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In Defence of Dooyeweerd and of Christian Philosophy

In this paper I should like to make some appreciative and critical remarks about Antoni Diller's article 'Herman Dooyeweerd-a Profile of his Thought' (*Spectrum*, Vol. 22:2, Summer 1990, pp. 139-154). Then I should like to put Dooyeweerd's thought into a broader context in relation to some educational issues which may be of particular interest to *Spectrum* readers.

It is good to have Diller's substantial article on Dooyeweerd because his increasing influence in the English-speaking world has been, for the most part, mediated and virtually anonymous. For example, Dooyeweerd's ideas profoundly influenced Hans Rookmaaker, playing a crucial role in his conversion, explicitly shaping his academic works like *Synthetic Art Theories* and implicit in his more popular writings like *Modern Art and the Death of a Culture*. In turn, Rookmaaker introduced Francis Schaeffer to some of Dooyeweerd's themes---a dependency that Schaeffer rarely, if ever, acknowledged. Other scholars published in Britain – although few of them are British - who make significant reference to Dooyeweerd include Al Wolters, Calvin Seerveld, Bob Goudzwaard, Nick Wolterstorff, M. S. Van Leeuwen, Alan and Elaine Storkey, Paul Marshall, Arthur Holmes, Mark Roques, Leslie Newbigin, Oliver O'Donovan and Jeremy Begbie, to name a few.

However, in spite of the growing number of positive references to Dooyeweerd's work, his writings¹ remain largely unavailable in Britain. He has been regarded with a considerable amount of suspicion, if not antagonism, by some leading evangelicals in this country. What I believe that many of the older evangelical leaders found worrying about Dooyeweerd was the fact that he called into question the religious and philosophical neutrality of scholarship in general, not excluding the natural sciences and mathematics. This [147] was anathema to a generation whose thinking had been shaped by the essentially logical positivist conviction that scientific knowledge was simply the result of careful observation and clear logical thought. Given such a view, science needed to be liberated from the distorting influences of religion and metaphysics. Indeed, for that generation, the history of science itself was told in Comtian terms: positive scientific knowledge emerged through the elimination of metaphysical spectacles so that the facts themselves could be observed and recorded and inductive generalisations could be made and verified. The 'Protestant' contribution to this process was seen to be its rejection of (Aristotelian) metaphysics as the framework of science (and theology) and its embracing of (rational) empiricism.

Given such an understanding of modern natural science, Dooyeweerd appeared to be a reactionary metaphysician demanding that science should once again be subjected to the straitjacket of a new (dubiously) Christian philosophical system. For these older evangelicals, this was seen as deeply problematic for at least two reasons. In the first place, one of the major themes of evangelical apologetics of the 1960s had been that one could be a good (conforming) scientist *and* a committed evangelical Christian. There was no contradiction. As a scientist one studied the facts and laws of Nature, i.e. creation; as a Christian one studied the texts and principles of Scripture. What was looked for was peaceful co-existence. Secondly, the highly specialised character of British science education - from A Levels onwards - virtually guaranteed illiteracy with, respect to the history and philosophy of science.

¹ The Herman Dooyeweerd Foundation now has an intensive programme for the translation and publication of Dooyeweerd's complete works. Two other books by him available in English but not mentioned by Diller are *Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular and Christian Options* (Toronto, 1979) and *A Christian Theory of Social Institutions* (La Jolla, California, 1986).

Consequently, to ask of scientists a major, rethinking of the presuppositions of their disciplines was to ask for what they were hardly in a position to deliver. But in some cases the request doubtless touched a raw nerve and today the whole position is beginning to be reconsidered.²

Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science

Having sketched a few features of the curiously mixed reception of Dooyeweerd's thought in Britain, I should now like to make some specific comments on Antoni Diller's mainly negative commentary.

In the first place, I find it amazing that Diller fails to point out that [148] the ongoing critique and demolition of positivist philosophy of science (and general epistemology) associated with the names of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Polanyi, Radnitzky *et als* was anticipated in general terms by Abraham Kuyper in the nineteenth century and, in great detail, by Dooyeweerd and his colleagues--much of it even before the final versions of logical positivism were formulated. To put the matter simply, it seems to me that the consensus view in the philosophy, history and sociology of science is that positivism is indefensible and that all scientific theories are inescapably and necessarily embedded in epistemological and ontological presuppositions within religious, cultural, social and economic contexts.³ There is, of course, a vigorous debate over how exactly the matter should be formulated. The point I am making here is that Dooyeweerd's work is far from being obsolete--as suggested by the older evangelical leaders under the influence of positivism--or rendered outmoded by the 'Fregean Revolution'--of which more anon. It is my view that his work has deep contemporary relevance in a double sense. In the first place, it is providing some basic equipment which is enabling a new generation of Christian scholars to work on the integration of Biblical faith and scholarship at a professional and technical level.⁴ In the second place, Dooyeweerd's work is highly pertinent to the crisis of contemporary scholarship which is being ever more openly acknowledged---in part under the label of post-modernism.

