|
| -
The limitation of doctrine and their operational solutions: Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions in Normandy.
A case study: 11th Armoured Division
|
Major General Pip Roberts GOC 11th Armoured Division
(Source: Tout K (2002) Roads to Falaise: Cobra and Goodwood Reassessed)
1. Introduction:
by 1944 the Tanks had made themselves the prisoners of their own orthodoxy, keener to adhere to the letter of their cherished doctrine than to win the rewards a violation of it might bring(1)
John Keegans statement is representative of the orthodox view of the British during the Normandy campaign. For many years, the British 2nd Army(2)in Normandy has come in for criticism as being tactically inept when compared to the Germans, and even their American allies. The armoured element has come in for even more criticism, simply stating that the Anglo-Canadians were unable to overcome doctrine and adopt a fluid method of organisation and co-operation in battle as exemplified by the German Kampfgruppe or the American Combat Command. This essay will seek to show that while the Anglo-Canadians had failures, which hampered their efforts early in the campaign, by the end in Normandy the Anglo-Canadian armoured forces(3) were adopting combined arms teams and co-operating with other elements of the army successfully. It will do this by looking at the Anglo-Canadians pre-eminent division in Normandy, the 11th Armoured which, Russell Hart has called one of the:
few well-trained and well-led divisions
[of the campaign](4)
It will look at firstly, the training and doctrinal methods pre-Overlord and then secondly, the solutions found in the field to operational problems.
2. Organisation and equipment:
Britain's armoured forces at the time of the Normandy campaign were in the main equipped with the US produced M4 Sherman in various guises. There were several exceptions to this; firstly, the 7th Armoured Division and the divisional reconnaissance regiments were equipped with the A27M Cromwell, a British cruiser tank. Secondly, the Army Tank Brigades were equipped with the A22/42 Churchill infantry tank, this tank was heavily armoured and ideally suited to its role. The armoured regiments used the final vehicle, the M3 Stuart, as a light tank. The artillery elements of the armoured divisions were equipped initially with one regiment of the M7 Priest self-propelled gun, though this was replaced with the Sexton SPG, which mounted a 25pdr. The other regiment was equipped with towed 25pdr guns. The divisional anti tank regiments were equipped with the M10 tank destroyer, which was built on the Sherman chassis; this got rearmed with the 17pdr gun, the most effective tank gun in the British and US armies, and made it a very effective anti-tank weapon.
The basic organisation of a British armoured division in 1944 was as follows:
This organisation was based on several years of experiments(5) both in Britain and in operational circumstances and represented the best compromise based upon Britains regimental traditions and the needs of modern armoured warfare. The changes were the realisation of the need for more infantry within the divisions.
The Sherman has come in for bad press in regards of its capabilities especially those that equipped the British forces as they have often been considered those:
rejected for overseas combat duty by the U.S. Army.(6)
However, as John Keegan has commented it was:
a magnificent expression of American mass-production
(7)
While it was not as formidable as its contemporary German tanks the Sherman was easily massed produced, 49000 were produced during the war. However, it did have its defects. They were extremely inflammable, this was due to the dry storage of ammunition, though this was changed to wet storage during the campaign, and gained the nickname Ronson by the British after the lighter which always lit first time and Tommy cooker from the Germans and it had a high profile making it an easy target for German tanks.
Bill Close, a squadron Commander in the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment comments that in the main the Sherman could not deal with German tanks at ranges over 500 yards:
Our ordinary 75mm gun could not knock out either a Tiger or a Panther except at 500 yards range, and in the rear with a bit of luck in the flank!(8)
However, by the summer of 1944 there was one version, the Firefly that was armed with a high velocity 17pdr gun that could compete with the latest German tanks. This became the main tank killer of the tank troops and was preciously guarded by the troops. It was initially issued based on one per troop. Though, the Firefly did still have some shortcomings, most notably it high velocity Armour Piercing round kicked up a lot of dust causing problems with aiming and that the new gun made the turret very cramped.
The vast number of Shermans produced led them to be easily replaced. For example, in Operation Goodwood, the British lost 36 per cent of their tank strength and as Max Hastings comments that, the vast reserve of tanks meant:
that replacements reached almost every armoured division within 36 hours.(9)
These vast reserves even led to the planning of an operation, Goodwood, which relied heavily on the utilisation of these reserves in order to lower infantry casualties. As Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey commented:
tank reinforcements were pouring into Normandy faster than the rate of tank casualties. So we could afford
to plan an operation in which we could utilise
tanks and economise on infantry.(10)
3. Doctrine and training:
11th Armoured Division was formed in the fall of 1941 and was one of a series of armoured divisions ordered formed by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in response to Germanys Panzer divisions, which had rampaged through France the previous summer. Its first commander was the tank pioneer Major General Sir Percy Hobart(11) ; the divisions insignia is taken from Hobarts family crest.
The doctrine that was used to train the officers and men of 11th Armoured Division came in several different forms. Firstly, the bulk of information came from the War Offices Military Training Pamphlet (MTP) series; these covered the majority of trades in the army and every aspect of fighting from minor tactics to the handling of large formations. The second method for the dissemination of doctrine was the Army Training Memorandum (ATM) series. This series was an inter-war series, which meant to keep troops up to date with recent innovations. In the war years, it was regularly published with notes from the theatres of operations, most notably North Africa. Thirdly, there was the Army Training Instructions (ATI). This was used to fill the gap while MTPs were published. ATIs could be published quickly, for example, ATI No. 3 Handling of an Armoured Division, was published two months after a cloth exercise occurred, which attempted to solve the problems relating to the handling of an armoured division.
The final two methods are the most relevant to armoured warfare as it was considered impossible to keep printed doctrine up to date with the most recent developments. This led to the publication of two battle experience publications. Firstly, Notes form Theatres of War (NTW), this was first publicised at the time of the CRUSADER offensive. Secondly, there was Current Reports from Overseas (CRO). This provided a vehicle for the dissemination of ideas down to brigade level, which did not yet have endorsement from the War Office but did not have the same weight as NTWs.
Therefore, it is from these sources that doctrine for 11th Armoured Division was based and that training from their formation to their landing in Normandy stemmed. As Timothy Harrison Place comments:
Between them, Military Training Pamphlets, Army Training Memoranda, Army Training Instructions, Notes from Theatres of War, Current Reports from Overseas
represent the main sources
on doctrine and its evolution up to D-Day.(12)
The initial conception of armoured doctrine for the home-based armoured divisions came from ATI No.3 Handling of an Armoured Division(13). This publication gave primacy to the tank in operations and that the support group of the division should be used to occupy ground and provide a pivot from whence the tanks could operate. Armour was considered the main striking force and all else was to support this. Co-operation between armour and infantry was considered simply the one handing over to the other. While 1942 saw a significant change in the armoured division structure, one armoured brigade was replaced with an infantry one, at a tactical level little change in the way of co-operation. While a new doctrine was published in 1943, it ascribed much the same role for the infantry brigade as the infantry of the old support group. In actual fact some commanders still saw the role of tanks as that of cavalry as shown when 9th Armoured Brigade charged diagonally across the gun line of the 2nd Irish Guards during exercise SARUM(14). This tactic would again come back to haunt tank crews during Operation GOODWOOD.
Slowly, news from the North African theatre filtered back to the units via the NTWs and CROs and belatedly doctrine was changed to include at least the motor battalions in action, though the infantry brigade remained firmly in the support role. By the time Hobart relinquished command their had been a realisation that their was a greater need of inter-arm co-operation. However, problems remained. The main problem was how to transport the infantry. It was found early on that transporting them on tanks caused discomfort for the infantry. It was not until the introduction of the White half-track in early 1944 that the situation was resolved. Therefore, the main problem of co-operation that existed was how to keep the infantry up with the tanks. Another problem was what role the infantry should play in supporting the armour. The re-equipping of the divisions with the Sherman in late 1943 led to infantry being reverted to a support role once again. This was due to the Sherman having a good HE(15) rounds with which to deal with soft targets.
The period of 1942-43 saw the increase in the attempt to co-ordinate armour and infantry. This was intensified when Major-General Roberts(16) took over the division in early 1944. Roberts with his experience in the desert saw the need to improve co-operation between armour and infantry. Roberts also saw the need to change the tactics used when launching an attack. Prior to his arrival their had been an attempt to use set piece tactics to assault a position, he change this by ordering that upon closing with the enemy the armoured brigade commander send his regiments around the flanks of the enemy. He ordered that regiments keep on the move and that deliberate reconnaissance be abolished. These were some of the advantages conferred on the division with the arrival of a commander with battlefield experience.
Another failure in training was the inability of the division exercises to be realistic. They suffered from being under the guidance of umpires who sought their regiment to be victorious rather than a fair comprehension of the battlefield environment. As Harrison-Place comments about 11th armoureds exercise EAGLE that was:
partial umpiring by umpires whose first loyalty was not to realism but to the interests of their own units.(17)
As has be seen the implementation of these publications and their associated doctrine was patchy and led to mistakes both in training and in operations. While attempts were made, belatedly, to correct the failings in training and doctrine, most notably with the arrival of Roberts from the Mediterranean, the problems encountered in training would come back to haunt the British in the early operations of the Normandy campaign. Had the lesson of North Africa been more forcefully implemented at both division and regimental lesson many mistake could have been avoided.
