Major General ‘Pip’ Roberts GOC 11^th Armoured Division

(Source: Tout K (2002) Roads to Falaise: ‘Cobra’ and ‘Goodwood’ Reassessed)

1. Introduction:

“…by 1944 the Tanks had made themselves the prisoners of their own orthodoxy, keener to adhere to the letter of their cherished doctrine than to win the rewards a violation of it might bring”(1)

John Keegan’s statement is representative of the orthodox view of the British during the Normandy campaign. For many years, the British 2nd Army(2)in Normandy has come in for criticism as being tactically inept when compared to the Germans, and even their American allies. The armoured element has come in for even more criticism, simply stating that the Anglo-Canadians were unable to overcome doctrine and adopt a fluid method of organisation and co-operation in battle as exemplified by the German Kampfgruppe or the American Combat Command. This essay will seek to show that while the Anglo-Canadians’ had failures, which hampered their efforts early in the campaign, by the end in Normandy the Anglo-Canadian armoured forces(3) were adopting combined arms teams and co-operating with other elements of the army successfully. It will do this by looking at the Anglo-Canadians’ pre-eminent division in Normandy, the 11th Armoured which, Russell Hart has called one of the:
“…few well-trained and well-led divisions…[of the campaign]”(4)
It will look at firstly, the training and doctrinal methods pre-Overlord and then secondly, the solutions found in the field to operational problems.

2. Organisation and equipment:

Britain's armoured forces at the time of the Normandy campaign were in the main equipped with the US produced M4 Sherman in various guises. There were several exceptions to this; firstly, the 7th Armoured Division and the divisional reconnaissance regiments were equipped with the A27M Cromwell, a British cruiser tank. Secondly, the Army Tank Brigades were equipped with the A22/42 Churchill infantry tank, this tank was heavily armoured and ideally suited to its role. The armoured regiments used the final vehicle, the M3 Stuart, as a light tank. The artillery elements of the armoured divisions were equipped initially with one regiment of the M7 Priest self-propelled gun, though this was replaced with the Sexton SPG, which mounted a 25pdr. The other regiment was equipped with towed 25pdr guns. The divisional anti tank regiments were equipped with the M10 tank destroyer, which was built on the Sherman chassis; this got rearmed with the 17pdr gun, the most effective tank gun in the British and US armies, and made it a very effective anti-tank weapon.

The basic organisation of a British armoured division in 1944 was as follows:

This organisation was based on several years of experiments(5) both in Britain and in operational circumstances and represented the best compromise based upon Britain’s regimental traditions and the needs of modern armoured warfare. The changes were the realisation of the need for more infantry within the divisions.

The Sherman has come in for bad press in regards of its capabilities especially those that equipped the British forces as they have often been considered those:
“…rejected for overseas combat duty by the U.S. Army.”(6)
However, as John Keegan has commented it was:
“…a magnificent expression of American mass-production…”(7)

While it was not as formidable as its contemporary German tanks the Sherman was easily massed produced, 49000 were produced during the war. However, it did have its defects. They were extremely inflammable, this was due to the dry storage of ammunition, though this was changed to wet storage during the campaign, and gained the nickname ‘Ronson’ by the British after the lighter which always lit first time and ‘Tommy cooker’ from the Germans and it had a high profile making it an easy target for German tanks.

Bill Close, a squadron Commander in the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment comments that in the main the Sherman could not deal with German tanks at ranges over 500 yards:
“Our ordinary 75mm gun could not knock out either a Tiger or a Panther except at 500 yards range, and in the rear with a bit of luck in the flank!”(8)

However, by the summer of 1944 there was one version, the ‘Firefly’ that was armed with a high velocity 17pdr gun that could compete with the latest German tanks. This became the main tank killer of the tank troops and was preciously guarded by the troops. It was initially issued based on one per troop. Though, the Firefly did still have some shortcomings, most notably it high velocity Armour Piercing round kicked up a lot of dust causing problems with aiming and that the new gun made the turret very cramped.

The vast number of Sherman’s produced led them to be easily replaced. For example, in Operation Goodwood, the British lost 36 per cent of their tank strength and as Max Hastings comments that, the vast reserve of tanks meant:
“…that replacements reached almost every armoured division within 36 hours.”(9)

These vast reserves even led to the planning of an operation, Goodwood, which relied heavily on the utilisation of these reserves in order to lower infantry casualties. As Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey commented:
“…tank reinforcements were pouring into Normandy faster than the rate of tank casualties. So we could afford…to plan an operation in which we could utilise …tanks and economise on infantry.”(10)

3. Doctrine and training:

11th Armoured Division was formed in the fall of 1941 and was one of a series of armoured divisions ordered formed by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in response to Germanys Panzer divisions, which had rampaged through France the previous summer. Its first commander was the tank pioneer Major General Sir Percy Hobart(11) ; the division’s insignia is taken from Hobart’s family crest.

The doctrine that was used to train the officers and men of 11th Armoured Division came in several different forms. Firstly, the bulk of information came from the War Offices’ Military Training Pamphlet (MTP) series; these covered the majority of trades in the army and every aspect of fighting from minor tactics to the handling of large formations. The second method for the dissemination of doctrine was the Army Training Memorandum (ATM) series. This series was an inter-war series, which meant to keep troops up to date with recent innovations. In the war years, it was regularly published with notes from the theatres of operations, most notably North Africa. Thirdly, there was the Army Training Instructions (ATI). This was used to fill the gap while MTP’s were published. ATI’s could be published quickly, for example, ATI No. 3 Handling of an Armoured Division, was published two months after a cloth exercise occurred, which attempted to solve the problems relating to the handling of an armoured division.

The final two methods are the most relevant to armoured warfare as it was considered impossible to keep printed doctrine up to date with the most recent developments. This led to the publication of two battle experience publications. Firstly, Notes form Theatres of War (NTW), this was first publicised at the time of the CRUSADER offensive. Secondly, there was Current Reports from Overseas (CRO). This provided a vehicle for the dissemination of ideas down to brigade level, which did not yet have endorsement from the War Office but did not have the same weight as NTW’s.

