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Lord Edward Carson is simultaneously both one of the most
revered and the most maligned in modern Irish history. To nationalists he
is remembered as the principal architect of partition, although that was
not his intention. Unionists, on the other hand see him as one of the
founding fathers of Northern Ireland. Similarly, that was not intention
either. Carson’s ambition was to save the union; not only for Ulster but
for the whole island.
Carson was a complex and fascinating
individual, rich
in paradoxes. A Dubliner and southerner who never lost his Irish brogue,
he found himself leading an overwhelmingly Ulster-based movement. Although
he became Ulster’s leader, never ceased at heart to be a Southern Irish
Unionist.
In an age of great advocates and on several occasions
a law officer of the Crown, Carson found himself the leader of an armed
rebellion, at least in the eyes of his political opponents. It is not
altogether surprising that a nationalist MP found it scarcely credible and
jibed that Carson would never discard his wig and gown for a spiked helmet
and a khaki suit. Carson was a man who exuded public certainty yet was
assailed and tormented by private doubts. He needed and received constant
reassurances from James Craig, the MP for East Down, his loyal lieutenant
and a formidable organiser, Carson suffered ill health for most of his
life, (but lived to be over 80 years old) However, this did not prevent
him from embarking on a gruelling parliamentary and extra parliamentary
campaign to preserve the union at the age of 56.

Carson’s politics too are often misunderstood.
Carson was no fanatic. His politics were liberal Unionist. As a young man
he had been approached by some nationalists to stand for Parliament for
their party. While Carson’s Unionism was flexible, his politics were
otherwise very liberal. But anyone who underestimated the strength of his
Unionist convictions made a grievous error. Carson was a Unionist because
he believed Ireland’s
interests were best served by the Union.
In 1986 when Carson refused the Conservative whip, he
said “I am resolved to take whatever course is best for Ireland”. In
1900 he told Arthur Balfour, “It is only Ireland that I am in politics
for” The maintenance of the Union was his guiding star of his career.
For the Union he was prepared sacrifice everything: party alliances,
personal friendships and even his own prospects.
Carson did not ultimately like politics. On one
occasion he quite truthfully told Lloyd George “I have remain a lawyer
first and a politician afterwards”.
Politics for Carson represented financial sacrifice.
When he accepted the leadership of the Irish Unionist Party in February
1910 he was at the height of his career and foregoing great riches. It was
his conviction and passionate belief in the Union that prompted him to
accept the leadership, even at the risk of his personal liberty.
Of Carson’s political
career, the ultimate paradox is the impressive statue in front of
Parliament Building at Stormont: a
statue of a man opposed to Home Rule parliament. Frequently misinterpreted
as an expression of triumphalism, in truth it is rather a symbol of
failure. Carson never sought to establish a parliament in Belfast.
Stormont was a by-product of the failure to defeat Home Rule.
Carson was born at 4 Harcourt Street, Dublin, on
February 9th 1854. His families back ground on his father’s
side was professional and middle class rather than landed gentry. His
mother, being one of the lamberts, of Athenry, Co. Galway, descended from
a Cromwellian settler. Carson was educated at Portarington and Trinity
College, Dublin. He was to represent his alma mater in Parliament between
1892 and 1918. His legal career began on the Leinster Circuit in 1878.
After 1893 he built up a formidable legal practice in England. His
background, upbringing, education and early professional career, was
firmly located in Southern Irish Unionist society. Before 1910 or 1911 he
had little or no experience or contact with Ulster society.
Carson’s association with Ulster, especially his
leadership of Ulster Unionism between February 1910 and February 1921,
accounts for only a modest proportion of a long and distinguished
political and legal career. Carson was a MP for Trinity College, Dublin,
for 26 years and MP for the Belfast constituency of Duncairn from December
1918 to May 1921. The greater part of his life was spent in the London
Parliament fighting for the Union.
In the General Election of 1910 Walter Long, chairman
of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party, who had previously represented
South County Dublin, was returned for a London constituency. Long resigned
as chairman of the Parliamentary Party, thereby creating a vacancy at what
was clearly a critical juncture for the future of the Union. The
Parliamentary Party conveyed its unanimous to Carson to become chairman.
Carson considered the matter carefully, weighing up, no doubt the
implications for the income, leisure and health. The future of the Union
out weighed all these personal considerations, Carson accepted the
position and the challenge. The Parliamentary Party met on February 21st,
1910 and formally elected Carson as its chairman. Carson was chosen on
account of his ability (which was universally recognised) rather than his
high profile in local Unionist politics.

Carson’s aim was the comprehensive defeat of Home
Rule. Carson realised that Home Rule would not be viable without
Ulster’s and more specifically Belfast’s heavy industry and had it not
been for the fact that the whole of Europe’s economy was thrown into
turmoil, as the result of two world wars, he would have been proved right.
He recognised John Redmond and his nationalists would never accept Home
Rule with Ulster exclusion. Therefore, Carson believed that if he could
demonstrate that Ulster Unionists were resolute in their determination to
oppose Home Rule, Home Rule would be dead in the water.
The signing of the Ulster Covenant on September 28th
1912, drilling and military preparations, the formation of the Ulster
Volunteer Force, the establishment of a provisional government in Belfast
and large scale arming of the UVF were all intended to demonstrate the
seriousness and depth of Ulster opposition to Home Rule.

