The 36th (Ulster) Division

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (I):

JANUARY TO MARCH 22ND, 1918

SNOWBOUND as they were, the troops of the 36th Division passed several days in the most agreeable conditions. One day there might be snow-fall; the next might succeed with keen frost, but there was no lack of timber for fuel, and the amenities of civilization were very welcome to men who for five months had dwelt amid devastation.

Training was practically impossible owing to the depth of the snow in the fields, but some musketry was carried out on a good rifle-range near Lucheux. The Artillery, having been relieved by that of the 63rd Division on Christmas Day, got no further than the Beaulencourt staging area, where it remained hemmed in by drifts.

The rest was, as usual, all too short, particularly in view of the exhausted condition of the troops. Immediately after Christmas the Division was again on the move, to the area Corbie - Boves - Moreuil. Brigade groups went by rail, the transport by road, staging at Puchevillers and Contay, The latter met with difficulties equal to those following the relief. Many lorries were stuck in drifts. In some cases the trains even were considerably delayed.

The British Army was extending its flank, taking over from the French a front far greater than it had ever held, even at the time of the German retirement of 1917, when its right had been on the Amiens-St. Quentin Road. This is not the place to discuss the wisdom of that extension, or supposing, as few will deny, that it was in itself reasonable, of its magnitude. Suffice it to say that Sir Douglas Haig now found himself seriously short of reserves.

The relief of successive French divisions was being slowly effected, and the progress of the 36th Division was leisurely. It remained five days at rest in the Corbie area, where it was joined by its Artillery. Then it went slowly forward, via Harbonnières, to the area of Nesle, a town left undamaged by the Germans in their retirement, into which they had herded civilians, old men, women, and children, from other towns and villages destroyed by them. Here Divisional Headquarters were established on January the 12th. That night the 107th Brigade relieved a regiment of the 6th French Infantry Division astride the Somme before St. Quentin, remaining under the orders of the French Divisional Commander. The night following the 109th Brigade relieved the other French regiment in line, command passing to General Nugent at 10 a.m. on the 14th, when Headquarters took over from those of the 6th French Division at Ollézy. The 108th Brigade was billeted in villages on the Ham - St. Quentin Road, with headquarters at Dury. The Divisional Artillery had been joined by the 14th Army Field Artillery Brigade. The relief of the French artillery was not complete till the 15th.

Reliefs of French by British formations always presented great difficulties, owing to the fact that reserves of munitions of every sort had to be transferred, instead of being simply handed over as when Briton relieved Briton. Differences of language and of method were scarcely less important. Yet it often happened that reliefs on such occasions were the most satisfactory of all. Each side was on its mettle. Staff work was meticulously careful, reconnaissances were thorough, guides of proved intelligence chosen. This case was no exception. There is hardly a diary of the formations and units of the 36th Division in which is not expressed high appreciation of the arrangements made by the French, and of the kindness with which advance parties were treated by them, One officer writes of his own reception by a French regimental commander: "The most amazing dinner I ever did have in the line ! We had course after course of wonderful things, with suitable wines, till it was hard to think that the Huns could be only a thousand yards distant, but that was all they were."

And not the officers only were entertained, for his men informed him that "the poilus made them eat the whole time and absolutely bathed them in coffee."

The front taken over ran from Sphinx Wood, some twelve hundred yards west of the village of Itancourt, to a point on the St. Quentin - Roisel Railway a thousand yards west of Rocourt Station. Rocourt is a suburb of the city of St. Quentin, at the gates of which the British Armies now sat. The position and its defences will have to be described later in some detail. Here it need only be said that the latter were already considerable, but that, the relief taking place in the midst of a thaw following upon weeks of snow and frost, the 36th Division succeeded to a legacy of fallen-in trenches and mud. For the rest, it was on the whole a quiet front and not uncomfortable.

The destruction of the villages behind our lines did not appear to be as complete as before Cambrai. A few French civilians had trickled back to villages such as Ollézy and Douchy, while the town of Ham, where were the Headquarters of the XVIII. Corps, was intact and was full of them.

The Germans, who had excellent observation, were, of course, quickly aware of the relief, and evidently received orders to obtain identifications of the new troops in front of them. After several fruitless attempts they succeeded in obtaining them. On the night of January the 22nd they entered our outpost line on the front of both Brigades, capturing in each case a wounded prisoner. A small patrol of the 10th Rifles was also waylaid by superior numbers, and an officer and sergeant taken. This appeared to content them, and thereafter, for a considerable time, the front became of a placidity such as the troops of the 36th Division had seldom known.

For the moment - a fleeting moment, indeed - the enemy had second place in the minds of officers and men of the Division. Its first concern was with its reorganization. The shortage of man-power had been talked of long enough. Its fruits had now to be plucked, and bitter they were.

The whole British Army was now cutting down its divisions to nine infantry battalions, and its brigades to three. From the tactical point of view, apart from the fact that it entailed a loss of some hundred and seventy-five battalions, the change had serious inconveniences. The brigade of four battalions was the traditional British formation, just as the regiment of three was the Continental. It was the formation which British commanders had handled in training and practice, upon which their conceptions of infantry in war were based. The moral loss was no less great, particularly in divisions and brigades with strong territorial associations and sentiment. It meant that battalions in every division disappeared, and that either their personnel was transferred to others, or that they became "Entrenching Battalions," pitiful, nameless ghosts, robbed of their pride and their traditions. Such changes could not be without their effect upon moral, working through the loss of esprit-de-corps, the very life's blood of a combatant unit.

The 36th Division, it will be remembered, had already received two regular battalions, the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles and the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers. It was now joined by three more, the 1st and 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, from the 29th and 32nd Divisions respectively, and the 1st Royal Irish Rifles, from the 8th Division. To make place for them, the 10th and 11th Inniskillings, the 8th/9th, 10th, and 11th/13th Rifles had to disappear.

Three Entrenching Battalions, the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, were formed from the disbanded battalions after the remainder, including the newcomers, had been brought up to strength. The 2nd Rifles in the 108th Brigade, and the 1st Irish Fusiliers in the 107th, were exchanged. The infantry of the Division was now as follows -

REORGANIZATION OF DIVISION

107TH INFANTRY BRIGADE- 1st Royal Irish Rifles,2nd Royal Irish Rifles,15th Royal Irish Rifles.

108TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.-12th Royal Irish Rifles,1st Royal Irish Fusiliers,9th Royal Irish Fusiliers.

109TH INFANTRY BRIGADE-1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,9th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

The new arrivals were all regular battalions of Ulster regiments, but the characteristics of the Ulster Division were entirely changed. Its infantry, formed originally from the U.V.F., had now Ulster-Scot and Celt intermingled, and received English recruits as well

At the same time the 16th Rifles (Pioneers) was reduced, with other Pioneer battalions in France, to three companies. One accretion of strength the Division received, as some small compensation. The 266th Machine-Gun Company arrived from England on January the 18th, and was formed, with the three existing Machine-Gun Companies, into the 36th Machine-Gun Battalion.

The tendency had been for the machine-guns of a Division to come more and more directly under the control of the Divisional Commander during active operations. A Divisional Machine-Gun Officer had long been employed, but he was rather an attaché to the staff than a commander. Under the new system there was a lieutenant-colonel commanding the battalion who received his orders from the staff of the Division

On February the 22nd the 30th Division, hitherto the reserve of the XVIII. Corps, was interposed between the 36th and 61st, taking over the front held by the 36th Division north of the Somme, in the Forward System. In the second position, or Battle Zone, the 36th Division continued to be responsible for a sector north of the Somme, behind the village of Fontaine~les~Clercs.

The frontage was thus reduced to about six thousand yards. The relief of French troops by British had meanwhile extended further south, and the 36th Division had on its right the 14th Division of the III. Corps.

The Battle of Cambrai had been the last fling of the Allies for the time being. They were now definitely upon the defensive, awaiting a great attack in some uncertainty as to the precise point at which it should be launched. The victories of the Central Powers upon other fronts, above all the collapse of Russia, had freed German troops which, if not for the most part of high quality, would be able to man defences while attack was delivered elsewhere by the superior troops they relieved. Not a week passed without the announcement of the arrival of new divisions from Russia or Italy. Between November the 1st, 1917, and March the 20th, 1918, the number of German divisions in the Western theatre had increased from one hundred and forty-six to one hundred and ninety-two. 

 The total continued to grow for some time after the launching of the offensive. The heavy artillery had also been greatly increased, while a number of Austrian artillery regiments had come to the aid of their allies. The forces of the Allies were now considerably outnumbered, though not nearly to the extent which many writers, then and since, have pretended. Moreover, they were without unity of command, and there was among them divided opinion as to the point at which they would have to meet the onslaught, though Sir Henry Wilson had insisted that it would be at the junction of British and French. There had been preparations for an advance in Flanders. The French had apprehensions of one in Champagne. On both these fronts there came, indeed, great attacks at subsequent dates.