Therefore, it is from these sources that doctrine for 11th Armoured Division was based and that training from their formation to their landing in Normandy stemmed. As Timothy Harrison Place comments:
“Between them, Military Training Pamphlets, Army Training Memoranda, Army Training Instructions, Notes from Theatres of War, Current Reports from Overseas…represent the main sources…on doctrine and its evolution up to D-Day.”(12)

The initial conception of armoured doctrine for the home-based armoured divisions came from ATI No.3 Handling of an Armoured Division(13). This publication gave primacy to the tank in operations and that the support group of the division should be used to occupy ground and provide a pivot from whence the tanks could operate. Armour was considered the main striking force and all else was to support this. Co-operation between armour and infantry was considered simply the one handing over to the other. While 1942 saw a significant change in the armoured division structure, one armoured brigade was replaced with an infantry one, at a tactical level little change in the way of co-operation. While a new doctrine was published in 1943, it ascribed much the same role for the infantry brigade as the infantry of the old support group. In actual fact some commanders still saw the role of tanks as that of cavalry as shown when 9th Armoured Brigade charged diagonally across the gun line of the 2nd Irish Guards during exercise SARUM(14). This tactic would again come back to haunt tank crews during Operation GOODWOOD.

Slowly, news from the North African theatre filtered back to the units via the NTW’s and CRO’s and belatedly doctrine was changed to include at least the motor battalions in action, though the infantry brigade remained firmly in the support role. By the time Hobart relinquished command their had been a realisation that their was a greater need of inter-arm co-operation. However, problems remained. The main problem was how to transport the infantry. It was found early on that transporting them on tanks caused discomfort for the infantry. It was not until the introduction of the White half-track in early 1944 that the situation was resolved. Therefore, the main problem of co-operation that existed was how to keep the infantry up with the tanks. Another problem was what role the infantry should play in supporting the armour. The re-equipping of the divisions with the Sherman in late 1943 led to infantry being reverted to a support role once again. This was due to the Sherman having a good HE(15) rounds with which to deal with ‘soft’ targets.

The period of 1942-43 saw the increase in the attempt to co-ordinate armour and infantry. This was intensified when Major-General Roberts(16) took over the division in early 1944. Roberts with his experience in the desert saw the need to improve co-operation between armour and infantry. Roberts also saw the need to change the tactics used when launching an attack. Prior to his arrival their had been an attempt to use set piece tactics to assault a position, he change this by ordering that upon closing with the enemy the armoured brigade commander send his regiments around the flanks of the enemy. He ordered that regiments keep on the move and that deliberate reconnaissance be abolished. These were some of the advantages conferred on the division with the arrival of a commander with battlefield experience.

Another failure in training was the inability of the division exercises to be realistic. They suffered from being under the guidance of umpires who sought their regiment to be victorious rather than a fair comprehension of the battlefield environment. As Harrison-Place comments about 11th armoured’s exercise EAGLE that was:
“…partial umpiring by umpires whose first loyalty was not to realism but to the interests of their own units.”(17)

As has be seen the implementation of these publications and their associated doctrine was patchy and led to mistakes both in training and in operations. While attempts were made, belatedly, to correct the failings in training and doctrine, most notably with the arrival of Roberts from the Mediterranean, the problems encountered in training would come back to haunt the British in the early operations of the Normandy campaign. Had the lesson of North Africa been more forcefully implemented at both division and regimental lesson many mistake could have been avoided.

4. Operations EPSOM, GOODWOOD, and the failure of doctrine:

Operation EPSOM was launched on the 26th of June under a massive bombardment of 700 guns. The objective of the operation was to gain the high ground of Hill 112 and then breakout into the Odon valley below. The operation was to be carried out by Lieutenant General O’Connor’s(18) VIII Corps, which was newly arrived from England. This corps included Robert’s 11th Armoured Division(19).

The initial attack by the 15th Scottish went well and in the first few hours of the division made an inroad of several miles on a front of three miles. Suddenly German resistance began to stiffen and the failure of the supporting operation of I and XXX Corps meant that VIII Corp was prone to a counter-attack on three sides. This occurred on the 27th. It was at this point that O’Connor decided to commit the 11th Armoured to the battle. Eventually the tanks of 29th Armoured Brigade reached Hill 112 but without an infantry, support they were forced to relinquish the position on the 30th after II SS Panzer Corps launched a counter attack. The previous day Montgomery had ordered a halt to EPSOM realising, it was going to go no further.

During the operation, 11th Armoured operated in virtually 2 distinct formation, 29th Armoured and 159th Infantry brigades, and conducted operations independent of each other. Initially in the operation, the 159th took Baron sur Odon and encountered heavy fighting there and from there subsequently served under various formations. When this occurred 29th was ordered to try to fight a way through to achieve a breakthrough from Cheux. This was the first mistake. Instead of using the tanks once a breakthrough had been achieved, O’Connor attempted to use the tanks to achieve the breakthrough. This meant that by the time any sort of gap had been created the armoured unit were too tired and exhausted to exploit it. The other major failure for the division during EPSOM was it lack of co-ordination between infantry and armour. Harrison-Place comments that:
“…Roberts reached the…conclusion…concerning the need for tank-infantry co-operation within the armoured division.”(20)
Though he was frustrated in his wish for greater co-operation as during the EPSOM operation his infantry brigade served under three commands, 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53rd Welsh divisions, which meant that he could not develop co-ordination between his units. Therefore, the only infantry that was supporting the tanks was the mechanised infantry of the 8th Rifle Brigade, and while they did sterling service, they were too few in number to be of effect.

EPSOM, therefore, shows the first major blooding for the division and started to show up the failing in their training especially, as commented above, the lack of effective inter arm co-operation.

11th Armoured’s next operation was GOODWOOD. This operation was launched on the 18th July as a precursor to the launch of the Americans operation COBRA. It had many conflicting aims. Montgomery had to up the objectives of the operation in order to gain the support he wanted from the strategic air forces, though he never fully believed the plan could be a breakout. Whereas, the commander of the 2nd Army, Lieutenant General Dempsey, believed it could achieve a breakout on the eastern flank. The operation has often been compared to the charge of the light brigade as it saw the use of an all armoured corps, VIII Corps(21), and had very little infantry support.