4. Operations EPSOM, GOODWOOD, and the failure of doctrine:
Operation EPSOM was launched on the 26th of June under a massive bombardment of 700 guns. The objective of the operation was to gain the high ground of Hill 112 and then breakout into the Odon valley below. The operation was to be carried out by Lieutenant General OConnors(18) VIII Corps, which was newly arrived from England. This corps included Roberts 11th Armoured Division(19).
The initial attack by the 15th Scottish went well and in the first few hours of the division made an inroad of several miles on a front of three miles. Suddenly German resistance began to stiffen and the failure of the supporting operation of I and XXX Corps meant that VIII Corp was prone to a counter-attack on three sides. This occurred on the 27th. It was at this point that OConnor decided to commit the 11th Armoured to the battle. Eventually the tanks of 29th Armoured Brigade reached Hill 112 but without an infantry, support they were forced to relinquish the position on the 30th after II SS Panzer Corps launched a counter attack. The previous day Montgomery had ordered a halt to EPSOM realising, it was going to go no further.
During the operation, 11th Armoured operated in virtually 2 distinct formation, 29th Armoured and 159th Infantry brigades, and conducted operations independent of each other. Initially in the operation, the 159th took Baron sur Odon and encountered heavy fighting there and from there subsequently served under various formations. When this occurred 29th was ordered to try to fight a way through to achieve a breakthrough from Cheux. This was the first mistake. Instead of using the tanks once a breakthrough had been achieved, OConnor attempted to use the tanks to achieve the breakthrough. This meant that by the time any sort of gap had been created the armoured unit were too tired and exhausted to exploit it. The other major failure for the division during EPSOM was it lack of co-ordination between infantry and armour. Harrison-Place comments that:
Roberts reached the
conclusion
concerning the need for tank-infantry co-operation within the armoured division.(20)
Though he was frustrated in his wish for greater co-operation as during the EPSOM operation his infantry brigade served under three commands, 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53rd Welsh divisions, which meant that he could not develop co-ordination between his units. Therefore, the only infantry that was supporting the tanks was the mechanised infantry of the 8th Rifle Brigade, and while they did sterling service, they were too few in number to be of effect.
EPSOM, therefore, shows the first major blooding for the division and started to show up the failing in their training especially, as commented above, the lack of effective inter arm co-operation.
11th Armoureds next operation was GOODWOOD. This operation was launched on the 18th July as a precursor to the launch of the Americans operation COBRA. It had many conflicting aims. Montgomery had to up the objectives of the operation in order to gain the support he wanted from the strategic air forces, though he never fully believed the plan could be a breakout. Whereas, the commander of the 2nd Army, Lieutenant General Dempsey, believed it could achieve a breakout on the eastern flank. The operation has often been compared to the charge of the light brigade as it saw the use of an all armoured corps, VIII Corps(21), and had very little infantry support.
The operation began under a massive preparatory bombardment by RAF Bomber Command and then the divisions jumped off from their position by the Orne River. 11th armoured objectives were Bras, Hubert Folie, Verrieres and Fontenay. Moving off without support from the infantry, who were fighting a parallel action, the tanks encountered their first problems, an anti-aircraft battery of 88mm anti-aircraft/tank guns, at Cagny(22), which knocked out 16 tanks. The division had only just started to move out. Worse was to come, the only Forward Air Controller was killed and the units behind 11th Armoured were caught in huge traffic jams. Roberts then ordered Cagny to be masked by the 8TH RB and 23rd Hussars. This was a mistake because once they moved into position they were in full view of German tanks and the 23rd Hussars took heavy casualties. For most of the day, units received flank attacks to their exposed positions. As Bill Close comments on the losses received by the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment:
We had received a considerable number of casualties with seven tanks knocked out from my squadron and a similar number from B and C squadron.(23)
The 19th would see much the same problems as the previous day. 3rd RTR attempted to take Bras. The major problem in attacking Bras and Hubert Folie was the 3000 yards of open country between them and the divisions start line. In this area were many dug 88s and infantry armed with Panzerfausts who took a great heavy toll on the tank units, who had limited infantry support to deal with the positions. Though by the end of the day their was an attempt at forming battle groups, for example, one was made up of the 4th KSLI, 3rd Mons and 23rd Hussars while they attempted to hold onto Hubert Folie.
Operation GOODWOOD has attracted much criticism, some quite rightly so. It was ill conceived to send in an all armoured attack into country that was perfect for German anti-tank guns that had the range to knock out all Allied tanks with ease. There is also a sense of bad luck for the forward units of 11th Armoured to of had their FAC knocked out so early on in the operation. The biggest failure in doctrine though was the distinct lack of co-operation between the armour and infantry. Once again, OConnor forced 11th Armoured to fight as two separate entities. Roberts to his credit was dismayed by this fact, after seeing its effect in EPSOM, but when he attempted to change it, he was threatened with his division loosing the lead in the operation. Therefore, despite attempts pre-invasion to train the divisions to operate with infantry in GOODWOOD they were denied that opportunity and as Harrison Place comments:
Their deployment disregarded the doctrine in which they had been trained. No wonder that few successes came their way.(24)
Bill Close also comments that:
Goodwood was a shambles, but only because our method of advance was forced upon us without infantry
(25)
Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD had shown failing in the British armoured division not just at tactical level but also there employment at a higher level. They had shown failings and proven once and for all that tanks could not, and should not operate without infantry and also that they were a fine instrument for exploitation not a blunt one with which to take and hold ground. Thankfully, the armoured units reputation would be regained in their final operation, BLUECOAT, where 11th Armoured would lead the way.
5. Operation BLUECOAT and success:
BLUECOAT was to see the coming of age for Britain's armoured divisions. In the operation they would use combined armour-infantry teams to deal with the problems the bocage country gave them. This was especially apparent in 11th Armoured who led the way with the tactics and they were finally being run along the lines suggested in the training documents of 1942-44.
Even the planning of the operation was done in a new fashion; it was left to the divisional commander to formulate the orders and movements of his units. For Roberts this meant complete freedom to organise his units into combined armour-infantry groups. For the operation, he formed four battle groups from his division. By this time the armoured reconnaissance regiment was being used as a fourth armoured regiment as the division had the 2nd Household Cavalry attached. This use of battle group was the first success for the doctrine, which had been attempted to be laid down in Britain in the years 1942-44.
The operation opened on the 30th July with VIII Corps heading for Vire and XXX Corps launching an assault against Mont Pincon. The division was ordered to march for Le Beny Bocage. Before it could do this, it had to take St Martin-des-Besaces. Initial movement on the first day was slow but by the second, the German front began to crumble in front of VIII Corps. On the morning of 31st St Martin was attacked by the battle group of the 2nd Fife and Forfarshire Yeomanry and 4th KSLI. It was during this attack that a gap in the lines was found by the 2nd Household Cavalry, who were attached to 11th Armoured, at what is now known as Bull Bridge over the Souleuvre River. This was an opportunity for the division to shift its weight of advance and gain an advantage, which it duly did by the end of the second day. The cause of this gap was uncertainty of the two German divisions in the area over who was to blow the bridge. By realising, there was a gap the battle group of the 3rd Mons and 23rd Hussars were ordered to concentrate there and strike out. As Major J J How comments:
Roberts saw his chance and seized it.(26)
This small action early on in the operation shows the flexibility that could occur when an armoured division and its commander were given the opportunity. By controlling the battle himself and not always checking with his Corps commander Roberts was able to take the opportunity and seize a vital crossing over the river that would help speed up his advance.
By being given, the freedom to plan his own operations and fully direct his divisions operations Roberts was able to advance quickly and eventually seized Perriers ridge. This created a salient in the front as Guards and the Americans on either side were advancing much slower. This led to a halt in operations and to hold the ground that had already been seized. The 6th August the division, two brigade boxes on the ridge came under a counter attack by the 10th SS Panzer Division. The division by utilizing combined operation from all elements were able to hold their position but it was close run thing as the historian of the 23rd Hussars confidently comments:
General Eberbach had reported to von Kluge that 10th SS Panzer had captured Hill 224 not true!(27)
Operation BLUECOAT shows several elements of how to make the best use of an armoured division. Initially by allowing Roberts to plan his own operations he could tailor his division to the mission it was given. Secondly, the operations that occurred around St Martin and Bull Bridge show is a good example of what should happen when an opportunity arises and how to exploit it. By being able, to exploit the situation at hand Roberts managed to get a head start on his advance and was eventually ahead of XXX Corps who were supposed to be leading BLUECOAT but whose attacks had become bogged down. The final example of the actions on Hill 224 show that when used to good effect and supported by infantry, armour could hold a static position against determined counterattack.
