Nazis: French
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1935-1945. New York, NY:
Enigma Books, 2003. 492 pages, photos, charts, index.
After ten years in the counterespionage branch of the French military
intelligence service--the Deuxiëme Bureau--Col. Paul Paillole
resigned from the army in 1945. This memoir, the first of three
autobiographical accounts, was originally published in French in 1975.2
Here he tells about his early life; his unexpected assignment to the
intelligence service; his experiences during World War II when he rose
to head counterespionage; and his decision to leave the service. It is a
tale of French political maneuvering as much as counterespionage
operations.
Prior to the war, Paillole reveals how his counterespionage element
penetrated the Abwehr and other German intelligence
organizations, including the SIGINT service, while developing relations
with the British secret services that would one day pay dividends. On
the Nazi side, of particular interest is the case of Hans Thilo-Schnidt
(ASCHE), the German agent who provided material on the Enigma codes and
was handled by then-Capt. Gustave Bertrand. Curiously, Paillole does not
mention his subsequent interrogation of Bertrand in London just prior to
D-Day, when the latter was suspected of telling the Germans the date of
the invasion.3
In the course of describing his operational duties and because he
remained in counterespionage his entire career, Paillole also provides a
detailed look at the Nazi intelligence services and the changes they
underwent as it became clear that the war was lost.
In 1942, after serving with the resistance in France, Paillole was
forced to escape the Nazis and reached London via Spain. There he
established contacts with Charles de Gaulle's intelligence chief, Andrè
Dewawrin (aka PASSY)--although he avoided de Gaulle--and the head of
MI-6, "C," assuring each that he wished for a cooperative arrangement
among the various allied and French intelligence services. This was a
risky and difficult path because of the ongoing power struggle between
de Gaulle and his bitter rival for French power, Henri Giruad, for whom
Paillole had been assigned to work in Algiers after leaving London. When
de Gaulle emerged the victor and succeeded in establishing his singular
authority as the French leader-in-exile in 1944, Paillole managed to
retain his counterespionage duties because of his reputation for
success. In the end, though, his loyalty to Giruad was not forgotten by
de Gaulle. Against Paillole's strong opposition, the intelligence and
counterespionage service was spilt into two organizations. When Paillole
subsequently requested a command outside of counterespionage, it was
denied. That was when he left the Deuxiëme Bureau and never looked
back.
The story told in Fighting The Nazis is more than another
interesting World War II intelligence biography. Paillole's assiduous
application and articulation of counterintelligence principles
demonstrate their universality while making clear that it is the people
who make the difference.
Giles Scott-Smith. The Politics of Apolitical Culture:
The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-war American
Hegemony. London, UK: Routledge, 2002. 233 pages, endnotes,
bibliography, appendix, index.
In her book, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts
and Letters, Francis Saunders makes an impassioned argument that the
person who pays the piper, calls the tune. Specifically, she argues that
in establishing the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) as a worldwide
counterpoint to communist propaganda, the CIA inexorably exerted rigid
political control over the intellectual product of the writers and
artists that the CCF supported, without their knowledge.4
Pierre Grèmion, however, saw the "Congress as an important
semi-autonomous transnational organization that contributed a great deal
to the major intellectual debates of its time, whatever the CIA role."
5
Giles Scott-Smith takes a more theoretical look at the CCF as he seeks
to determine the extent to which it was "a hegemonic instrument of
American foreign policy?" For comparison purposes, he considers "the
political, economic and cultural linkages" put forward by Marxist
Antonia Gramsci as factors in determining hegemony. This approach is, he
suggests, "necessary in order to better appreciate the CIA's role and
the historical context in which these events occurred." The CCF, he goes
on, had a "decidedly political impact during the Cold War" that was
"institutionalized by the US government (in particular the CIA) as an
ideological force representative of the free society of the West from
which it emerged...in stark contrast to the cultural sterility that
resulted from the doctrines imposed by both fascist and communist
regimes." He acknowledges that discovery of the CIA role raised
questions about the validity of the CCF's positions, which the left
still exploits, but he concludes that the "anti-Communist convictions of
the congress did not originate with the CIA." They had existed long
before the CIA "began spending Washington's money on cultural
warfare."