The Possibility of Christian Philosophy

As to Diller's own view of epistemology, I am perplexed. In one place he writes:-

'... I do think that Dooyeweerd has contributed some really worthwhile ideas to Christian thinking. To mention just one example at this stage, I [149] think that his replacement of the Greek idea of the soul - in his philosophy -- by the Biblical idea of the heart is entirely correct and justified.' (p. 140)

For Dooyeweerd - and Kuyper before him - this idea of the heart as the radical centre of human life implied that all of life, including theorizing in the special sciences and in philosophy, was ultimately controlled by the allegiances of the heart, whether they be Christian, pagan or humanist. A few lines after his apparent

² Cf. my *The Growing Crisis of the Evangelical Worldview and its Contemporary Resolutions* (M.A. in Theology, Bristol University, 1973).

³ A useful introduction to some of these debates is provided by A. F. Chalmers' *What is This Thing Called Science?* (Open University, 1986).

⁴ E.g., the growing series of works published by the University Press of America: H. Hart's *Understanding our World: An Integral Ontology* (1984); *Theories of Work* (on the structure and functioning of theories in science, in particular during the Copemican Revolution) (1987), by M. D. Staffeu; P. A. Marshall and R. E. Van der Vemen (Eds), *Social Science in Christian Perspective* (1988); and P. A. Marshall, S. Griffioen and R. J. Mouw (Eds), *Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science* (1989). See also Brian Walsh and Richard Middleton's *The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian Worldview* (1984), published by InterVarsity Press in America.

affirmation of Dooyeweerd's anthropology, Diller then makes a statement that seems to presuppose that the Greek idea of the rational soul as constituting the human essence—or the kindred Humanist idea of the rational mind—is correct after all. Diller writes:-

‘...I tend to side with those people who deny the possibility of Christian philosophy, but I'm not a hardline advocate of this position.’ (p. 140)

Diller produces no argument to demonstrate the impossibility of Christian philosophy. He makes no Biblical or theological case. He does not even refer to Paul's warning: 'See to it that no-one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ' (Colossians 2:13). *Prima facie* here we have a mandate for *Christian* philosophy and a repudiation of *non-Christian* philosophy,

However, Diller rejects the mandate for Christian philosophy and embraces the validity of non-Christian philosophy. He seems to find comfort in the fact that Heidegger – an atheistic Existentialist member of the Nazi party⁵ - and Barth - a Neo-Orthodox theologian⁶ - would agree with him. I am tempted to say 'They would!'. The non-Christian philosophy to which Diller has given his allegiance he refers to repeatedly as that which is associated with the 'Fregean revolution' (pp. 144, 147, 149).
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The 'Fregean Revolution'

For Diller, Frege and the analytic or linguistic tradition in philosophy of which he was the founding figure seems to set the standard of philosophical respectability and acceptability. The three major criticisms of Dooyeweerd that he sets out in his conclusion (p. 153) indicate little more than the fact that Dooyeweerd is not part of that tradition ... in which alone real philosophical insight, wisdom and truth are to be found. Diller writes of Dooyeweerd that 'he uncritically accepts the Cartesian position that epistemology is the foundation of philosophy' (p. 153). Elsewhere he writes:-

‘But Dooyeweerd uncritically accepts - he nowhere argues for it - the view that the theory of knowledge is central to philosophy.’ (p. 144)

But Dooyeweerd does not argue for the foundational role of epistemology for the simple reason that he does not embrace the Cartesian revolution. As Diller himself writes, it is not epistemology that is foundational but religious *ground motives* that are foundational for Dooyeweerd. As regards Diller's claim that the theory of knowledge is central for Dooyeweerd, I'm not completely clear as to what 'central' means here. In one rather obvious sense I would maintain that for Dooyeweerd ontology is more basic and that the very formulation of epistemological questions makes ontological assumptions--about knowers and knowables and their relation.