The operation began under a massive preparatory bombardment by RAF Bomber Command and then the divisions jumped off from their position by the Orne River. 11th armoured objectives were Bras, Hubert Folie, Verrieres and Fontenay. Moving off without support from the infantry, who were fighting a parallel action, the tanks encountered their first problems, an anti-aircraft battery of 88mm anti-aircraft/tank guns, at Cagny(22), which knocked out 16 tanks. The division had only just started to move out. Worse was to come, the only Forward Air Controller was killed and the units behind 11th Armoured were caught in huge traffic jams. Roberts then ordered Cagny to be masked by the 8TH RB and 23rd Hussars. This was a mistake because once they moved into position they were in full view of German tanks and the 23rd Hussars took heavy casualties. For most of the day, units received flank attacks to their exposed positions. As Bill Close comments on the losses received by the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment:
“We had received a considerable number of casualties with seven tanks knocked out from my squadron and a similar number from B and C squadron.”(23)

The 19th would see much the same problems as the previous day. 3rd RTR attempted to take Bras. The major problem in attacking Bras and Hubert Folie was the 3000 yards of open country between them and the divisions start line. In this area were many dug 88’s and infantry armed with Panzerfausts who took a great heavy toll on the tank units, who had limited infantry support to deal with the positions. Though by the end of the day their was an attempt at forming battle groups, for example, one was made up of the 4th KSLI, 3rd Mons and 23rd Hussars while they attempted to hold onto Hubert Folie.

Operation GOODWOOD has attracted much criticism, some quite rightly so. It was ill conceived to send in an all armoured attack into country that was perfect for German anti-tank guns that had the range to knock out all Allied tanks with ease. There is also a sense of bad luck for the forward units of 11th Armoured to of had their FAC knocked out so early on in the operation. The biggest failure in doctrine though was the distinct lack of co-operation between the armour and infantry. Once again, O’Connor forced 11th Armoured to fight as two separate entities. Roberts to his credit was dismayed by this fact, after seeing its effect in EPSOM, but when he attempted to change it, he was threatened with his division loosing the lead in the operation. Therefore, despite attempts pre-invasion to train the divisions to operate with infantry in GOODWOOD they were denied that opportunity and as Harrison Place comments:
“Their deployment disregarded the doctrine in which they had been trained. No wonder that few successes came their way.”(24)
Bill Close also comments that:
“Goodwood was a shambles, but only because our method of advance was forced upon us without infantry…”(25)

Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD had shown failing in the British armoured division not just at tactical level but also there employment at a higher level. They had shown failings and proven once and for all that tanks could not, and should not operate without infantry and also that they were a fine instrument for exploitation not a blunt one with which to take and hold ground. Thankfully, the armoured units reputation would be regained in their final operation, BLUECOAT, where 11th Armoured would lead the way.

5. Operation BLUECOAT and success:

BLUECOAT was to see the coming of age for Britain's armoured divisions. In the operation they would use combined armour-infantry teams to deal with the problems the bocage country gave them. This was especially apparent in 11th Armoured who led the way with the tactics and they were finally being run along the lines suggested in the training documents of 1942-44.

Even the planning of the operation was done in a new fashion; it was left to the divisional commander to formulate the orders and movements of his units. For Roberts this meant complete freedom to organise his units into combined armour-infantry groups. For the operation, he formed four battle groups from his division. By this time the armoured reconnaissance regiment was being used as a fourth armoured regiment as the division had the 2nd Household Cavalry attached. This use of battle group was the first success for the doctrine, which had been attempted to be laid down in Britain in the years 1942-44.

The operation opened on the 30th July with VIII Corps heading for Vire and XXX Corps launching an assault against Mont Pincon. The division was ordered to march for Le Beny Bocage. Before it could do this, it had to take St Martin-des-Besaces. Initial movement on the first day was slow but by the second, the German front began to crumble in front of VIII Corps. On the morning of 31st St Martin was attacked by the battle group of the 2nd Fife and Forfarshire Yeomanry and 4th KSLI. It was during this attack that a gap in the lines was found by the 2nd Household Cavalry, who were attached to 11th Armoured, at what is now known as Bull Bridge over the Souleuvre River. This was an opportunity for the division to shift its weight of advance and gain an advantage, which it duly did by the end of the second day. The cause of this gap was uncertainty of the two German divisions in the area over who was to blow the bridge. By realising, there was a gap the battle group of the 3rd Mons and 23rd Hussars were ordered to concentrate there and strike out. As Major J J How comments:
“…Roberts saw his chance and seized it.”(26)
This small action early on in the operation shows the flexibility that could occur when an armoured division and its commander were given the opportunity. By controlling the battle himself and not always checking with his Corps commander Roberts was able to take the opportunity and seize a vital crossing over the river that would help speed up his advance.

By being given, the freedom to plan his own operations and fully direct his division’s operations Roberts was able to advance quickly and eventually seized Perriers ridge. This created a salient in the front as Guards and the Americans on either side were advancing much slower. This led to a halt in operations and to hold the ground that had already been seized. The 6th August the division, two brigade boxes on the ridge came under a counter attack by the 10th SS Panzer Division. The division by utilizing combined operation from all elements were able to hold their position but it was close run thing as the historian of the 23rd Hussars confidently comments:
“General Eberbach had reported to von Kluge that 10th SS Panzer had captured Hill 224 – not true!”(27)

Operation BLUECOAT shows several elements of how to make the best use of an armoured division. Initially by allowing Roberts to plan his own operations he could tailor his division to the mission it was given. Secondly, the operations that occurred around St Martin and Bull Bridge show is a good example of what should happen when an opportunity arises and how to exploit it. By being able, to exploit the situation at hand Roberts managed to get a head start on his advance and was eventually ahead of XXX Corps who were supposed to be leading BLUECOAT but whose attacks had become bogged down. The final example of the actions on Hill 224 show that when used to good effect and supported by infantry, armour could hold a static position against determined counterattack.

6. Conclusion:

As has been seen the 11th Armoured in Normandy went through many problems that stemmed from areas of their training and doctrine and regimental system.

During their training period, there was a distinct failure to disseminate the information coming back from the front. While these did come back in the form of NTW’s and CRO’s they were never fully formed into official doctrine and therefore, not fully disseminated.

The other major problem facing the force in its early years was the problems of inter-arm service co-operation that was enshrined in regimental tradition, as Russell Hart comments:
“…traditionalism enshrined in…regimental system…continued to retard development of the interarm and interservice co-ordination…”(28)
For example, officers of the RTR were adamant that the tank had primacy in warfare and sought to see the survival of their Corps. They also based much of their theories on the work of Basil Liddell Hart and Major General Fuller who also sought to protect the Corps and the role of the tank. This is most notable with Hobart, a disciple of the work of the former, who sought to use the tanks of 11th Armoured as the main weapon of the division, whereas, Roberts, with his experience, saw the importance of co-operation between the various services of the division. Both EPSOM and GOODWOOD showed the fatality of the use of the early theories of armoured warfare and the realisation that what was trying to be taught, greater inter-arm co-operation, was the way forward. This is something that Roberts knew. BLUECOAT showed that his efforts to improve inter-arm co-operation after taking command had not been in vain once he was given the opportunity to exercise command of his division fully.