For those concerned with the political-economic approach to social
progress and the battle between democracy and communism, this is an
important work, its complex theoretical narrative
notwithstanding.
Knud J. V. Jespersen. No Small Achievement: Special
Operations Executive and the Danish Resistance 1940-1945. Odense,
DK: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2002. 594 pages, endnotes,
bibliography, photos, maps, index (names only).
During World War II, German intelligence managed to double more that
40 of the agents parachuted into Holland and run them against their
Special Operations Executive (SOE) controllers--they called it Operation
NORTH POLE. After the war, when the Dutch sent representatives to London
to examine files to determine why the operations went wrong, the British
said the files had been burned in a tragic fire at SOE headquarters in
1945. The Dutch, in disbelief, expelled the MI-6 representative in
Holland.
The Danes also wanted to record their contribution to the wartime
resistance and the role they played under the guidance of SOE. During
1976-77, Danish historian Jorgen Haestrup published a three-volume
study, which became the standard work on the subject from the Danish
perspective, though it was recognized that it lacked the story of the
British side.6
There matters stood until 1994 when Danish historian Knud Jespersen
arrived in London to examine recently released SOE files concerning the
Danish resistance. Many of the original 210 files were missing;
Jespersen was told that most had been destroyed in the SOE headquarters
fire. Like the Dutch, Jespersen had doubts, but he decided to examine
the 86 files released (hundreds of documents, many with names excised)
to determine, to the extent possible, what the SOE sought to accomplish
through the Danish resistance. The result of his efforts was No Small
Achievement.
The need for a more complete version of the story of the Danish
resistance, writes Jespersen, was in part to show the nation and the
world that after "the shameful capitulation of 9 April 1940," the Danes
were active in the opposition to the Nazis. To give an idea of the kind
of resistance undertaken, the book tells the stories of some of the
groups that worked with Britain to sabotage German facilities. Typical,
and perhaps most well known, is the Hvidsten group that received supply
drops under wicked conditions at Mustard Point, located just outside the
town of Hvidsten in the far north of Denmark. Its leader and seven
members were captured on 26 June 1944, tried by military tribunal, and
shot. This event became a symbol of the resistance to those involved.
Younger historians, however, have taken a revisionist view of the Danish
resistance, pointing out that earlier histories omitted mention of the
communist role, which they did, and placed too much emphasis on the
value of the Danish contribution. In this view, the real purpose of the
resistance was less to oppose the Germans than to lay the groundwork for
the correct postwar government--minus the communists.
Jespersen discusses all these views, providing chapters on SOE
organization and overall mission; the planning for support of the
invasion, including the Jedburgh teams; and the "Spectre of
Communism." The balance of the book describes detailed planning and
operations--often involving conflict with the Danes in London--over the
five-year history of the resistance, adding details from British files
not previously available. In several areas, Jespersen notes necessary
adjustments in Danish histories--as, for example, the so-called "Princes
Plan." The P-Plan, as it was called, which was developed by Danish
general staff officers as a way to resist occupation, figures
importantly in the narrative. It was accepted by SOE as part of its
CHAIR Plan (code name for the build-up of a secret army). Another
for-the-record example describes the transmission of microfilm to the
Danish SOE controller in Stockholm by insecure means, allowing the
materials to be confiscated by the Swedes. References to the British
reports on this matter are included.
Jespersen ends with an assessment of the impact of the Danish
resistance on the war, quoting SOE and SHAEF reports, while providing
his own data on number of agents involved, supplies dropped, and the
effects of sabotage. As SHAEF put it, the resistance in Denmark "caused
strain and embarrassment to the enemy...[and a] striking reduction in
the flow of troops and stores from Norway [that] undoubtedly had an
adverse effect on the reinforcements for the battles East and West of
the Rhine." In the British files, Jespersen found a report that assessed
that the overall impact of Danish resistance was restored national pride
and political unity. He views this achievement as SOE's most important
contribution in Denmark.
Willard C. Matthias. America's Strategic Blunders:
Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991.
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 367
pages, footnotes, index.
Former military intelligence officer and charter member of the CIA's
Office of National Estimates Willard Matthias surveys "long term
analytic intelligence" and the role it played, "or should have played,"
in the preparations for World War II and the conduct of the Cold War.
