THE GAUL - A CONVINCING AND COST-EFFECTIVE FORMAL INVESTIGATION?
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We recommend our visitors to visit this site: http://the-trawler-gaul.blogspot.com which contains the latest updates The following articles provide summaries of the Gaul case and its latest developments: The Sinking Of The Trawler Gaul Case Reopened Perversion of justice, corruption, fraud and the lack of accountability of the British government & |
The Hull trawler Gaul sank in 1974 with the loss of all 36 crew. The wreck was located in 1997, surveyed in 1998 and 2002; and, in 2004, a formal investigation concluded that the vessel had capsized due to flooding through the duff and offal chutes, which had all been left open by the crew.
The 'new evidence' is not so new
Here we now reproduce a fragment from one of the items of correspondence, now in our possession, which may aswer some questions and raise others:
For more, please visit this LINK
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Gaul sister ships
Quizzed on the failings of the Re-opened Formal Investigation, the Department for Transport maintain that there was no design defect on the Gaul, because the sister vessels, with the same design, did not sink.
The above comments imply that the duff and offal chutes gave satisfactory trouble free service throughout the lives of the sister vessels. A closer look into this matter shows that, in fact, this is not quite the case:
The Gaul had three sister vessels: Arab, Kelt and Kurd. These vessels are still in service, but none is currently working as a trawler.
Available records show:
1. That the Kappin (ex Arab) is currently working as a fish processing factory freezer ship off the Greenland coast.
The Arab was sold in 1983 and converted into a support depot ship for submersibles; in 1984 it was converted back into a stern trawler. The vessel continued to work as a stern trawler until early 2006 when it was converted into a fish factory ship.
A very good photo of this vessel can be viewed at:
http://www.shipspotting.com/modules/myalbum/photo.php?lid=235426
The vessel was visited in 2003, by the retained experts for the RFI for the purposes of obtaining information that could be of use to the Investigation. The vessels crew were also quizzed at that time (ref. Technical paper presented by the retained experts The loss of the MFV Gaul - http://www.bctq.com/isleman.html)
As part of the RFI, a party visited the FV KAPPIN, a sister vessel to GAUL still fishing from the Faroes. Discussion with the crew revealed that flooding of the factory deck was a recurrent problem. This had been dealt with in part by installing deep well pumps and blanking off the forward offal chute. Even so, crew recounted serious flooding incidents as a direct result of water coming through the aft duff chute. Fortunately this was never catastrophic.
Does this mean that the crew of the Kappin have also been leaving the chute flaps and covers open?
2. That the Bergen Surveyor (ex Kelt) is currently working as a seismic survey vessel for Norwegian owners.
The Kelt was sold in 1982 and initially converted into a support depot ship for submersibles; in 1997 it was converted into a seismic survey vessel.
A very good photo of this vessel can be viewed at:
http://www.shipspotting.com/modules/myalbum/photo.php?lid=63966
It is most likely that the duff and offal chute openings would have been removed at the time of time of its initial conversion in 1982 (support vessels do not need arrangements for the discharge of duff and offal). The picture shows that, in its current guise, the chute openings are no longer present.
3. That the Southern Surveyor (ex Kurd) is currently working as a marine research vessel and is owned by the Australian Government. The factory deck on this vessel has been converted into a laboratory.
The Kurd was sold in 1983 and initially converted into a support depot ship for submersibles; in 1988 it was converted into a research vessel.
A very good photo of this vessel can be viewed at:
http://www.marine.csiro.au/nationalfacility/images/1shipside_lge.jpg
It is most likely that the duff and offal chutes would have been removed at the time of its initial conversion in 1983. The picture shows that, in its current guise, the chute openings are no longer present.
Note
Experts visited the FV Kappin in December 2003 and, during discussions, the Kappins mate revealed that on the previous voyage, significant amounts of seawater had entered the vessels factory space through the aft duff chute opening.
He also indicated that he was aware of this ingress of water and had been monitoring the situation.
At the time of their visit, the experts also found that the counter-balanced flap in the duff chute was movable (i.e. it was not seized).
Hence:
If this non-return flap was operable during that voyage of the Kappin, and significant amounts of water still had been able to enter the factory space, then this could only have happened if:
1. The hinged inner covers were open; AND
2. The movable counterbalanced flap (designed to be the principal barrier against the sea and which would normally be closed due to gravity) must have been open or forced open (* ) for this water to gain access inside the ship.
