

natural reason, its speculative metaphysical-theo-ontological speculation concerning the being of God, its idea of the soul as a substantial, rational form, etc. These latter points and many others have been thoroughly developed by Dooyeweerd,¹⁴⁵ and are necessary for seeing the background of the nature-grace views of eternity as they apply to God, man, and the cosmos, as well as to time, eschatology, and history.

Obviously the description given here of these views is influenced by an elaborate view of these matters on our part. In the thetical part of this dissertation a systematic presentation of our views on eternity, time, etc., will be given, at which time it would be well to refer back to this section. A general survey of the nature-grace thinking on these points was necessary to show the background for the critical points in Dooyeweerd, since he shares the nature-grace thinking presented here. Before evidence is given to this it is necessary to emphasize the wide-spread character of these views so that Dooyeweerd's synthesis on these points might be put in proper perspective.

¹⁴⁵. See footnote 93 of this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

SPECIFIC CRITIQUE AND EVIDENCE OF SYNTHESIS ON THE PROBLEM OF GOD'S ETERNITY, MAN'S ETERNITY, AND TIME

The transcendental critical thinking of Dooyeweerd is founded in a vision concerning God's eternity, creaturely eternity, and time, and his vision on these points is controlled by the religious ground-motive of nature-grace. There is no quarrel with the central thrust of the transcendental critique, i.e., that theoretical thinking is not autonomous, and that the autonomy of theoretical thought is the result of an absolutizing of theoretical thinking, which absolutization is caused by a prior religious, central commitment. The central choice of position which controls the direction of our theorizing is of a religious character. However, the transcendental critique itself in its steps and three basic problems as Dooyeweerd outlines them, cannot be followed any longer. The very statement of the details of this critique betrays the influence of nature-grace. It could be agreed with Dooyeweerd that the gegenstand relation is of central importance and must always be clearly distinguished from naive experience. But to some extent, even in the formulation of the gegenstand relation, the nature-grace influence comes to expression. Vollenhoven has recently stressed the importance of the gegenstand relation.¹ This is important since he sees clearly the nature-grace influence on Dooyeweerd. Although he does not refer to his criticism in these terms, his thinking differs precisely from

1. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 6, 11, 14.

Dooyeweerd's at the points where it seems that the nature-grace influence is the strongest. Vollenhoven clearly rejects the transcendent, supra-temporal character of the selfhood and yet wants jealously to maintain the gegenstand relation of theoretical thought. This is totally impossible for Dooyeweerd. The third part of the transcendental critique especially, presupposes a transcendent point above the temporal horizon with its cosmic diversity, if self-reflection and a totality view, time consciousness, and intermedial synthesis are to be achieved. It is to be one of our theses that to work in terms of the transcendental critique the way Dooyeweerd sets it up involves one in the nature-grace influence in his thinking. This critique compels one to accept his nature-grace vision on the points of created eternity and time. The setting or placing or formulation of the problem (problemstelling) of the transcendental critique must be challenged since it presupposes nature-grace thinking in Dooyeweerd.

Transcendental critical thinking serves two basic uses in Dooyeweerd. First, it serves the reformatio-nal use of seeking to expose, "lay bare," the religious ground-motive behind the autonomy of theoretical thought. It seeks to show immanence thinking from the inner nature of theoretical thought itself, that theoretical thought has religious presuppositions and presupposits, i. e., that there is a religious choice of position and commitment directing and underlying theoretical thought, and thus it seeks to expose autonomy. Its reformatio-nal value is consequently seen in that it seeks to cut off all speculative metaphysics and theo-ontological speculation. Christian transcendental critical thinking is anti-speculative, anti-metaphysical thinking. This is its great emphasis. It seeks to show that in its various expressions

speculative metaphysics is based on the dogmatic and uncritical posture of the autonomy of theoretical thought. This is Dooyeweerd's intention and the reformatio-nal line.

A second use of the transcendental critique is more important for this dissertation. The transcendental critique serves to cover up the nature-grace influence on Dooyeweerd and the specific ontology type which lies at the basis of his formulation of the steps of the transcendental critique itself. Dooyeweerd, like Kant, wants to demand that theoretical thought be modest. This modesty in Kant, as Dooyeweerd has repeatedly emphasized, is a mask. It seems that there is a masking of a deeper problem via the transcendental critique which can also be found in Dooyeweerd. In other words, there is a certain amount of ekspis² involved in transcendental critical thinking as Dooyeweerd explicates it. For example, by stating that time is the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, he protects himself from all penetration of the nature-grace motive. It could be agreed that cosmic time is the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, but for Dooyeweerd this implies a distinct view of time which is immediately correlated to the transcendental religious horizon. Created eternity is elevated beyond the reach of thought, especially theoretical thought. Time, for instance, in our view, should not be limited to our earthly temporal horizon, but rather, it ought to be maintained that all that is created is temporal and all that is temporal is created. In Dooyeweerd's view there is an undue restriction placed on theoretical thought because his idea of cosmic time

2. By ekspis is meant an attitude of unbelief that does not make full use of the Word of God and the perspective found in the Scriptures. It unduly restricts the significance of the Scriptures for theorizing by falling into minimal biblical reflection and usage.

