Groundwork
Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals pursues the notion that moral law must be a general formula that is applicable in any type of situation and should not be influenced by specific interests, conditions or circumstances. Any influences derived from culture or society should not affect one's motive for action. Despite Kant's repeated attempts to emphasize the universality of a priori moral principles, unfettered by a posteriori contingencies, he fails to recognize the possibility that moral principles cannot be developed without consideration of the societal and cultural circumstances that affects us as human beings. Morals belong to the realm of humans as they do not exist in the non-human animals while distinctive features of human beings include the institution of society and the faculty to have culture. Stripped of these traits, humans can no longer be considered in the same light and any consideration of morals applying to such beings would seem invalid as universally applicable to human beings.
The notion that moral law be a general formula, universally applicable, a priori, is a fundamental idea in Kant's Groundwork. Kant asserts that it would be impossible for us to derive universal moral laws from specific events and experiences. Since all events are contingent upon specific circumstances, none of our experiences can be a source of moral principles that apply in all cases and all circumstances and it would be impossible for us to derive a priori ideas from examples in our experience. As such, a priori principles are independent of anything empirical or a posteriori. " [...] not only are moral laws [...] essentially different from all the rest in which there is some empirical [a posteriori] element, but the whole of moral philosophy is based entirely on the part of it that is pure [a priori]." (Kant 57) Conditions such as those related to society are then empirical and moral law cannot be based on such contingencies if it is to be a universally valid moral law.
Yet humans are inherently social animals and morals are arguably directly related to the institution of society. Non-human animals do not have morals, even humanoid/human-predecessor animals did not have morals. The faculty of language was undoubtedly required for the emergence of morals and the rise of society accompanied the rise of language. Indeed, to discuss morality without considering the circumstances of human society and culture undermines the value of morality, with morality being distinctively human. To illustrate the importance of including societal factors in the consideration of supposedly universal moral principles it may be useful to give an example.
Take the prohibition against theft. We, as members of a Western society, live in a world of property. In our world, shaped by values of our culture and society, it is contradictory to steal, because when you steal you expect others to recognize your ownership of what you have stolen even though you failed to respect the ownership of the person who you stole it from. Yet let us imagine a world without a concept of personal property, a world where everything is collectively owned by the community. In such a world (which existed in aboriginal cultures), there would be no such thing as theft because there would be no such thing as personal property. It seems to be the case that a moral law against theft would be non-contradictory and universally applicable but what value does it have in a society where theft does not exist?
Such an analysis can be applied to almost all other moral laws such as those against lying. (Lying, in our society, is self-contradictory but may not be so in a society with different expectations.) Kant's overemphasis on a priori principles as guiding principles for the formulation of a general moral law is restricted by his ethnocentric view of how the world works. He fails to recognize that "universal" laws are universal only in certain contexts and we cannot know what actions are self-contradictory or invalid as moral law before we know what society a particular person is living in. In Chapter 2 of Groundwork, Kant gives four examples of how he thinks the categorical imperative should be applied in everyday life. (Kant 96-98) Each of these examples of duty seems to be affected by the social institutions and traditions of Kant's world. Though most people would not disagree with the values that are explicit in his examples, they can hardly said to be absolute, universally applicable imperatives.
Although Kant's general formula for the moral law as universally applicable and based in a priori principles is useful as a starting point for the discussion of morality, he fails to take into account the extreme possibility that even blatantly self-contradictory actions may not be deemed as immoral in a society where there is no conception of such an action. Kant is correct in asserting that a priori principles are required in order to make bias-free determinations of what should be universally applicable moral law but ultimately, we as humans are constituted by many a posteriori influences that cannot just be stripped away. Humans, without the influences of society and culture, can no longer properly be considered humans. What would you have other than an automaton that spends its life in pure rational thought? A discussion into morals must necessarily take the influences of society into consideration.