6. Conclusion:
As has been seen the 11th Armoured in Normandy went through many problems that stemmed from areas of their training and doctrine and regimental system.
During their training period, there was a distinct failure to disseminate the information coming back from the front. While these did come back in the form of NTWs and CROs they were never fully formed into official doctrine and therefore, not fully disseminated.
The other major problem facing the force in its early years was the problems of inter-arm service co-operation that was enshrined in regimental tradition, as Russell Hart comments:
traditionalism enshrined in
regimental system
continued to retard development of the interarm and interservice co-ordination
(28)
For example, officers of the RTR were adamant that the tank had primacy in warfare and sought to see the survival of their Corps. They also based much of their theories on the work of Basil Liddell Hart and Major General Fuller who also sought to protect the Corps and the role of the tank. This is most notable with Hobart, a disciple of the work of the former, who sought to use the tanks of 11th Armoured as the main weapon of the division, whereas, Roberts, with his experience, saw the importance of co-operation between the various services of the division. Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD showed the fatality of the use of the early theories of armoured warfare and the realisation that what was trying to be taught, greater inter-arm co-operation, was the way forward. This is something that Roberts knew. BLUECOAT showed that his efforts to improve inter-arm co-operation after taking command had not been in vain once he was given the opportunity to exercise command of his division fully.
The divisions in Normandy initially threw away anything they had been taught from their experiences in the field. It took them making several mistakes early in the campaign to bring around a realisation that tanks could not operate effectively without some form of infantry support. This throwing away of the training book was in part to preserve infantry casualties, as by 1944 21st Army Group was a wasting asset. Therefore, there was an attempt to use what the army had a lot of and that was tanks. This was a costly error, which eventually led to the formation a battle groups and the realisation of the doctrine of 1942-44. As Russell hart comments:
in Normandy British ground forces enhanced their capabilities in
combined arms co-operation.(29)
While this essay has shown that 11th Armoured were able to realise the limitation in their training and the control from higher command most of the other Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions had a similar learning curve in the Normandy campaign. Another example of where the Anglo-Canadian forces managed to overcome the limitation in their doctrine was during operation TOTALISE/TRACTABLE. In the early stages Canadian II Corps failed to use, it has armoured forces effectively and use them to find weak points in the German defences and seek exploitation. Instead, they became bogged down in fighting. However, by the start of TRACTABLE the armoured division were, like 11th Armoured, operating in battle groups and seeking operational manoeuvre against the enemy. The 1st Polish Armoured Divisions action around Trun was very similar to those that happened to 11th Armoured around Hill 224. therefore, the anglo-canadian armoured division were as flexible as their allies and enemies armoured formation by the end of the campaign.
Therefore, it can be said that the problems faced in Normandy were down to failure to disseminate doctrine properly and the limitation to implement at the right level and therefore, train the units effectively. As Harrison Place comments that, the problems faced could be:
traced to doctrinal error, consequent training error and incompatibility
with official doctrine.(30)
9. Bibliography and References
Beale P (1998) Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War
Brisset J (Translated by Bates T) (1989) The Charge of the Bull: A History of the 11th Armoured Division in Normandy 1944
Close MC Major B (2002) A View from the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War
Delaforce P (1996) Marching to the Sound of Gunfire: North West Europe 1944-5
Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division
D Este C (1994) Decision in Normandy
Fletcher D (1993) The Universal Tank: British Armour in the Second World War Part 2
French D (2000) Raising Churchills Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945
Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day
Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy
Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944
How Major J J (1984) Hill 112: Cornerstone of the Normandy Campaign
How Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout
Jarymowycz R J (2001) Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine
Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy
Tout K (2002) Roads to Falaise: Cobra and Goodwood Reassessed
10. Further Reading
Adair A HS (1986) A Guards General: The Memoirs of Major-General Sir Allan Adair, BT, GCVO, CB, DSO, MC, JP, DL
Beal P (1995) Tank Tracks
Cary J (1966) Tanks and Armour in Modern Warfare
Carver Field Marshal Lord M (1979) The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare
Harris J P (1995) Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939
Harris J P and Toase F H (eds.) (1990) Armoured Warfare
Hunnicut R (1978) Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank
Larson R H (1984) The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare, 1918-1940
Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
Macksey K (1976) Tank Tactics, 1939-1945
Macksey K (1971) Tank Warfare: A History of Tanks in Battle
Ogorkiewicz R M (1970) Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles
Roberts G P B (1987) From the Desert to the Baltic
Tout K (1998) A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise
Tout K (2000) The Bloody Battle for Tilly: Normandy 1944
Verney G L (1954) Desert Rats
Endnotes:
1. Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy, Pg. 197
2. This formation contained British, Canadian and Polish units.
3. Anglo-Canadian Armoured forces in Normandy comprised the following: Guards, 7th, 11th, 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Division, 4th, 8th, 27th, 33rd and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades and the 6th Guards, 31st and 34th Tank Brigades.
4. Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy, Pg. 304
5. To see the changes made in the structure of the Anglo-Canadian Armoured Division see Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day, Pg. 98-100 and is the source for the above chart.
6. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 309
7. Keegan J (1994) Loc Cit, Pg. 197
8. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division, Pg. 13. Bill Close is also the author of Panzer Bait and had no fewer than 11 tanks knocked out from under him in the northwest Europe campaign.
9. Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, Pg. 279
10. Cited in Deste C (1994) Decision in Normandy, Pg. 355. Taken from the paper Operation Goodwood by Basil Liddell Hart. In 1952, Liddell Hart persuaded Dempsey to talk at length about Operation Goodwood.
11. For a Biography of this early pioneer in Britains armoured forces see - Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
12. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 14
13. This was published on the 19th May 1941.
14. This exercise took place in July 1942. Unfortunately, for the Irish Guards, the umpires deemed 9th Armoured to far away to do damage with their 2pdr gun. 9th Armoured were subsequently criticised by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke for their charge. For details of this incident see Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 108
15. HE High Explosive rounds. This type of round was used to destroy targets such as trucks and artillery. Previously the armoured units had been equipped with British cruiser tanks that were armed with 6pdr that did not have an effective HE round.
16. Previously Roberts had commanded an armoured regiment in the desert before being command of 23rd Armoured Brigade in Tunisia under the 1st Army. He also had the distinction of being the youngest Major General in the British Army.
17. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg26
18. OConnor was a veteran of the North African campaign and had been captured during Operation Battleaxe but escaped from his Italian prisoner and on his return to England was given command of VIII Corps.
19. Other divisions in the corps included the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division and43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division
20. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 156
21. This consisted of 7th, 11th and Guards Armoured Divisions.
22. Apparently, this Luftwaffe battery was ordered by Colonel Hans Von Luck of the 21st Panzer Division to turn the guns on the tanks. He initially objected but Luck managed to persuade him. See Hastings M (1984) Op Cit, Pg. 276
23. Close MC Major B (1998) A View From the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War, Pg. 121
24. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, pg. 159
25. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, Pg. 68
26. How MC Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout, Pg. 54
27. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, Pg. 94
28. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg.304
29. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 320
30. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 167
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| To what extent can it be argued that the war in the Mediterranean was peripheral to allied victory in World War Two? |
|
This essay seeks to address the argument that the Allied effort in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations (MTO) was peripheral to the Allied victory in WWII. The essay intends to show what the main argument for is, then address this by showing that in actual fact the Allied effort in the MTO was actually vital to victory in WWII.
The main argument for the MTO being peripheral to the Allied war effort was that it was strategically irrelevant to the war in Europe and that it was merely a sideshow. In Brian Holden Reids Article The Italian Campaign 1943-45: A Reappraisal of Allied Generalship[i] he states that the allied campaign in Italy was badly organised and that it was given a vague set of directive with which to fight the campaign. Thus he believes the campaign moved slowly due to a lack of co-ordinated command, which led to a slow down in the theatre. As Reid comments on the directives General Alexander was given after the Yalta Conference:
This was the final and fittingly vague directive issued for the Italian campaign[ii]
This essay will show how the campaign in the MTO was important to the Allied war effort and how it taught many lessons that would be important in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO). It will look at the following aspects of the campaign. Firstly, victories and morale, it will show how that until 1943 the MTO was the only area where the Axis could be fought and victories gained for the allies and thus keeping up morale of both the armies and the Home Front. Secondly, it will look at the nature of the development of the Allied command structure that would be so well used in the ETO. Thirdly, it will show how the MTO was a proving and training ground for much of the weaponry and fighting techniques that would be used in the ETO. Finally, it will show how the MTO effectively tied down 26 German divisions on the Italian peninsula after D-Day, 6th June 1944, thus stopping there redeployment to either the western or eastern fronts.