The divisions in Normandy initially threw away anything they had been taught from their experiences in the field. It took them making several mistakes early in the campaign to bring around a realisation that tanks could not operate effectively without some form of infantry support. This throwing away of the training book was in part to preserve infantry casualties, as by 1944 21st Army Group was a wasting asset. Therefore, there was an attempt to use what the army had a lot of and that was tanks. This was a costly error, which eventually led to the formation a battle groups and the realisation of the doctrine of 1942-44. As Russell hart comments:
“…in Normandy British ground forces enhanced their capabilities in…combined arms co-operation.”(29)

While this essay has shown that 11th Armoured were able to realise the limitation in their training and the control from higher command most of the other Anglo-Canadian armoured divisions had a similar learning curve in the Normandy campaign. Another example of where the Anglo-Canadian forces managed to overcome the limitation in their doctrine was during operation TOTALISE/TRACTABLE. In the early stages Canadian II Corps failed to use, it has armoured forces effectively and use them to find weak points in the German defences and seek exploitation. Instead, they became bogged down in fighting. However, by the start of TRACTABLE the armoured division were, like 11th Armoured, operating in battle groups and seeking operational manoeuvre against the enemy. The 1st Polish Armoured Divisions action around Trun was very similar to those that happened to 11th Armoured around Hill 224. therefore, the anglo-canadian armoured division were as flexible as their allies and enemies armoured formation by the end of the campaign.

Therefore, it can be said that the problems faced in Normandy were down to failure to disseminate doctrine properly and the limitation to implement at the right level and therefore, train the units effectively. As Harrison Place comments that, the problems faced could be:
“…traced to doctrinal error, consequent training error and incompatibility…with official doctrine.”(30)

9. Bibliography and References

Beale P (1998) Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War
Brisset J (Translated by Bates T) (1989) The Charge of the Bull: A History of the 11th Armoured Division in Normandy 1944
Close MC Major B (2002) A View from the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War
Delaforce P (1996) Marching to the Sound of Gunfire: North West Europe 1944-5
Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division
D’ Este C (1994) Decision in Normandy
Fletcher D (1993) The Universal Tank: British Armour in the Second World War Part 2
French D (2000) Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945
Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day
Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy
Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944
How Major J J (1984) Hill 112: Cornerstone of the Normandy Campaign
How Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout
Jarymowycz R J (2001) Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine
Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy
Tout K (2002) Roads to Falaise: ‘Cobra’ and ‘Goodwood’ Reassessed

10. Further Reading

Adair A HS (1986) A Guards’ General: The Memoirs of Major-General Sir Allan Adair, BT, GCVO, CB, DSO, MC, JP, DL
Beal P (1995) Tank Tracks
Cary J (1966) Tanks and Armour in Modern Warfare
Carver Field Marshal Lord M (1979) The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare
Harris J P (1995) Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939
Harris J P and Toase F H (eds.) (1990) Armoured Warfare
Hunnicut R (1978) Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank
Larson R H (1984) The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare, 1918-1940
Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
Macksey K (1976) Tank Tactics, 1939-1945
Macksey K (1971) Tank Warfare: A History of Tanks in Battle
Ogorkiewicz R M (1970) Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles
Roberts G P B (1987) From the Desert to the Baltic
Tout K (1998) A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise
Tout K (2000) The Bloody Battle for Tilly: Normandy 1944
Verney G L (1954) Desert Rats

Endnotes:

1. Keegan J (1994) Six Armies in Normandy, Pg. 197
2. This formation contained British, Canadian and Polish units.
3. Anglo-Canadian Armoured forces in Normandy comprised the following: Guards, 7th, 11th, 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Division, 4th, 8th, 27th, 33rd and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades and the 6th Guards, 31st and 34th Tank Brigades.
4. Hart R (2001) Clash of Arms: How the Allies won in Normandy, Pg. 304
5. To see the changes made in the structure of the Anglo-Canadian Armoured Division see Harrison Place T (2000) Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day, Pg. 98-100 and is the source for the above chart.
6. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 309
7. Keegan J (1994) Loc Cit, Pg. 197
8. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division, Pg. 13. Bill Close is also the author of Panzer Bait and had no fewer than 11 tanks knocked out from under him in the northwest Europe campaign.
9. Hastings M (1984) Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, Pg. 279
10. Cited in D’este C (1994) Decision in Normandy, Pg. 355. Taken from the paper ‘Operation Goodwood’ by Basil Liddell Hart. In 1952, Liddell Hart persuaded Dempsey to talk at length about Operation Goodwood.
11. For a Biography of this early pioneer in Britain’s armoured forces see - Macksey K (1967) Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
12. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 14
13. This was published on the 19th May 1941.
14. This exercise took place in July 1942. Unfortunately, for the Irish Guards, the umpires deemed 9th Armoured to far away to do damage with their 2pdr gun. 9th Armoured were subsequently criticised by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke for their charge. For details of this incident see Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 108
15. HE – High Explosive rounds. This type of round was used to destroy targets such as trucks and artillery. Previously the armoured units had been equipped with British cruiser tanks that were armed with 6pdr that did not have an effective HE round.
16. Previously Roberts had commanded an armoured regiment in the desert before being command of 23rd Armoured Brigade in Tunisia under the 1st Army. He also had the distinction of being the youngest Major General in the British Army.
17. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg26
18. O’Connor was a veteran of the North African campaign and had been captured during Operation Battleaxe but escaped from his Italian prisoner and on his return to England was given command of VIII Corps.
19. Other divisions in the corps included the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division and43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division
20. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 156
21. This consisted of 7th, 11th and Guards Armoured Divisions.
22. Apparently, this Luftwaffe battery was ordered by Colonel Hans Von Luck of the 21st Panzer Division to turn the guns on the tanks. He initially objected but Luck managed to persuade him. See Hastings M (1984) Op Cit, Pg. 276
23. Close MC Major B (1998) A View From the Turret: A History of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Second World War, Pg. 121
24. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, pg. 159
25. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, Pg. 68
26. How MC Major J J (1981) Normandy: The British Breakout, Pg. 54
27. Cited in Delaforce P (1993) Op Cit, Pg. 94
28. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg.304
29. Hart R (2001) Op Cit, Pg. 320
30. Harrison Place T (2000) Op Cit, Pg. 167

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To what extent can it be argued that the war in the Mediterranean was peripheral to allied victory in World War Two?