The blunders he discusses include: the failure of the War and Navy
Departments to focus on Japanese military and naval operations rather
than diplomatic moves prior to 7 December--one of the few analysts to
make this point; the unconditional surrender decision that
prolonged the War; the failure to properly consider the plot to
assassinate Hitler; the unnecessary decision to drop the atom bomb on
populated areas; allowing the World War II military state of mind to
persist during the Cold War; and the failure to understand that the
Marxist conception of history was world domination without military
conquest.
The bulk of the book concentrates on the Cold War. Using estimates
written during that time--many written by the author--Matthias faults
the United States for the Cold War's unnecessary length and vitality. In
several instances--Korea, for example--he finds the CIA's analysis of
Soviet intentions correct, but ignored by the policymakers in favor of
the Defense Department. Matthias blames the arms race as much on
"anticommunist paranoids" as on genuine threats from the Soviets. The
reader learns much about the behind-the-scenes exchanges within the
Board of National Estimates, the use of their product by the government,
and the relationship between CIA analysts and academic experts. The
latter, he suggests, fell apart during the Reagan administration as a
result of the politicization of intelligence, which he condemns.
While many estimates are cited in the text, the lack of a
bibliography is disappointing. Still, the book gives a unique look at
strategic analysis from the inside and is worth serious attention by
today's analysts and policymakers alike.
Peter Hennessy. The Secret State: Whitehall and the
Cold War. London, UK: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2002. 234
pages, endnotes, photos, index.
In 1946, the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded
that "within the next fifty or perhaps a hundred years...the Soviet
Union will inevitably become the most powerful, the richest and the best
ordered country in the world." The Cold War that followed was waged to
prevent the realization of that prediction and, notes University of
London professor Peter Hennessy, quoting an MI-6 officer, "the hot end
of the cold war was espionage." It was also a "specialists'
confrontation, not a peoples' conflict," and many of those specialists
sat on the JIC. Comprised as it still is of the heads of the
intelligence services and various cabinet officials, it reaches the
"agreed views, by consensus," which are then circulated to its
government customers.
From World War II until the present, Hennessy reviews the JIC
mechanism and its functions during various periods of the Cold War in
considerable detail based on newly declassified cabinet documents. There
are the Top Secret, color-coded Indications-and-Warning lists circulated
to the Queen and other officials that indicate what the government
considers important in predicting nuclear war. Then come the problems of
going nuclear in spite of the restrictions imposed by the McMahon Act
from the US Congress. No less significant were the impact of the
Cambridge spies and the subsequent introduction of positive vetting,
controversial for practical and political personal-privacy reasons. Also
included is a discussion of the British continuity-of-government
plans--code named TURNSTILE--including the "last train" scenario. The
Mitrokhin archive material makes it possible to observe the reaction of
the Soviets to the British defense planning and atomic attack exercises
that were often misinterpreted by the Kremlin. The book is well
documented, and, though without a bibliography, is a valuable JIC primer
in light of the recent Hutton Report, which, inter alia, examined
the JIC role in the British assessments of Iraqi WMD sent to the Prime
Minister before Britain decided to go to war against Saddam Hussein.7
The Secret State ends with a comment on the current amorphous
situation presented by "the apparently irrational Islamic fanatics" and
a description of the Prime Minister's "end-of-the-world drills." Both
are sobering and their dependence on intelligence is
great.
Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds. Paradoxes
of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel.
London, UK: Frank Cass, 2003. 210 pages, end-of-chapter notes, index.
This volume will come as no surprise to those who knew the late
Michael Handel, technically a political scientist but more a historian,
who was an expert on military intelligence and an authority on the
theory of strategic surprise. While teaching at the Naval War College,
Handel was caught by tactical surprise in his own life when he was given
only a few months to live. But, with characteristic zest, he worked to
shape the conference at which the papers in this volume were presented
after his death.
Michael Handel received his Ph.D. from Harvard, and then achieved
tenure at Hebrew University in Israel. Subsequently, he took US
citizenship, returned to the United States, and taught at the Army War
College until 1990, when he joined the faculty at the Naval War College.