The first aspect to be considered is that the MTO was the only area were the Allies were gaining victories over Axis until, firstly, the bombing effort gained momentum in 1943 and secondly, until Allied forces landed in France on D-Day. This essay will use several examples, Operation Compass in 1940 and the Second Battle of El Alamein in 1942, to show how these victories were important to keep morale up both at home and within the army. After the fall of France in 1940 Britain stood alone in the fight against the Axis alliance. At home the Germans had just started there bombing campaign to prepare an invasion of the country. It is at this point the Italians launched an offensive against the British forces in Egypt[iii]. This force was commanded by General Graziani and comprised of 236000 troops and approximately 400 tanks. Against this force Lieutenant General Wavell, in command of the British forces in the Middle East, had 50000 men and 300 armoured cars and tanks. Initially Graziani advanced fifty miles to Sidi Barani where he halted in late September. While Graziani halted, Wavell built his forces up and received reinforcement from the Empire. When he was ready he launched Operation Compass on the 7th December 1940. This was to be a five day raid under the command of Major General OConnor with the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Division. What was initially to be a raid, turned out to be the one great British operation of the war. In 58 days of operation the British captured 130000 troops, 845 guns and 380 tanks and as Lucio Ceva comments:
Together with the contemporaneous conquest of Ethiopia, this was the greatest land victory by the British Commonwealth during the whole war
[iv]
Richard Holmes comments:
It succeeded beyond anyones wildest hopes.[v]
This victory came at a time when Britain had its back to the wall and thus provided a great boost to morale both to the army and civilians back in Britain.
The next example of a great victory, which helped morale both at home and in the army, is the second Battle of El Alamein. This was also the first victory for the future war hero, the then Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery. General Sir Claude Auchinleck at the Battles of Gazala and First El Alamein had laid the foundations for the victory at El Alamein. He also created the original plan for the second battle. Most importantly as Barrie Pitt states Auchinleck:
had halted Rommels drive to the Nile
[vi]
Montgomery officially took command of the 8th Army on the 15th August 1943. With this he began preparation for the decisive show down with the Deutsches Afrika Korps[vii] and the Italian Africa Army. The battle was to be a set piece affair based upon Montgomerys belief of how to fight a battle effectively. He based it upon massive superiority in all arms. The battle opened on the night of the 23/24 October with a bombardment of 882 guns. The battle eventually took on the appearance of a First World War battle of attrition which was only broken when Montgomery launched Operation Supercharge which outflanked Rommels southern positions and caused him to retreat. El Alamein in conjunction with Operation Torch, the landing in North Africa brought an end to the campaign by forcing Rommel back into Libya as Dear et al states:
El Alamein was the climax of the Western Desert campaigns and one of the turning- points of the war
[viii]
The victory at El Alamein had an uplifting effect on British morale at home as it was the first significant victory for several years and to the British public it seemed as if they were finally turning back the Germans, as Marion Yass states:
General Montgomerys victory at El Alamein marked the turning point of the war in the west. At home, the desperate mood of the early months of 1942 vanished.[ix]
The second area to be considered is that of the Allied command structure. Many of the commanders that were to have a prominent role in the ETO learnt their lessons in the MTO. Also the structure of command was also that which had worked in the MTO i.e. Eisenhower as supreme commander with Montgomery as his battlefield commander. There are countless examples of the army and corps commanders for the ETO having served in the MTO. Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey had been a commander of XIII Corps in the desert. He later commanded the British 2nd Army in Europe. Both Generals Omar Bradley and George Patton were commanders in the MTO, though their roles were reversed in Europe with Bradley commanding the 12th Army Group and Patton the 3rd Army. The continuance of command did not just stay with the army it also stretched to the Air Forces, for example, Air Chief Marshal Tedder was Allied Air Commander in the MTO and latter was Eisenhowers deputy in Europe.
Eisenhower was chosen as supreme commander in Europe due to his performance in the MTO, while he was not a brilliantly strategist but he was an excellent man manger and managed to meld men of many nations together. As Richard Overy States:
He was a natural choice as the senior General
in Europe
After a year in the field he had much more experience than Marshall.[x]
It was with the experience gained by these commanders in the MTO that would help lead to the successful invasion of Europe in 1944.
The third area to be assessed is that of the consideration that the MTO was a proving ground for many of the techniques that would be used in the ETO. This aspect can be seen in several ways; firstly it was a blood letting for the green American troops. It was in North Africa that they were to experience there first combat against the Germans and their first defeat at Kasserine Pass. The Americans were to come out of this experience knowing that they had a lot to learn and as Alan Wykes states it taught the British and Americans to:
cooperate with each other
and showed Eisenhower the:
weaknesses in command and decided on changes.[xi]
The MTO also became a proving ground for amphibious operations, which were to be used so successfully in Europe at D-Day. Many lessons were learnt in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and Anzio, which would be used to good effect at D-Day and as Stephen Ambrose states:
None of these lessons, somewhat surprisingly, came from previous
experience in the Pacific
After North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the commanders in Europe did not feel a need to ask their counterparts in the Pacific about their experiences[xii]
Surveying of beaches by Combined Operations Pilotage Parties, improvements to landing craft were made and use of landing craft as off shore artillery batteries were just some of the improvement made to amphibious warfare prior to the landing on D-Day that came out of the experiences in amphibious warfare in the MTO.
Another area that saw improvement was that of combined operation between the ground forces and air forces. This was borne out of experiences in the Western Desert. The then commander of the Desert Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Tedder did much to improve co-operation with the army. He developed a technique know as Tedders Carpet to clear a path for ground troops. The technique involved the bombers saturating the ground with high explosives and napalm. This technique was used in the MTO and was also used to help the breakout from Normandy during Operation Cobra. Another technique developed in the desert but also used to great effect in Europe was Cabrank this system involved the air forces providing close air support for ground troops in periods of intense fighting. It was developed by Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst, commander of the Desert Air Force, and was first used successfully at the crossing of the river Sangro in November 1943 and it was later used in Europe to great effect as Ian Gooderson states:
That British armour was capable of successfully exploiting fighter-bomber support when provided on CABRANK[xiii]
Also as Overy states the MTO also had an effect on the American air forces to the point that they realised that:
The cumbersome command structure that evolved in 1941 had predictable effects
The humiliation in Tunisia forced a major reassessment of how American tactical air forces were used.[xiv]
The final area of consideration is that after D-Day, while the MTO became a sideshow it still had an important role to play in that it managed to tie down approximately 26 German division that could have been better used elsewhere, for example, to shore up Army Group Centre on the Eastern Front which collapsed after the Soviet launched Operation Bagration or to throw back the Allied forces after D-Day. As Reid states the Italian campaign managed to keep bottled up:
a well commanded, seasoned force of veterans, whom it was preferable to keep bottled up in Italy.[xv]
Therefore in conclusion it can be said that while the MTO was not the war wining theatre it was extremely important to the allied war effort. Pre 6th June 1944 it was, as this essay has shown, important in several different ways. Initially it was important to Britain in the aspect of keeping morale up at home especially at a time when victories over the Germans were at a premium, this was very important at keeping the British people going. It was also very important to the troops who were shown, especially at the Second Battle of El Alamein, that they could defeat the Germans. The battle also created the myth of Montgomery, which also helped to instil confidence in British troops as Richard Lamb states:
They felt he knew how to use in action the modern technology in which they had been training for so long, and that he had the authority and knowledge to lead them to victory over Hitlers armies
[xvi]
This undoubtedly had a great effect on British morale that they know believed they had a commander with which they could win the war.
The MTO also taught the Allies many lessons involving the many aspects of modern warfare such as amphibious warfare and cooperation between air and ground forces that were to be so vital in Europe. It was also in the MTO that the right commander for in Europe was found, Eisenhower, it was here that he managed to hone his skill and diplomacy so that he could deal with the many different nation with which he would have to deal with in Europe.
Post 6th June 1944 the MTO greatest contribution to the Allied war effort is in its holding down of 26 veteran German divisions that could have been much better employed elsewhere in Europe.
So if it is even just in this final assessment then it cannot be claimed that the MTO was peripheral to Allied victory in WWII as it laid the foundation for the Allies ultimate success in Europe and by its very nature it laid down the necessary framework in training and operations that were to prove so successful for the Allies.
I. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, Pg. 128-161
II. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Op Cit, Pg. 157
III. The term British will be used to donate all forces fighting under the British flag, these included: the Dominion forces of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and South Africa and the Free French and Polish forces
IV. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Op Cit, Pg. 86
V. Holmes R (2001) Battlefields of the Second World War, Pg. 50
VI. Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 2: Auchinlecks Command, Pg. 323
VII. Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) stands for the German Africa Corps commanded by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
VIII. Dear I C B (General Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II, Pg. 256
IX. Yass M (1973) The Home Front: England 1939-1945, Pg, 95
X. Overy R (1995) Why The Allies Won, Pg. 144
XI. Wykes A (1982) The Biography of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pg. 62
XII. Ambrose S E (1994) D-Day June 6, 1944: The Battle for the Normandy Beaches, Pg. 137
XIII. Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45, Pg. 87
XIV. Overy R (1995) Op Cit, Pg. 226
XV. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Op Cit, Pg. 158
XVI. Lamb R (1983) Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure, Pg. 72
Bibliography:
Ambrose S E (1994) D-Day June 6, 1944: The Battle for the Normandy Beaches
Barnett C (1999) The Desert Generals
Dear I C B (General Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II
Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45
Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) The Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War
Holmes R (2001) Battlefields of the Second World War
Lamb R (1983) Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure
Overy R (1995) Why The Allies Won
Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 1: Wavells Command
Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 2: Auchinlecks Command
Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 3: Montgomerys Command
Yass M (1973) The Home Front: England 1939-1945
Wykes A (1982) The Biography of General Dwight D. Eisenhower
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lions led by donkeys is a fair assessment of British military leadership in the Great War.