(* ) For a more details on this very plausible scenario, please see the FULL TECHNICAL REPORT (PDF) page on this site
The main purpose of a formal investigation is to determine the facts surrounding an accident and establish its causes, such that conclusions can be drawn and recommendations made, which can subsequently be implemented for the public good.
Full information on the formal investigation (pdf. copies of the report and transcripts of evidence) available at www.fv-gaul.org.uk (all Crown Copyright)
Background
In 1974 the Hull trawler Gaul sank during severe weather in the Barents Sea, north of Norway. All thirty-six persons on board lost their lives in this tragedy. A Governmental formal investigation into the cause of the vessels loss was carried out at that time and this concluded that the vessel had foundered after being overwhelmed by a succession of heavy seas.
At the time of its loss no distress call was made and no wreckage was found and this, coupled with the fact that the vessel was considered to be one of the best of its type and only two years old, led to increasing speculation, rumours and theories as to the nature and cause of its loss.
In 1997 an expedition, led by a journalist located the wreck of the Gaul, and in April 1999 the Deputy Prime Minister ordered the formal investigation to be re-opened.
In 2002 a detailed underwater survey was carried out by the MAIB (The Marine Accident Investigation Branch) and this found that the flaps and covers for two openings in the side of the vessel on the chutes used for refuse discharge (duff and offal) were fully open. This discovery meant that the factory deck space within the vessel had been effectively open to the sea at the time the vessel was lost.
The report of the Re-opened Formal Investigation was released on 17 December 2004. Its principal finding was that undetected water ingress, through the duff and offal chute openings, had been the causal factor in the vessels loss. The fact that the chutes were found to be open was deemed to have been due to negligence on the part of the crew and of inadequate maintenance of their means of closure by shore based maintenance staff.
Some critical comments on the findings of the Formal Investigation into the loss of the trawler Gaul (see the FULL TECHNICAL REPORT for further details on the issues raised here)
The duff and offal chute openings in the hull of the vessel were provided with a two-barrier closure system: an outer non-return flap (the strength barrier) and an inner cover (the leakage barrier), and these were both required to be closed in order to maintain the hulls full watertight integrity.
A careful study of the report of the re-opened formal investigation indicates that its principal findings need to be viewed with caution and that there are important questions, which remain unanswered.
Most importantly, an examination of the technical drawings of the vessel and of the underwater survey footage reveals that there were clear design faults in the construction and closing arrangements of the duff and offal chute openings.
It is therefore possible to put forward an alternative loss scenario in which the vessel was lost due to this design fault - a scenario that both fits the facts and is more plausible that the one chosen by the formal investigation panel.
Several failings:
The analysis that was carried out into the technical characteristics, arrangements, function and adequacy of the duff and offal chute structures, as detailed in the formal report, appears to have been only of a cursory nature. Since the adequacy and efficiency of these structures and fittings should have been the core issue of this investigation. The fact that this did not happen is considered to be a serious failing.
The report also contains a number of significant errors relating to the construction of the hinged and counter balanced non-return flap and of its ability to undergo in-service maintenance.
The inner covers to the duff and offal chutes were categorised as being watertight whilst in reality they were not even of a weathertight construction standard.
The definitions provided within the report for weathertight and watertight are incorrect. Watertight and weathertight are terms that have internationally agreed definitions such that items which are categorised and accepted as being of a watertight or weathertight standard, need to meet strict requirements for strength and design. These are generally set by National and International standard.
The main design fault:
Unfortunately, it can be demonstrated that the outer non-return flap arrangement, which was present onboard the Gaul was such that, in certain circumstances, the sea could act directly on the exposed free edge of this outer flap
and push it open.
In such circumstancess, if the inner covers had also been open or had subsequently failed[2] , the seawater would have been able to enter the vessel unhindered.
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For a pictorial explanation of the design defect on the Gaul, please follow this link: http://webzoom.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/Gaul%20design%20fault.pdf
This shows that a slightly different design arrangement of the outer non-return flaps would have prevented the rapid flooding of the Gaul, even with the inner covers left fully open.
It is therefore suggested that the loss of the vessel was caused by design faults in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes and their means of closure.
A second design fault:
In addition to the main fault mentioned above, a second design inadequacy in the construction of the Gauls chutes has been detected. This gives weight to the possibility that the bolted flap assemblies within the duff and offal chutes became twisted due to wave loading and remained open thereafter (i.e. item (14) on our factor tree diagram), and reinforces the theory that the non-return flaps on the Gaul were opened by the action of the sea, at the time of the incident.(i.e. items (1) and (5) in the same diagram).