⁵ In *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers* Ed. J. O. Urmson, (London: Hutchinson, 1960) we read:-

'It was in Husserl's *Jahrbuch* that Heidegger's main work first appeared in 1927, with a dedication to Husserl: *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time). In 1933, when Hitler came to power, Heidegger accepted the Rektorat of the University of Freiburg, welcomed Hitler's ascent as the dawn of a new era, praised the abolition of academic freedom (his inaugural address on his concept of the German University was published under the title of *Die Selbstbehauptung der Deutschen Universitaet* and completely dissociated from Husserl because he was a Jew.' (p. 161)

⁶ See my critique of Barth on philosophy in my paper *Barth's Theological Method* (Christian Studies Unit, 1981).

But why, we may wonder, does Diller make these charges against Dooyeweerd and why does he go on to claim that Dooyeweerd's epistemology is 'psychologistic'? The answer, I suspect, has more to do with Frege than with Dooyeweerd. Frege (in the footsteps of Plato) was 'convinced that proper philosophy was the logical analysis of (timelessly unchanging) concepts which existed independently of human knowing and which alone made human knowledge possible. Given this view, the twin heresies for philosophy would be *historicism* (which traced the genesis of human understanding collectively) and *psychologism* (which focused on the intellectual development of the individual). By this token the history of ideas (including the history of philosophy and the sciences) and epistemology become strictly *irrelevant* to philosophy proper a la Frege.⁷ But there are reasons to believe that this whole philosophical [151] programme of Frege's is fatally flawed. Its proposed field of investigation - pure concepts or meanings - has not been shown to exist. Its method of 'logical analysis' is far from clearly explained and its claim to a religious and metaphysical neutrality has not been demonstrated. The fact that such rigorous analysis seems to lead to quite different conclusions renders its claims problematic. And, finally, if that were not bad enough, whatever appearance of abstractness and generality this philosophy has is bought at the price of sterility and irrelevance to the real perplexities of modern culture, inside and outside academia.

In the same work that Diller quotes, *Frege's Philosophy of Language*, Michael Dummett himself maintains the following:-

'... philosophy has, as its first if not its only task, the analysis of meanings ... the theory of meaning, which is the search for such a model, is the foundation of all philosophy, and not epistemology, as Descartes led us into believing.'⁸

Diller does not mention the fact but Dooyeweerd characterises his own philosophy as the systematic analysis of meaning. The great difference is that Dooyeweerd is concerned with the meaning-character of created reality while the adherents of post-Fregean analytic philosophy have an obsessive and idolatrous preoccupation with the linguistic dimension of reality to which they attach quasi-messianic expectations-freedom from metaphysical delusions, intellectual clarity and the ability to see the world aright.⁹

What I think needs to be recognised is that the Descartes-Frege debate which Diller seems to regard as presenting *fundamental* alternatives-epistemological justification or analysis of meanings--is actually a family dispute within Humanism between those who share the assumption that the Christian revelation has no relevance to philosophy. This is the assumption that the one who claimed to be the Logos, the light of the world, the wisdom of God, the one wiser than Solomon, the way, the truth and the life not only is unable to illuminate the philosophic quest for understanding and wisdom but would actually constitute a barrier and hindrance to philosophic progress.

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⁷ See Stephen Toulmin's brilliant critique of Frege In *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 52ff.

⁸ Michael Dummett, *Frege's Philosophy of Language* (London, 1973), p. 559.

⁹ For a devastating satirical polemic directed at linguistic philosophy, see Ernest Gellner's *Words and Things* (London, 1972). See also J. N. Findlay's *Wittgenstein: A Critique* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) and J. H. Olthuis *Facts, Values and Ethics* (Van Gorcum, N.V., 1968).

The Dogma of the Autonomy of Theoretical Thought

From a Christian perspective, it seems that a different choice ought to confront philosophy which would lead to a recognition of quite different alternatives. The question is that of philosophy's response to the Word of God (meaning Special rather than General Revelation). On this basis, Dirk Vollenhoven, a historian of philosophy and Dooyeweerd's colleague at the Free University of Amsterdam, developed a typology or classification of philosophies. Greek and Roman philosophies (e.g., Plato and Aristotle) he labelled *pre-synthesis*, i.e., purely pagan and ignorant of the Word of God. Medieval philosophy (e.g., Aquinas) was *synthesis* (mixing Christian and pagan ideas) while, subsequent to the 1450s, philosophies became *anti-synthetic* in two opposite directions. There were the philosophies of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment that increasingly rejected the Christian side of the medieval synthesis. There were those of the Reformation that struggled to reject the pagan side of the medieval synthesis, mostly with very limited success.¹⁰