The term Lions led by Donkeys first came into common usage to describe British military leadership of the Great War when Alan Clark wrote his book The Donkeys. The term is by its very nature polemic and is seen as a method of apportioning blame for what occurred on the western front during the Great War. In Clarks case he is seeking to lay the blame for the western front squarely at the door of the generals and most notably Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, possible as a means of shifting the blame from politicians, as he was one himself. As Tim Travers comments Clark and other orthodox historians attitudes have:
created
a mud and blood image of the First World War, which stressed the horrors of the war and/or the callousness of generals
The former Prime Minister Lloyd George, who sought to blame the generals for the problems of the western front, suggested this opinion of the Great War early on in his memoirs. The famous military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart in his books on the Great War, Reputations and The Real War, also picked upon it. The historian John Laffin in his book British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One has more recently picked upon the interpretation that the western front generals were both aloof and callous in their actions. As Laffin comments the:
senior generals of World War I were limited in their professionalism, in that they gave orders but when things went wrong did not accept responsibility.
Laffin carries along on this theme and even later in his book has a chapter entitled Haig, Haking and Gough: Incompetence, Callousness and Vanity
Much of the orthodox interpretation of the war stems from this apparent aloofness and has evolved into a myth of how the Great War was fought. This myth has seriously been perpetuated by appearance of what passes as school history. War poets such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfred Sassoon are commonly passed off as what the war was and how it was fought and are more commonly taught in English lessons rather than History lessons. As Ian Beckett comments:
English teachers have much to answers for in terms of the enduring image of the Great War.
This myth of the western front has also made its place in popular culture with the production by the BBC of Blackadder Goes Forth. This has also often been passed off as an accurate view of the western front.
So the orthodox interpretation has sought to apportion blame of the Great War away from the politicians, both pre-war and during the war, and lay it at the door of the Generals. This view has been perpetuated into popular culture through the teaching of the war poets in school and through television.
These interpretations have in the past fifteen to twenty years come in for serious criticism from a new school of revisionist historians who have sought to re-asses this situation. The new spate of revisionists have tended to look at the operational side of the debate in an attempt to balance out the attack on Great War British generalship and as Correlli Barnett comments:
by 1918 Haig and his Army commanders
had proved professionally superior to their German
counterparts
Members of this new school of historians include Paddy Griffith and Tim Travers. Much of their work has been dedicated to looking at the development of tactics and the usage of new weaponry by the army, most notably he tank and air power and the development of the all-arms battle. They find that the orthodox view is structurally flawed as it typically finishes on the 1st July 1916, the opening of the Somme offensive. Though as Griffith points out:
tactics were already being reformed in quite significant ways at least as early as
2nd July 1916
By looking at the lower areas of operations revisionists have been able to show that the British generals on the western front were always looking for methods to improve the way the war was fought and to end it as quickly as possible.
Revisionists also note that by not looking any further into subjects such as command and control and battlefield tactics orthodox historians have failed to see the complete picture of what revisionist see as successes, most notably the Hundred Days in 1918. Revisionists believe that the changes instituted by the General Headquarters of the BEF led to the ending of the war and that the advances that were made in 1918 would not have been possible without them.
As commented much work has been done on seeking to understand the performance of the British in the war. Further to this Dr John Bourne at the University of Birmingham is compiling a computer-based biography of divisional commanders in an attempt to understand tactical as well as operational decision-making. Also the Imperial War Museum has started the SHLM Project to compile information on divisional operations in the war.
So as has been seen the debate on British military leadership has been very politically charged as the orthodox historians, of whom some politicians are members, have sought to lay blame at the door of the generals. Though revisionists have attempted to move away from this apportioning of blame at look more at the operational level of the war in order to seek an answer to the question of the effectiveness of British military leadership. Most revisionists would be reluctant to deny that mistakes were made, such as the first day of the Somme, but what they seek to be made understood was that changes were made. Therefore, if they had not been made then how could the war have been won and as such how could the military hierarchy that was involved in these changes be considered donkeys. As revisionists vehemently point out the military hierarchy were constantly looking for ways to shorten the war with as few casualties as possible.
Therefore, to only consider the debate from the standpoint of the orthodox historians is, as revisionists claim, fatally flawed in its methodology as it is missing the whole picture. That is that things did change, new methods were introduced and that to only look up to the first day of Somme is only half of the story of British generalship on the western front.
Bibliography:
Books:
Barnett C (1963) The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London
Brown M (1999) The Imperial War Museum Book of 1918: Year of Victory, London, Pan Macmillan
Clark A (1961) The Donkeys, London, Hutchinson
Ferguson N (1998) The Pity of War, London, Penguin
Glanfield J (2001) The Devils Chariots: The Birth and Secret Battles of the First Tanks, London, Sutton Publishing
Griffith P (1994) Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Armys Art of Attack 1916-18, New Haven and London, Yale University Press
Griffith P (Ed.) (1996) British Fighting Methods in the Great War, London, Frank Cass
Hughes M (1999) Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East 1917-1919, London,
Frank Cass
Laffin J (1992) British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One, Stroud, Allan Sutton Publishing
Liddell Hart B H (1970) A History of the First World War (2 Volumes), London, Cassell
Neillands R (1999) The Great War General on the Western Front 1914-1918, London, Robinson Publishing
Samuels M (1995) Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918, Frank Cass, London
Terraine J (1963) Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, Hutchinson, London
Travers T (1990) The Killing Ground: The British Army and the Emergence of Modern
Warfare, London, Routledge
Woodward D R (1983) Lloyd George and the Generals, London, Associated University Presses
Journals:
Beckett I, The Military Historian and the Popular Image of the Western Front, 1914-1918, Historian, 53 (1997:Spring), Pg. 11
Newell J Q C, Learning the Hard Way: Allenby in Egypt and Palestine 1917-1919, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 14:3 (1991:September), Pgs. 363-387
Phillips G, The Obsolescence of the Arme Blanche and Technological Determinism in British Military History, War in History, 9:1 (2002), Pgs. 39-59
Travers T, The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower and Technology, Journal of Military History, 54:2 (1990:April), Pgs. 173-200
Newspapers:
Barnett C, Saturday Essay, Daily Mail, June 29 1996
Outline of Operation Jubilee:
At 0445[i] on 19 August 1942, the first forces landed on the French coast at Berneval approximately six miles from Dieppe. This was the first wave of a raid in force on the French town of Dieppe. As the Operational Orders for Jubilee states the purpose of the operation was:
Operation Jubilee is a raid on Jubilee with limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of an eardrum near the town and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and other craft in the harbour.[ii]
Operation Jubilee was the culmination of two years of raiding by the COHQ and was largest attempted to date. The major part of the raiding force was comprised of troops from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. The British provided additional troops in the form of No. 3 and 4 Commando from the Army and A Commando from the RM. There were also small detachments of French and US personnel, the most prominent of which were the fifty US Rangers attached to Lieutenant Colonel The Lord Lovats 4 Commando. The military forces involved in the operation came under the ground force commander Major General J H Roberts, the GOC of the 2nd Canadian Division. Roberts was a curious choice for such a prestigious and difficult mission, as he had not actually seen battlefield command in the war and therefore, like most of his soldiers were untrained and untested in combat.
The RAF supplied substantial forces in the support of Jubilee. In total sixty-one fighter squadrons were involved as well as nine further squadrons in various other roles.[iii] As will be discussed in a further chapter this force was inadequate to meet the needs of the operation and was actually there for another reasons that will become apparent. The air commander on the day was Air vice Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a man who would go on and command the Allied air forces during Operation Overlord.
The Navy, whose military head, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was deeply suspicious of such operations, only provided paltry forces for the support of the operations. The heaviest ships involved in the operation were destroyers of which eight were used. In total, there were two hundred thirty seven vessels in various roles for the operation.[iv] All of these ships came under the command of Captain J Hughes Hallett.
The operation began, as it was to go on. No. 3 Commando, the first unit to land, at Berneval came under intense fire and of their twenty-three landing craft, only six made it to shore. Most of these men themselves became casualties, but despite this, the commando managed to keep the battery quite though they did not actually take it out as the plan called for.
The next units to land were the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch of Canada. Of the approximately five hundred men who landed, only six returned unscathed. The reason for this was that they landed fifteen minutes behind schedule and eight after the Germans had sounded the alarm.