This essay seeks to address the argument that the Allied effort in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations (MTO) was peripheral to the Allied victory in WWII. The essay intends to show what the main argument for is, then address this by showing that in actual fact the Allied effort in the MTO was actually vital to victory in WWII.   The main argument for the MTO being peripheral to the Allied war effort was that it was strategically irrelevant to the war in Europe and that it was merely a sideshow. In Brian Holden Reid’s Article The Italian Campaign 1943-45: A Reappraisal of Allied Generalship[i] he states that the allied campaign in Italy was badly organised and that it was given a vague set of directive with which to fight the campaign. Thus he believes the campaign moved slowly due to a lack of co-ordinated command, which led to a slow down in the theatre. As Reid comments on the directives General Alexander was given after the Yalta Conference: “This was the final and fittingly vague directive issued for the Italian campaign”[ii]   This essay will show how the campaign in the MTO was important to the Allied war effort and how it taught many lessons that would be important in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO). It will look at the following aspects of the campaign. Firstly, victories and morale, it will show how that until 1943 the MTO was the only area where the Axis could be fought and victories gained for the allies and thus keeping up morale of both the armies and the Home Front. Secondly, it will look at the nature of the development of the Allied command structure that would be so well used in the ETO. Thirdly, it will show how the MTO was a proving and training ground for much of the weaponry and fighting techniques that would be used in the ETO. Finally, it will show how the MTO effectively tied down 26 German divisions on the Italian peninsula after D-Day, 6th June 1944, thus stopping there redeployment to either the western or eastern fronts.   The first aspect to be considered is that the MTO was the only area were the Allies were gaining victories over Axis until, firstly, the bombing effort gained momentum in 1943 and secondly, until Allied forces landed in France on D-Day. This essay will use several examples, Operation Compass in 1940 and the Second Battle of El Alamein in 1942, to show how these victories were important to keep morale up both at home and within the army. After the fall of France in 1940 Britain stood alone in the fight against the Axis alliance. At home the Germans had just started there bombing campaign to prepare an invasion of the country. It is at this point the Italians launched an offensive against the British forces in Egypt[iii]. This force was commanded by General Graziani and comprised of 236000 troops and approximately 400 tanks. Against this force Lieutenant General Wavell, in command of the British forces in the Middle East, had 50000 men and 300 armoured cars and tanks. Initially Graziani advanced fifty miles to Sidi Barani where he halted in late September. While Graziani halted, Wavell built his forces up and received reinforcement from the Empire. When he was ready he launched Operation Compass on the 7th December 1940. This was to be a ‘five day raid’ under the command of Major General O’Connor with the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Division. What was initially to be a raid, turned out to be the one great British operation of the war. In 58 days of operation the British captured 130000 troops, 845 guns and 380 tanks and as Lucio Ceva comments: “Together with the contemporaneous conquest of Ethiopia, this was the greatest land victory by the British Commonwealth during the whole war ”[iv] Richard Holmes comments: “It succeeded beyond anyone’s wildest hopes.”[v] This victory came at a time when Britain had its back to the wall and thus provided a great boost to morale both to the army and civilians back in Britain.   The next example of a great victory, which helped morale both at home and in the army, is the second Battle of El Alamein. This was also the first victory for the future war hero, the then Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery. General Sir Claude Auchinleck at the Battles of Gazala and First El Alamein had laid the foundations for the victory at El Alamein. He also created the original plan for the second battle. Most importantly as Barrie Pitt states Auchinleck: “ had halted Rommel’s drive to the Nile ”[vi]   Montgomery officially took command of the 8th Army on the 15th August 1943. With this he began preparation for the decisive show down with the Deutsches Afrika Korps[vii] and the Italian Africa Army. The battle was to be a set piece affair based upon Montgomery’s belief of how to fight a battle effectively. He based it upon massive superiority in all arms. The battle opened on the night of the 23/24 October with a bombardment of 882 guns. The battle eventually took on the appearance of a First World War battle of attrition which was only broken when Montgomery launched Operation Supercharge which outflanked Rommel’s southern positions and caused him to retreat. El Alamein in conjunction with Operation Torch, the landing in North Africa brought an end to the campaign by forcing Rommel back into Libya as Dear et al states: “El Alamein was the climax of the Western Desert campaigns and one of the turning- points of the war ”[viii]   The victory at El Alamein had an uplifting effect on British morale at home as it was the first significant victory for several years and to the British public it seemed as if they were finally turning back the Germans, as Marion Yass states: “General Montgomery’s victory at El Alamein marked the turning point of the war in the west. At home, the desperate mood of the early months of 1942 vanished.”[ix]   The second area to be considered is that of the Allied command structure. Many of the commanders that were to have a prominent role in the ETO learnt their lessons in the MTO. Also the structure of command was also that which had worked in the MTO i.e. Eisenhower as supreme commander with Montgomery as his battlefield commander. There are countless examples of the army and corps commanders for the ETO having served in the MTO. Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey had been a commander of XIII Corps in the desert. He later commanded the British 2nd Army in Europe. Both Generals Omar Bradley and George Patton were commanders in the MTO, though their roles were reversed in Europe with Bradley commanding the 12th Army Group and Patton the 3rd Army. The continuance of command did not just stay with the army it also stretched to the Air Forces, for example, Air Chief Marshal Tedder was Allied Air Commander in the MTO and latter was Eisenhower’s deputy in Europe.   Eisenhower was chosen as supreme commander in Europe due to his performance in the MTO, while he was not a brilliantly strategist but he was an excellent man manger and managed to meld men of many nations together. As Richard Overy States: “He was a natural choice as the senior General in Europe After a year in the field he had much more experience than Marshall.”[x] It was with the experience gained by these commanders in the MTO that would help lead to the successful invasion of Europe in 1944.   The third area to be assessed is that of the consideration that the MTO was a proving ground for many of the techniques that would be used in the ETO. This aspect can be seen in several ways; firstly it was a blood letting for the green American troops. It was in North Africa that they were to experience there first combat against the Germans and their first defeat at Kasserine Pass. The Americans were to come out of this experience knowing that they had a lot to learn and as Alan Wykes states it taught the British and Americans to: “ cooperate with each other ” and showed Eisenhower the: “ weaknesses in command and decided on changes.”[xi]   The MTO also became a proving ground for amphibious operations, which were to be used so successfully in Europe at D-Day. Many lessons were learnt in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and Anzio, which would be used to good effect at D-Day and as Stephen Ambrose states: “None of these lessons, somewhat surprisingly, came from previous experience in the Pacific After North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the commanders in Europe did not feel a need to ask their counterparts in the Pacific about their experiences”[xii] Surveying of beaches by Combined Operations Pilotage Parties, improvements to landing craft were made and use of landing craft as off shore artillery batteries were just some of the improvement made to amphibious warfare prior to the landing on D-Day that came out of the experiences in amphibious warfare in the MTO.   