Even if the attack were to come, as seemed most probable, on the front of General Gough's Fifth and General Byng's Third Armies, its exact scope was uncertain. The final opinion appeared to be that, while the opening assault would extend further south, the main weight of the attack would be north of the Somme, along which would be formed a defensive flank. There is little doubt, from the writings of German staff officers since published, that such was the original intention, and that only unexpectedly great success south of the Somme induced Ludendorff to modify it. It appears also that the Crown Prince, in whose Group of Armies were the forces in the left of the German advance, urged him to adhere to his first plan even after the battle had been several days in progress

Lord Haig in his Despatches has revealed that, not being able to hold all his extended front in adequate strength, having to take risks somewhere, he took them on the front of the Fifth Army, where there was most elbow-room, and where loss of ground was likely to have least serious effects. It had become more and more apparent that defence in depth offered the best means of checking and breaking up an advance, and it had been laid down by G.H.Q. that all preparations must be based upon that system. Unfortunately, with the slender forces at the disposal of General Gough, defence in adequate depth implied a very shadowy defence in breadth.

The system of defence of divisions in line comprised a Forward Zone and a Battle Zone. The object of the former was to withstand a minor attack, and to check and, so far as might be, disorganize and disintegrate a major one. On the Battle Zone the Army Commander was to oppose the enemy's advance with all the forces at his disposal. The Forward Zone comprised a front and intermediate system; the former consisting of outpost line, line of resistance, and counter-attack companies; the latter of a system of isolated forts, wired all round, known as the Line of Redoubts.

The Battle Zone likewise consisted of two main lines of defence, organized internally with counter-attack units and wired-in redoubts. The description of  these defences may sound formidable till it is explained that there was but one battalion for the defence of each of them to two thousand yards on the front of the 36th Division, and even less density further south. There were likewise Rear Zone defences, notably behind the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la Somme. Here it may be added that confusion has been caused in the minds of many by the fashion in which the names "Somme River," "Somme Canal," "St. Quentin Canal," and "Crozat Canal" have been used by various writers in their descriptions of the battle; because the canalized Somme, giving birth to different canals at different parts of its course, was also the main obstacle in two successive lines of defence.

The Somme runs south-west from St. Quentin to St. Simon, west for nine miles to Voyennes, then more or less due north to Peronne. Over the first of these three sections it is canalized under the name of the Canal de St. Quentin; over the second two, under that of the Canal de la Somme. Where confusion is apt to arise is in the fact that at St. Simon the Canal de St. Quentin leaves its parent river and runs down to the Oise at Terguier. In the account that follows, the river, a winding, branching stream, will be disregarded, and the Canals, which formed the real obstacles, alluded to always as the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la Somme.

The front held by the 36th Division was in its natural features not ill adapted for defence. It was crossed by a series of ridges and valleys running east and west, parallel to the front line. Behind the front-line system, which was on the same ridge as the German outposts and on its reverse slope, was a deep valley known as Grugies Valley, from Grugies to the St. Quentin-La Fère Road, north of Urvillers, thence curving northward into "No Man's Land," towards Neuville - St. Amand. Grugies Valley had therefore its advantages and its dangers. On the one hand it afforded good masked positions for machine-guns; on the other, it was a conduit, from the north-eastern end of which attack might flow down behind the line of resistance of the Forward Zone.

Behind it was another ridge, upon which was the Line of Redoubts. Behind this again the ground sloped away gradually, rising to a slighter ridge, along which ran the Essigny - Contescourt Road. Upon the forward and reverse slopes of this last ridge were the positions of the two southern sectors of the Battle Zone, four thousand five hundred yards behind the front line. The northern sector, as has been explained, was north of the St. Quentin Canal. These positions were good, but they had one great failing. The front line of the 36th Division ran roughly from west to east to Sphinx Wood, while thence the line of the 14th Division ran more nearly north and south. The right flank was therefore very insecure. Should Urvillers fall, the right of the 36th Division's Forward System would undoubtedly crumple, while should such a calamity as the capture of Essigny occur, the defences of the Battle Zone would be turned.

The night of February the 22nd, which saw the entry into line of the 30th Division, saw also a reorganization of the system of defence. All three Brigades now entered the line, the 108th on the right, 107th in the centre, and 109th on the left. Each had one battalion in the Forward Zone, one as garrison for the Battle Zone, and one in reserve. In each case the Forward Zone battalion had two companies in the line of resistance, finding their own outposts, one company for counter-attack in the front system, and one "passive resistance company, with battalion headquarters, in a large fort in the Line of Redoubts. This unfortunate description implied that the last-named company was not allowed to counter-attack to retake ground lost in the front system. The Battle Zone battalions were billeted close to their battle stations, that of the 108th Brigade in dug-outs at Essigny Station, along the railway cutting, of the 107th Brigade in quarries near Grand Séraucourt, and of the 109th at Le Hamel, on the other side of the St. Quentin Canal. The artillery was disposed in two groups covering the Forward Zone, with one of the three Brigades, the 153rd, in reserve as supporting brigade. On February the 28th, when XVIII. Corps announced a "state of preparation" the batteries of this brigade took up positions south-east of Grand Séraucourt to cover the Battle Zone, with a section per battery pushed forward to temporary positions covering the Line of Redoubts.

Upon these positions a vast amount of work had to be accomplished, an amount so vast that it permitted of very scanty time being allotted for training. The Battle Zone had practically to be created. The lines had been merely sited by the French, and a little wire put up. Work was concentrated first of all upon this; secondly, upon the fortresses which were to contain battalion headquarters and "the passive resistance" company in the Line of Redoubts - known, from right to left, as "Jeanne d'Arc" , "Racecourse", and "Boadicea"; and lastly, upon making good the main communication trenches, and making wired-in platoon keeps in the Forward Zone.

 There was shortage of wire in February and the early part of March, and bad indeed would have been the state of the defences but for the large dumps left behind by the French, for which the countryside was scoured. As it was, no-one in the 36th Division can be said to have., been satisfied with the state of the Battle Zone by mid-March. Most of the trenches were no more than eighteen inches deep, it having been ruled that there would be time to dig them out when it became necessary to occupy them.

Uncanny work it was awaiting, in the silence of quietest of quiet lines, a mighty attack of which for very long there was scarce an indication. In the earlier days, save for reports from higher formations of aerodromes, hospitals, and railways far behind the German lines, the sole warning sign was in the large numbers of officers, maps in hand, observing day by day the British trenches and the country behind them. There was no great increase of movement on forward roads till about the 12th of March. Aeroplane photographs taken about this date showed that a large number of shell-holes a few hundred yards from the outpost line had been worked upon.

 It was surmised that these were being prepared for trench mortars, for the destruction of the British front-line system, as that of the Russians had been destroyed before the last great German advance at Riga. Significant also, in this connection, was the fact that Oskar von Hutier, who had carried out that attack, was now in line opposite, in command of Eighteenth Army. His known character and antecedents were food for reflection.

New military roads were also discovered behind Itancourt. But it was a few clear mornings and evenings, from the 15th of March onwards, that brought most conclusive evidence of what was impending. From the dovecote in Essigny, the best observation post on the XVIII. Corps front, which was manned by the 36th Division's excellent observers, an enormous amount of traffic could now be observed. Along the main road from Guise-Mont d'Origny to St. Quentin, in particular, huge convoys of lorries and horse transport were seen, as dusk drew in, moving towards the last-named city. Small place for doubt now remained.

On March the 4th occurred a curious incident. The Germans had apparently come to the conclusion that the British front line had been abandoned; and, indeed, it was held lightly enough by isolated sections. Strong patrols, amounting in general to a platoon, suddenly issued from the German trenches all along the 36th Division's front, in broad daylight. The outposts might be weak, but they could resist an attempt of this sort. Under the fire of Lewis guns all the patrols were stopped and dispersed with heavy loss. Patrols sent out in turn from the outpost companies captured in all one officer and ten other ranks. It was a sharp lesson, and thereafter, till the opening of the attack, was no move by the German infantry.

From March the 12th onward was instituted a series of nightly bombardments, in which the now considerable heavy artillery at the disposal of the XVIII. Corps took part, of valleys and dead ground forming probable assembly positions. Tests of the action to follow the preconcerted Corps message, "Man Battle Stations" were carried out. Bridges had long been prepared for demolition and allotted to particular sections of the Field Companies.

Small mine-fields had been constructed in case of the employment of tanks by the enemy. Grugies Valley was starred with machine-guns, to sweep its length with zones of flanking fire. It was felt by officers and men of the Division that what the limited means at its disposal permitted had been accomplished. The worst misgivings were with regard to the gaps between keeps and redoubts in the Forward Zone, owing to the paucity of numbers available for its defence. There was no touch between the battalion headquarters forts in the Line of Redoubts; they were in no sense mutually supporting. There was little to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the intervals, pushing forward his main advance almost unembarrassed by them, while special detachments swallowed them at leisure.

Much noise of enemy traffic was heard at night from the 17th onward. On the evening of the 18th two Germans entered our lines on the front of the 107th Brigade to give themselves up. They declared they had deserted to avoid the coming battle,, which would not now be long delayed. They confirmed the suspicions of massed trench mortars on the front. They had seen great numbers of troops, particularly of artillery. St. Quentin, they said, was packed with men. On the night of the 20th a raid was carried out by the 61st Division, resulting in the capture of prisoners who stated that the attack was to be launched the following morning. A special bombardment was therefore carried out from 2-30 to 3 a.m., with heavy rolling barrages on likely positions of assembly.

The great moment, for which, it is scarce exaggeration to say, men were waiting all the world over, came at 4-35 a.m. on the morning of March the 21st. The infantry of the 36th Division was then disposed as follows:-

MORNING OF MARCH 21ST

RIGHT BRIGADE: 108TH BRIGADE.Forward Zone: 12th Rifles; Battle Zone: 1st Irish Fusiliers; Divisional Reserve: 9th Irish Fusiliers.