Next to come was the frontal assault on Dieppe itself, White and Red beaches. This was led Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, White beach, and the Essex Scottish, Red beach. Initially things looked good for the unit as fighter-bombers had attacked German position and the defenders appeared dazed. This eventually passed and the defenders started pouring machine gun and mortar fire into the area. As Lieutenant Fred Woodcock of the Royal Hamiltons, who was caught in a landing craft that was filled with Bangalore torpedoes and hit by a mortar bomb, comments he could ...only remember the sound, because I was blinded. The boat filled with water and I was soon up to my neck.[v]
The assault on Dieppe was supposed to be supported by twenty-nine[vi] Churchill MkIII tanks from Calgary Tank Regiment[vii]. However, from the start of the operation things deteriorated. The LCTs were fifteen minutes late arriving at the beaches and as has been commented this had
unfortunate results for the general fortunes of the operation on the main beaches.[viii] Eventually all of the tanks were destroyed and by all accounts only three make it onto the esplanade.[ix]
At 0630, approximately an hour and half after the main landing, Major-General Roberts decided that the situation was ready to land his floating reserve. This consisted on the Fusiliers Mont Royal. Roberts gives his reasons as follows:
About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that "Red" Beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve.[x]
In this decision Roberts was wrong as Red Beach had not been cleared and was not ready, the RHLI were pinned against the beach wall. In addition, the FMR were landed at the wrong place.
The RM A Commando had initially been intended to land in the harbour and cut out enemy craft. It was soon found that this was not possible. Therefore, they became part of the floating reserve. At 0800, Roberts, having been deceived by intelligence again, decided to commit them to White beach to force a breakthrough. This necessitated a quick rethink on the way into the beach and as Lieutenant M. Buist, RN comments it soon became clear that this was to be a
sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade.[xi] The commando came under a hail of artillery fire and its intended effect became negligible.
The next attack was at Green beach by the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada on the inner western flank. Initially there was success but eventually things started to go wrong. It was intended for the SSR to land at zero hour, 0450, and the QOCHC to land an hour and a half later and pass through them capture the high ground and proceed to Dieppe. The SSR quickly entered Pourville and became involved in fire fights with groups of Germans. The SSR attempted to subdue them with fire from the supporting destroyers and 3-inch mortars, but to no avail and they became bogged down. The QOCHC then landed at 0520 and were to link up with the tanks of the Calgary and capture a nearby airfield. This proved fruitless as the tanks were destroyed mostly on the beaches. By this time, everything was going wrong and both regiments attempted form a cordon until ordered to withdrawal.
The furthest unit to the west, 4 Commando, landed at 0454 and their objectives was to take out the German battery at Vasterival. This was Operation Cauldron and was the only successful operation during the raid. As an official report comments this operation was
a model of bold action and successful synchronization.[xii] Its success will be covered later.
By 0930, it became clear to everyone that the operation was a failure and landing craft started taking the wounded off the beach. At the same time both the Military Commander, Roberts, and the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallet, contended that withdrawal was necessary and that it should begin at 1100.[xiii] By 1250, all troops that could be evacuated had been removed from the beaches. Thus ended one of the bloodiest days in Commonwealth military history. The casualty rate for the ground force reached almost sixty percent. As one historian has commented, it was a cruel fate for a country, Canada, who had waited:
over two and a half years for combat and be killed, maimed, or captured within a single morning one of the undeniable tragedies of the Second World War[xiv]
[i] All times given are in British Summer Time. In the German War Diaries, all times were given in Continental time, which is one hour ahead.
[ii] Quoted in Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 83 Preliminary Report on Operation Jubilee (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 Aug 42 19 Sept 1942, p. A-1. From here on this report will be referred to as CMHQ No. 83. The reoccurrence of the word Jubilee is in reference to Dieppe and was used in an attempt to keep the target from German agents. However, in an accident of war on the final page of the Operational Orders the map reference for the target, Dieppe, was given, so much for protecting the target.
[iii] Terraine J (1997) The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945, p. 560. Though the Official History quotes fifty six squadrons of fighter: Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Volume 2: The Fight Avails, p. 143
[iv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) History of the Second World War: The War at Sea Volume II, p. 243
[v] Quoted in Atkin R (1980) Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster, p. 153
[vi] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 108 Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches. 17 Dec 43 Amended on 12 Jul 1950. Paragraph 137 From here on CMHQ 108
[vii] This unit was official known in the Canadian organisation as the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)
[viii] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraph 80.
[ix] See CMHQ 108 Op Cit Paragraph 84-88
[x] CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 142
[xi] Quoted in CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 174
[xii] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 101 Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks. 11 Aug 1943 p. 21. From here on CMHQ 101
[xiii] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraphs 225-230
[xiv] Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. p. 2
Dieppe and The Failure of Inter-Service Co-operation:
One of the oft-cited reasons for the failure of Operation Jubilee is the failure by the three services, the RAF, RN and the Army, to co-operate effectively on the day. It has often been argued that each of the services had their own agenda when going into the operation. This so-called agenda can be best represented by the role of the RAF during the operation; therefore, this is what shall be looked at first.
The RAFs central agenda for engaging in the Dieppe operations was the need to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. This is shown in the composition of the RAF forces that were committed to the battle. Leigh-Mallorys forces consisted of approximately sixty fighter squadrons and nine other squadrons. The nine other squadrons comprised of four Army Co-Operation Command squadrons equipped with the new North American Mustang tactical reconnaissance aircraft. The remaining five were equipped with Douglas Boston and Bristol Blenheim light bombers form No. 2 Group. The structure of this forces show that the RAF was more intent on dog fighting with the Luftwaffe over the battle area than providing support for the troops on the beach. The most notable feature missing from the force structure are any medium or heavy bombers. As Loring Villa comments
The role of the RAF in Dieppe appears
to have been a strange combination of heavy investment in fighter effort with
indifference to the necessity for bombardment.[i]
Much of the failure to employ the right force structure at Dieppe lay in the failure of inter-war planning. The RAF was still by this time deep rooted in its Trenchrdian ethos that the bomber would always get through and that it alone would win the war. This ethos was developed during a period in the RAFs history were it was struggling to survive. In order to survive the RAF searched for its raison detre. For the Air Staff this was strategic bombing and as Williamson Murray has commented
senior [RAF] air leaders held fast to Trenchards ideological belief in the bomber. This approach rejected co-operation with the other services.[ii] Also as has been commented elsewhere the Air Staffs hostility to the development of Close Air Support doctrine lay in its
confidence that a fully-developed strategic bomber offensive could win the war on its own account.[iii]
Thus by the outbreak of war the RAF found itself unable to deal with CAS operations for the army. Many of these failures were shown up during the Battle for France in 1940. The RAFs experience in France can be summed as
that it had neither the aircraft, doctrine nor training to be effective[iv] because
the RAF had spent the previous twenty years planning to fight a war quite different
[v]
On the 1 December 1940, the RAF formed the Army Co-operation Command. This was a belated attempt to rectify the failures found in France and under its aegis; many lessons were learned, but unfortunately not used during Operation Jubilee as seen by its force structure, which only consisted of nine squadrons from this Command. A Command that could have possibly added much to the operation because as has been commented this Command did
some of the most significant theoretical work on battlefield cooperation between the two services
[vi]
As commented before the failure to use heavy bombers in a fire support role needs to be addressed. The failure to use them does not come down to either Air Marshal Mountbatten[vii] or Leigh-Mallory, the air commander on the day, but much rather to the intervention of the chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Harris. When Leigh Mallory requested the use three hundred bombers for pre-bombardment, he was rebuked by Harris, who was acutely aware of the inadequacy of his command to currently achieve its primary goal, the bombing of Germanys industrial heartland. Therefore, he was unwillingly to divert a sizable section of his command to a raid which he considered as hopeless as attacking U-Boat pens. His position can be understood when looking at the assault on Normandy because bombing patterns from heavy and medium bombers were found to be
uneven, with some areas overhit and others relatively untouched.[viii] Thus by looking at the example of Normandy it is hard to wonder whether they would have much of an effect.
Thus, the main burden for support of the operation fell the fighter squadrons that made up the bulk of Leigh-Mallorys command and as the Official History of the RAF comments the
squadrons did what was expected of them
[ix] and that was in some way to seek air superiority over the beach areas. In this respect, Leigh-Mallorys command did a valiant effort but as recent revelations has shown not as well as could have been hoped for. At the time, it was believed that the RAF had shot down ninety-one aircraft, forty-four probable and one hundred fifty one destroyed on the ground, but as later research has shown the figure is actually somewhere nearer forty-eight destroyed and twenty-four damaged.[x] When compared to RAF losses on the day of one hundred six aircraft this was a heavy price to pay. In terms of Close Air Support, the picture was also much worse. As so much of Leigh-Mallorys command was made up of fighters, it was found to be very hard to support the troops on the beach as the cannon armed fighters could make little impression on the concrete casemates that made up the bulk of the German defences.