Another area that saw improvement was that of combined operation between the ground forces and air forces. This was borne out of experiences in the Western Desert. The then commander of the Desert Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Tedder did much to improve co-operation with the army. He developed a technique know as ‘Tedder’s Carpet’ to clear a path for ground troops. The technique involved the bombers saturating the ground with high explosives and napalm. This technique was used in the MTO and was also used to help the breakout from Normandy during Operation Cobra. Another technique developed in the desert but also used to great effect in Europe was ‘Cabrank’ this system involved the air forces providing close air support for ground troops in periods of intense fighting. It was developed by Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst, commander of the Desert Air Force, and was first used successfully at the crossing of the river Sangro in November 1943 and it was later used in Europe to great effect as Ian Gooderson states: “That British armour was capable of successfully exploiting fighter-bomber support when provided on CABRANK”[xiii] Also as Overy states the MTO also had an effect on the American air forces to the point that they realised that: “The cumbersome command structure that evolved in 1941 had predictable effects The humiliation in Tunisia forced a major reassessment of how American tactical air forces were used.”[xiv]     The final area of consideration is that after D-Day, while the MTO became a sideshow it still had an important role to play in that it managed to tie down approximately 26 German division that could have been better used elsewhere, for example, to shore up Army Group Centre on the Eastern Front which collapsed after the Soviet launched Operation Bagration or to throw back the Allied forces after D-Day. As Reid states the Italian campaign managed to keep bottled up: “ a well commanded, seasoned force of veterans, whom it was preferable to keep bottled up in Italy.”[xv]   Therefore in conclusion it can be said that while the MTO was not the war wining theatre it was extremely important to the allied war effort. Pre 6th June 1944 it was, as this essay has shown, important in several different ways. Initially it was important to Britain in the aspect of keeping morale up at home especially at a time when victories over the Germans were at a premium, this was very important at keeping the British people going. It was also very important to the troops who were shown, especially at the Second Battle of El Alamein, that they could defeat the Germans. The battle also created the myth of Montgomery, which also helped to instil confidence in British troops as Richard Lamb states: “They felt he knew how to use in action the modern technology in which they had been training for so long, and that he had the authority and knowledge to lead them to victory over Hitler’s armies ”[xvi] This undoubtedly had a great effect on British morale that they know believed they had a commander with which they could win the war.   The MTO also taught the Allies many lessons involving the many aspects of modern warfare such as amphibious warfare and cooperation between air and ground forces that were to be so vital in Europe. It was also in the MTO that the right commander for in Europe was found, Eisenhower, it was here that he managed to hone his skill and diplomacy so that he could deal with the many different nation with which he would have to deal with in Europe.   Post 6th June 1944 the MTO greatest contribution to the Allied war effort is in its holding down of 26 veteran German divisions that could have been much better employed elsewhere in Europe.             So if it is even just in this final assessment then it cannot be claimed that the MTO was peripheral to Allied victory in WWII as it laid the foundation for the Allies ultimate success in Europe and by its very nature it laid down the necessary framework in training and operations that were to prove so successful for the Allies.   I. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, Pg. 128-161 II. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Op Cit, Pg. 157 III. The term ‘British’ will be used to donate all forces fighting under the British flag, these included: the Dominion forces of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and South Africa and the Free French and Polish forces IV. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Op Cit, Pg. 86 V. Holmes R (2001) Battlefields of the Second World War, Pg. 50 VI. Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 2: Auchinleck’s Command, Pg. 323 VII. Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) stands for the German Africa Corps commanded by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel VIII. Dear I C B (General Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II, Pg. 256 IX. Yass M (1973) The Home Front: England 1939-1945, Pg, 95 X. Overy R (1995) Why The Allies Won, Pg. 144 XI. Wykes A (1982) The Biography of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pg. 62 XII. Ambrose S E (1994) D-Day June 6, 1944: The Battle for the Normandy Beaches, Pg. 137 XIII. Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45, Pg. 87  XIV. Overy R (1995) Op Cit, Pg. 226 XV. Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) Op Cit, Pg. 158 XVI. Lamb R (1983) Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure, Pg. 72   Bibliography:   Ambrose S E (1994) D-Day June 6, 1944: The Battle for the Normandy Beaches Barnett C (1999) The Desert Generals Dear I C B (General Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45 Gooch J (Ed.) (1990) The Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War Holmes R (2001) Battlefields of the Second World War Lamb R (1983) Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure Overy R (1995) Why The Allies Won Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 1: Wavell’s Command Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 2: Auchinleck’s Command Pitt B (2001) The Crucible of War Volume 3: Montgomery’s Command Yass M (1973) The Home Front: England 1939-1945 Wykes A (1982) The Biography of General Dwight D. Eisenhower   ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   Lions led by donkeys is a fair assessment of British military leadership in the Great War.   The term ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ first came into common usage to describe British military leadership of the Great War when Alan Clark wrote his book The Donkeys.[1] The term is by its very nature polemic and is seen as a method of apportioning blame for what occurred on the western front during the Great War. In Clark’s case he is seeking to lay the blame for the western front squarely at the door of the generals and most notably Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, possible as a means of shifting the blame from politicians, as he was one himself. As Tim Travers comments Clark and other orthodox historians attitudes have: “ created a ‘mud and blood’ image of the First World War, which stressed the horrors of the war and/or the callousness of generals ”[2]   The former Prime Minister Lloyd George, who sought to blame the generals for the problems of the western front, suggested this opinion of the Great War early on in his memoirs.[3] The famous military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart in his books on the Great War, Reputations and The Real War,[4] also picked upon it. The historian John Laffin in his book British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One[5] has more recently picked upon the interpretation that the western front generals were both aloof and callous in their actions. As Laffin comments the: “ senior generals of World War I were limited in their professionalism, in that they gave orders but when things went wrong did not accept responsibility.”