The crucial feature shared by pre-synthesis, synthesis and (non-Christian) anti-synthesis philosophers is their commitment to what Dooyeweerd calls 'the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought'. What Diller fails to make explicit is that the analytic philosophy to which he is committed shares this dogma. While it may not *prima facie* sound terribly important whether or not one accepts the possibility of Christian philosophy or embraces the dogma of autonomy, the implications when traced out systematically are massive. It is far more significant than a small technical dispute between a handful of Christians who are involved with academic philosophy. What we are talking about here is whether or not there can be a legitimate Christian view, perspective, understanding, interpretation of reality (every dimension of it including, not least, education and the diverse disciplines that inform education at its various levels) or whether the only legitimate and universally valid view of reality is the 'rational', 'objective', 'neutral', 'unbiased' one (whatever that is!) required and demanded by the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought.

All thought of a Christian or biblically shaped philosophy of education, or history, or politics, or ethics, or even religion is [153] excluded by the dogma. Nor can there be Christian theology if the adjective 'Christian' means anything more than specifying the field of investigation. For theology, if it is to be a legitimate academic theoretical discipline, can in no way *presuppose* the truth of the Christian faith or the reality of revelation. Any such *faith* will necessarily bias research and seriously detract from the objectivity of the results. As Jowett of Balliol College maintained in the late nineteenth century, 'we must treat the Bible like any other book'.¹¹ It need hardly be remarked that many erstwhile departments of (Christian) theology have drawn these conclusions, have abandoned the teaching of dogmatic or systematic theology, and now style themselves as 'departments of religious studies'. Now the philosophy sociology, psychology, phenomenology and history of religions is at the centre of

¹⁰ Cf. John Van Dyk's *A Survey of the History of Philosophy* (Sioux Center, Iowa: Dordt College Press) available from the Christian Studies Unit. Van Dyk uses Vollenhoven's categories to re-write the history of western philosophy.

¹¹ One's response to Jowett's slogan is highly instructive concerning one's philosophical framework. The Christian dualist will want to insist on special treatment for the Bible -- after all it is a 'sacred' rather than a 'secular' book. The secularizing liberal theologian will applaud Jowett as a fearless searcher after truth. Those out of the Dooyeweerdian stable who prefer to call themselves 'Reformational'--will 'agree' with Jowett, saying 'Yes, the Bible must be treated like any other book every book of course must be understood within a biblical perspective'. For a development of this, see Calvin Seerveld's *A Christian Critique of Art and Literature* (Toronto, 1964) available from the Christian Studies Unit.

their curricula. And their boast is not that of *Christian* perspective but that of rational criticism, scientific methodology and scholarly rigour.¹²

In short, if Christian philosophy really is a contradiction in terms – as Diller, Heidegger and Barth maintain-then all the professional groups of Christians who have organized over the last couple of decades are totally illegitimate for there can be no such thing as a Christian perspective on anything. There is simply the truth about things which is accessible to all rational people, as long as they lay [154] aside those prejudices (including the Christian faith) which would distort their understanding.

It must be admitted that in relation to the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought many Christians in scholarship opt for some type of dualism. Reality is divided into realms of reason and faith, or facts and values, or objective and subjective, or, more concretely, realms of the 'secular curriculum' and 'worship and R.E.'. But, like the proverbial camel that has managed to get its head into the tent, it is only a matter of time before it carries the whole tent away. Once any area of reality, knowledge or activity is conceded to the dogma, no meaningful limit can thereafter be set without a feeling of irrational dogmatism. Underlying this is the unity and coherence of creation itself which is not amenable to any sort of secular/sacred partition.

In the sharpest possible contrast to all this, Dooyeweerd, following Augustine maintains *Credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order that I may understand). In other words, the Christian faith alone gives true access to reality. The Christian revelation, far from being an impediment to philosophy and scholarship, is actually the greatest possible blessing. The converse of this is that every other faith –including the faith in 'reason' that lies behind the dogma of autonomy-will prove itself to be an impediment, yielding a bitter harvest of dogmatism, relativism, reductionism and incoherence in the scholarly enterprise.