the heart, the church, sacrament,⁶ and angels. They are mysterious and unfathomable for different reasons. There is no need, therefore, to restrict the temporal to the "earthly" as Dooyeweerd does, and also no need for correlating the temporal to the central sphere of created eternity. If we follow Dooyeweerd here, we are left wholly in the dark as to what angelic beings are like, what heaven is all about, and all of the riches of Word-revelation concerning these central points does not sufficiently direct our perspective. This is an example of skepticism that seems to be implied in the transcendental method. By holding to the importance of this central supra-temporal sphere and by calling it the central sphere of occurrence, he succeeds in hiding the nature-grace influence from being exposed. It means that Dooyeweerd, by his own principles of transcendental critical thinking, cannot speak about the central supra-temporal sphere. To this principle he is quite consistent and consequently it is very hard to detect the nature-grace influence concerning his view of created eternity and religious transcendence, since he cannot describe it theoretically according to his own principles. Dooyeweerd therefore can point to any attempt to lay his thinking open at these points as a violation of critical thinking, or any attempt to describe this transcendent realm in the past history of theology or philosophy, as metaphysical speculation. It seems, however, that he violates his own critical method enough on these points for one to see the influence at the bottom of his transcendental critique. If one compares Dooyeweerd with Diemer on these points one can see a marked

6. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, IV, pp. 48ff. This feature that things within the time horizon are mysterious and unfathomable is the stress of Popma throughout his whole 7 volumes.

is limited to the earthly. In this way the supra-temporal, central, religious realm is one which increasingly takes the importance, and the temporal earthly world is only seen as the expression field of the eternal, both in its divine and creaturely sense. In this way, if he was operating with a scholastic view of created eternity, it could never be analyzed by theoretical thought, since theoretical thought is strictly limited to the temporal earthly horizon as Dooyeweerd sets it up. As a matter of fact, cosmic time is always to be seen in strict correlation to created eternity in Dooyeweerd's system. As an alternative to this, one could maintain that if what is central or religious is included in cosmic time, then that does not imply at all that it can be made into a ground of theoretical thought, since theoretical thought can still be religiously directed. The heart of man is not analyzable, not because it transcends the temporal horizon, but because it is the ground³ of theoretical thinking which cannot be turned back upon by theoretical thinking unless the ground itself be relinquished and another ground be taken. Many facets of created reality, all of which are completely subject to time and within the time horizon, are completely unfathomable to theoretical thinking, e.g., Christ in his human nature,⁴ animals,⁵

3. By "ground" it is meant that it is the necessary basis for any concept or idea, and that one can conceive religion without being religiously determined, so that one is necessarily involved in a regressus ad infinitum. See Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte (Kampen; J. H. Kok, 1956), pp. 92-93, 110-111. Popma, in contrast to Dooyeweerd, believes one cannot even have an idea of religion (p. 93). Cf. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 57.

4. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, I, p. 58, concerns the image of God in man and mystery in general.

5. Popma, De Beeldschap van het Boek Job (Gees: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1957), passim. Popma finds in God's pointing out to Job his stupidity, the unfathomable depth of wisdom in the animal world and the impenetrable mystery which all animals present us with. Also, Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under dierenwereld.

difference. Whether there is a real difference between these men on the points of God's eternity, time, or created eternity, is able to be doubted. But one thing seems clear, and that is that Diemer is much more speculative on these points than Dooyeweerd would ever be. If one would try to show Dooyeweerd's views by criticizing Diemer's views on the same points, Dooyeweerd would undoubtedly disavow Diemer's views as being speculative metaphysics. Nevertheless, the same structure is in Dooyeweerd, though masked, and this masking is due to his stress on carrying forth consistently transcendental critical thinking.

In order to point out carefully the nature-grace perspective influencing the formulation of the steps in the transcendental critique, it will be necessary to hunt for small clues in Dooyeweerd's idea of created eternity and God's eternity in order to reconstruct accurately his vision. There are only clues, because as has been intimated, it is in accordance with his critical thinking not to speculate about these matters of created eternity and the new earth. Nevertheless, it will be shown that Dooyeweerd has a definite view of these matters, which although mostly unexpressed, control his transcendental critique, method, and thinking.

That Dooyeweerd has the older, more scholastic view of eternal life comes out clearly in what he writes following the death of his friend, Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm. He writes, "Midden in zijn arbeid nam God hem op 76 jarigen leeftijd weg, zonder ziekbed, zonder doodstrijd in een haast onmerkbaar overglijding uit het tijdelijk naar het eeuwig leven."⁷ [underlining mine] Here we see what seems to be a scholastic view of eternal life. Eternal life is looked at here as something one enters

7. Dooyeweerd, "Ter nagedachtenis van mijn vriend Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm," p. 11.

when one leaves the temporal. It misconceives the range of the temporal. In contrast to this misconception, there is every reason also to think of the dead in Christ who are with Christ in heaven, as mysterious as it might be, to be completely subject to time and even to have time consciousness. What is more, it is the uniform testimony of the New Testament that eternal life is received through faith already before death, e.g., "Whosoever believeth in me hath eternal life and hath passed from death unto life and shall never die."⁸ Popma says that eternal life is dated. It has nothing to do with leaving the temporal. What is more, the temporal can never be left, not at death, nor on the new earth after the judgment. We shall see how this thought of Dooyeweerd fits with his idea that the heart of man is not subject to temporal death, but is, by its nature, eternal and incorruptible (onvergankelijk). Here we see the nature-grace postulate, that "time is for a time," that time ceases to be in effect at death. We could extend the application of this postulate to Dooyeweerd and say that for him the temporal functions are for a time, or the temporal function mantle is for a time. Since Dooyeweerd believes in a resurrection of the dead, the body of believers, it would seem, must be also a non-temporal body or a so-called "spiritual" or "glorified body," i.e., one fit for eternal life as opposed to the temporal which man leaves at death as he "glides over into eternal life." This alone is actually all that is needed to show the nature-grace construction in Dooyeweerd's thinking on these matters.