In November 1911 Carson drafted a memo suggesting
that “it might be necessary to raise the question (of Ulster exclusion)
some time by amendment”. It was in this spirit that Carson supported the
Agar-Robartes amendment for four county exclusion in June 1912 and Carson
introduced his own amendment for the exclusion of the nine counties of
Ulster in January 1913 Carson still believed that it was possible to
defeat Home Rule by insisting on the exclusion of either the whole of
Ulster or even part of it.
However, in November 1913 Carson meet a delegation of
Southern Unionists and posed them a series of highly significant
questions. Is it your decision that I am to go on fighting for Ulster?
Yes. Will my fight in Ulster interfere in any way with your fight in the
south? No. If I win in Ulster, am I to refuse the fruits of victory
because you have lost? No.
This episode signaled the fact that Carson no longer
believed it was possible to defeat Home Rule for the whole of Ireland. His
task between November 1913 and the summer of 1941 was to save Ulster, or
as much of Ulster as possible, from the operation of a Home Rule Bill.
By the time of the Buckingham Palace conference of
July 1914 Carson had succeeded in establishing the case for some form of
Ulster exclusion from the operation of the third Home Rule Bill. Two areas
of contention remained. First, whether exclusion would be temporary or
permanent and, secondly, the extent of the area to be excluded. As to the
former issue, nationalists obviously viewed temporary exclusion with
greater favour than permanent exclusion.
Unionists obviously preferred and expected exclusion
to be permanent. On the
latter question, nationalists were reluctantly prepared to contemplate for
county exclusion. The formal
unionists position was to insist on exclusion for all nine counties of
Ulster, but Carson appreciated that the best they could hope for was six
county exclusion. But for the
outbreak of the great war in August 1914 modern Ulster would consist of
four rather than six counties.
In May and June 1916, in the immediate aftermath of
the Easter rebellion in Dublin, Lloyd George negotiated separately with
John Redmond and Carson to secure a swift solution to the Irish question.
Lloyd George’s starting point recognised that Carson’s bottom
line in July 1914 was six country exclusion. Accordingly, Lloyd George offered Redmond immediate home rule with
temporary six county exclusion and Carson immediate home rule with
permanent six county exclusion.
On Jun 12th Carson undertook the painful
task of persuading the Ulster Unionists Council to accept the Lloyd George
scheme. This of course was a
source of great pain and anguish to the Unionists of Cavan, Donegal and
Monaghan. Similarly, John
Redmond and John Dilon convinced a nationalist convention to accept Lloyd
George’s proposals on June 23rd. On July 13th 1916 Lord Midleton, a leading Southern
Irish Unionist, established that Lloyd George’s scheme was provisional
and Redmond insisted that Nationalists would never acquiesce in permanent
six county exclusion. Lloyd George had no option but to shelve his proposals.
Carson never exhibited much enthusiasm for the
Government of Ireland Act which was introduced in the commons on February
25th 1920. The
bill proposed the establishment of two parliaments in Ireland, one in
Belfast and one in Dublin. Northern
Ireland, the area to be placed under the Jurisdiction of the Belfast
parliament was to be a six county rather than a nine county Ulster. The
legislation was grafted in this way at the insistence of James Craig and
the Ulster Unionist leadership. Behind
the scenes, as early as November 1919, they had indicated to Walter Long,
Chairman of the cabinet committee that they would accept no other
settlement. This, of course,
showed scant regard for the interests of the Unionists of Cavan, Donegal
and Monaghan.
Ulster Unionists would take no responsibility for the
bill which they disliked on principle but they would not oppose its
progress onto the statute book because it conceded Ulster’s right to
separate treatment in preference to the concept of an all Ireland
parliament which was provided for in the 1914 act.
Carson’s response to the bill remained luke-warm.
Carson was invited to become Northern Ireland’s
first Prime Minister but it was an honour he declined.
It would have involved operating the government of Ireland Act
which he had viewed with distaste. The
prospect of office had little attraction for him.
On February 4th 1921 he formally relinquished the
leadership of Ulster Unionism.
On May 21st 1921 Carson accepted a
life-peerage and judicial office as Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Two months later a truce was agreed between the IRA and the
British government. Negotiations resulted in the Anglo Irish Treaty signed
in December 1921. The treaty
brought the Anglo Irish Conflict of 1919 – 1921 to a close and gave
dominion status to the 26 counties while allowing Ulster to remain part of
the United Kingdom.
Carson’s maiden speech in the House of Lords on
December 14th, 1921 was a bitter denunciation of the treaty. Carson regarded it as an abject surrender to terrorism and an utter
humiliation for the British Empire. Carson’s
acute sense of betrayal and bitterness at the treaty evidence in the
speech were the product of his southern unionist roots.
Thereafter, Carson exhibited little public interest
in Ulster politics he made occasional visits and the massive statue of
Carson in front of parliament buildings at Stormont was unveiled in his
presence on July 8th, 1933.
Carson died on October 22nd, 1935 at Cleve
Court, near Ramsgate. HMS
Broke conveyed the body to Belfast for a state funeral in St Anne’s
Cathedral, where he was buried
within the precincts.
Originally
published in the Orange Standard
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