Monsters and History:
Traditional and Posthuman Monsters
J.
Randall Groves, Ph.D.
Professor
of Humanities
Ferris
State University
“All beings so far have created something
beyond themselves; and do you want to be the ebb of this great flood and even
go back to the beasts rather than overcome man? What is the ape to man? A
laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And man shall be just that for the
overman: a laughingstock or painful embarrassment.” (Thus Spake Zarathustra, First Part, 3)
The presentation of monsters in science fiction and horror as well as
the contemplation of their creation in the musings of worried medical ethicists
display fairly consistent visions of possible futures. These visions reveal an
antipathy toward the seemingly inevitable evolution of a “posthuman” species as
humans make increasing use of genetic engineering and human interfaces with
mechanical objects and digital systems. To the extent that these changes become
commonplace they invite a change in the form of transformation into something
evolutionary. This evolutionary possibility implicates a philosophy of history
that projects changes in our conception of human nature, changes that make
clear that human nature is itself historical. This change in our view of human
nature also affects the way we conceive of monsters.
Not all monsters imply an historical theory. Traditional monsters such
the werewolf, the dragon, the vampire and the gargoyle appeal to “dark
traditions.” These dark traditions are generally the result of a dialectical
polarity with religious traditions. Although religion typically has a theory of
history, the monsters that result from the dialectical polarity are only
historical in the sense of that a being that represents “fallen nature” is a
detour from the historical process. They represent, at most, a temporary
degradation from the inevitable victory of the true faith of believers.
Traditional monsters are generally accidents of birth. As Marie-Helene
Huet points out, women are associated with monsters in being regarded as
accidents of birth. We see this view in Empedocles and Aristotle, and the view
stays alive in the Western tradition in spite of the fact that biology tells us
that if either sex is “accidental,” it is the male sex, with the female being
the “default” sex unless certain changes are brought about to transform the
female into a male. Aristotle writes, “Anyone who does not take after his
parents is really in a way a monstrosity, since in these cases Nature has in a
way strayed from the generic type. The first beginning of this derivation is
when a female is formed instead of a male.”[1]
This connection between women and monsters will turn out to be a key to
understanding how monsters came to embody philosophies of history.
Huet also shows us the connection between bad birth and women’s
imagination. She writes, “Since Antiquity, even the most innocuous deformities,
birthmarks, had been thought to have been caused by the mother’s imagination
and her capacity to imprint on her child’s body the mark of a cherished
object.”[2]
Finally, Huet argues that monsters are an instantiation or residue of
immoral actions.[3] The monster
is the curse that results from immoral actions. There is always some “original
sin” at the source of the generation of the monster.
All this adds up to show that the traditional role of the monster in
literature and film is to give a negative conception of “the other.” And there
will always be the other. Indeed, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen has as one of his seven
theses concerning monster culture that “the monster always escapes.”[4]
The monster never dies. And since traditional monsters never die, they cannot
be historical. History requires finitude. History is not the eternal recurrence
of the same; it is on-going change that creates real difference.
Typical examples of traditional monsters include the vampire, the
mummy, the werewolf, King Kong, the Creature from the Black Lagoon and more
recently, Clive Barker’s cenobites from his Hellraiser series. These
monsters are abominations of nature, twisted versions of normality. Each of
these examples has its own genesis story, but I will limit my treatment to two,
werewolves and cenobites, that display some typical characteristics of
traditional monsters. Werewolves are generally interpreted to represent the
fear of adolescent transformation and subsequent loss of control. The cenobites
represent the dangers of overreaching desire and curiosity and the transforming
effect of immoral behavior. Cenobites begin as ordinary humans, but their quest
for every greater pleasures and pains as well as the quest for ever more exotic
experience gradually transforms their bodies until they become monsters in the
flesh to mirror the monstrosity of their minds. Werewolves are the more tragic
since they are victims, while the cenobites choose to become monsters. In
neither case, however, do these monsters implicate the future so as to imply a
philosophy of history. Posthuman monsters, on the other hand, do imply a
philosophy of history. Before we discuss posthuman monsters, however, we need
to explain a bit more what is meant by posthumanism.
As humans become ever more intertwined with technology, they find
themselves becoming something more than human, something “posthuman.” Another
term often used is “cyborg,” which was originally reserved for human/technology
mixtures, but has come to mean any blurring of the human and “other.”[5]
Posthumans are also likely to welcome non-humans to the posthuman future.
Artificial intelligence, robots, created species, chimeras (species mixes), a
global Internet consciousness, are all possible co-inhabitants of the future.