Thus to perceive whether the RAF had an agenda on Dieppe, as Loring Villa claims is top judge whether it was more a fault in its command and the force structure that was given to the operation. Loring Villa argues that aerial bombardment may have made a difference, but if the experience of Normandy two years later is examined then it is hard to see whether it would have made a difference, because as previously commented heavy bombers tended to be uneven and could often over hit their targets. In addition, the bombing of urban areas, which Dieppe was, can be a hindrance to attacking troops as was to be seen two years later in the rubble of Caen. Thus, it is doubtful whether three hundred bombers would have been of much help to the attackers. While the use of bombers was unlikely to help the operation, the miss-allocation of tactical air assets was the biggest failure and one of the greatest lessons of the operation. While the troops on the ground went unhindered by the Luftwaffe, they also faced a hard time attacking defensive positions. If the force structure had taken into account the many advances by the Army Co-operation Command and given more attention to CAS operations the operations may have been more of a success. Thus as the Official History comments;
the close support
was not entirely effective
because the cannon of our fighters made little impression on concrete [and] because
the military commanders were unable to indicate
targets for attack.[xi]
After the operation, one of the main criticisms and lessons was the need for massive fire support during the landing phase of any operation. To this end the RN provided both cruisers and battleships for all future amphibious landings, but the question was asked why none for the raid on Dieppe. The RN position during the raid on Dieppe can best be surmised by the attitude of the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound. Pound was weary of providing capital ships for any raid for fear of losing one in the English Channel; Pound viewed this as unacceptable to the RN at that time and as the papers of Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman comment, when he asked Mountbatten why there were no battleships Mountbatten told him that he had been that
should the battleship be sunk, we could never claim Dieppe as a victory
[xii]
Pounds position is understandable; to place a battleship of the coast of France in daylight and within reach of the Luftwaffe would have been asking for it to be attacked. 1942 was not 1944 and the allies yet had not achieved complete aerial supremacy, which gave them the advantage of doing virtually as they pleased during Operation Overlord. If Pound had acquiesced to the request he would have placed one of his most valuable ships within striking distant of an air force that had as yet not been crippled, as it would be by 1944 and as has been commented,
perfect air cover was impossible until the Luftwaffe was decisively defeated. [xiii]
Stephen Roskill, the Official Historian of the RN, also offers another possible explanation why a capital ship was not used and that was as he comments,
because our long experience of engaging coast defences
had not generally produced happy results.[xiv] This is a possible reference to the failure of the assault on Gallipoli during the First World War. If this is the case, we have an instance of previous failure permeating into the mind of the head of the RN. By letting, this into his mind Pound obviously allowed a previous naval failure to cloud his judgement. Unfortunately though there is little evidence as to whether this is true because like the other service chiefs, Pound has left little detail as to his thoughts on the raid and why he may not have allowed the use of a battleship.
In addition, Pounds reason to not use a battleship can be seen by the deployment of his ships. The RN started the war with thirteen capital ships and by 1942 it was down to nine, and these were spread all over the globe. Two were in-home waters; four were temporarily in the Indian Ocean while the rest were in the Mediterranean. Thus, it can be seen why it was hard to deploy a major ship in support of what was in Pounds mind a minor operation. Pounds major concerns at this time were the protection of vital convoys and attempting to defeat or at least keep in check the forces of the Axis navies. As such, Pounds fleets were already stretched to their limits, but also the commander was as, Churchill consistently harassed Pound for information on every aspect of the naval war and as such felt the pressure like all member of the COS.
[i] Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorised Action, p. 128
[ii] Murray W (1999) War in the Air 1914 45¸ p. 88
[iii]Jacobs W A Air Support for the British Army, 1939-1943, Military Affairs, 46:4 (1982: Dec) p. 175
[iv] Lloyd Clark War in the Air 1939-45 in Trew S and Sheffield G (Eds.) (2000) 100 Years of Conflict 1900-2000, p. 225
[v] John Buckley The Air War in France in Bond B and Taylor M (Eds.) (2001) The Battle for France and Flanders Sixty Years On, p. 117
[vi] Terraine J (1997) Op Cit, p. 351
[vii] Mountbatten on becoming the Chief of Combined Operations held titles in each of the three services; being Vice Admiral of the Navy, Lieutenant General of the Army and Air Marshal of the RAF.
[viii] Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support 1943-45, p. 240
[ix] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Op Cit, p. 144
[x] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Ibid
[xi] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Op Cit, pp. 144-145
[xii] Cited in Loring Villa B (1994) Op Cit, p. 95. This comes from the Baille-Grohman papers which are held in the National Maritime Museum Archives, Greenwich
[xiii] Loring Villa B (1994) Ibid
[xiv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) Op Cit, p. 241
[xv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) Op Cit, p. 251 |
Counterfactuals: Critically consider the implications if the United States had decided not to use the atomic bomb on Japan in August 1945.
Counterfactual history has in recent years become an increasingly popular area of historical study with numerous books having been released over the last few years. These books have been produced by such well known authors as Robert Cowley, Niall Ferguson, Erik Durschmied and Dennis Showalter. Counterfactual history offers historians a tool into why some decision were made and why other were not and as one historian has commented
counterfactual propositions are implicit in many historical judgements
Thus counterfactuals offer the historian insights into what might have been had the chosen course not been selected.
One of the greatest counterfactuals in military history and also the history of the twentieth century is President Trumans decision in 1945 to order the deployment and use of the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the bomb had not been used it offers several counterfactual for the subsequent course of the war. There are several aspects to be investigated. Firstly, there is the planned US invasion of the Japanese home islands, Operation Downfall. Secondly, the outcome of the continued strategic bombing campaign and maritime blockade of the home islands. Thirdly, there is the Soviet card, whom entered the war against Japan on 9 August 1945, and there planned operations in Manchuria and in Korea, an operation which one historian has commented
had a greater effect on the decision by Japanese leaders to end the Pacific war
than the
atomic bombs
Finally, there is one aspect which is often forgotten when thinking about the end of the war in the Far East and that is British and Commonwealth operations in the vital theatre of South-East Asia, an area that would become a melting pot in the immediate post war period, especially French-Indochina.
The first area of this What If to be considered is the planned US invasion of the Japanese home islands. Operation Downfall was planned to go ahead in two distinct phases. The first phase was to be Operation Olympic, the invasion and occupation of the Japanese islands of Kyushu. This operation was to be launched November 1 1945. After this Operation Coronet, larger invasion forces were to land on the Kanto plain of Honshu and occupy Japans political and industrial homeland and Tokyo and Yokohama. Coronet was to be launched in March 1946. The planned forces for the operation were to be massive in size. Olympic itself would be larger than the invasion of Europe, Overlord, and Coronet would be larger still. In terms of lands forces there would be four distinct armies involved in both operations. These were the Sixth, Eight and Tenth armies which were already in Pacific Theatre of Operations (PTO) and the First army which was due to be redeployed from the European Theatre of Operations (ETO). In total there would be somewhere in the region of five million men involved in Downfall. The vast majority of these forces would be American, though Britain and the Commonwealth would be contributing a small force of three divisions, one each from Britain, Canada and Australia, the British Pacific Fleet, then serving with Admiral Halsey's Fifth Fleet and some squadrons from the Royal Air Force. This was a massive force with a single purpose, the occupation and subjugation of the Japanese home islands. As paragraph one of the Strategic plans for Downfall comments that the:
Strategic Plan constitutes the basis for directives for operations to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by seizure of vital objectives in the Japanese Archipelago.
While American plans for Downfall continued the Japanese too planned for a possible invasion of their home islands. Their counter operation for American incursion of their home islands was codenamed Operation Ketsu-Go. It called for massive strikes against the invading forces. It has for many years been estimated that by 1945 Japanese forces and industry were on the verge of complete and utter destruction, and while this is to some extent true, the Japanese army itself was able to mobilise a vast amount of men and material to meet any invasion of the home islands. The Japanese army was able to amass nearly two and a half million men organised into fifty three infantry divisions and twenty five brigades. On top of this there were two armoured division, seven armoured brigades and four anti-aircraft divisions. A not too inconsequential force with which to repel the invaders. They were organised into four area armies to guard the home islands. In addition there were approximately twenty eight million men in the National Volunteer Force, a Home Guard of sorts. In addition there were numerous Kamikaze units ready to repel the invaders. It is approximated that the Kamikaze forces had amassed something in the region of five thousand aircraft and one thousand suicide craft with which to barrage the invasion fleets anchored of the islands of Japan. It was these forces that created the greatest worry for the invading forces.
US estimates of casualties for the invasion of Japan were based on their preceding campaign on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa and in the recapture of the Philippines. For example during the campaign for Okinawa US forces had suffered heavily. There being 7613 soldiers killed and 31807 wounded. This works out as a casualty rate of approximately twenty three percent. The naval forces involved also suffered heavily losing thirty six warships. Based on these casualties it was estimated in some corners that in the initial invasion period the Americans would lose somewhere in the region of half a million men killed and wounded. Though it is possible that it may not have been this high because the closer US forces got to Japan the more the war took its toll on the Japanese military. The Japanese military ethos on the eve of World War II related to honour and obedience and fighting, literally, to the last soldier. For example, during the fighting for Tarawa in 1943 only one hundred and forty six marines surrendered out of a force four and a half thousand. This had changed by the assault on Okinawa when as many as seven thousand men surrendered. As such the Japanese militaries combat efficiency had declined; therefore, it could be argued that by the time of Downfall Japanese resistance would not have been what it was during the early campaign of the Pacific war. Thus an invasion of Japan may well have been easier than had been previously thought, though on the other hand it may have been just as bloody as predicted.