A very important passage which bears on this subject is to be found

8. John 5:24, 25; 6:40; 11:24-26; 3:16-18. See also Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under leven, eeuwig; leven, nieuw; for a running critique of the scholastic view of eternal life.

The whole quotation has been given because it is our intention to draw more than one conclusion from this passage, and also so that the reader may see the context in which these points come out. In line with what has been stressed, we again meet the phrase, "in this life" (in dit leven). This phrase, in the light of the quotation, shows how Dooyeweerd views time. This sentence from the quotation, "In this life the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) is bound... to time" has meaning only if one supposes that at some future date it will not be bound to time. We have already seen this to be the case when he speaks of "gliding over out of the temporal into eternal life." Here again we encounter the thought that the life to come is not bound to time. This definitely is a Greek idea. What also appears from this quotation is that Dooyeweerd is looking for an intermediate condition (tussentoeestand) between time and God's eternity. From this article it is patent that this notion was developed by the scholastic nature-grace thinkers, and Dooyeweerd even admits the similarity of his notion to the scholastic one, although he tries to set himself off from Boethius and Aquinas.¹⁰ However, the very thought of a non-temporal intermediate condition (tussentoeestand), no matter how one seeks to Christianize it, is already a nature-grace construct. It automatically brings with it the idea that something created is non-temporal and therefore eternal. This implies a restriction of the time idea, order idea, and law idea and brings another order, law, and world idea into juxtaposition with an "earthly" order idea, time idea, and law idea. Two order ideas, law ideas, and the idea of created time and created

10. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

when Dooyeweerd deals with the meaning of "het aeuum in de wijsbegeerte der wetidee." He says,

Het is nu duidelijk, dat deze opvatting van het 'aeuum' onmiddellijk verband heeft met de Aristotelische opvatting van eeuwigheid en tijd, en met de Aristotelische opvatting van 'ziel' en 'lichaam'. Is de tijd slechts de maat der beweging, dan kunnen de 'animae intellectivae' als zoodanig, d.i. naar haar wezen, niet aan den tijd onderworpen zijn. Op het Christelijk transcendentie-standpunt is deze opvatting meellijk te aanvaarden, omdat hier het centrum van de menselijke natuur niet in de 'rede' kan worden gezocht en dus ook de menselijke ziel, de 'inwendige mensch' of het 'hart' van 's menschen bestaan, niet langer als hypostase van een uit den tijdelijken kosmischen samenhang ge-abstraherd functiecomplex kan worden gevat.

Ik zou nechtens den term 'aeuum' in den zin van een tussentoeestand tusschen tijd en eeuwigheid, gaarne willen overnemen. Ik ween, dat daartegen te minder, bezwaar kan bestaan, omdat hij in desen zin juist in den Christelijken gedachtegang is opgekomen, die beheefte gevoelde aan een onderscheiding tusschen het beventijdelijke in creatuur-lijken zin en de eeuwigheid in den zin van het zijn Gods. In het menschelek zelfbewustzijn als centrum der religieuse concentratie aller tijdelijke functies ontmoeten wij dan inderdaad het beven-tijdelijke in den zin van het aeuum. Dat aeuum is dus als actuele toestand niets anders dan de grontrijke concentrering van het tijdelijke op de eeuwigheid in religieuse transcendering van de tijdelijke toestand.

Waar in het hart de eeuw gelegd is, beheert deze aeuum-toestand tot de ingeschapen structuur van ense zelfheid, die zich telkens meet actualiseeren, wanneer ens zelfbewustzijn in religieuse concentratie vergezigt is, zelfs al openbaart het aeuum-bewustzijn zich in een afvallige richting, doordat het het eeuwige in den tijd zoekt. Immers ook de vergeddelijking van het tijdelijke is slechts in religieuse transcendering van de tijdsgrens mogelijk, al blijft deze transcendering, als concentratie der tijdelijke functies, haar band aan die tijdsgrens behouden. In dit leven is de aeuum-toestand dus steeds aan den tijd gebonden. Een speculatie over den aeuum-toestand bij de schuldiging van ziel en lichaam, of bij de engelen, is wijsgeerig onvrichtbaar, en 'meteorica et vacua speculatio' in Calvijn's taal gesproken, omdat het hier gaat over 'verberggheden', die ens nog niet geopenbaard zijn. Al enke veertellingen, begrippen, en ideeën zijn in dit leven in den tijd gebonden, en ook ens zelfbewustzijn blijft op den tijds horizon betrekken, al transcendeert het den tijd in het aeuum.⁹

9. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentie-standpunt," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 4-5.

eternity are constitutive elements in nature-grace thinking.

Deeyeweerd stresses that "in this life" the condition of created eternity (serum-toestand) is always bound to time. Here we see the important stress on the correlation of created eternity and time. This thought must never be de-emphasized if the true importance of created eternity in Deeyeweerd is to be understood. It means two things: first, without this correlation no time consciousness is possible for man. It is precisely from his increased eternity consciousness that man achieves time consciousness and that he can know as his own, his body, i.e., his temporal function mantle which he leaves at death and which is subject to decay and temporality. Man has a time consciousness because he has an eternity consciousness, but he would have neither if he were only in time and not (in his heart) eternal and above cosmic time. In this same article he says,

Wanneer wij in het diepste concentratiepunt van ons bestaan den tijd niet te boven gingen, dan zou ook ons bewustzijn noodzakelijk in den tijd opgaan, en daarmee de mogelijkheid der religieuze zelf-concentratie ontbreken. Het zou geen tijdsprobleem kennen, want het wezenlijk probleem wordt de tijd eerst, wanneer wij digantisch tegenover hem kunnen nemen in het boven-tijdelijke, dat wij in het diepste van ons wezen ervaren. Slechts omdat de eeuw (het serum) in 's menschen hart gelegd is, terwijl hij met geheel zijn functieantel in den tijd bealeten is, kan hij ook wezenlijk tijdsbesef hebben. Ging hij existentieel in den tijd op, dan zou hij ook het waarachtig tijdsbesef missen.

