The following is my translation of an article called: Darwins Lehre und die soziale Sittlichkeit von Erich Becher, Bonn. It appeared in a German popular science magazine, Kosmos Handweiser für Naturfreunde 1909, Heft 12, Seiten 386-387.
I'm not aware of any previous translations.
Trevor Dykes.

Darwin's theory and the social ethic by Erich Becher, Bonn
Science investigates the world as it is, and is not concerned with what is ethically justified in the world or that which is not. Decisions about right and wrong, good and evil, require the use of other perspectives as these concepts are not part of science. However, should we be in agreement concerning the objectives of our social interactions, then scientific knowledge does provide us with material to help realise our ends, to come close to our ideals.

Such material, with regards to elevating humanity in terms of body and soul, is provided by the hypotheses of Darwin. If natural and sexual selection, use and non-use, have led to the development of organisms upwards until humanity, then it seems reasonable to enquire as to whether they also improved the body and soul of people, if they could be made more intelligent, beautiful and healthier over the course of time.

The hypothesis of natural selection is based on the fact of variability, the difference of siblings. Darwin assumes that generally, from an excess of born descendants, only the best suited, favourably formed will be able to prevail in the struggle for existence, and come to reproduce; the less suited will be treated in stepmotherly ways by nature, and die prematurely. Because of this, the better adapted will produce the descendants and, on average, the next generation will be fitter. This process repeats itself continually and leads to ever more mature adaptation. (Additional note: According to my understanding, that's a cartoon version of what Darwinian theory actually states. It says nothing about "ever more mature adaptation".)

The scientists argue strongly about the worth of this hypothesis. The object here is to examine whether natural selection can have significance as the means of maturity in cultural humanity. One has derived an ethic of callousness from the selection theory. The hard, unforgiving struggle for existence, the defeat of the weak bringing progress, the higher development. Support for the impoverished penalising the strong, the whole of social assistance softening the strength of the struggle for existence, are wrong, they undermine selection and favour weakening the species. Humanity is not brought higher by sympathy and help, but rather by stark, callous dominance by the strong.

Kropotkin, on the contrary, has noted the remarkable fact that animals, which are most advanced in their development, and especially those with the highest intelligence, are the ones which support one another, indeed, that cooperate with one another under the circumstances of life: ants, bees, parrots, apes. There can be absolutely no doubt that the development of humanity, and its culture, has only been possible on the foundation of mutual support, social cooperation in the face of the callous struggle for existence.

Natural selection can have no leading significance for cultural humanity because the reproduction rates of the highest standing nations is so low, while lower peoples breed much more strongly. There is a shortage of human material for the natural selection. We must be frugal with precious human lives, should we not want to be forced back to wars between nations. As far as can be reckoned with a natural selection, it appears to me that social assistance should be more encouraged rather than discouraged. Victory or defeat in the struggle for existence depends upon two factors, firstly upon the equipment of the organism itself, but further upon the favour or hostility of the living conditions in which it finds itself. The more that external conditions, the chance of birth etc, are decisive for success or failure, then the less will survival of the fittest apply. Those wishing to encourage this selection will, therefore, seek to remove the differences in external circumstances, in as far as they do not encourage the fitness of individuals; they will not condemn the social movement of the present, but rather support it. The fruit in the womb of the mother already suffers due to unfavourable social conditions (hard, physical labour of women during the pregnancy). No less are the selection disturbing circumstances during baby- and childhood. Sometimes, social problems (child labour, unhealthy industries) lead directly to the destruction of the most energetic human material, in that it is the strong who are subjected to the damage, and often brought down by it.