CENTRE BRIGADE: 107TH BRIGADE.Forward Zone: 15th Rifles;Battle Zone: 1st Rifles;Divisional Reserve: 2nd Rifles.

LEFT BRIGADE: 109TH BRIGADE.Forward Zone: 2nd Inniskillings;Battle Zone: 1st Inniskillings;Divisional Reserve: 9th Inniskillings..

The artillery had begun moving a large proportion of its guns to new positions on the night of the 17th, having taken a hint from the fate of batteries on the front of the Third Army, which had just been subjected to the heaviest "mustard" gas bombardments experienced in the whole course of the war. The moves of batteries of the 173rd Brigade were actually not complete till a few hours prior to the launching of the attack. The dispositions were then as follows:

RIGHT GROUP. (Covering front of 108th and 107th Infantry Brigades.) Headquarters, 173rd Brigade, R.F.A."A," " B," " C," and " D " Batteries, 173rd Brigade, R.F.A. 462nd Battery, R.F.A 464th Battery, R.F.A..

Four of the six batteries of this Group moved on the night of the 20th. It is reported that their evacuated positions were assailed with destructive fire so heavy that they would have been completely neutralized from the first had they remained in them.

LEFT GROUP. (Covering front of 109th Infantry Brigade.) Headquarters, 179th Army Brigade, R.F.A383rd Battery, R,F.A463rd Battery, R.F.A."D" Battery, 232nd Brigade, R.F.A..

BATTLE ZONE GROUP.Headquarters, 153rd Brigade, R.F.A."A" "B," " C," and " D" Batteries153rd Brigade, R,F.A..

With one great crash there opened a tremendous bombardment, of trench mortars by the hundred and every calibre of artillery save the 77-mm, field gun. Its continuous roar was punctuated, to those a little distance front the line, by the explosions of huge single shells upon objectives in rear. So far as can be ascertained the German programme consisted of a concentration mainly of trench mortars on the front system; a bombardment with high explosive and phosgene gas of the Line of Redoubts, the valley in rear of it, the trenches of the Battle Zone, and Battery Valley, which ran behind its ridge; for which 105, 150, and 210-mm. howitzers were employed; and fire on villages in rear, and upon the crossings of the Canal de St. Quentin, with the largest howitzers and high-velocity guns. Particularly heavy fire was directed upon the redoubts and battery positions.

The proportion of lethal shell to high-explosive gradually decreased, till the barrages were composed entirely of the latter, There was, according to the reports of artillerymen, a remarkable absence of 77-mm. shell and of instantaneous fuses, Five minutes after the opening of the bombardment the order, "Man Battle Stations," was sent out by the General Staff. Dawn had broken in a dense mist, Morning mists at this season and in this district are the rule rather than the exception, but this was far thicker than the ordinary.

It was at five o'clock impossible to see more than ten yards ahead, and visibility increased very slowly till the afternoon. All the battalions in the Battle Zone appear to have reached their stations, upon ground thoroughly known to officers and men, in good time, but, as communications were constantly cut and runners were slow amidst the fog and the shelling, reports were long in coming to hand. This loss of telephone communication rendered it almost impossible to issue barrage orders to the artillery.

The German infantry attack was launched at 8-30 a.m. That the enemy attacked the major part of the line of the 36th Division frontally is disproved by the reports of survivors and returned prisoners. The main assault of the Germans, it must be remembered, was due west, almost parallel to the 36th Division's outpost line from Sphinx Wood to Gauchy. The advance must have swept straight up the Grugies Valley. There is evidence that Racecourse Redoubt, which contained the battalion headquarters and one company of the 15th Rifles, was attacked before the companies in the front system.

Hopeless indeed was the position of the men in this front system, outnumbered three or four times, taken in rear by parties which came upon them without warning. The case of the machine-gunners, from whom, in the defence of the valley, much had been hoped, was equally desperate. The Germans swept on them, as it were, out of nothingness. Few can have had opportunity to fire a shot ere they were rushed.

It was believed at the time that all troops in the front system had been speedily overwhelmed. The evidence of returned prisoners, however, has established that there was at least one magnificent defence in this area, which, though then unknown, must have had invaluable results. The three companies of the 12th Rifles in the front system of the 108th Brigade were, as will be seen from the map, astride the national road running from St. Quentin to La Fère, which for several miles south of this point ran roughly parallel with the British front line.

Captain L. J. Johnston, who commanded "C," the counter-attack company, states that though the preliminary bombardment smashed up their trenches and cut huge lanes in their wire, though owing to the mist and the fumes of gas-shell it was impossible to see more than a few feet ahead, the casualties were relatively light. Though all communication to rear was cut, the telephone line held as far back as Le Pontchu Quarry, "C" company's headquarters.

Captain Johnston thus received word when the attack was launched, and began to move his company into Foucard Trench. In its progress up the communication trench it met a small party of Germans, who were shot or bayoneted. The fact was, however, thus made unpleasantly apparent that the enemy had broken through the line of resistance. The keeps held by "A" and "D companies, farther forward, were still resisting, but by 11 a.m. were completely surrounded, and finally overwhelmed by weight of numbers.

For four hours constant bombing attacks were launched on Foucard Trench. On several occasions parties of Germans entered the trench, but in savage hand-to-hand fighting were elected. About thirty prisoners were taken and sent back under escort to Le Pontchu Quarry. About noon a most determined assault was carried out with flammenwerfer, to be bloodily repulsed.

An hour later the fog suddenly lifted. It was then clear to "C" company what progress the enemy had made. More than a mile to rear the Germans could be seen swarming about Jeanne d'Arc Redoubt, which held the battalion headquarters and "B" company. On the front of the 14th Division German cavalry could be seen advancing, and, what was even more astonishing, a column of transport, three hundred yards long, moving down the main St. Quentin-La Fère Road, about four hundred yards to the right of "C" company's position. Lewis-gun fire opened upon this body in a few seconds killed or wounded every man and horse in it, leaving the whole column in a welter of confusion.

By now, however, the company was being attacked from both flanks, and a withdrawal to Lejeune Trench, five hundred yards in rear, was ordered. The enemy followed up the withdrawal fiercely and with the greatest gallantry, a rather pathetic incident occurring when a single German with bayonet fixed charged the whole line!

The incident is instructive, as it reveals the high state of training in the offensive spirit of the attacking troops, and helps to account for some of their successes in later days, when our men were wearied out. "C" company, reinforced by the forward headquarters, which had been in Le Pontchu Quarry, now numbered nearly a hundred and twenty men. A further magnificent stand was here made.

About 3 p.m. a company of the enemy, evidently believing they had to deal with but a handful, was seen marching up in fours from the rear. The men held their fire till the Germans reached point-blank range. Then such a blast burst forth as brought the whole body to the ground. Captain Johnston believes that not a man escaped.

The position, however, was now hopeless. All thought of cutting a way through was out of the question, so thick were the enemy to rear. The end came at 4 p.m. A German tank came down the main road, firing into the trench in enfilade. At the same moment a whole battalion advanced from the front. There were about a hundred men only alive, many of them wounded. There was no course open but surrender. As the prisoners were marched back toward St. Quentin they had the grim satisfaction of seeing the column of transport they had annihilated still strewn in indescribable confusion about the road.

This most valorous defence was, as has been stated, unknown at the time. After the Armistice one Military Cross, two Distinguished Conduct Medals, and four Military Medals were awarded to the survivors of the company. The defence of "C" company of the 12th Rifles, against hopeless odds, when all seemed melting about them, must be held to rank with the very finest episodes of that month of March, the blackness of which is gilded with so many deeds of imperishable courage and fortitude.

The front system pierced, the enemy wasted no time upon the Line of Redoubts. The leading battalions pushed through the gaps between them, leaving it to their successors to attack them deliberately, with the aid of trench mortars and flammenwerfer. At 11-45 am, a report was received from the 30th Division, on the left, that the enemy had broken through on either side of the Epine de Dallon Redoubt, and that the special "redoubt barrage" was being put down. At 12-10 p.m. the "redoubt barrage" was ordered on the 36th Division's front also. That the enemy had passed through the Line of Redoubts before the barrage was put down is now certain. Twenty minutes later the 107th Brigade received a message from its Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Cumming, whose work in reconnaissance was extremely gallant and useful, that the attack upon the Battle Zone was developing. At 12-15 p.m. Artillery Groups were warned to be prepared to withdraw their batteries to the Battle Zone positions.

The personnel of the 18-pounder batteries of the 173rd Brigade was, however, obliged to withdraw from its guns, being attacked at close quarters by riflemen and machine-guns. Breech blocks and sights were carried away by the gunners in their retirement. The most serious report of all came from the 107th Brigade. The enemy was in Contescourt, in the section of the Battle Zone held by the 1st Rifles. It appears that the platoon of this battalion told off to defend the northern part of the village, was almost destroyed by a shell on the way up. A company of the and Battalion moved forward in an attempt to eject him, but suffered heavily from machine-gun fire and failed to achieve its purpose.

The position was now very dangerous, but not irretrievable. Save at Contescourt, where the enemy made no further progress, the Battle Zone was intact. So, likewise, was that of the 30th Division on the left, and of the 61st Division further north, save at one point.