Nu is het boven-tijdelijk concentratiepunt in het zelf-bewustzijn, dat zich slechts in de religieuze concentrering van al onze functies op de eeuwigheid kan actualiseeren, nog niet zelve eeuwig te nemen.

Waar op dit punt veel misverstand in sake mijn evvatting is gesezen, dien ik daarbij een oegeblik nader stil te staan. Reeds in de Christelijke synthesesophis uit den tijd der patrietiek en schelastiek werd de noodzakelijkheid ingezien tusschen tijd en ware eeuwigheid een tusschontestand aan te nemen, een aeternitas creata, welke niet den term werd aangeduid.¹¹

11. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

In a footnote dealing with the phrase in this quote, "de eeuw (het serum) in 's menschen hart gelegd is," Dooyeweerd says, "Ik laat thans in het midden of de bekende tekst van Prediker 3:11 in dezen zin moet worden verklaard. De geheele Heilige Schrift leert ons immers, dat het eeuwighheidsbesef aan 's menschen hart is ingeschapen."¹² This eternity consciousness not only provides man with the possibility of time consciousness, but enables one, as we have seen earlier, to have a totality view of the cosmos.¹³ We have also seen that unless he participates in the totality of meaning which is supra-temporal and eternal in a created sense (i.e., characterized by het serum) intersodal synthesis cannot be completed. To this is to be added that man would also not be able to have veritable self-knowledge since it is in the true condition of created eternity (serum-toestand) that he is vis à vis his eternal Origin. To be added to this is the very important facet that cosmological and cosmic consciousness depend on this created eternity of the heart.¹⁴ This shows the importance of the heart being supra-temporal if man is to be man. Man's consciousness enters the temporal by means of intuition and man's body is completely enclosed in the temporal except for the one transcendent point, or center of consciousness, which never can get into time, precisely because eternity has been laid in it and its nature is to be transcendent; that this center can never be temporal is clear because it only is meaning if it is subjected to the central unity of law, the law of love which as unity

12. Ibid., p. 2, footnote 1.

13. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 8, 11, 30-32, especially footnote 1 on p. 30.

14. Ibid., II, pp. 447-448, here referred to as the transcendent selfhood which we shall see is identical with the eternity in the heart of man which makes him transcendent in his center.

is the totality and fullness of the law on the law side. This means that it also cannot be temporal since all diversity of law proceeds from this transcendent unity of law precisely by being refracted through the prism of time. That the heart can never be temporal but is transcendent and only enters through intuition and has its body in time, comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd says that "de vergoddelijking van het tijdelijke is slechts in religieuze transcendentering van de tijdsgrans mogelijk, al blijft deze transcendentering, als concentratie der tijdelijke functies, haar band aan die tijdsgrans behouden."¹⁵ This should make it clear that transcending is not an activity through which the selfhood moves from within the time horizon to beyond the time horizon, so that if the activity stopped it would fall back into the time horizon. Even the deification of the temporal is done by the selfhood from its transcendent position towards the temporal. The selfhood is held in existence by its concentration law which guarantees its transcendent position even in apostasy.¹⁶ It is from this transcendent position that transcendence is possible. From the point of view of theoretical thought subject always to the transcendental horizon of cosmic time, we can see that our selfhood transcends cosmic time, that is, is above cosmic time, is transcendent. Our selfhood in the supra-temporal, and therefore transcendent, directs the temporal towards itself as root unity, that is, it concentrates it by drawing and directing its lower temporal bodily functions in creaturely concentration. This means that

15. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentiestandpunt," p. 5.

16. This fact comes out in his account of the opening process led by apostate faith in a disharmonious way which proves to be the result of the central tendency of the heart to absolutize. This shows that it retains its transcendent structure even when directed to the temporal. A New Critique, II, pp. 322-323.

by directing the lower to itself, the selfhood as root unity is directing the temporal to the eternal which in this case is the Origin. But the temporal is only centered or concentrated on the eternal Origin through the transcendent root unity, the selfhood, which is the individual concentration point.¹⁷ This concentration is actualized in self-reflection which is a religious act and which must be repeatedly actualized. Apostate theoretical thought fails to see its real transcendent concentration point in the selfhood because that selfhood is seeking to actualize itself by concentrating on the temporal. This means that apostate thought cannot help but absolutize one of the temporal aspects since this apostate thought is finally thought directed by the concentrating, absolutizing apostate ego or selfhood which is seeking its Origin and rest in the restless temporal meaning dynamics. Since apostate thought is not directed above the temporal it does not arrive at true transcendental self-reflection and time consciousness and seeks also its root unity as well as its Origin in an aspect.¹⁸

A second thing which is involved, because the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) is bound and correlated to time in this life, is that all our "voorstellingen begrippen en ideeën" are bound to time, and therefore our knowledge of the condition of created eternity is completely limited to the time horizon. This means that "in this life" there should be no speculation concerning the condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) at the time of the separation of soul and body, i.e., at death when the incorruptible (onvergankelijke) soul or selfhood

17. Ibid., I, p. 59. The individual selfhood can be called a concentration point and a root unity although the Archimedean point is always individual and supra-individual.