One has accused medical science, and especially hygiene, on a number of occasions of maintaining the weak and degenerative. That is unjust. The strong are also helped by health care; over time, unhygienic conditions damage the whole human material. Despite a sharper selection on a plantation with 'unhygienic' conditions, in the shadow or near a factory, will be poor while one in a healthier place would flourish. One should not overestimate the uses of illness for selection. Tuberculosis, for example, often does not inhibit the reproduction of the sick; it also does not only afflict the weak, but also those with strong constitutions active in dangerous fields (Schleifer). Children's illnesses ensure that not all the elite come into reality, as the afflicted could die without help and care; the frequency of such outbreaks of illnesses could lead cultural peoples closer to extinction.

The wars of cultural peoples bring about a decimation of the strong and healthy, and proportionately favour the physically weaker.

An elimination of illness and weaknesses could provide excellent leadership for cultural peoples. Heinholtz and Menzel had hydrocephaly; one found Menzel had extensive traces of tuberculosis; Spinoza, Schiller, Goethe, Jacobsen all had tuberculosis. And one can think of the illnesses of Byron, Darwin, Descartes and Kant, and blind geniuses such as Milton, Euler; Metschnikoff speaks of Fresnel, Leopard, Weber, Schumann and Chopin in the same sense. It is easy to extend this list; and the connection between genius and insanity could also be taken into account, in as far as it stands up to scrutiny. The helping care of the sick has provided enormous cultural value for humanity.

Strong intellectual gifts and cultural greatness are unfortunately not promoted by natural selection. The genius and the hero are treated harder by the struggle for existence than the average person. Natural selection fails here.

Sexual selection could, it might be thought, work better, faster and more humanely than natural selection. Enormous misery could be avoided if the reproduction of people with inheritable diseases and the weak were suppressed. One has called for the exchange of testimonials of health between married couples. Such state regulation would remove feelings of sexual responsibility, and that is what sexual selection is all about; then freedom when choosing a marriage partner cannot be taken away, as some utopians have suggested. Reproduction of those with inheritable diseases could be made impossible by the state. It has undoubtedly been shown that cultural weaknesses can be passed on through many generations, so that a single family can give rise to numerous criminals, prostitutes and vagabonds.

Sexual selection could be made more effective by placing more weight on personality in the choice of a partner being decisive, and less on external factors (eg. money, protection). And a higher worth for love and marriage would be significant for social-biological conditions. Such an approach, with feelings of responsibility for the descendants and a respect for intellectual and physical value of the partner, is most likely to result in the institution of a permanent marriage. The superficially exciting is much more decisive for temporary liaisons as is, even worse, the intention and art of arousal, an erotic temperament. The feeling of responsibility towards the children, their raising as the common work of both the father and mother, is best promoted by a permanent marriage -despite any resultant harm. Damaging to selection are marriages for money and, to a lesser degree, deliberate childlessness of often well situated families (in contrast to an often shockingly high fertility amongst the poorest social levels).

The sermon of a genius of morality is suitable, so as to support against the regrettable appearance of the extinction of exceptionally gifted families. The inheritance of great gifts is undoubtedly true. An ordered family life for personalities of genius would best serve to maintain the inheritable treasure of humanity.

As well as natural and sexual selection, Darwin also recognised the direct effects of the environment as factors for adaptation. Luxury, as well as social misery, works to damage the species. Consequently, social researchers have also used these perspectives to support the social help movement; to strive for simple, healthy conditions with respect to food, housing, clothing and professional work.

Alcoholism and sexual diseases are particularly dangerous factors for a degeneration, and these fill the hospitals for the sick and insane, and also the prisons.

Darwin observed the strengthening effects of usage, the weakening effects of non-use, as being inheritable, and this in the intellectual area. If he was correct with this assumption, which has indeed recently found experimental support (Kammerer etc), then this calls for a mighty increase in responsibility for our actions and desires. Doing good does not only strengthen the individual, but also the descendants. The less desirable traits of people can only be further discouraged by meticulous avoidance of such activities.

An index of more of my translations of old Kosmos articles can be found at:

Kosmos Translations Archive

A number of Mesozoic (and post-Mesozoic) location summaries can be found at Localities.