At noon all three battalion headquarters on the Line of Redoubts were most manfully holding out, beating off attack after attack. General Nugent had refused to allow more than one company from a reserve battalion on the 107th Brigade's front to reinforce that holding the Battle Zone. He had still, therefore, with his Pioneer Battalion, reserves to fill a gap. Moreover, there was in rear the 61st Brigade of the 20th Division, allotted to the support of the 36th Division's front, though not yet at General Nugent's disposal.

Up till now it might be said that, their superiority in numbers and their advantage from the mist having been taken into consideration, the Germans had been held as effectively as could have been expected. The mist was now clearing, and machine-gunners in positions of the Battle Zone were beginning to cause loss to the enemy.#But from the right there came news most disquieting. The Germans had captured Manufacture Farm, in the front line of the 14th Division's Battle Zone; soon afterwards they were in Essigny. It is difficult to ascertain precisely at what moment this important point, on dominating ground, was occupied by the enemy.

The reports of the 108th Brigade would seem to put it about noon. On the other hand, an air report to the 14th Division stated that at 1-30 p.m. all the roads south of Urvillers were "teeming" with Germans, and that batteries were in action in the open south-west of the village. Now, in an attack, roads do not begin to "teem" with troops until supports and reinforcements move up, some time after the leading waves.

Moreover, the detachments of two guns of the Machine-Gun Battalion, with positions near Essigny, state positively that there were Germans in that village considerably earlier, and that they themselves were in action against parties advancing upon the railway station from it. One gun dispersed an important attack with great loss before it was destroyed by artillery fire. The second covered the railway cutting, up which the enemy presently began to press from the south. Later it was withdrawn to a point fifty yards west of the cutting, whence it continued to engage the enemy advancing from Essigny. It remained in action till ordered to withdraw at night.

At whatever hour precisely the enemy penetrated Essigny, it is certain that by one o'clock, whilst all along the front the Germans were attacking the Battle Zone, the right of the 108th Brigade was completely turned. At this time the telephone line to Station Redoubt, wherein were the headquarters of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, which had been cut long before, was repaired, and General Griffith learnt that fierce fighting was in progress here in the front line of the Battle Zone, and that the 41st Brigade on the right had been driven back. By 2-30 p.m. the enemy was in Fay Farm, south of Essigny, three thousand yards behind the front line of the 14th Division's Battle Zone.

On the front of the 1st Irish Fusiliers the enemy forced an entry at the railway cutting, but every attempt to advance was defeated by the Lewis-gun fire of the garrison. General Griffith now moved up the 9th Irish Fusiliers to form a defensive flank. A veritable break-through had occurred on the right, extending a considerable distance south over the front of the III. Corps. The general situation, from being menacing, was become suddenly desperate.

At 4-5 p.m. General Nugent ordered the 108th Brigade to form a flank along the railway line, half-way to the village of Lizerolles, to which it should be prolonged by the 14th Division.

On the left flank of the 36th the 1st Inniskillings was holding stoutly. General Nugent therefore put at General Griffith's disposal the 9th Inniskillings, the reserve battalion from the 109th Brigade. This battalion was swung across the front. Colonel Peacocke, its commanding officer, reported, however, that the troops of the 41st Brigade were now holding on, and that he had accordingly taken up a position behind the 9th Irish Fusiliers. So the position remained, more or less, till dusk began to draw on. The enemy was in Contescourt, but the 1st Rifles clung to the cross-roads south-east of the village.

The right company of the same battalion maintained its position in desperate fighting. Enemy troops massing along the canal bank between Dallon and Fontaine-les-Clercs, for the attack upon the Battle Zone positions of the 1st Inniskillings north of the canal, were heavily engaged by the batteries of the Left Group.

The fire was observed and controlled from Ararat Observation Post, on the high ground north-west of Quarry Redoubt, with which telephone communication was maintained. At length the Germans succeeded in running a forward gun into Fontaine, but all efforts to serve it were frustrated by the fire of the 463rd Battery R.F.A.

Up forward, meanwhile, the three Redoubts of the Forward Zone, hopelessly beleaguered, completely surrounded by the enemy, had fought a battle that may be described as epic. The enemy pounded their trenches with trench mortars, attacked, was beaten off, bombarded once again, again attacked. Jeanne d'Arc, on the right, was the first to fall, about noon.

The other two fought on, in the hopes of effecting a break-through after dusk. But it was out of the question, so thick was the enemy now in their rear. Trench after trench was taken by the enemy in Racecourse Redoubt, till at last only a corner round the railway cutting remained. Attacks with flammenwerfer were repulsed, largely through the skill with the rifle grenade of Captain Stewart, the Adjutant. Such a battle against incredible odds could not continue for ever.

 At half-past five, almost simultaneously, though they had of course no communication with one another, Colonel Cole-Hamilton, commanding the 15th Rifles, and Lord Farnham, commanding the 2nd Inniskillings, decided that further resistance was impossible. Both were highly complimented upon their resistance by the German officers who took over the forts. Colonel Cole-Hamilton was told that a battalion had been attacking him all morning, and that a second had been brought up during the afternoon. He himself had about thirty men unwounded. In the case of the headquarters of the and Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Germans released two pigeons in Boadicea Redoubt with messages announcing its capture.

The messages were received by the Headquarters of the 36th Division. The resistance of Racecourse and Boadicea Redoubts affords a rare example of that "cold courage," unsupported by the ardour and excitement of an advance or the hope of ultimate victory, which has been so often displayed by soldiers of British race in all periods of the history of British arms.

At 4-15 p.m. the 61st Brigade of the 20th Division, placed at the disposal of the 36th Division, was ordered to man the St. Simon defences, an arc covering the hairpin bend in the Canal de St. Quentin, and including the villages of Avesne and the Pont de Tugny. General Cochrane, commanding the Brigade, established headquarters at St. Simon.

The position on the right flank grew still more serious toward evening. Finally the Commander of the Fifth Army decided to withdraw the III, Corps behind the Canal de St. Quentin, in conformity with which move it was necessary for the 36th Division to be swung back also, pivoting upon the 1st Inniskillings, which battalion still clung to its Battle Zone. The 61st Brigade was ordered to withdraw across the Canal, obtaining touch on the right with the troops of the 14th Division, east of Avesne. From its left, half-way between Tugny and Artemps, the 108th Brigade was to hold up to the cemetery at Happencourt. Thence, up to and inclusive of Le Hamel, was to come the 107th Brigade. Then the 9th Inniskillings was to prolong the line to the Battle Zone defences of the 1st Inniskillings. The 61st Brigade was not to withdraw from the arc of the St Simon bridgehead till the troops of the other Brigades had completed their retirement. When this had been effected, the 61st Brigade was to be in touch not only with the 108th, along the Canal, but with the 60th Brigade of its own Division, now at the disposal of the 30th Division, which had outposts on a line from the Canal south of Happencourt to Vaux, north of the Ham - St. Quentin Road.

The retirement began at 10-30 p.m., being covered by small rearguards. In the darkness the troops were not seriously pressed by the Germans. Long before dawn all battalions were established in their new positions, the three Brigade Headquarters of the 36th Division being at Lavesne, and that of the 61st Brigade in the old Divisional Headquarters at Ollézy. General Nugent had meanwhile transferred his headquarters to Estouilly, north of Ham. It must be remembered that each Brigade had by now had one battalion almost completely destroyed, and that the Battle Zone battalions were at an average strength of about two hundred and fifty men. There was an accretion in artillery strength. Two batteries, A/91st and C/91st, of the 20th Divisional Artillery, together with the 232nd Siege Battery, were put at the disposal of the 36th Division, and remained with it throughout the retreat, though there were constant changes in the formation of Groups. The Siege Battery was later transferred to a special Heavy Artillery Group, with two others, directly under the orders of the 36th Divisional Artillery.

The destruction of bridges and pontoons allotted to the Engineers of the 36th Division was carried through without hitch. Shortly after noon the pontoon and foot-bridge at Fontaine were destroyed by the 121st Field Company, which in the small hours of the 22nd of March blew up the whole group of bridges between Grand Séraucourt and Le Hamel. Later, in daylight, the 150th Field Company blew up the Artemps Group. The Tugny and St. Simon bridges had been allotted to other sections of the company. Lieutenants C. L. Knox and I. B. Stapylton-Smith were each responsible for twelve bridges. The first warning received by the former was when the debris of the Artemps bridges floated down-stream. He at once commenced his task. Several of the bridges were destroyed under machine-gun fire.

At Tugny, the Germans were advancing on the main steel-girder bridge when the time-fuse failed. The night dew or the mist had spoiled it. As Lieutenant Knox rushed forward the foremost of the enemy were upon the bridge, a long one. He tore away the useless time-fuse, clambered under the frame-work of the bridge, and lit the instantaneous fuse. The bridge was destroyed, and, by some miracle, Lieutenant Knox was uninjured. He received the Victoria Cross. Among many heroic actions performed by officers and men of the Division in the course of the war it would be difficult to point to one of finer calibre. At St. Simon, Lieutenant Stapylton-Smith blew up a large number of the enemy with one of the three main bridges

The early hours of March the 22nd, which dawned in thick mist like the day before, passed fairly quietly. For the moment, the right flank of the Division and the III. Corps on its right being behind the barrier of the Canal de St. Quentin, the greater pressure was shifted to the north. In bitter fighting the troops of the 1st Inniskillings held their ground in the forward positions of the Battle Zone, till 2 p.m., when, completely outflanked, they were ordered to withdraw to Ricardo Redoubt, the headquarters redoubt in the Battle Zone, upon which attack after attack was launched, to be beaten off with heavy losses by the defenders.