Possible causes for the loss of the Gaul:
The Re-opened Formal Investigation came to the conclusion that the outer non-return flaps in the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had been seized in the open position since the time of the vessels departure from port - this conclusion having been drawn from the fact that the flaps were found to be in the open position during the 2002 underwater survey.
The fact that the inner covers were also found to be open during this survey was ascribed to the crews failure to close them.
In his closing remarks the judge stated firmly that "no other possible causes remained open".
The diagram published HERE shows, however, that not only was this incorrect, but that there were other more plausible explanations for the loss of the vessel:
The 'official' causes for the loss of the vessel
1. The outer flaps
The 2004 formal Investigation into the sinking of the FV Gaul concluded that the cause for the loss of the vessel was the ingress of a large quantity of seawater through the two duff and offal chutes openings in the hull of the vessel.
The double-barrier protections of these openings the inner covers and the outer flaps - were found to be in the open position during the underwater survey in 2002.
The fact that the outer flaps were found open, the investigation concluded, was due to seizure caused by corrosion in the vessels 16 month old flap hinges and failure on the part of the crew and shore maintenance staff to identify and rectify this problem.
The fact that the inner covers were also found open was explained away by crew negligence. The trouble with these findings, however, is that they were based on several unsubstantiated assumptions.
Let's take the presumed corrosion at the flap hinges. (For a few more details on this issue please click HERE.) As the same combination of materials, mild steel and brass, had been used in a number of other structures on the Gaul (e.g. for the toggles and clips on all weathertight hatches and doors), one would expect similar corrosion problems in those areas.
In reality, though, this doesnt seem to be the case. Quite the reverse, as the following clips[1] show, even after 28 years under the sea, the toggles and clips on the Gaul did not present such a level of corrosion and seizure that would prevent them from being easily unscrewed by the ROV[2] arm.
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[1] Extracts from the 2002 MAIB video footage - © Crown copyright
[2] Remote Operated Vehicle
2. The inner covers
One of the RFIs principal justifications for concluding that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul (i.e. at least one of them) had been tied open by the crew was the RFIs interpretation of an image, taken during the 2002 underwater survey, which purportedly shows a wire going across the inner lid.
This time a single flap lid, which we can see, is in the open position. It is difficult to see, but if one looks carefully you can see that the chute here is kept in the open position by a wire pinned across the top left-hand corner, which I am indicating now with the laser pen.[*]
We have also viewed this picture, as well as the rest of the video footage, and have come to a different conclusion, which we now present in this DOCUMENT.
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[*] Nigel Meeson QC, representing the Attorney General, advising on one of the matters on which the RFI should focus, during his opening speech to the Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation.
The RFI recommendations:
The safety recommendations that are put forward by the report reflect its findings (i.e. human error) and, as such, do not have real significance for the design of modern fishing vessels.
Notwithstanding this point, these recommendations have not as yet been promoted in appropriate maritime safety fora, and, in this respect, they are likely to be disregarded.
Comments on possible recommendations:
The most disturbing issue that stems from this Report is the fact that it did not recommend international ratification of the Torremolinos Convention*. Ratification of this Convention would have provided the opportunity to introduce an effective legislative safety framework for commercial fishing vessels worldwide (there are 24000 deaths in this industry annually). The Convention has not yet entered into force due to its lack of support from a sufficient number of IMO member States (the UK has also not ratified this Convention).
The fact that the vessel had important ship-side fittings that were of deficient design is an important issue that should be brought to the attention of contemporary designers.
(* Torremolinos protocol of 1993 relating to the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977)
Additional factors:
The findings of an accident inquiry can have important financial implications for the families of those lost. If the formal investigation had found that the loss of the Gaul was caused by a design defect and not negligence, would it not have been the case that the victims families would have been entitled to substantial compensation?
Current UK legislation - The Merchant Shipping (Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims) (Amendment) Order 1998 provides an indication of current payment limits for seafarers lost at sea.
Concluding remarks
The cost of this investigation was estimated at approx.£10m., the question that needs to be asked is:
Has this been a convincing and cost-effective formal investigation?
Notes
Full details on the above are contained in the .pdf file, which may be downloaded from:
http://webzoom.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/Comments%20on%20the%20loss%2026.8.06.pdf
The author of these technical papers is a Marine Surveyor and Naval Architect, who is currently employed by the UK government. These papers are the result of his private research.
From the commencement of this private research up until this present moment in time, the author and his family have been the subject of intimidation, both in and out of the workplace,both in the UK and especially in Belgium (where he had been seconded to work for an EU institution until 2006.)