The Charge of 'Rigidity'

Turning from Diller's rejection of the idea of Christian philosophy in general, we come to his more specific criticism of Dooyeweerd. Diller writes:-

'But the main reason I do not think of myself as a Dooyeweerdian is that-ultimately-I find Dooyeweerd's philosophy too *rigid* ... I often feel that he is forcing the material he's dealing with into his preconceived rational scheme of things. He is imposing a rational structure on reality rather than seeing the rational in the real.' (p. 141)

He puts this more specifically in his conclusion:-

'The theory of the law-spheres is a straight-jacket into which reality is forced to fit.' (p. 153)

¹² Whether these claims are substantiated or are windy rhetoric--whistling in the dark-may be indicated by the degree of seriousness with which such liberal theology is taken by the academic community at large. Do the philosophers, the sociologists, the psychologists, the literary critics or the physicists anxiously ponder whether their own researches are out of line with such academic theology and therefore invalid? Hardly. Rather, such theology is usually perceived by secularized academics as pathetic-out of date, ill-informed, evasive in discussion, equivocal in use of concepts--and desperately scrambling for a few small crumbs of academic respectability. Nor should we miss the fact that very few scholars nowadays make such claims for their own disciplines. The philosophers of science and quite a few physicists won't even make such claims for physics! But this word on the streets hasn't yet reached the ears of most of the theologians. Will someone please tell them!

In response to this charge I would like to make a number of points. First, the charge is pure assertion. No examples are given of reality being given a Procrustean treatment by Dooyeweerd so there is [155] nothing specific to discuss. But perhaps a clue exists in the word he has italicized, the word '*rigid*'. Here is my guess at his meaning. For the last four hundred years, western humanism has produced a whole succession of highly reductionist philosophies which have attempted to reduce the whole of reality to one or two of its aspects, e.g., materialism, physicalism, biologism, psychologism, rationalism, sociologism, historicism, economism, etc. About all these systematic philosophical schemes it can rightly be said that they attempt to find unity and coherence at the price of losing the richness of reality. Dooyeweerd sees all such schemes as idolatrous—the rejection of the Creator and the idolatrous absolutisation of one or more aspects of creation. A central characteristic of post-modernism is the confused recognition that there is nothing absolute within creation which can provide unity and coherence. One American humanist philosopher, Herbert Kohl, described the situation as follows¹³:-

At the outset of this century many people felt that this world was exceedingly simple and that its structure could be reflected through language. Either language could be reduced to an all-inclusive "logical" system, or essences and principles that would reveal reality in all its naked elegance and simplicity could be uncovered. At the turn of the century, and even after the Great War that no one believed in, the quest for simplicity was rife ...

To be "modern" in Europe and America is to give up simple explanations of man and the world, to embrace complexity once and for all. and to try, somehow, to manage it.

Modern philosophy is a philosophy of complexity and of disillusionment. Yet it is also a philosophy of discovery; for as modern philosophers accepted that they couldn't say "it all", that "it all" was, in fact, not to be said, they discovered a new richness in the world. When they realised that there could never again be a simple system of thought, they were able to begin orientating themselves in a world of newly discovered complexity.' (pp. 16-17)

This characterization is of course paradigmatically illustrated by the transition we find between Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (completed in 1918 and published in 1922) and his *Philosophical Investigations* (completed in 1945 and published in 1963). In the former we find the 'simplicity' of the crystalline world of logical-atomism, in the latter the complex world of evolving language games. Certainly, with respect to Wittgenstein, one slightly false note that Kohl, writing in 1965, brings to the situation [156] is an upbeat note of (American) optimism. In Wittgenstein, both early and later, we find a pervasive pessimism -- the main philosophical source of which was the writings of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, from whom Wittgenstein absorbed Buddhism at second hand.¹⁴

I suspect that Diller's 'rigidity' and Kohl's 'simplicity' are much the same in intent. And they both identify them with Christian philosophy or with Christianity in general. So their common message seems to be that philosophy needs to be liberated from the constrictions – of Christianity - to cease imposing a simple logical system on reality (Diller) and to cease demanding simple answers (Kohl). Kohl himself puts the latter point as follows in the conclusion or epilogue of his book:-

¹³ In *The Age of Complexity* (New York: Mentor Books, 1965).

¹⁴ See Bryan Magee's *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) – especially the appendices on Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein and on his Buddhism.