The Germans across the Canal were meanwhile far in their rear, having batteries in Artemps by now. Finally, Ricardo Redoubt was surrounded, the 9th Inniskillings being compelled to fight a rearguard action back to the Happencourt - Fluquières Line, upon which, as has been recorded, were troops of the 60th Brigade. On the right the Canal Line held, though the enemy had brought up batteries, trench mortars, and machine-guns under cover of the mist, and was bombarding it heavily.#At noon General Nugent was informed that, in consequence of the decision of the Higher Command to hold the line of the Canal de la Somme and its continuation southward, the Canal de St. Quentin, a further withdrawal was necessary. The 36th Division, with the 6ist Brigade attached, was now to hold this position from the present right flank of that Brigade to Sommette-Eaucourt. The 61st Brigade had already a battalion, the 7th D.C.L.I., holding from the Canal junction to a point west of the Dury - Ollézy Road, less one company, which had been moved down to the right flank to fill a gap between its right battalion, the 7th Somerset L.I., and the troops of the 14th Division.

Its other battalion, the 12th King's, was driven out of Tugny at dusk by the advance of the enemy north of the Canal de St. Quentin, crossed the Canal de la Somme at Dury, and was withdrawn through the 7th D.C.L.I. to support on the railway behind that battalion. The withdrawal of the Brigades of the 36th Division was complete at 11 p.m., when the last troops passed through Pithon.

The 108th Brigade took over the defence of the Canal bank from the left of the 7th D.C.L.I. to Sommette - Eaucourt. The 107th Brigade moved to Eaucourt and Cugny, the 109th to Brouchy in support. As no touch could be obtained with the 30th Division, which was to have prolonged the line westward, by the 108th Brigade, the 21st Entrenching Battalion, which had now come under General Nugent's orders, was put in on the left of the Brigade.

Ricardo Redoubt, in which the heroic resistance of Colonel Crawford's 1st Inniskillings continued all day, was now, of course, completely isolated. At three o'clock the commanding officer sent away a detachment, some men of which succeeded in making their way back to our lines.

The remainder fought to the end. Finally driven to the north-western corner of the Redoubt, they ejected the enemy bombers who had now a footing there. Two men alone, Privates Bailey and Conway, drove out one group of the German bombers. Trench mortars pounded them from all sides, which they could not reach. A mere handful was taken prisoner with Colonel Crawford about 6 p.m. It is difficult to overestimate the value of this magnificent stand against overwhelming odds,

The position at two o'clock on the morning of March the 23rd may be summarized for the sake of clarity. The 36th Division, with attached troops, held the line of the Canal de St. Quentin and Canal de la Somme from a mile and a half north-west of Jussy to a mile west of Sommette - Eaucourt. Upon this line it had, from right to left, the 61st Brigade (7th Somerset L.I. on right, 7th D.C.L.I. on left, 12th King's in support); the 108th Brigade (9th Irish Fusiliers on right, 1st Irish Fusiliers on left; with a composite battalion of details and men returned from courses finding the outposts, to allow some rest to the other battalions); 21st Entrenching Battalion. The length of the front was upwards of five miles. The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) was at Sommette - Eaucourt, where the battalion had been working since before noon on a line of strong points. The 109th Brigade, consisting now of the 9th Inniskillings, was at Brouchy, in reserve. The 107th Brigade Headquarters and the and Irish Rifles were at Cugny. The other battalion of this Brigade, the 1st Rifles, now very weak, was at Eaucourt. Divisional Headquarters were at Fréniches.

The artillery position is somewhat complicated, owing to early losses and subsequent changes. The Potter Group (A/153rd Brigade R.F.A,; B/153rd Brigade R.F.A.; D/173rd Brigade R.F.A.; D/91st Brigade R.F.A.; and 383rd Battery R.F.A.) had been ordered to join the 20th Division. It was in action in Bacquencourt during the day, rejoining the 36th Division in the afternoon after a big march. The front was now covered by the Erskine Group (A/91st and C/91st Brigade R.F.A.; and D/173rd Brigade R.F.A.) on the right, in positions in and around Aubigny; and the Eley Group (463rd and 464th Batteries R.F.A.; C/153rd and D/153rd Brigade R.F.A.; B/91st Brigade R.F.A.; and two howitzers of B/232nd Army F.A. Brigade) on the left, in positions near Brouchy. The Heavy Artillery Group was out of touch, and could no longer cover the divisional front.

The Machine-Gun Battalion had disappeared as a unit, bur there were still detachments with each of the Brigades, acting as a rule under the orders of the battalion commander on the spot.

During the afternoon the Engineers of the 36th Division had taken over from the XVIII. Corps the destruction of bridges in Ham and along the river and canal to Ollézy. They were all effectively destroyed, save the main railway bridge at Pithon, which was found not to have been prepared. French railway troops, working in haste and with insufficient explosives, did all the damage in their power to it, but it is believed to have been swiftly repaired by the enemy.

The battle had been till now an attack with great superiority of numbers upon partially-prepared positions, or naturally formidable obstacles, such as the canals and the marshy bed of the Somme.

From the morning of the 23rd open warfare developed, from the moment the enemy, as happened early, had driven the 14th Division back from the Canal de St. Quentin at Jussy. That accomplished, the Canal de la Somme at this point formed no real obstacle to the German advance, because, from St. Simon to Voyennes, it was parallel with it. For the 36th Division there were no more defences till the front line of 1916 was reached. It had to fight its battle of the 23rd and 24th of March in open country. The account of that battle and of the remainder of the retreat must occupy a chapter to itself

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (II) MARCH 23RD TO 30TH, 1918

IN the account which follows, it is scarcely to be hoped that all the confusion arising from reports that often conflicted can be eliminated. The resistance made by the 36th Division and its attached troops was one in which a large number of units, some existing, some hastily improvised, took part. But, for the most part, they werç very small units, except for the battalions of the 61st Brigade, less depleted and less wearied by the morning of March the 23rd than those of the 36th Division.

This chapter opens with events occurring forty-eight hours after the beginning of the great German bombardment. In that period the troops of the Division had been constantly engaged in fighting, or, when not fighting, on the march, or upon the alert for a fresh attack. On the nights neither of the 21st nor the 22nd had more than a couple of hours' sleep been snatched by any of the infantry.

Many units had had absolutely none. The men were already wearied out. The 1st Rifles, to take one example, after fighting all day on the 22nd in the neighbourhood, first of Le Hamel, then of Happencourt, had marched by night to Pithon, there crossed the Canal de la Somme, then continued its march to Eaucourt, which was reached at three in the morning. The distance covered was nine miles. Even on arrival there was not rest for all, as piquets had to be posted round the village.

It is hard for those who have not seen a great retreat of this nature to imagine how depressing are the circumstances and the sights which he sees about him to the soldier entrusted with the fighting of delaying actions, how great his mental and moral, apart altogether from his physical, strain. The flood of civilians pouring out of towns and villages was in itself a pathetic and depressing sight. At three o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd the nurses of the C.C.S. in Ham were walking down the Guiscard Road, carrying bundles, some of them assisting wounded men.

Lorries and. ambulances had already taken the worst cases, but at this stage there was not transport enough for all. Such sights as these were calculated to prey upon the mind and react upon the moral of the stoutest hearted. Allied with great physical fatigue and the sensation of being three or four times outnumbered, their effect was even more dangerous.

The exploits of the troops of the Fifth Army are great enough without straining the note. Some writers had made it appear as though the men were of triple brass. Men are of less durable material. Each has what may be called his "weakening-point," which is arrived at sooner in some men than in others. There were cases of weakness in the days that followed among troops of the 36th Division, as among other troops. But their achievements must be measured by the standard of their cruel and heart-breaking task. With that as gauge, these achievements, viewed as a whole, stand out in their magnificence, a shining monument to the spirit of the race that bred them.

The 21st Entrenching Battalion, interposed on the left of the 108th Brigade to find touch with the troops of the 30th Division, had not succeeded in its object. It was discovered at dawn that the line of the 30th Division turned back from the Canal about Verlaines. The 23rd Entrenching Battalion, consisting of men of disbanded battalions of the 36th Division, under the orders of the 30th, beat off all hostile attempts to cross the Canal in the neighbourhood of Offoy.

Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Odo Vivian, the officer commanding that battalion, reports that at 7 a.m. troops fell back on his right from Ham, saying that they had been driven out by the enemy. About eleven, two Canadians informed him that they had slept the night in the town and seen no sign of the Germans. Be this as it may, it seems certain that the crossings at Ham, of all places on the front, were least effectively guarded, and that the enemy had some troops over the Canal here by noon. To cover the left flank, the dismounted sections of the Engineers and a battalion of divisional details were put into position north of Golancourt.

It was, however, on the other flank that danger first appeared. The enemy, according to the reports of the 14th Division, effected a crossing at Jussy at 3-30 a.m., but was counter-attacked and driven back by the 7th K.R.R.C. This respite was temporary only. By 11-15 a.m. the enemy was over the Canal de St. Quentin at many points, though the 7th Somerset L.I. clung stoutly to its position. Half an hour earlier the 2nd Rifles had been ordered to take up a defensive line east of Cugny, in touch with troops of the 14th Division, which had fallen back astride the road from that village to Flavy-le-Martel.