Posthuman monsters, such as
Frankenstein’s monster, Robocop, the Alien monsters, the hybrids of Octavia
Butler’s Zenogenesis series, unlike
traditional monsters, imply a possible future that has both positive and
negative aspects, but is almost always a posthuman future. Humans are about to
become something else. They are becoming posthuman, and possibly monsters. And
when the monster becomes posthuman, it
adds an historical dimension because the monster presents a possible form
humans could take in the future.
The notion of the posthuman is therefore a theory of history as well as
an addendum to the theory of evolution. To be sure, posthuman evolution is
different from biological evolution. There is not necessarily the sense that
the human species will be left behind by a superior species that mutates from
it because of a singular advantage. Rather, different people will deploy a
range of posthuman changes to improve life or to adapt to conditions. People
will choose their physical and mental forms, and they will not
necessarily be consistent. People will choose differently according to their
personal taste and according to their income. Some may not choose wisely, and
they may become monsters.
The posthuman monsters of contemporary science fiction and horror
suggest a different unfortunate result to human overreaching than that of
traditional monsters like the cenobites. Overreaching has roots in
Judeo-Christian religion with the stories of the Garden of Eden and the Tower
of Babel. Overreaching occurs when humans attempt to move beyond traditionally
defined limits. The cenobites seek an unending increase in earthly experience.
They are moving beyond the moral limits imposed by religion, but they most
certainly are not attempting to reach the divine, which is a key element of
overreaching and a central taboo of most religion. This taboo, however, is
given a positive interpretation by the Enlightenment with its belief in the
perfectibility of man and universal human progress. The perfectibility of man
is, of course, a theory of history. The posthuman monster tells us that just as
the belief in the perfectibility of man can paradoxically lead to human terror
in politics, as occurred in the French and Russian revolutions, it can also
create monsters. Goya’s “Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters,” which is a
political statement about the French Revolution also accurately predicts the coming
of posthuman monsters.
While there has been little discussion of the historical implications
of monsters and posthumanism, history has not been completely ignored in
studies of the posthuman. Elaine Graham, in an excellent treatment of the
posthuman,[6]
relies heavily on the historical views of Michel Foucault, which are very
insightful, particularly with regard to the history of posthuman-present.
Monsters reveal the necessary negation, the “fracture” of the established
order. Nevertheless, Graham’s use of Foucault neglects how science fiction
presents the posthuman future-historically. Science fiction operates with a
view of history drawn largely from the Enlightenment’s belief in progress but
with a counterweight from the Romantic critique of this belief. While a
Foucauldian analysis is helpful for explaining some of the elements of the
Romantic critique in posthumanism, it misses other elements and fails to
capture the Enlightenment views that underlie posthumanism. Thus we need to
supplement our Foucauldian analysis with one that draws upon a historical
theory that is a better fit with the posthuman ambivalence toward scientific
progress.
By its very nature, Science Fiction has been involved in the
postulation of future histories. The most notable example, of course, is the Foundation
Series by Isaac Asimov. In this paper, however, I am not as interested in
the explicit treatments of history in science fiction, but the implicit
philosophy of history that comes with stories dealing with posthuman monsters.
Interestingly, given the deep connection between monsters and women
alluded to earlier, it is precisely when “woman” becomes historical that
monsters become historical. Mary Shelley’s mother writes “Vindication of the
Rights of Women” and then gives birth to Mary Shelley, who, in turn, gives
birth to Frankenstein’s monster. When the traditional category of the female is
called into question by feminism the whole idea of woman becomes historical.
Now it is true that 19th century thought is generally historical,
and so one might argue that 19th century monsters like Frankenstein
were bound to be historical since they reflected their age. But the vampire is
also a quintessentially 19th century monster born of Romanticism,
and some could argue that it was born on the same night as Frankenstein at the
ghost story writing contest at the home of Lord Byron.[7]
I would argue, however, that although the religious components of the Romantic
critique of the Enlightenment help to maintain the interest in traditional
monsters, it also creates a new kind of monster altogether.
Some Posthuman monsters
The Alien series uses the monstrous vision of H.R. Giger, whose
“biomechanical” aesthetic forces us to visualize a mixture of the organic and
inorganic. There have been several interpretations of the Alien series
as an exploration of the “monstrous-feminine,”[8]
but it has not been noted how the changeable concept of human nature, of
historical nature, is developed in these films. The aliens impregnate humans
and other creatures in a perverse version of reproduction involving oral rape.