18. Ibid., II, pp. 323-325.

glides over into eternal life, or concerning the sevum or created eternity of the angels. The reason given is that "het hier gaat over 'verborgheden' die ons nog niet geopenbaard zijn." Here it is clear that Dooyeweerd regards the angels as characterized by the condition of created eternity (sevum-toestand), that he regards them also, as well as the soul or heart after death, as supra-temporal, eternal in the creaturely sense, but warns that as yet we do not know enough about this state since enough has still not been revealed and because we are still bound to time and in this life. Here many points dealt with so far in this dissertation come clear. It is a common constituent of all nature-grace thinking that angels are regarded as not subject to time, in spite of the clear testimony of Scripture to the contrary. Popma has repeatedly emphasized the time consciousness of demons and the fallen angels.¹⁹ It is simply inconceivable that one can deny that the angels are subject to cosmic time especially when one looks at the book of Revelation. Here in vision, John sees the heavenly thrones from which the judgments issue and are carried out by the angels. The heavenly creatures are on tiptoe waiting for the coming wrath of God, waiting for the opening of the seals. Perhaps one of the best intimations of the strong time awareness of heavenly creatures is in Revelation 10:6. This is the text which is the locus classicus for the idea that time ceases and eternity begins at the judgment day. It speaks of the fact that "there shall be time no longer." In the context of the opening of the seals it obviously refers to the fact that there will be no more postponement of the display of God's final wrath. It is time now for the

19. See footnote 116 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

seventh seal; there will be no more time or delay or postponement, but as the prophets have declared, the "mystery of God should be finished."²⁰ This text, which has been appealed to so repeatedly in Reformed and Catholic scholasticism, has nothing to do at all with the cessation of cosmic time so that eternity might begin. But it does clearly underscore the time consciousness of the heavenly creatures and their awareness of events, and indicates precisely the opposite of what it has been supposed to. This, along with Revelation 6:10 which speaks of the departed saints, beheaded, but asking under the altar "how long," shows unmistakably that Scripture does not hesitate in the least to think of the heavenly angels and departed saints as subjected to cosmic time and historical events and of these creatures as having a strong time consciousness in this state. It is true that these passages are not straight narrative and the book is filled with apocalyptic images, but it is the burden of this whole book to show the interrelation of Christ to his people and to history as a whole, so that his people on earth might be comforted to know that Christ directs their earthly lives and history as a whole. In the beginning of this chapter it was remarked that Dooyeweerd's critical thinking serves also the use of masking the nature-grace influence which lies hidden in his view of created eternity and time in addition to the reformational use of cutting off speculative metaphysical thinking. Here we see a good example of this. On the one hand he stresses that there can be no speculation about the sevum condition of the angels because there is not yet enough revelation and because our "thinking, representations, and ideas are bound to time," and

20. See footnote 139 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

on the other hand he assumes that angels are eternal, or are characterized by aeuum which is clearly a nature-grace speculative notion which Scripture in no way countenances. It is speculative metaphysical in the extreme to think of angels as participants in a condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) and thus not in time.²¹ In the history of scholastic theology the notion that angels did not have bodies and other speculative notions which were inherited from the Greek theo-ontological tradition, were said to come from the text that speaks of them as "ministering spirits."²² Popma points out that there is no reason to speak of angels as being characterized as non-bodily and the presumption is stronger that they ought to be thought of as being in possession of bodies.²³ But in any case, that they are eternal in a created sense is so interwoven with the nature-grace perspective on these points that it is astounding that Dooyeweerd did not see this. In another place in the same article we have been discussing, he speaks of Thomas' idea of the aeuum of the angels without seeing the full speculative depths of the whole idea.

On the one hand, Dooyeweerd employs a speculative view of aeuum and even applies it to angels, and on the other hand, he says we cannot know anything about them and that it is speculative to try. It is here that the transcendental critical method, that hides and covers and makes it difficult to pin Dooyeweerd down, now shows the second use of the method quite clearly. The emphasis on cutting off speculation concerning even angels and departed saints could be appreciated if Dooyeweerd did not make this aeuum condition of the selfhood so all important

21. Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 76-80.

22. Hebrews II 4.

23. Popma, op. cit., pp. 14, 83-85.

for his Christian transcendence standpoint. This condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand) controls his whole transcendental method and in turn he uses the transcendental method to cut off all access to the speculative notion of aeuum. How does he know at all that angels partake of created eternity unless, via the "in and out method" of exegesis;²⁴ he has read this into the Scriptures and then read it out again. For as Dooyeweerd himself stresses, Scripture comes to us in our temporal, integral, naive experience and speaks to us in all our functions in the language of time, and according to Dooyeweerd, according to the order of time of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde). Nowhere is there the slightest hint that aeuum applies to angels in Scripture. Here we see a hermeneutic for looking at biblical texts, one which seems to have a point elevated above the time order (tijdsorde) as it is seen in faith, the point of view of the transcendent selfhood in its immediate²⁵ relation to the eternal Origin and from which it can perceive the central nature of Word-revelation. It would seem from this point one is able to say that when the Scriptures speak to us in the language of time about angels and heaven, it is only pointing to the eternal.²⁶ This religious hermeneutic and its relation to the order of time of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde) will be dealt with in more depth later, but for now it should be clear that the transcendental method can serve the use of hiding nature-grace influence.

24. Vollenhoven, "Nieuwe filosofie (1961-1962) Monarchianisme (voor het irrationalisme)" (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1962), p. 7. Vollenhoven Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte (Amsterdam: THEJA, n.d.), pp. 22-23.

25. The idea of "immediacy" in Dooyeweerd, as in Kuyper before him, is quite important and will be dealt with later.

26. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 33.