[6] Laffin carries along on this theme and even later in his book has a chapter entitled ‘Haig, Haking and Gough: Incompetence, Callousness and Vanity’[7]   Much of the orthodox interpretation of the war stems from this apparent aloofness and has evolved into a myth of how the Great War was fought. This myth has seriously been perpetuated by appearance of what passes as school history. War poets such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfred Sassoon are commonly passed off as what the war was and how it was fought and are more commonly taught in English lessons rather than History lessons. As Ian Beckett comments: “English teachers have much to answers for in terms of the enduring image of the Great War.”[8] This myth of the western front has also made its place in popular culture with the production by the BBC of Blackadder Goes Forth. This has also often been passed off as an accurate view of the western front.   So the orthodox interpretation has sought to apportion blame of the Great War away from the politicians, both pre-war and during the war, and lay it at the door of the Generals. This view has been perpetuated into popular culture through the teaching of the war poets in school and through television.   These interpretations have in the past fifteen to twenty years come in for serious criticism from a new school of revisionist historians who have sought to re-asses this situation. The new spate of revisionists have tended to look at the operational side of the debate in an attempt to balance out the attack on Great War British generalship and as Correlli Barnett comments: “ by 1918 Haig and his Army commanders had proved professionally superior to their German counterparts ”[9]   Members of this new school of historians include Paddy Griffith and Tim Travers. Much of their work has been dedicated to looking at the development of tactics and the usage of new weaponry by the army, most notably he tank and air power and the development of the all-arms battle. They find that the orthodox view is structurally flawed as it typically finishes on the 1st July 1916,[10] the opening of the Somme offensive. Though as Griffith points out: “ tactics were already being reformed in quite significant ways at least as early as 2nd July 1916 ”[11] By looking at the lower areas of operations revisionists have been able to show that the British generals on the western front were always looking for methods to improve the way the war was fought and to end it as quickly as possible.   Revisionists also note that by not looking any further into subjects such as command and control[12] and battlefield tactics[13] orthodox historians have failed to see the complete picture of what revisionist see as successes, most notably the ‘Hundred Days’ in 1918. Revisionists believe that the changes instituted by the General Headquarters of the BEF[14] led to the ending of the war and that the advances that were made in 1918 would not have been possible without them.[15]   As commented much work has been done on seeking to understand the performance of the British in the war. Further to this Dr John Bourne at the University of Birmingham is compiling a computer-based biography of divisional commanders in an attempt to understand tactical as well as operational decision-making. Also the Imperial War Museum has started the SHLM Project to compile information on divisional operations in the war.[16]   So as has been seen the debate on British military leadership has been very politically charged as the orthodox historians, of whom some politicians are members, have sought to lay blame at the door of the generals. Though revisionists have attempted to move away from this apportioning of blame at look more at the operational level of the war in order to seek an answer to the question of the effectiveness of British military leadership. Most revisionists would be reluctant to deny that mistakes were made, such as the first day of the Somme, but what they seek to be made understood was that changes were made. Therefore, if they had not been made then how could the war have been won and as such how could the military hierarchy that was involved in these changes be considered ‘donkeys’. As revisionists vehemently point out the military hierarchy were constantly looking for ways to shorten the war with as few casualties as possible.   Therefore, to only consider the debate from the standpoint of the orthodox historians is, as revisionists claim, fatally flawed in its methodology as it is missing the whole picture. That is that things did change, new methods were introduced and that to only look up to the first day of Somme is only half of the story of British generalship on the western front.   Bibliography:   Books: Barnett C (1963) The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London Brown M (1999) The Imperial War Museum Book of 1918: Year of Victory, London, Pan Macmillan Clark A (1961) The Donkeys, London, Hutchinson Ferguson N (1998) The Pity of War, London, Penguin Glanfield J (2001) The Devil’s Chariots: The Birth and Secret Battles of the First Tanks, London, Sutton Publishing Griffith P (1994) Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18, New Haven and London, Yale University Press Griffith P (Ed.) (1996) British Fighting Methods in the Great War, London, Frank Cass Hughes M (1999) Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East 1917-1919, London, Frank Cass Laffin J (1992) British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One, Stroud, Allan Sutton Publishing Liddell Hart B H (1970) A History of the First World War (2 Volumes), London, Cassell Neillands R (1999) The Great War General on the Western Front 1914-1918, London, Robinson Publishing Samuels M (1995) Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918, Frank Cass, London Terraine J (1963) Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, Hutchinson, London Travers T (1990) The Killing Ground: The British Army and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, London, Routledge Woodward D R (1983) Lloyd George and the Generals, London, Associated University Presses   Journals: Beckett I, The Military Historian and the Popular Image of the Western Front, 1914-1918, Historian, 53 (1997:Spring), Pg. 11 Newell J Q C, Learning the Hard Way: Allenby in Egypt and Palestine 1917-1919, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 14:3 (1991:September), Pgs. 363-387 Phillips G, The Obsolescence of the Arme Blanche and Technological Determinism in British Military History, War in History, 9:1 (2002), Pgs. 39-59 Travers T, The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower and Technology, Journal of Military History, 54:2 (1990:April), Pgs. 173-200   Newspapers: Barnett C, Saturday Essay, Daily Mail, June 29 1996 [1] The book was originally published in 1961. The term is taken from a conversation that was apparently held between Colonel Max Hoffman and General Erich Von Ludendorff describing the British army on the western front. [2] Travers T (1990) The Killing Ground: The British Army and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, Pg. xvii [3] Lloyd George’s memoirs, War Memoirs, ran to six volumes and were published between 1933 and 1936. [4] Reputations: Ten Years On was originally published in 1928 and then The Real War 1914 – 1918 was published in 1930. Both attempted to lay the blame of the war at the Generals’ feet. [5] Laffin J (1992) British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One. This book picks up to a large extent were Clark left off and seeks to re-interpret what he considers pre-conceived myth about the war. [6] Laffin J (1992) Op Cit, Pg. 3 [7] Laffin J (1992) Op Cit, Pgs. 79-89 [8] Beckett I, The Military Historian and the Popular Image of the Western Front, 1914-1918, Historian, 53 (1997:Spring), Pg. 11 [9] Barnett C Saturday Essay, Daily Mail, June 29 1996 [10] For example see Martin Middlebrook’s (1971) The First Day on the Somme. This book is typical of the orthodox stance, dealing with as the title suggests with the 1st July 1916. [11] Griffith P (Ed.) (1996) British Fighting Methods in the Great War, Pg. xii [12] A recent work on this subject has been Samuels M (1995) Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918. This book has attempted to compare and contrast the methods of the two major belligerents. [13] The most notable work on this subject is Griffith P (1994) Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918. By looking at the second half of the war Griffith offers a convincing argument of change instituted by the Generals. [14] BEF – British Expeditionary Force. This term applies to the armies based in France. [15] It must also be noted that the advances made in 1918 were greater than those made in the Italian Campaign of World War II thirty years later. [16] A good introduction to this project is John Lee’s chapter The SHLM Project – Assessing the Battle Performance of British Divisions in Griffith P (1996) Op Cit, Pgs 175-181   Outline of Operation Jubilee:   At 0445[i] on 19 August 1942, the first forces landed on the French coast at Berneval approximately six miles from Dieppe. This was the first wave of a raid in force on the French town of Dieppe. As the Operational Orders for Jubilee states the purpose of the operation was: ‘Operation Jubilee is a raid on Jubilee with limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of an eardrum near the town and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and other craft in the harbour’.