The results of these mutant pregnancies subsequently take on some of the
features of humans and other creatures such as the ship creature from the fist
film and the dog from the third. The fourth film brings out this theme more
explicitly in several ways. The hybrid nature of the cloned Ripley, the failed
clones of Ripley, the “child-monster” of the queen and Ripley—these are all
posthuman creatures that signal a hybrid or cyborg future. And in Alien vs.
Predator we see an Alien/Predator combination at the end. This future
history of alien contact is very dystopic since very little of humanity
survives the combination.
Very similar to the Giger/Scott aliens are Octavia Butler’s Oankali of
her Zenogenesis series and the Borg of Star Trek. Both of these creatures absorb some aspects of their
victims and create new species, but in both cases more of humanity is
maintained in the hybrid. Both still present dystopic futures, but not quite as
much is lost to the monster as with the Alien series. In fact, arguments
are made in both cases that the result is a step up from humanity, a superior
hybrid. Butler attempts to help us come to terms with deviant sexuality by
asking that we imagine a benevolent species that travels the universe looking
for “failed species” and combining with them through genetic mixing and
manipulation. An interesting twist is that the Oankali and humans initially
find each other deeply repulsive. The main character, Lilith, can hardly bear
to even look at an Oankali, never mind engage in sex with it and give birth to
a hybrid. Although the Oankali appear to the reader to be benevolent, the
humans, unsurprisingly, find the prospect of mixing species horrific. Another
key to the story is that humans are presented as inherently defective because
of their destructive combination of intelligence and hierarchy. The combination
will “cure” us of our defect and give rise to a new species without it. The
Oankali, too, will be improved by the combination. But some humans never come
to terms with the Oankali and prefer to die out rather than combine with them.
Butler manipulates the reader into thinking these recalcitrant humans exhibit
precisely the defects in human nature that caused our near self-destruction and
that a more progressive human will embrace the Oankali and its promise of a
star-faring hybrid future.
The Borg of Star Trek are a biomechanical hybrid species that absorbs
all alien races into its collective. Above all, the Borg reject individuality.
As each new species is conquered, it is fitted with mechanical interfaces that
enable it to perform various tasks as well as communicate with all other Borg
in a collective consciousness. Individuality, the Borg argue, is flawed, and
individuals lead a flawed existence. In fact, humans find removing their kind
from previous incorporation into the Borg collective very difficult since these
people generally agree that the Borg existence is superior. Only after a
long-term reindoctrination do these former Borg embrace humanity and
individuality. The Borg idea speaks to our deep-seated fear that technology may
get out of control and eventually take us over. Unlike the Terminator
series, however, humans are not eliminated, they are incorporated. Like the
Butler’s humans, Star Trek’s humans find Borg and Borg life repulsive. Unlike
Butler’s humans, Star Trek’s humans are presented as correct in resisting
incorporation. Both cases, however, ask us to consider that humanity might be
improved in ways, which, while they fall short of full-scale incorporation,
still present an improvement. So while we may not wish to give up our
individuality altogether, we might want to consider being a little less
individualistic. We even might gain by having the ability to be in constant
communication with other people or by incorporating various kinds of mechanical
or cybernetic interfaces into our bodies.
Cronenberg has done more than any other filmmaker to explore the limits
of the posthuman. The posthumans of David Cronenberg are notable for blurring
the boundaries between the human and animal and the human and computer.
Existenz, Videodrome, the Brood and the Fly all explore human-animal-computer
mixes. Existenz and Videodrome also blur the boundaries and
nature of perception and reality. The
Brood and The Fly deal with the
notions of hybridity and mutation, but they do not add anything important to
the above discussions. On the other hand, Existenz and Videodrome explore how reality itself may change in the posthuman
era. The games of Existenz do not create a mere virtual reality; they
create another reality, and possibly a superior reality. Cyberspace in
Cronenberg’s films is a highly sensual reality rather than our current, rather
sterile, on-line reality. The characters in these films swear to the “higher”
existence achieved and look down upon ordinary perceptual existence. Future
history is therefore not only a new time; it is a new place and a new feeling.
The rules of experience are changed.
Another sort of posthuman monster is the artificially intelligent
beings we anticipate as robots or androids. In popular culture, such posthumans
include the robots of I, Robot, A.I., Data from Star Trek and the Terminator. These posthumans are created by humans, but they are
not human hybrids. Rather, they add a new partner in the community of
intelligent beings. These posthumans have aspirations that fit their
predicament: “I want to be a real boy.” They may be friends or partners, like
the Bicentennial Man or Data, or they
might be irrevocably hostile like the Terminator.