Though it may never have had to come to invasion due to the second what if. After the capture of the Marianas in 1944, the last island, Guam, fell in August of that year, US strategic bombers came into effective range of the Japanese home islands and could launch an air war with which to disrupt Japans war production and command and control networks. The reduction of Japan was left the US 20th Army Air Force which operated off Tinian in the Marianas. When the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) reported in its findings it claimed that Japan would have surrendered by November 1945, the projected date for Operation Olympic, from the weight of the strategic bombing campaign. As the USSBS comments;
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
The report argued that if the bombing of Japans cities and industrial targets had continued then she would have had to of surrendered by late 1945. The conventional strategic bombing campaign is best typified by the fire bombing of Tokyo. The raid, launched on the 9/10 March 1945, caused massive damage to Tokyos infrastructure destroying up to twenty industrial targets and causing up to eighty five thousand Japanese casualties. The continuation of the firebombing campaign coupled with the US Navys blockade of Japans important sea lanes through the use of submarine warfare caused the crippling of Japans ability to continue the war. Americas strategic bombing force in the Pacific would have been, by the latter part of 1945, significantly reinforced by units from the ETO. It was planned the US 8th Air Force with it Boeing B17s Flying Fortresses would redeploy to the PTO. This would add approximately two thousand airframes to the already significant force of Boeing B29 Superfortresses of the 20th Air Force. The Royal Air Force also planned to deploy three bomber groups to the Far Eat under the auspicious of Tiger Force This force would have been equipped with Avro Lancaster MkX and the new Avro Lincoln, both long range bombers with significant payload capacity. Had this campaign been allowed to continue with all of its added weight it would have arguably brought Japan to its knees without the use of the atomic bombs or the need for an invasion. As one historian has argued the strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese was the most successful case of military coercion through the use of air power and even without the atomic bombs its still stands out as an immensely successful campaign.
Another aspect of the alternatives decision for the end of World War II is the role of the Soviet Union in the Far East. It had been a constant in allied planning that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan. At the Yalta Conference, Argonaut, in February 1945 it was agreed that in return for Soviet entry against Japan there would be status quo in Mongolia and the acquisition of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. With this agreement and the end of the war in Europe, Soviet units were gradually transferred to the Far East via the trans-Siberian railway. In the space of two months Marshal Vasilevskys Far Eastern Command had doubled from forty to eighty divisions and on 9 August the soviets launched a massive assault on the Japanese Kwantung army based in Manchuria. By the end of hostilities on and about 20 August the Soviet army had destroyed the Kwantung army causing more than 80000 casualties. This operation was but a precursor for what had been planned by the Soviets. They had planned a continued advance into Korea and an invasion of the Japanese home island of Hokkaido at about the same time as the US planned invasion, Operation Downfall. If this planned invasion had gone ahead it may well have had huge effects on the post-war nature of Japan and the Far East. It can easily be surmised that Japan would have been occupied in a similar manner a Germany was with three zones of occupation, US, Britain/Commonwealth and Soviet, rather than just being occupied by America. Tokyo would have become the Berlin of the far eat but in the American zone. It would have therefore, been a useful counterweight to Soviet demands over the status of Berlin in 1948. As such it can be seen while Soviet entry would have helped in the destruction of Japan it may well have added another aspect to the Cold War with Japan becoming Americas counterweight to Soviet power in central Europe. Though it must also be kept in mind that Stalin having a say in Japanese politics may well have also affected aspects of American post war policy in the Pacific as well. This was because in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, Japan was used as a logistics springboard with which to launch their campaigns.
While the actual fate of Japan has been considered by many historians with respect to the use of the atomic bomb and any other possible alternatives, one area which has often been left out of these considerations is the fate of South East Asia in the final months of the war. With the launch of Operation Capital and Dracula, Field Marshal the Viscount Slim, commander of the British 14th Army, launched the liberation of Burma. Dracula was the culmination of many years of hard fighting and saw the re-capture of Rangoon. With this act Burma was liberated and planning was underway for the liberation of all former British colonies in the region. The British had planned to send forces from Germany to Burma in order to facilitate further advances and in preparation General Stopford formed the 12th Army which would eventually be handed over to General Sir Miles Dempsey, former commander of the 2nd Army in North West Europe. Under this command structure, headed by Slim, who was by now Allied Land Force commander South East Asia, the British/Commonwealth forces had planned the liberation of Malaya and Indonesia. This combined with the Australians coming up from Borneo was designed to clear the Japanese from all colonial possessions. Had the war continued and Britain liberated these countries the communist insurgent forces which had resisted the Japanese and then turned against the British post war may not have been able to draw on the popular support which they did after the war. If this had occurred Britains position in South East Asia may well have been much stronger and any subsequent retreat from the Empire may well have been far less bloody and these countries transition to democracy may well have been smoother.
While in the British colonies this may have been possible, French colonies would have been a much greater problem as they had no forces in the region, the first French troops did not arrive until December 1945, thus it may have been harder to assume a position of the liberator without the support of Britain. Though this may have been true, the crumbling of Japanese resistance may have seen increased pressure from the Viet Minh and Chinese Communist forces and such given them a much stronger position against the French colonial administrators when or if they returned. This may well have led to a united Vietnam thirty year earlier and without the bloodshed of two subsequent wars.
In conclusion it can be seen that there are many what ifs concerning the ending of the war in pacific, many of them involve important decisions on the state of the post war world in the Far East and South East Asia. For example, if the Soviet Union had invaded Japan would it have become a powder keg like Berlin was in Europe or would it become a counterweight to Stalin policies in Europe. A vast amount of literature has been written on the subject, a vast amount of it dealing with the planned US invasion, this has stemmed from an attempt to explain the eventual use of the atomic bomb and whether it was morally right to use it when there were other alternatives to the planner of the war but had they been used would the war have been better of than if the bomb was used. That is an argument that will undoubtedly go on as we do not know as that is the point of a counterfactual, we are surmising on event that did not happen and in one historian view, because of the prevailing Soviet posture, the war had to end when it did.
Bibliography:
Documents:
United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War) Washington, D.C. 1 July 1946 Accessed at www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm
US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA
Operation Downfall (Invasion of Japan), Strategic Plan, May 1945
Books:
Bayly C and Harper T (2004) Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945, Penguin, London
Cowley R (Ed.) (2002) More What If? Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been, Macmillan, London
Dear I C B (Gen. Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Deutsch H C and Showalter D E (Eds.) (1997) What If? Strategic Alternatives of WWII, The Emporers Press, Chicago
Durschmied E (2002) The Hinges of Battle: How Chance and Incompetence Have Changed the Face of History, Hodder and Stoughton, London
Feis H (1971) The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, Princeton University Press, Princeton
Lamont Brown R (1999) Kamikaze: Japans Suicide Samurai, Cassell, London
Pape R A (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell University Press, Cornell
Parillo M P (1993) The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis
Rees D (1997) The Defeat of Japan, Praeger, Westport
Tosh J (1999) The Pursuit of History: Third Edition, Longman, London
Journals:
Bauer K J and Coox A C Olympic VS Ketsu-Go Marine Corps Gazette, August 1965, Vol. 49, No. 8. Accessed at www.ibiblio.org
Miles Jr R E, Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved, International Security (10:2) Fall 1985
Websites:
Operation Downfall: The Invasion of Japan, November, 1945 Accessed at www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/8141/downfall.html
Transcript of "Operation Downfall [US invasion of Japan]: US Plans and Japanese Counter-Measures" by D. M. Giangreco, US Army Command and General Staff College, 16 February 1998 Accessed at www.mtholyoke.edu
World War II in the Pacific, Operation Downfall: Olympic, Coronet, The Invasion of Japan Accessed at www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html
US Army Military History Institute, Operation Downfall (Invasion of Japan), Strategic Plan, May 1945, p. 7
USAMHI, Operation Downfall (Invasion of Japan), Strategic Plan, May 1945, attached letter from R. K. Sutherland Lieutenant General. United States Army. Chief of Staff.
Estimates of Japanese forces taken from Bauer K J and Coox A C Olympic VS Ketsu-Go Marine Corps Gazette, August 1965, Vol. 49, No. 8. Accessed at www.ibiblio.org Kamikaze meant the Divine Wind and was in reference to the wind that had repelled the Mongol Invasions of 1274 and 1281. In both the Kami, the Japanese name for their Shinto Gods, were summoned to help the Japanese nation repel the invaders. For an excellent introduction to the history of the Kamikaze and their motives see: Lamont Brown R (1999) Kamikaze: Japans Suicide Samurai.
This figure has recently come into question with the declassification of documents relating to Downfall. It has led to a re-examination of the potential casualty figure for the invasion of Japan, for example see: Miles Jr R E, Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved, International Security (10:2) Fall 1985
|
|