By noon the troops on the right were falling back from Flavy-le-Martel and Annois, hard pressed by the enemy. The retirement continuing, the 1st Rifles was moved up on the right flank of the 2nd Battalion. On its right were at first no British troops, but a line was hastily taken up by dismounted French dragoons. In this position the line remained on this flank for some hours. The 1st Rifles was constantly engaged and managed to hold its ground. The 2nd Battalion did not come into action till later in the afternoon, as there were still in front of it a few men of the 14th Division who had retired from Flavy.

Meanwhile, in the centre, the line from Sommette - Eaucourt to Ollézy, and that of the 61st Brigade upon the Canals, held in splendid fashion. It was now the turn of the left flank.

The 9th Inniskillings was heavily attacked from the north-west at Aubigny. One company fell back in disorder from the village. Thereupon the Brigade-Major, Captain G. J. Bruce, rode forward, rallied the men, and galloped into the village at their head. The Germans were driven out. It was a wonderful example of the inspiration of personal gallantry and leadership upon weary and disheartened men. Gradually, however, the line at this point fell back under severe pressure. Sommette - Eaucourt was lost, and a little later Brouchy. Both flanks of the Division were now completely turned.

At 4-30 p.m. General Cochrane, commanding the 61st Brigade, ordered the 7th D.C.L,I. and the 7th Somersets to withdraw to the line of the Ham - Terguier Railway, from the brook west of Annois to the Ollézy - Eaucourt Road. The Somersets, however, upon the Canal de St. Quentin, lost the better part of three companies, which fought on when surrounded till all their ammunition was gone ere surrendering. The D.C.L.I. extricated itself under great pressure, and took up position upon the new line.

And now upon the right the attack was renewed in great force. Enemy battalions passed through Flavy and deployed on either side of the Cugny Road. At about 5 p.m. the Germans attacked that village, using trench mortars to cover the advance, to be repulsed by the 2nd Rifles. A gap had now formed between this battalion and the 1st, through which the enemy pushed at dusk.

The 1st Rifles was also attacked at 7 p.m., and also drove off the enemy, but this mere handful of brave men was now menaced both from. south-east and north-west, and, to avoid being surrounded,. withdrew towards Beaulieu, a mile south-east of Cugny. The 2nd Rifles also was compelled to evacuate the village, taking up a position astride the Villeselve Road at its western outskirts.

When night fell the line ran east of Beaulieu, to the western edge of Cugny, to the railway south-east of Ollézy, and along it to the Ollézy-Eaucourt Road, thence along the road, including the village of Eaucourt, a thousand yards south of Brouchy, to north of Golancourt.

Behind it was a line of French infantry, pushed up hurriedly, without artillery or more ammunition than was carried on the men, roughly from Esmery - Hallon, through Flavy-le-Meldeux and Villeselve, to Beaumont-en-Beine. The Headquarters of the 36th Division were withdrawn from Fréniches to Beaulieu-les-Fontaines, north of the Roye - Noyon Road, at six in the evening.

In the course of the day all arms of the Division had been constantly in action. The 16th Rifles, which had been put at the disposal of the officer commanding the 9th Irish Fusiliers, 'had been fighting all day upon the Somme, and had fallen back in the general withdrawal on the left flank. Details of the Machine-Gun Battalion, under the second-in-command, Major Low, had, as has previously been recorded, also been in action on the left, All details, men returning from courses and leave, had been pushed into the battle. The clerks and runners of the 109th Brigade Headquarters had fought at Brouchy.

Great steadiness and devotion to duty had been shown by the Artillery. Two batteries of the 91st Brigade (from the 20th Divisional Artillery), A/91st and C/91st, are specially mentioned in the report of the C.R.A. When infantry, in the first case that of the 109th Brigade, in the second that of the 61st Brigade, fell back upon their positions, the battery officers rallied the men, and the gunners aided them to dig in in front of the guns.

Amid all the confusion food supplies had not failed, though no rations could be distributed, to the troops in line till the small hours of the morning of March the 24th. The 107th Brigade was able, besides keeping its own troops supplied with tools for entrenching, to send a number of picks and shovels to Rifle Brigade battalions of the 14th Division in the neighbourhood of Cugny. On this day and throughout the retreat the work of the Train and Supply Column was most praiseworthy, while the Staff Captains of Brigades showed forethought in their arrangements. The medical services, under great difficulties, had done all that was possible in the evacuation of wounded.

The night passed fairly quietly. It was doubtless employed by the Germans to bring up fresh guns, for upon the morrow the volume of artillery fire was noticeably greater. There was no German infantry attack with the light, as might have been expected, on the morning of March the 24th. It did not come on either flank in any strength till about ten o'clock. Very probably the enemy had been relieving his front-line battalions, and their successors were not ready to renew the struggle till some hours after dawn.

It was, however, discovered at dawn that parties of Germans had entered Golancourt in the darkness, and that our men had evacuated the village. This was a very serious blow, as it threw into confusion schemes formulated overnight between General Hessey, commanding the 109th Brigade, and General Cochrane, commanding the 61st.

These two commanders had planned a counter-offensive to ease the pressure on the left flank, and blunt the pronounced salient into which the line was being forced. General Nugent had put at General Hessey's disposal a composite battalion under Major Knox, and had later strengthened his line by sending up three hundred details from Beaulieu, servants, orderlies, grooms from Headquarters, and the personnel of the Signal School. These were formed into two companies, under the command of Captain W. Smyth, R.E., attached to the General Staff, and Captain C. Drummond, A.D.C. to General Nugent. Major Knox's detachment was to move via Golancourt, approach Aubigny as closely as might be in the mist, and attack the village at eight o'clock. Meanwhile the 9th Inniskillings, with a company of details, was to reoccupy Brouchy.

General Cochrane arranged to retake Eaucourt with a hundred men of the 284th Army Troops Company, R.E., who had come under his orders, commanded by two of his own infantry officers. This he had succeeded in doing before midnight on the 23rd. Touch was obtained by the attacking force with the 7th D.C.L.I., on the railway where crossed by the Ollézy-Eaucourt Road.

But Major Knox came under heavy machine-gun fire from Golancourt on his march, and was unable to make headway. The attacks upon Aubigny and Brouchy were therefore cancelled, and the companies of details thrown in on the left of the 9th Inniskillings. The position of the 7th D.C.L.I. on the railway was now impossible. The battalion was being pressed on either flank, and its right was in air. At eleven o'clock General Cochrane ordered it to fall back from the railway, and to take up a line in touch with the fragments of the 12th King's, a thousand yards west of Cugny, roughly parallel with the Cugny-Eaucourt Road. The right company of the D.C.L.I. had to fight a rearguard action to cover the withdrawal, and suffered considerable loss from machine-gun fire. Upon its heels the Germans pushed forward their machine-guns and a number of single field guns which had been brought across the Canal.

At this time the 2nd Rifles was still maintaining its position, three hundred yards west of Cugny. Behind it, between Cugny and Montalimont Farm, the 1st Battalion had dug itself in. It will thus be seen that there were two thin lines of men, literally back to back, with about a mile between them, one facing east toward Cugny, the other west toward Golancourt. Such a situation could not possibly persist. On the right there was intense confusion.

Here the French had been relieving what was left of the troops of the 14th Division, between Cugny and Ugny-le-Gay, when the Germans attacked, and the two lines, relievers and relieved, had been rolled back before noon. La Neuville-en-Beine had been lost. The difficulties were not lessened by the fact that small parties of troops of the 14th Division, which had become intermixed with those of the 36th, received the order that they were relieved by the French, and were to fall back upon Guiscard. Their withdrawal left new gaps, of which the enemy, whose light machine-gun groups were handled throughout the day with consummate skill, was not slow to avail himself.

The salient held by the 36th Division suddenly caved. From all sides the semicircle fell back upon Villeselve which was heavily bombarded by the enemy from noon onward. Desperate efforts were made by Brigade Staffs to rally the men in front of Villeselve, and get them into trenches with the French infantry. To a great extent they were successful, but the impossibility of co-ordination between troops which always fought in method so different was plainly apparent. When the trenches were shelled the French troops walked out of them.

When the shelling ceased they walked back. Such procedure was all very well for formed units under their own leaders; it was impossible to make it understood by scattered details of men of a dozen units, harassed and strained by four days' fighting. Eventually, at about three o'clock, the French received orders to retire. Our men likewise fell back from the village.

Meanwhile upon the right had been enacted a drama truly heroic which has never been recorded, because, in the days when reports and despatches were written, there was no survivor to tell its story.

On the morning of the 24th, the 2nd Rifles consisted of the following officers: Captain T. Y. Thompson, D.S.O., commanding since the officer commanding at the outset of the attack, Major Rose, had been wounded; Captain J. C. Bryans, Lieutenant M. E. Y. Moore, M.C.; Lieutenant R. B. Marriott Watson, M.C.; Lieutenant J. K. Boyle, M.C.; Lieutenant E. C. Strohm; and perhaps two hundred other ranks. Of these, Lieutenants Moore and Marriott Watson were old companions-in-arms. They had served together in the 13th Rifles; had together taken part in that battalion's great raid on June the 26th, 1916, and had both been wounded on July the 1st. Having withdrawn from the eastern to the western skirts of Cugny overnight, the battalion had steadfastly maintained its position, almost entirely unsupported. After beating off an enemy attack at ten in the morning, it was discovered that ammunition was woefully short, and orders were issued to fire at especially good targets only. Captain Thompson, deliberately exposing himself to encourage the men on the menaced right flank, which was being again attacked, was killed, as also was Lieutenant Marriott Watson.