They may fight for their rights like the Bicentennial
Man, or they may fight to eliminate ours. We will not know until they
exist. And when they do, it may be beyond our abilities to turn back the clock.
Things may go horribly wrong with artificially intelligent beings, but things
have sometimes gone horribly wrong among humans. The genocidal killers of
Rwanda or Nazi Germany probably hold their own against most descriptions of
possible future horror by artificially intelligent beings. Despite the
misgivings of some philosophers, the future will probably bring us artificial
companions, and these companions will probably be both good and evil. On this
point, Nietzsche is undoubtedly wrong. What comes after humanity will not be
beyond good and evil.
There is yet another type of posthuman, the inferior or fallen
posthuman. The key example of this type of posthuman is the Zombie. While the
Zombie is very much like traditional monsters, it has some key characteristics
of the posthuman. The first zombies to hit the screen came out shortly after
the Red Scare of the 1950’s. Americans were afraid that they or their neighbors
might be the victims of communist brainwashing, that they would lose their
individuality and their powers of reason to communist ideology. They were also
afraid of the geometric progression of the zombie’s bite. Zombies create many
zombies, which, in turn, create many zombies, together yielding a geometric
progression that quickly overruns humanity. Although communism is never
mentioned, it is fairly clear that this fear made the original zombie film, Night of the Living Dead, resonate with
audiences. Later, the zombie changed its signification and became associated
with consumerism, as we see in the film, Dawn
of the Dead. This is not to neglect the traditional fears the zombie spoke
to, namely the taboos concerning cannibalism and dead bodies. But an important
element in the idea of the zombie is surely the fear that humans will devolve into
something less than human rather than evolve into something greater than human
and that this devolution will be a rapid geometric process. If we can get
better, we can certainly get worse. And we sometimes do get terribly worse,
worse even than the monsters that are supposed to scare us. An accurate film
rendering of the Rwandan genocide would look rather more like Dawn of the
Dead than it would Hotel Rwanda, and it would be just as horrific.
One might argue that the
vampire idea contains posthuman elements. I have already identified the vampire
as a traditional and therefore non-historical monster, but there are elements
that coincide with some of the posthuman monsters. The geometrically
progressing nature of vampire mirrors that of the Zombie, but rarely is
geometric logic used in vampire films, with the notable exception of the film, Lifeforce.
The notion of the separation of species is generally piecemeal. The number of
vampires is typically kept small to maintain the secret of their existence. The
vampires do not represent the future. In fact, Anne Rice works with the notion
of vampires as preservers rather than as creators of culture.[9]
Posthuman horror is more ambivalent than traditional horror. While one
might want to be immortal like a vampire, most would reject the high cost of
becoming one. Posthumanity, on the other hand, offers much that we might very
well accept if we could be certain of avoiding the dangers that the posthuman
poses. Although I might worry about viruses, if I could be sure of avoiding
them, or at least their more pernicious effects, I would probably agree to be
fitted with internal hard drives and wireless connectivity with others. If I
could grow wings that looked like angel wings rather than something horrific, I
might choose to do so. The appeal of the posthuman is partly what makes it a
philosophy of history. It also relocates the fear associated with monsters from
“the other” to ourselves. The Enlightenment’s turn to critical self-awareness
was bound to eventually become a Romantic cognizance of the dangers of our
embrace of constant self-recreation. We are afraid that the changes we
willingly or unwillingly undergo will turn out badly and turn us into something
we abhor. The monsters we fear then will be the monsters that we become.
The sobering thought is that we probably will become posthuman to an
ever-greater degree. We might not even recognize the humans of the year 3000.
And they might look back in embarrassment that we even considered saying no to
posthuman evolution.
[1] Aristotle, Generation of Animals, trans. A.L. Peck (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1963), I xxi, 113, quoted in Huet, Monstrous Imagination (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 3.
[2] Huet, 16.
[3] Huet, 21.
[4] “Monster Culture (Seven Theses)," Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, in Monster Theory, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 4.
[5] See, in particular, Donna J. Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, (New York: Routledge, 1991).
[6] Elaine Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture. (Manchester UP, 2002).
[7] I am thinking of Polidori’s contribution, “Vampyre.”
[8] See, for example, Barbara Creed’s The Monstrous-Feminine (London: Routledge, 1993), 16-31.
[9] This is the argument of Frank Grady in his article on vampires in Monster Theory, 225-41.