So far it has been shown that Dooyeweerd operates with a typically scholastic view of eternal life, a notion which involves leaving the temporal and entering into eternal life. From what has been said in the section in which a global oversight of nature-grace thinking on these points was presented, we can see that an outline is emerging which definitely shows that he is under the nature-grace ground-motive concerning his notion of eternal life. The same applies to his idea of the restriction of time to the "earthly" cosmos and his consequent attributing of the aeon condition to angels. The phrase "in this life" shows clearly that Dooyeweerd is operating with the general notion that time ceases and is only for this life, and that the aeon condition, which is as yet still hidden in its fullness because of lack of revelation concerning it, only is entered into at death and in the future. The whole nature-grace complex concerning heaven as non-temporal, leaving time, and no future perspective for cosmic time because a created eternity is substituted for cosmic time, is clearly and unmistakably present. It will be shown that these notions follow from an implicit idea of God's eternity as an "eternal present" and the whole nature-grace schemata will be clear.

It can now be said however that the intermediate condition (tussen-toestand) or aeon which brings with it "eternity consciousness" is exceedingly central as a background for his theoretical, philosophic systematics and for his transcendental critique.

These points will be established in still further detail and from slightly different angles since to establish these points is vital to our whole critique. In an interesting article from his early years, Dooyeweerd says,

Achter alle subjectfuncties, welke de mensch in de onderscheiden wetstringen bezit schuilt de religieuze persoonlijkheid of ikheid, welke het eeuwige wezen van den mensch uitmaakt. Wederling mine en ook, schoon zelve onder geen wetbegrip te vatten, den wil draagt. De verdorvenheid van dit fundament aller subjectfuncties maakt ons. Tenzij wij door Gods geest in Christus wedergeboren zijn, onbekwaam tot eenig goed en geneigd tot alle kwaad.

De wedergeboorte anderszids is het werk van den Heiligen Geest en evenmin als eenig ander van Gods werken onder de wet te vatten.

Toch openbaart dit werk Gods, dat den wortel van alle menselijke subjectfuncties verandert, zich ook in den wereldsamenhang van onze bedeeeling, als vrijschepende inwerking Gods in ons dagelijksch leven en werken.²⁷

Here he clearly states that the "religious personality or I-ness constitutes the eternal essence of man." This comes at a time before Dooyeweerd had written his article in which he developed his idea of aeon. Here, and as we shall see in further quotations from this article, he has still not developed his idea of cosmic time, and he also operates far more uncritically with his idea of created eternity. The notion that the I-ness or religious personality constitutes the eternal essence of man shows clearly, at least, that there is a clear duality in man between the eternal essence and the temporal body. It also points out the fact that at death the aeon condition, although Dooyeweerd stresses that we know little here, applies not to the body which is subject to temporal death, but applies rather to the eternal essence of man, the religious personality or I-ness. This is mentioned now to show a basis in the text of Dooyeweerd for a conclusion which was drawn earlier (pp. 137-138) without explicit textual support in Dooyeweerd, namely

27. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsteden," Anti-revolutionnaire Staatkunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) II (1926), pp. 76-77.

that he regards the serum condition as applying to the soul rather than the body.

In an earlier section an attempt has been made to show that one should not conclude that Dooyeweerd necessarily has a dualism because of his stress on the eternal essence and temporal body which constitute man.²⁸ It was stressed there that it is rather to be looked at as a duality since he is monistic, and that the duality is in terms of two primal contrasts which are always correlated in man. This is mentioned here because we now want to show that this rather sharp duality present in an early article continues throughout his later writing and that it has even been somewhat developed. We are seeking to confirm the basic thesis that the idea of created eternity in nature-grace fashion is a binding, central, and present, even up to recent times.

When Dooyeweerd speaks of the scriptural view of the heart, he quite often brings to one's attention that the soul is not subject to "temporal death." For example, he says,

Waar de Schrift in praegnant religieuzen zin over de menschelijke ziel of geest spreekt, doet ze ons deze steeds zien als het hart van heel het tijdelijk bestaan, waaruit alle uitgangen van het tijdelijke leven zijn. In het tijdelijk bestaan leert de Schrift nergens een dichotomie tusschen 'redelijke ziel' en 'materieelichaan', maar ze vat dit tijdelijk bestaan in zijn geheel als lichaam, dat bij den dood wordt afgelegd. Daarentegen is 's menschen geest of ziel als religieuze wortel van het lichaam volgens de openbaring der Schrift niet aan den tijdelijken (doch buiten Christus Jezus aan den ewigen) dood onderworpen, omdat hij inderdaad alle tijdelijke dingen te boven gaat.²⁹

In another instance he writes,

De 'ziel' van 's menschen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door den tijdelijken dood niet

28. See pages 45-48, 56-58 of this dissertation.

29. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mensch in de W.d.W.," p. 135.

getroffen wordt maar ook na de aflegging van het 'lichaam', d.i. van heel den tijdelijken, in individualiteits-structuur besloten bestaansvorm, blijft voortbestaan, is de religieuze wortel de menschelijke existentie, door de Schrift ook wel de 'inwerdige mensch' of het 'hart' van den mensch genoemd, 'waaruit alle uitgangen des levens zijn' en 'waarin de eeuwigheid gelegd is'. Zij is, gelijk kuypert het in zijn Stonelezingen over het Calvinisme uitgedaald bleef en nog in zijn eenheid ligt samengevat'. Dat concentratiepunt ligt volgens Kuypert 'niet in de gespreide stengels, maar in den wortel, waarop alle stengels uitschoten'. En dat punt kan nu niet anders liggen dan in de tegenstelling tusschen al het eindige in ons mensche-lijk leven en het oneindige, dat er achter ligt. Dáár alleen is de gemeenschappelijk bron, van waaruit de verschillende stromen van ons mensche-lijk leven opkoven en zich verdeelen'. En dat gebruikt ook Kuypert niet alleen het beeld van den religieuzen wortel, maar ook dat van het brandpunt: 'Persoonlijk ervaren wij dan ook gedurig, hoe in het diepst van ons gemoed, op het punt waar dit gemoed zich voor den Eeuwige ontaluit, alle stralen van ons leven als in één brandpunt samenval- len en alleen daar die harmonie hervinnen, die ze in het leven zoo talkens en zoo pijnlijk verliezen'.³⁰