Among his many books and accomplishments was the founding, with
Cambridge professor Christopher Andrew, of the journal Intelligence
and National Security, which has provided a scholarly forum for the
publication of serious research on intelligence since 1986.
Of the seven original articles in Betts and Mahnken's collection, the
first is by Handel himself on "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic
Surprise." The other six are in honor of this original thinker, writer,
and teacher, and draw on his work. Two are by CIA officers--Woodrow J.
Kuhns, the Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence,
and Mark M. Lowenthal, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Analysis and Production. Kuhns writes on "Intelligence Failures:
Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology," while Lowenthal's article
looks at "Grant vs. Sherman: Paradoxes of Intelligence and Combat
Leadership." Columbia professor Richard Betts discusses "Politicization
of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits," while professor James Wirtz of the
Naval Post Graduate School considers the "Theory of Surprise." Professor
John Ferris at the University of Calgary addresses British military
deception in two world wars, and Uri Bar-Joseph, senior lecturer at
Haifa University, contributes an essay about intelligence failure and
the case of the Yom Kipper War.
Each of these essays is well documented and calculated to make the
reader think and learn. Michael Handel would have been proud of this
book.
Jessica Stern. Terror in the Name of God: Why
Religious Militants Kill. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2003. 368
pages.
The dust jacket on this book characterizes Jessica Stern as "the
foremost US expert on terrorism," an accolade she is quick to deny,
attributing it solely to the publisher's PR department. But this
chemistry major from Barnard College with a Ph.D. in chemical weapons
from MIT; this former NSC staffer in the Clinton administration; this
Foreign Relations Council Fellow, Hoover Institute scholar, and Harvard
University lecturer does know a good deal about terrorists and weapons
of mass destruction. Terrorists are what this book is about. And in
doing her research she interviewed them in the United States, Pakistan,
Israel, India, Indonesia, and Lebanon.
Of particular interest to some Studies in Intelligence readers
is the case of Mir Aimal Kansi, who paid with his life for his attack on
CIA employees outside the main entrance at Headquarters. Operating on
the theory that one must deal with terrorists on their own terms if some
trust is to be established and knowledge exchanged, Dr. Stern wrote to
Kansi while on death row and after a while he granted her an interview.
The results are at the same time illustrative, informative, and
revolting. But they are depressingly typical of how the Islamists think
and what they intend to accomplish.
In trying to "comprehend terrorists from the inside," Stern meets
with a great variety of them, from an assistant to Osama bin Laden and
his family to a twelve-year-old potential suicide bomber, who confides
that he goes to the Madrassah because that is the only place where he
can find food. Then there is a different kind of terrorist, one that
chooses to kill doctors to prevent abortions. She talks to them, too,
trying to learn whether there are generic qualities to the species.
In many ways, this is a disturbing book. But for those who want to
understand the why of today's war on terror and the terrorists
themselves, it is a valuable source of insights.
Lauren Kessler. Clever Girl: Elizabeth Bentley, the
Spy Who Ushered in the McCarthy Era. New York, NY: Harper Collins,
2003. 372 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.
After nearly 50 years of public obscurity, Elizabeth Bentley--Vassar
graduate, teacher, former NKGB espionage agent, the first woman guest to
appear on the televised "Meet The Press,"8
author of Out of Bondage,9
and post-World War II FBI informant--is the subject of two well-written
and informative biographies published within a year of each other. The
first, by University of California (Davis) history professor Kathryn S.
Olmsted,10
was reviewed by Michael Warner in Studies in Intelligence (Vol.
47, No. 2, 2003). Lauren Kessler, a professor at the University of
Oregon, has given us the second and, by doing so, suggests there is
still more to be learned about the enigmatic Miss Bentley. She is right.
Despite considerable overlap, there are significant differences in
the details and emphasis of the two biographies. One example stems from
Bentley's claim that she was descended from Roger Sherman, a signer of
the Declaration of Independence. Kessler finds genealogical evidence
that this was so and that it was part of the family lore before Bentley
was born in New Milford, Connecticut, on 1 January 1908. Olmsted
concludes, from different sources, that the link was fictitious to
enhance the "shock value of her biography."11
Another example involves Bentley's studies in Italy after her graduation
from Vassar. Kessler suggests that her thesis was more the work of her
professor or his assistant than her own. Olmsted agrees but devotes more
space than Kessler to the topic, describing the problems it caused when
Bentley returned to Columbia University to finish her Masters
Degree.