'There is no single explanation of all phenomena, no single characterisation of language, and most of all, no one point of view from which man 'must' be considered. Throughout my text there has been no mention of God or religion. This is not because contemporary philosophers are necessarily atheists, or because I believe modern philosophy refutes religion. Rather it is because contemporary philosophers, with few exceptions, have faced the fact that religion is no longer an active part of the everyday life of men in the Western world. Philosophy insofar as it considers the actual lives men lead these days must consider life as lived without divine guidance or grace. *Life has become too complex for simple answers; hence philosophy insofar as it is modern does not consider religion an issue... Life does not have a single great question with a single answer, but questions and answers'* (p. 271 and my italics)

But, of course, Kohl himself is demanding that philosophy is and must be secularized in order to fit the modern humanist worldview and lifestyle. Religion - along with its simple questions and answers - must be excluded. The resulting philosophy may well show little indication of 'divine guidance or grace'. What Kohl does not seem to have considered is the possibility of divine judgement on philosophies that suppress the truth by rejecting the light of revelation (Romans 1:18-21, 1 Corinthians 1:18-25). The assumption of Kohl (and Diller?) is that if the western humanist tradition cannot supply a systematic philosophy that can take seriously both the unity and the diversity of creation then such a philosophy is not to be had and the demand for one is pointless. So unity is to be abandoned-and [157] questions about K are to be banned as 'metaphysical', 'pre-Fregean' or simply 'old-fashioned'-and diversity (or complexity) is to, be embraced as *ultimate*. The possibility that systematic philosophy may indeed be possible on an alternative Christian foundation is nowhere investigated. Nor should it be overlooked that it was precisely those secularising philosophies precipitated by the 'Cartesian revolution' that introduced into modern philosophy a whole series of 'simple' philosophies with their highly reductionist ontologies. Medieval philosophies stemming from a Christian worldview---in spite of their syntheses with paganism-had much richer and more complex ontologies.

Dooyeweerd's Christian Philosophy and Education

What I find striking is that Dooyeweerd's account of the structure and aspects of reality is, to the best of my knowledge, so much richer and more empirically adequate than anything else on the market, past or present. One simple example will have to suffice here. Let us briefly compare Dooyeweerd with those (former) giants of British philosophy of education, Professors Richard Peters and Paul Hirst. Simply with respect to Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects-which is only a small part of his systematic philosophy Dooyeweerd recognizes fifteen irreducible aspects of creation. Hirst and Peters have only seven 'forms of knowledge'.¹⁵ Dooyeweerd's elaborated theory has provided tools and categories which have been hailed by scholars in every discipline as providing crucial insights for their theoretical investigations. The theory of Hirst and Peters - which is actually little more than some ideas towards a theory - was, for a season, admired, preached and then quietly abandoned. The real questions, of course, are as to whether there are more (or fewer) aspects, what exactly they are, and how they relate and cohere. For a fruitful debate these matters need to be considered in detail and other comparable theories articulated. Unfortunately Diller offers us neither in his discussion.

¹⁵ 15. For a detailed comparison see my M.Ed. thesis 'Reason and Commitment in Education' (Bristol University, 1976).

In conclusion, let me ask the *Spectrum* reader's inevitable question, 'But what's in Dooyeweerd for education and educationalists?'. That's the subject of another article but, for now, let me mention a few books. Many of you will have read *Curriculum Unmasked* (1989), a popular book in which Mark Roques utilizes many of Dooyeweerd's [158] insights without using the terminology. Three other educational works in the Dooyeweerdian tradition which make major contributions to Christian reflection are the following: Harro Van Brummelen's *Walking with God in the Classroom* (1988), Stuart Fowler, Harro Van Brummelen and John Van Dyk's *Christian Schooling Education for Freedom* (1990) and Rockne McCarthy, Donald Oppewnaal, Walfred Peterson and Gordon Spykman's *Society, State and Schools: A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism* (1981). Here in my view are some good educational fruits of the Christian philosophy associated with Dooyeweerd. Check them out!¹⁶

¹⁶ Dooyeweerd is a substantial but not the only contributor to what is known as the 'Reformational Movement' which now has international dimensions. The term 'reformational' intentionally implies ever ongoing reformation rather than any claim to finality or perfection. I see myself as within this general movement but, like many others, am convinced that redemption is the restoration of creation (Cf. Al Wolters' *Creation Regained*, IVP, 1986). A number of us feel that Dooyeweerd is mistaken on the subject of time and eternity and that, as a result, his eschatology is far too neo-Platonic - but he is not alone in this!