Dooyeweerd gives his counterpart to the scholastic notions of the simplicity, indivisibility, and imperishability of the soul when he says,

Eenvoudig, ondeelbaar en onvergankelijk [underlining mine] blijft de ziel als transcendent geestelijk religieus centrum van het mensche-lijk bestaan, dat heel het lichaam in zijn tijdelijke structuur bezield en het mensche-lijk karakter opdrukt. Maar deze ziel is niet als zoodanig, maar slechts in haar tijdelijke openbaringen in het vergankelijke lichaam voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek vatbaar, omdat zij voor-onderstelde van alle wetenschappelijke werkzaamheid is.³¹

These are common formulations and they occur in other places.³²

What we are seeking to establish in these quotations is that they strongly suggest that the soul is indestructible and exists on after death

30. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 181-182.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

32. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," p. 35. Also, Vernieuwing en Besinning (Zutphen: J. B. Van den Brink, 1963), p. 42.

essential feature of his thinking throughout his life. When he spoke earlier of the fact that in this life we do not know what aeuum will be like at the separation of soul and body and in respect to the angels because we are in this life bound to time, we clearly see that he regards the heart or soul as in possession of the condition of created eternity (aeuum-totstand). We therefore do not know what this eternity of the soul will be like after death because it is beyond our concepts, but there can be no doubt about the aeuum characteristic of the soul or heart after death. It is precisely because of this characteristic that it is not subject to "temporal death" and lives on without the body, and is indestructible and does not perish.

It seems that aeuum in respect to the heart of man becomes "eternal life" after death for believers. In contrast to Dooyeweerd, one must maintain that the idea of "eternal life" can only be applied to believers, for it is the opposite of "eternal death." Also, it must be maintained that according to Scripture "eternal life" is the possession of the whole man already "in this life," i.e., before death, before believers go to be with Christ. Dooyeweerd too closely identifies aeuum which is in contrast to this temporal life with eternal life, and he does this in such a way that it is only entered into when the soul glides over into eternal life. For his eternal death ought to be the direction of the aeuum condition as it is directed away from God at death, but the Scriptures say that one who does not believe is condemned already in this life. For Dooyeweerd, however, the aeuum condition is the nature of the selfhood whether it is believing or unbelieving. As a situation or condition aeuum is creaturely concentrating on the eternity of the Origin, and this very concentrating is only possible because the selfhood is eternal

precisely because of its nature as created eternity. Therefore, he says that it is not subject to temporal death. These characteristics given the soul are precisely those of created eternity or of the aeuum condition. One could say that the eternity or aeuum, in its creaturely sense, is characterized by indivisibility, indestructibility, and simplicity. This is so because time is the principle of cosmic diversity.³³ For these reasons Dooyeweerd often speaks of religion, the transcendent sphere, as being undifferentiated, or before differentiation. It is precisely for this reason that no concept of the heart is possible since concepts presuppose the logical and the non-logical aspects, and in the transcendent root unity there is no longer present any distinction between the logical function and the non-logical bodily function.³⁴ Diversity is strictly limited to the earthly temporal cosmos and all that is above the earthly is not diversified, but rather, full, unified, undifferentiated, indivisible, simple, and indestructible, and partakes of eternity in a creaturely sense, or in the divine sense as applied to God.³⁵ We can see that when earlier Dooyeweerd spoke of the fact that the religious personality or I-ness comprises the eternal essence of man he was setting forth what was to remain an

33. Dooyeweerd, "De leer der analogie in de Thomistische wijsbegeerte en in de W.d.W.," *Phil. Ref.*, VII (1941), p. 48. He clearly states that the time order brings the diversity of aspects into existence. Also, *A New Critique*, I, pp. 16-19, 1-5, 106. See also footnote 31 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

34. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip." This article contains one of the clearest applications of the transcendental method. Also, *A New Critique*, I, pp. 1-5, 106.

35. Dooyeweerd uses time as a boundary line, *A New Critique*, I, p. 102. This is interesting because the law is the boundary line between God and man. There are two fundamental boundaries (*Grenzen*) to his system. Time as a boundary line divides the creation into its two basic contrasts, eternity and time, while the law is the boundary between the sovereign Creator and subjected creation.

in a creaturely sense, that is, transcendent. Dooyeweerd explains the spostatate absolutizing of the temporal, or seeking the eternal in the temporal by the presence of this condition of created eternity (aeuum-toestand). Since for Dooyeweerd aeuum is a structural characteristic of the selfhood of Christians and non-Christians alike, we can conclude that this aeuum condition "in this life," that is, before death in the case of Christians, is not yet to be called eternal life, but rather becomes eternal life when the "indestructible" soul puts off its body at death. Then the believing man is strictly in aeuum and this is the same as in eternal life. At the resurrection of the dead the "spiritual body" would then be added to the indestructible soul and thus the body would also partake of aeuum. In contrast to this it has been pointed out that Dooyeweerd must maintain two directions to the aeuum condition, namely, eternal life and eternal death, but this is not emphasized.