[ii]   Operation Jubilee was the culmination of two years of raiding by the COHQ and was largest attempted to date. The major part of the raiding force was comprised of troops from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. The British provided additional troops in the form of No. 3 and 4 Commando from the Army and ‘A’ Commando from the RM. There were also small detachments of French and US personnel, the most prominent of which were the fifty US Rangers attached to Lieutenant Colonel The Lord Lovat’s 4 Commando. The military forces involved in the operation came under the ground force commander Major General J H Roberts, the GOC of the 2nd Canadian Division. Roberts was a curious choice for such a prestigious and difficult mission, as he had not actually seen battlefield command in the war and therefore, like most of his soldiers were untrained and untested in combat.   The RAF supplied substantial forces in the ‘support’ of Jubilee. In total sixty-one fighter squadrons were involved as well as nine further squadrons in various other roles.[iii] As will be discussed in a further chapter this force was inadequate to meet the needs of the operation and was actually there for another reasons that will become apparent. The air commander on the day was Air vice Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a man who would go on and command the Allied air forces during Operation Overlord.   The Navy, whose military head, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was deeply suspicious of such operations, only provided paltry forces for the support of the operations. The heaviest ships involved in the operation were destroyers of which eight were used. In total, there were two hundred thirty seven vessels in various roles for the operation.[iv] All of these ships came under the command of Captain J Hughes Hallett.   The operation began, as it was to go on. No. 3 Commando, the first unit to land, at Berneval came under intense fire and of their twenty-three landing craft, only six made it to shore. Most of these men themselves became casualties, but despite this, the commando managed to keep the battery quite though they did not actually take it out as the plan called for.   The next units to land were the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch of Canada. Of the approximately five hundred men who landed, only six returned unscathed. The reason for this was that they landed fifteen minutes behind schedule and eight after the Germans had sounded the alarm.   Next to come was the frontal assault on Dieppe itself, White and Red beaches. This was led Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, White beach, and the Essex Scottish, Red beach. Initially things looked good for the unit as fighter-bombers had attacked German position and the defenders appeared dazed. This eventually passed and the defenders started pouring machine gun and mortar fire into the area. As Lieutenant Fred Woodcock of the Royal Hamilton’s, who was caught in a landing craft that was filled with Bangalore torpedoes and hit by a mortar bomb, comments he could ‘...only remember the sound, because I was blinded. The boat filled with water and I was soon up to my neck.’[v]   The assault on Dieppe was supposed to be supported by twenty-nine[vi] Churchill MkIII tanks from Calgary Tank Regiment[vii]. However, from the start of the operation things deteriorated. The LCT’s were fifteen minutes late arriving at the beaches and as has been commented this had ‘ unfortunate results for the general fortunes of the operation on the main beaches.’[viii] Eventually all of the tanks were destroyed and by all accounts only three make it onto the esplanade.[ix] At 0630, approximately an hour and half after the main landing, Major-General Roberts decided that the situation was ready to land his floating reserve. This consisted on the Fusiliers Mont Royal. Roberts gives his reasons as follows: “About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that "Red" Beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve.”[x] In this decision Roberts was wrong as Red Beach had not been cleared and was not ready, the RHLI were pinned against the beach wall. In addition, the FMR were landed at the wrong place.   The RM ‘A’ Commando had initially been intended to land in the harbour and cut out enemy craft. It was soon found that this was not possible. Therefore, they became part of the floating reserve. At 0800, Roberts, having been deceived by intelligence again, decided to commit them to White beach to force a breakthrough. This necessitated a quick rethink on the way into the beach and as Lieutenant M. Buist, RN comments it soon became clear that this was to be a ‘ sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade.’[xi] The commando came under a hail of artillery fire and its intended effect became negligible.   The next attack was at Green beach by the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada on the inner western flank. Initially there was success but eventually things started to go wrong. It was intended for the SSR to land at zero hour, 0450, and the QOCHC to land an hour and a half later and pass through them capture the high ground and proceed to Dieppe. The SSR quickly entered Pourville and became involved in fire fights with groups of Germans. The SSR attempted to subdue them with fire from the supporting destroyers and 3-inch mortars, but to no avail and they became bogged down. The QOCHC then landed at 0520 and were to link up with the tanks of the Calgary and capture a nearby airfield. This proved fruitless as the tanks were destroyed mostly on the beaches. By this time, everything was going wrong and both regiments attempted form a cordon until ordered to withdrawal.   The furthest unit to the west, 4 Commando, landed at 0454 and their objectives was to take out the German battery at Vasterival. This was Operation Cauldron and was the only successful operation during the raid. As an official report comments this operation was ‘ a model of bold action and successful synchronization.’[xii] Its success will be covered later.   By 0930, it became clear to everyone that the operation was a failure and landing craft started taking the wounded off the beach. At the same time both the Military Commander, Roberts, and the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallet, contended that withdrawal was necessary and that it should begin at 1100.[xiii] By 1250, all troops that could be evacuated had been removed from the beaches. Thus ended one of the bloodiest days in Commonwealth military history. The casualty rate for the ground force reached almost sixty percent. As one historian has commented, it was a cruel fate for a country, Canada, who had waited: ‘ over two and a half years for combat and be  killed, maimed, or captured within a single morning one of the undeniable tragedies of the Second World War’[xiv]   [i] All times given are in British Summer Time. In the German War Diaries, all times were given in Continental time, which is one hour ahead. [ii] Quoted in Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 83 ‘Preliminary Report on Operation “Jubilee” (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 Aug 42’ 19 Sept 1942, p. A-1. From here on this report will be referred to as CMHQ No. 83. The reoccurrence of the word Jubilee is in reference to Dieppe and was used in an attempt to keep the target from German agents. However, in an accident of war on the final page of the Operational Orders the map reference for the target, Dieppe, was given, so much for protecting the target.