Captain Bryans now assumed command. Messages sent up from the 1st Rifles in rear, ordering the battalion to withdraw, did not reach it. The men who bore them were killed or wounded. In any case, it was the opinion of Captain Bryans that a retirement across the bare, open country between Cugny and the village of Villeselve, with the Germans on three sides of him, was impossible.From noon onwards was a lull, which was occupied in reorganization of the line.

Then, about 2 p.m., preceded by a violent barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire, supported by an attack from low-flying aeroplanes, an assault was launched, the Germans sweeping in from the left in overwhelming numbers, despite the gaps cut in their ranks by fire.

By the time the enemy was upon them there was scarce a round left to fire. "Many," writes Captain Bryans, "had only their bayonets left. Rather than wait for the end, they jumped from the entrenchments and met it gallantly. It was an unforgettable sight. We were overwhelmed, but not disgraced."

After a desperate hand-to-hand fight, the little band was simply engulfed. Lieutenants Moore and Boyle were killed. Of about a hundred and fifty men on their feet when the attack began, it is estimated that over a hundred were killed or wounded.

With the enemy pressing south-eastward from the direction of Golancourt, and westward from Beaumont-en-Beine, the situation was as acute as it had been at the worst moment of the morning. It was relieved by a great charge carried out at 3 p.m. by troops of General Harman's 3rd Cavalry Division, which had been assisting to maintain the line of the 14th Division during the morning. The 7th and Canadian Brigades had been moved in the direction of Beaulieu, to check the German pressure on the salient.

A detachment of the 6th Brigade, about a hundred and fifty men, under Major Watkins Williams, 10th Hussars, charged from the neighbourhood of Collézy the enemy advancing through the two copses north-west of Villeselve. The detachment came under heavy machine-gun fire, and many saddles were emptied. But it achieved its object. The Germans were caught in the open, a considerable number cut down or shot, and over a hundred prisoners taken. Infantry of the 36th Division, weary as they were, followed up the charge cheering. It was a most brilliant little action.

But it was, and could be, no more than a delaying action. There was no question of reoccupying Villeselve. The 9th and 62nd French Divisions had orders to withdraw before heavy attacks, holding the enemy where possible, but never risking a break in their line. Toward evening Berlancourt and Guiscard were heavily shelled. The enemy had now some 150-mm. batteries in action, and employed instantaneous fuse against Guiscard. Here Captain Rabone, Brigade-Major of the 108th Brigade was wounded. The Headquarters of the 9th French Division moved out of Quesmy, south of Guiscard, only just in time to avoid being surrounded. Patrols of the enemy, using white flares after dark as a guide to their artillery, were in Guiscard before 11 p.m.

At 11 p.m. the 36th Division was put at the disposal of the 62nd French Division, and ordered to withdraw its troops through its line. The 108th Brigade, leaving the remnant of the 9th Irish Fusiliers to fight a rearguard action on the ridge between Guiscard and Berlancourt, withdrew to Crisolles, and later to Sermaize, where the men had some rest. The 107th and 109th Brigades withdrew to Sermaize and Frétoy-le-Château, arriving about 2 a.m, in the morning of the 25th.

During the day the artillery attached to the 36th Division, to which the Potter Group, after having been in action under the 20th Division, had been returned, had actively barraged the roads leading south from the Canal de la Somme upon which the enemy was advancing. The Potter Group had bombarded the enemy massing for attack in the neighbourhood of the Esmery-Hallon -- Golancourt Road, causing considerable casualties to parties in the open. The Erskine Group continued in action near Beines till French and British infantry had withdrawn through its guns.

Battery remained covering the retirement till after dark, and was fortunate to be able to extricate its guns after the Germans were in Berlancourt. The Eley Group had to make three withdrawals, first, before noon, to Berlancourt; then, at 2-30 p.m., to Buchoire, where it covered the French infantry; and at 6 p.m. to the neighbourhood or Frétoy-le-Château. In every case the retirement was delayed till the last possible minute. The men of "C" and "D" Batteries, 153rd Brigade R.F.A., displayed the highest courage and most dogged perseverance throughout this day.

At night the Erskine Group was put at the disposal of the 9th French Division, the Eley and Potter Groups at that of the 62nd French Division, under the control of the 36th Divisional Artillery Headquarters. General Brock, on return from leave, assumed command of the two latter Groups. Colonel H. C. Simpson, who had hitherto acted as C.R.A., became Liaison Officer with the 62nd French Division.

An order of the 62nd French Division, issued at 2-15 a.m. on March the 25th, contained the following information and instructions for the 36th Division. The general line held ran west of Quesmy, Bethancourt, Fréniches, to the Canal de Robécourt at Rouy, east of Nesle. The role of the 62nd Division was to check the enemy's advance, and prevent his crossing the Canal de Robécourt before, at earliest, the evening of the 25th. The British batteries were to remain in action under the orders of the 62nd French Division.

The remaining troops of the 36th Division were to be withdrawn for reorganization, in readiness to assist the 62nd Division in case of emergency. The reorganization, such as it was, was carried out in the course of a fifteen-mile march. The 21st Brigade, now reduced to less than five hundred of all ranks, was ordered to rejoin its own Division north of Roye. It was detached from the line of retreat at Avricourt, where it was met by a column of 'buses. Officers and men saw it go, to the further desperate fighting which awaited its survivors, with sentiments of the warmest admiration.

During the whole period of their attachment to the 36th Division, General Cochrane's men had displayed wonderful endurance and devotion. In the centre of a line which was turned upon both flanks, they had held each one of their successive positions till the last possible moment.

The troops of the 36th Division halted at mid-day in the neighbourhood of Avricourt, where they had a few hours' rest. They then received orders to resume their march. The 107th Brigade moved back to Guerbigny, on the banks of the Avre; the 108th Brigade to Erches, a mile north of that village; the 109th Brigade to Guerbigny and Warsy. Troops arrived between midnight and two o'clock, and, for the first time since the beginning of the attack, had a continuous sleep of at least six hours in comfortable billets. The 9th Irish Fusiliers, however, coming straight through from the neighbourhood of Guiscard, a distance of upwards of thirty miles, did not arrive till 8 a.m. General Nugent established his headquarters in Warsy.

The spectacle of the infantry upon that march was one that would have aroused compassion in the most war-hardened breast. Men's faces were deeply marked by overwhelming fatigue and lack of sleep. Some moved in a sort of trance, stumbling forward oblivious to their surroundings. In some cases their boots had given out. Many company officers, in the course of the last few miles, dispensed with the regulation halts, because they found it almost impossible to get their men on their feet again after them.

They lay like logs, and had to be violently shaken before they could be recalled to consciousness. Fortunately more 'buses had been sent for the 61st Brigade than that scanty remnant required, and a few were able to assist in moving back the men absolutely unable to walk.

There were other sights upon that line of march perhaps even more moving. The men in this evil case were, after all, soldiers, undergoing such experiences as many soldiers have undergone in many great retreats. The spectacle of the civilians, turning out in haste from their homes, was often heartrending. Their big wains would be piled high with their household possessions, with perhaps the old grandmother of the family holding its youngest baby, perched perilously on top. Mile after mile, at the cart-tail, or driving cattle that became mixed up with the British transport, the children trudged in the rain. It was only the rich and comparatively fortunate that had horsed transport. The poorer struggled along with the most valuable of their things upon handcarts.

The present writer remembers seeing a woman carried out on a bed and put on to a farm-cart. He was told she had given birth to a child two hours earlier. A little later he came upon an old woman pushing her paralyzed husband in a wheelbarrow. Let those who desire to realize what effort this requires for a woman of sixty, try wheeling a heavy man in a wheelbarrow even a hundred yards. For these room was found in a British lorry at the next village, but there were many cases where such relief was impossible.

The mien of these unfortunates was wonderful. Here and there a woman sobbed as she walked, a man cursed his chance. For the most part, about the most incongruous of these little cavalcades there was the high dignity of sorrow and suffering stoically and nobly borne.

In the course of the mid-day halt, details were as far as possible sent to their own units. In the 107th Brigade the 2nd Rifles, which had disappeared at Cugny, was reformed at about the strength of a large platoon. A company of the 15th Rifles, under Captain Miller, which had been a part of the first-formed battalion of details, was attached to the Brigade. The 109th Brigade formed small companies from the remnants of the 1st and 2nd Inniskillings.

The fighting of March the 25th exhibited in lamentable fashion the difficulties that occur in a retreat when two armies, using different methods, speaking different languages, based upon different lines of communication, with different apprehensions preoccupying the minds of their commanders, are being forced back before a victorious and more powerful enemy.