It was at Columbia that Bentley became a communist and set off down
the road to becoming a Soviet agent in the mid-1930s. During World War
II, she was one of the main Soviet agent-couriers servicing other
communist agents who had penetrated nearly every department of the US
government. By 1944, however, the Soviets had decided to replace her
with Russians and her clandestine life began to crumble. Fearing
exposure from other defectors, she went to the FBI field office in New
York City on 7 November 1945 and began dictating a 112-page statement
describing her espionage activities for the previous 10 years. Since
Bentley mentioned British citizens with whom she dealt, the FBI notified
MI-6, whose head of the Soviet counterespionage section, Cambridge spy
Kim Philby, promptly notified Moscow. Thus, the American networks that
Bentley compromised were shut down before she signed her statement on 30
November 1945, and the FBI came up with little prosecutable evidence.
But, as Kessler makes clear, Bentley brought to an end the era of the
communist ideological spy.
In 1948, Bentley testified before Congress in public hearings, naming
all those prominent officials she had accused to the FBI. This brought
on denials from those she exposed--Alger Hiss; the Rosenbergs; OSS
officer Duncan Lee; former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Harry
Dexter White; and Nathan Silvermaster, to name but a few--and
vilification by the unsympathetic left-leaning press. With no documents
to support her charges, those accused went free, but she continued life
as an FBI informant. For a while, the proceeds from her book sustained
her life style, including her excessive drinking. But the press coverage
made it difficult to hold a job--there was no defector resettlement
program then. From 1953 until her death ten years later, Elizabeth
Bentley's life was a gradual descent into obscurity and poverty. It is
here that there are other significant differences in the Kessler-Olmsted
accounts. Olmsted finds evidence that Bentley's latent bisexuality
became a factor in her life as her links to the Soviets deteriorated.
Kessler does not mention this aspect. On the other hand, Kessler
demolishes assertions that Bentley lied in her testimony. Olmsted tends
to give credibility to this charge made by another FBI informant, Harry
Matusow, who also claimed to have had an affair with Bentley. As Kessler
notes, Matusow was a self-confessed liar who served five years in jail
for perjury in between his 15 marriages--nine to the same women.
All of Bentley's difficulties might have been avoided but for a
single decision by the US government: to keep VENONA secret. VENONA, a
made up word with no etymological roots, was a cover name for the
message product of a successful American code-breaking operation run
against the NKGB. The results became available gradually beginning in
1946. Kessler tells how Bentley, aware only of the FBI's failure to
arrest any of those she knew had spied and enduring daily trashing in
much of the press, was unaware that she was codenamed UMNITSA or CLEVER
GIRL in the VENONA cables and that the decrypted messages corroborated
her charges. When the VENONA decrypts were made public in 1995,
posthumous vindication appeared to be hers--she had not lied where it
counted. But there were still some who challenged her allegations and
the validity of the VENONA decrypts, calling them FBI forgeries. These
VENONA-deniers--mostly journalists and scholars--are the progeny of
those who called Bentley's book the hysterical musings of a neurotic
spinster.
In Clever Girl, Lauren Kessler tells the Bentley story with an
easy reading style adding many well-documented personal details about
her life that had escaped public attention.
Robert J. Stove. The Unsleeping Eye: Secret Police and
Their Victims. San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003. 367
pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.
Domestic surveillance carried out by a nation's secret police is a
topic that historically has received too little attention, according to
Australian journalist Robert Stove. He acknowledges that terms such as
Gestapo, Securitate, OGPU, and KGB are familiar to
many today, but he argues that little has been written about how
excessive domestic surveillance came into being. The Unsleeping
Eye is intended to correct that deficiency. His approach is
historical. He presents five case studies that illustrate the
progression of domestic secret police operations from Elizabethan times
under Sir Francis Walsingham to the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover. In
between, we learn how the French protected the government from within,
during the times of Cardinal Richelieu and under Napoleon's secret
police chief Joseph Fouchè, who started a national identification
system. Then comes the system developed by the Tsars for the same
purposes, which evolved into the practices of the NKVD. Finally, the
Germans, starting from a different political model, created the
Gestapo and its variants.