As we have seen, this idea of non-temporal, indivisible eternity applies to the soul after death, before death while still in the body, and to the angels, and thus this aeuum forming an intermediate condition (tussentoeestand) between temporal diversity and God's eternity is characteristic of nature-grace thinking.

Dooyeweerd has made quite an effort to Christianize his view of the heart or soul and to set it off from the scholastic views and the nature-freedom views concerning the soul. For example, he deals at length with this point in his article, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrip." He tries especially to set off his view from the immortality of the soul as it is related to the form-pole of the form-matter motive of Greek thinking.³⁶ He makes every effort in

³⁶. Especially pp. 34ff. in part II of this article.

this article not to have his view of the heart confused with the idea of the substantial soul of scholastic philosophy. He simply believes that the Scriptures teach the simplicity, indivisibility, indestructibility, and the created eternity of the soul, and then not only on the basis of Ecclesiastes 3:11, but also from the whole of the Scriptures. Berkouwer, in defense of Dooyeweerd, tries to do justice to the fact that Dooyeweerd's new dichotomy has nothing at all to do with the traditional whole-part scheme and substantial soul of the scholastics. Berkouwer's emphasis on the difference of Dooyeweerd's view is fair to Dooyeweerd in general, but he views him a little too much through the light of his own position. He rightly defends Dooyeweerd against Spier's surmise to the effect that the supra-temporality of the heart would also involve some sort of super-creaturalness.³⁷ As Berkouwer has rightly seen, this is wholly foreign to Dooyeweerd. Berkouwer is also correct when he points out that Dooyeweerd does not view the supra-temporality of the heart in the sense of an added "gift" or "broom," nor does he wish a "relation" between God and an independent and self-enclosed and self-existing man, a relation which would be added to man's humanness.³⁸ He is also correct over against Popma who suggests that aeuum always implies an aeternitas participata notion.³⁹ He rightfully stresses that Dooyeweerd, in speaking of the heart, intends not a deeper part of man, but rather the whole man with all his temporal functions in his religious concentration, i.e., in his relation to God.⁴⁰ He is in error

³⁷. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), pp. 260-263.

³⁸. Ibid., p. 261.

³⁹. Ibid., p. 262.

⁴⁰. Ibid., p. 263.

though, when he says, "He (Dooyeweerd) does not mean to place eternity (aeonum) and time neatly next to each other."⁴¹ However, contrary to Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd does do just this, although the word "neatly" prejudices the matter somewhat. Berkouwer does not do full justice to the scope of this idea of aeonum. We have already seen that Dooyeweerd ascribes it to the angels, although he does not speculate much about this. But much more, Dooyeweerd also applies the notion of aeonum to the fact of religion as a supra-temporal, central sphere of occurrence, to the fact of leaving the temporal at death, to the fact of the heart after it has laid off its temporal cloak, to the body, to the fact of man having an eternal destination, and to the fact of a supra-temporal root community. Berkouwer obviously has not studied the broader use of the term "supra-temporality" in Dooyeweerd's total writings, or he would not have dismissed this so quickly. Even with his defense he is hard pressed to defend some of Dooyeweerd's formulations concerning this point,⁴² and if he were to probe more deeply, he might be less convinced. He does not deny that Dooyeweerd speaks of the selfhood as in an aeonum state or having an aeonum consciousness⁴³ and so his defense does not really bear on our critique. It is true, as Berkouwer stresses, that Dooyeweerd views the heart of man only in its three central relations, but as a converging center of all the functions it is not identical with its body, for otherwise the distinction of heart and body would have no meaning. It is also true that the heart is the whole man in central relation to God, but the I-ness is only the center of consciousness,

41. Ibid., p. 263.

42. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

43. Ibid., p. 263.

otherwise there would be no sense to the term "center." It is precisely as transcendent center that the heart can be characterized as in an aeonum condition. This is not an attempt to read into Dooyeweerd's idea of the heart the scholastic view of substance, but it is not fair to Dooyeweerd to stress simply the idea of relation or the act of transcendence. The heart is under or subjected to the supra-temporal central law of love which is also the law of concentration, but it is not that law itself. Because of this the aeonum situation is a permanent state or situation for the heart, and the acts of actualization, transcendence, and concentration, as well as this permanent situation or condition on the subject side presuppose the structural permanence of the law of concentration which conditions that which is on the subject side. Berkouwer tends to represent transcendence as a "rising above" modal diversity.⁴⁴

44. Ibid., pp. 260, footnote 39, 261. This point of rising above or "transcending" needs to be very clear. Dooyeweerd regards only the center of consciousness to be transcendent and supra-temporal. Man's selfhood only is transcendent and because of this all man's consciousness except for this transcendent center is found "in this life" within time and the temporal horizon. For this reason when one speaks of the supra-temporal heart one is not speaking in Dooyeweerd's system as if man were half in time and half in eternity. All the diversity of his acts and the whole act structure enveloped together with the other three individuality structures make the body an integral structure for consciousness to express itself. Because it is only a point, a concentration point which can hardly be called a substance in any classical sense, a point which only exists in its three relations to God, fellowman, and the temporal, and does not stand in itself, one can easily see why Dooyeweerd can speak of man transcending the diversity of his acts and functions in his heart or soul or I-ness or selfhood. This is natural since Dooyeweerd stresses that man is in time with his consciousness with all that this involves time and time again, e.g., A New Critique, I, pp. 23, 24, 31, and especially III, p. 89, where he says, "The human body is man himself in the structural whole of his temporal appearance. And the human soul, in its pregnant religious sense is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual existence, which transcends all temporal structures." Also, II, pp. 477-479. With this stress in mind one can understand why Dooyeweerd can speak of man transcending time since man himself in his temporal appearance is in time, and yet he transcends time,