As an introduction to the subject, this is a useful book, provided
the reader is aware that the sources cited are inadequate--too much must
be accepted on faith. And relying on the book can sometimes be a risky
endeavor even when a source is identified. Take, for example, a
statement about the head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Müller: On page 235,
Stove states that "it now seems certain that he [Müller] fled to
Switzerland...was interviewed by the OSS...to offer him a job. He
subsequently laboured for the CIA as a dedicated, extraordinarily
knowledgeable anti-Communist, and apparently ended his days at--of all
places--Honolulu in 1973." The source for this extraordinary assertion
is Gregory Douglas, putative author of Gestapo Chief: The 1948
Interrogation of Heinrich Müller.12
Douglas also writes that Müller had dinner at the White House with
President Truman and knew Alan Dulles, both patent falsehoods.
The subject is of interest today, and Mr. Stove closes with comments
on the problems in the area of domestic surveillance exacerbated by the
9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001. He ends with
a warning that we may be witnessing a "re-emergence of outright secret
police terror..." and then admonishes us, in the words of Ben Franklin,
not "to give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety."
This quote is not sourced either.
Anonymous. Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden,
Radical Islam, and the Future of America. Washington, DC:
Brassey's, Inc., 2002. 394 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.
For those who ask themselves why the Islamists are conducting
terrorist acts against the West, Through Our Enemies' Eyes is a
sobering read. The author is quick to answer the question in part,
noting that since 1996, Osama bin Laden has:
...repeatedly warned America--always in public--that he would
incrementally increase the lethality of his attacks on U.S. interests
until we stopped supporting Israel, withdrew our military forces from
Saudi Arabia, and ended the embargo on Iraq. If the United States did
not yield to his demands, he would bring the war he was waging into
the continental United States...promise made, promise kept.13
The United States, Anonymous concludes, "has never had an adversary
who has more clearly, calmly, and articulately expressed his hatred for
America and his intention to destroy our country by war or die trying."
Furthermore, he continues, never have we so badly underestimated a
foreign threat. For example, contrary to US official statements that
Osama bin Laden did not believe we would invade his sanctuary in
Afghanistan, the reality, Anonymous tells us, is that he "sought to
prompt the attack." Why should this be so? The answer comes in
recognizing that bin Laden is not a traditional terrorist, but the
leader of a "worldwide, religiously inspired, and professionally guided
Islamist insurgency against Christians and Jews." The invasion was proof
of his claims about the Americans.
Through Our Enemies' Eyes seeks to explain bin Laden the man,
provide context and reasons for his abhorrence of the West, and describe
the religious basis for its intensity. Initially, Anonymous suggests a
parallel between bin Laden's views and the thinking of five
Anglo-American leaders--John Brown, John Bunyan, Thomas Jefferson,
Patrick Henry, and Thomas Paine. Each American fought for a cause in his
own determined way, a cause that succeeded even if the man did not live
to see it. While Anonymous suggests no moral equivalence in their
behavior, the power of a fervent, even passionate, pursuit of their
divergent goals as a factor in success, is worth scrutiny. Thus, one of
the main purposes of the book--to better understand bin Laden and
therefore the enemy--can be achieved by "reflecting on the origins of
[our] own country" and comparing the words of our founders with those
espoused by bin Laden in his Declaration of Jihad against the United
States. The point is reinforced with quotations beginning each
chapter that leave the reader no choice but to infer eerie correlations
with the Islamists and our past, and ponder the differences.
The story of bin Laden is unpleasant and disturbing, but well told.
For him and his followers, Islam is the superior religion and way of
life. That is his political correctness. And since the behavior of the
United States appears to Muslims as inconsistent with that view, its
physical elimination is warranted. Understanding how bin Laden reached
these beliefs is important and Anonymous devotes several chapters to his
background, personality, exile in Sudan--where he began his chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons acquisition program, and
assisted Iraq--and tenure in Afghanistan. We also learn of the formation
of al-Qa'ida, the differences between it and more familiar Arab
terrorist organizations, and the rationale for using violence to achieve
a goal and for accepting civilian casualties--all allowed by Islam, says
bin Laden.
Then comes an assessment of what can be expected for the future,
based on past actions. To bring this point home, chapter 13 presents a
sobering summary of al-Qa'ida events just since 1996. Chapter 14
explains why the Western crusaders are the target, noting that between
1980 and 1995, the United States "engaged in seventeen military
operations in the Middle East, all directed at Muslims. No comparable
pattern...occurred against any other people of any other
civilization."14
One sees that bin Laden has remained focused on a single goal: a Muslim
world, through a World Islamic Front, with an international army, and
with America as the bull's-eye.
The view of the future offered by Anonymous is less than hopeful:
"violent clashes between the West and Islam will be a central feature of
world affairs for the foreseeable future," with or without Osama bin
Laden. Anonymous offers no alternative to this assessment, but suggests
that if we are to find one, understanding bin Laden and his crusade is
the first step.
On the point of understanding, Anonymous is critical of what
he calls the "obsolete experts" in the media and government who do not
grasp the differences between bin Laden and the terrorists. The portrait
presented here is intended to elucidate those differences. This volume
is a gutsy declaration by a serving "decorated member of the US
intelligence community" (as the dust jacket describes him) and,
according to the acknowledgments, approval to publish did not come
smoothly.
From the reader's perspective, Through Our Enemies' Eyes lays
out a basis for understanding a man who has declared openly that his
goal is world Islamist domination. There are echoes of the early days of
communism and fascism here, and Anonymous urges us to pay attention to
bin Laden sooner than we did to Lenin and Hitler.
Footnotes
1.
Souza, p. 232.
2.
Col. Paul Paillole. Services sèciaux 1935-1945 (Paris, France: Laffont,
1975). His second book was Notre espion chez Hitler (Paris:
Laffont, 1985), and his third, L'homme des services secrets (Paris:
Julliard, 1995).
3.
See David Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day: Countdown to the Liberation of
Europe (London, UK: Little Brown, 2003), pp. 176-77, 121-22. Bertrand
was one of the few who knew about ULTRA and the date of the invasion. He
was captured and interrogated by the Gestapo in France before being
released and allowed to go to England. He told the British that he had
fooled the Germans into thinking he would become their agent and that is
why he was let go. The British wanted to know if this was true and, more
importantly, what he had told the Germans. Paillole was asked to
interrogate. He did and concluded that his old friend had likely said
nothing about ULTRA or D-Day. Bertrand was kept under house arrest until
after D-Day.
4.
Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World
of Arts and Letters (New York, NY: The New Press, 2000). For a review
of Saunders's book, see Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 1,
2002.
5.
Pierre Grèmion, Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: le Congress pour la
Libertè de la Culture, Paris 1950-1975 (Paris, France: Fayard,
1995).
6.
Jorgen Haestrup, Secret Alliance: A Study of the Danish Resistance
Movement 1940-45 (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1976-77), 3
vols., endnotes, maps, index.
7.
Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Death of Dr. David Kelly C.M.G (Ordered by the House of Commons,
28 January 2004).
8.
Washington, DC, NBC-TV, 6 December 1953.
9.
Elizabeth Bentley, Out of Bondage (New York, NY: Devin-Adair,
1951).
10.
Kathryn S. Olmsted, Red Spy Queen: A Biography of Elizabeth Bentley
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 268
pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.
11.
Resolution of this question would require the examination of the
genealogical data used by both authors. Olmsted admits hers was not
complete. Kessler relies on a privately published history of the Turrill
family.
12.
Gregory Douglas, Gestapo Chief: The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich
Müller (San Jose, CA: James Bender, 1995, 1997), 3 vols. Douglas has
used the pseudonyms Peter Stahl and Walter Storch on the Internet. He
claims a former CIA officer is one of his sources, a claim that officer
has denied to me. The documentary evidence he purports to have remains his
secret. Those facsimile documents he includes in his books are said by
experts to be of his own making and cannot be found in the National
Archives. Whatever happened to Müller, the one certainty is that he never
came to America.
13.
Anonymous, p. x.
14.
Cited in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1997), p. 217.
Hayden
B. Peake manages the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection.
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