The French were retiring south-west; the British west. Sooner or later a gap was inevitable. It occurred on this evening, at Roye. The 62nd French Division, covered by the Potter and Eley Groups under General Brock, fought an admirable delaying action. The Germans did not reach Libermont till 4 p.m., nor was the Canal crossed by them till about 6 p.m. Thereafter the 62nd Division, its left flank turned by the German advance at Nesle, withdrew to the line of the Roye-Noyon Road. During the remainder of the retreat the 36th Division saw no more of the artillery which had been attached to it, nor of its own C.R.A. and staff. An account of their action with the French must be left till a little later in this narrative.

The gap had formed, and in the early hours of the morning the enemy poured through Roye from the north-east, scarcely checked by the efforts of a French Cavalry Division, flung out upon a front of six miles. New French Divisions were about to detrain upon the Amiens - Montdidier Railway. If the Germans should strike home at that, a disaster far greater than any which the Allies had yet suffered would ensue. To close the gap there remained nothing but the remnants of the two original southern Divisions of the XVIII. Corps, the 36th and the 30th.

At 8 am. on the morning of March the 26th, the 36th Division received orders to take up a line from the neighbourhood of l'Echelle St. Aurin, on the Avre, where it was to obtain touch with the French, to the main Amiens-Roye Road, north of Andechy, linking up with the 30th Division. The 109th Brigade was ordered to take up a position from the river to Andechy, with the 108th Brigade on the left; the 107th Brigade remaining in reserve at Guerbigny. North and south of the western outskirts of Andechy ran a good trench, covered by a certain amount of wire, the second French line of 1916.

Some three hundred yards north of the village, however, this line bent north-eastward, and could not be occupied. The advanced troops of the enemy were already at hand, and it was a matter of minutes whether the troops would be able to take up the position. The suddenness of the advance may be gathered from the fact that farmers from Guerbigny were yoking their horses to ploughs on the ridge north of the village when they were informed of the situation by troops moving forward.

The present writer well remembers the gallant and dignified, "Eh bien, monsieur, ii faut partir alors," of one old man about to hitch in his team, when informed that the Germans were about a mile away.#By the time the troops of the 109th Brigade were in position the enemy was in Andechy. Those of the 108th were actually prevented from reaching their station on the Roye Road by machine-gun fire on their left flank. Touch with the 30th Division was never obtained here, but later on it was discovered that its right was at Bouchoir, a mile further back on the main road.

All through the morning small parties of the enemy attempted to work their way forward, but were held up by the fire of Lewis guns. The 122nd Field Company, under the orders of General Griffith, had been posted in echelon to protect the left flank. At 1 p.m., as the enemy appeared to be progressing slightly on the left, General Nugent ordered the 107th Brigade to hold the old French line following the road from Erches to Bouchoir. The 107th Brigade, to which was attached the 121st Field Company, the 16th Rifles, and the 21st Entrenching Battalion, as well as the personnel of its own Trench Mortar Battery, contained now the remnants of seven units. It was accordingly formed into three groups, the largest, under the command of Colonel McCarthy-O'Leary, 1st Rifles, consisting of its own three battalions, It was in position by 4 p.m., later pushing forward a line to gain touch with the left of the 108th Brigade.

The troops had now been in position for six hours; six hours of time the value of which no standard can measure. When their physical state is considered, the steadiness they showed on this occasion is equal to any of their achievements through the week that had passed. Every German attempt to advance was frustrated by their fire. No artillery was supporting them. Even a single battery of 18-pounders would have been of great service, and would have had many splendid targets round Andechy. The Germans, for their part, were now heavily bombarding the village of Erches, which the 108th Brigade Headquarters were obliged to quit, moving into the open fields behind it.

At dusk the enemy launched an attack in strength upon Erches, preceded by a bombardment. By eight o'clock he was in the village. The 108th Brigade Headquarters was attacked at close quarters, and General Griffith slightly wounded in the hand fighting his way clear of the German patrols. Colonel Place, the G.S.O.I of the Division, going up from Guerbigny in a car, with Colonel Furnell of the Ist Irish Fusiliers, and Major Brew of the 9th, to ascertain the position, ran into a party of the enemy.

A bullet stopped the engine of the car. Colonel Place jumped out, but before he could draw his pistol from under his coat was hit in the leg, and fell in the roadway. Instantly a German sprang upon him and stabbed at him with his bayonet. Fortunately for Colonel Place, the thickness of his "British Warm" saved him. The little party had no alternative to surrender. The car was subsequently recovered, towed back, and served the Division well in after days.

Colonel Place had been G.S.O.I of the 36th Division for more than two years. As a staff officer he was far more than merely able and efficient. His sympathy and imagination enabled him to grasp all points of view, and to understand those which were different to his own. He never seemed to require, as do so many men engaged on difficult tasks, an hour free from interruption, but could switch his mind on to each new problem presented to him, and return to his own where he had left it. His loss in this unlucky fashion was much regretted.

Lieutenant Cumming, whose reconnaissance on the 21st has been mentioned, led a patrol of six men into Guerbigny, to see if the enemy had yet entered it. They had not, but on his way the patrol was attacked by a German patrol of five. As a result of the fight every single German was. killed.

The remnants of the 108th Brigade had taken up a line west of Erches, putting themselves under the orders of General Hessey, as their own Brigade Staff had been cut off from them by the German patrols which had burst through. There was now heavy shelling and trench-mortaring of the British positions, the enemy having moved up guns and mortars into Andechy. A patrol sent out at 1-45 a.m. on the morning of the 27th by the 121st Field Company, saw Long columns of the enemy; infantry, transport, a troop of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, moving into Erches. Captain Miller's company of 15th Rifles, west of the village, was pounded with artillery and mortar fire, the trenches being obliterated and heavy casualties suffered. He had with him one machine-gun, and, as light appeared, this gun began to obtain many targets in Erches, inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy. At 8 a.m. the enemy entered a sap in front of his trench and began to bomb his way up. Lieutenant Young, with a handful of riflemen, promptly drove him out.

Meanwhile, clinging to a trench on the Erches-Guerbigny Road, was Captain Densmore Walker of the Machine-Gun Battalion, whose diary has previously been drawn upon in the course of this narrative, with a handful of men of his company, armed with rifles.

Behind him was a party of the 107th Brigade with one machine-gun. Captain Walker had with him a rifleman of the old 14th Rifles, now in one of the Entrenching Battalions, named Gilmour, one of those curious individuals who, when all seems to be melting about them in moments of great emergency, suddenly display resource and coolness which amaze all who have known them.

Together they had already carried out a patrol into Guerbigny, into which some of the enemy had been seen to move, in the course of which, Captain Walker cheerfully confesses, Rifleman Gilmour, rather than he, had been the leader..

The counter-attack which followed may be described in Captain Walker's own words, because it succeeds, as no official account ever can, in picturing the exact details for the minds eye.

"Things were looking as black as conceivable. I suppose it would be about 7-30 a.m. when the attack came. We heard shouting straight behind us and saw about a dozen men a mile away, coming towards us in a line. * One waved a white flag and they all shouted. Some said they were English, and we were relieved; some said they looked like French; and I said that any way we would fire on them - which we did. They were perfectly good Huns! They took cover when we opened, and then, when we were really interested in them, the real attack came from Erches. He swarmed on to the road and came down the trench. This looked like the finish of it. There was a general movement backwards, but Evans prevented the machine-gunners from dismounting the one machine-gun with the 107th Brigade, and got it into action on the top of the trench. This changed the aspect of things, as the Huns checked. We all got out of our trench (most people with the idea of clearing over the open, I fancy), and there we stood for quite a while, our people firing towards Erches, and the Huns hesitating. Seeing this latter tendency, Gilmour and I moved slowly towards Erches, trying to urge the troops to attack, but they were too undecided. . . . Then we saw a Hun in the trench just below us. I fired my revolver at him and he ran back. So we chased him. This settled matters! The Huns turned tail and our men followed. As my particular Hun turned round traverses I got in another couple of shots, but didn't bring him down. When we reached the road - which was sunken - . . . the bank came up to his waist, and he looked scared-horribly-but I fired again. . . . I distinctly saw what I thought was a puff of smoke go out from his pack. Any way he at once went down behind the bank, and Gilmour rushed up with his bayonet. I said 'Leave him,' but I don't know whether he did or not. And now I didn't know what to do. Fritz was legging it for Erches hard enough, and by this time indeed they had all reached it. I don't know how big the village was, but we might have rushed it. On the other hand, I didn't know what had happened on the left, or in what strength the enemy was. . . . At this stage I was delighted to see an infantry officer with an M.C. come up. I asked him if he thought it was any use trying to go on, and he said it would be better to make a line there."

Eventually Captain Walker, surrounded, except on the north-west, withdrew.

He adds:"I think on the whole the Erches scrap went in our favour. We were few in numbers compared with the Huns. They were backed up by victory, while our men were terribly tired, hungry, and dispirited. . . Our ammunition was about gone. For our M.G. we had three belts left when we retired. We were entirely surrounded, if only by Hun patrols, and we only knew hazily what direction to make for. In the circumstances, to delay a force superior in numbers and moral for half a day after it attacked our position, was as much as could be expected. I reckon the Boche should have wiped out our party at Erches, but we turned on him severely enough to persuade him to let us go quietly." It was, then, at Erches that the enemy first broke the line on a serious scale. On the right, south of the Avre, the French posts were withdrawing.

The 109th Brigade had no alternative but to cross. It was impossible to retire along the right bank, The crossing was superintended by the Brigade Major, Captain G. J. Bruce, and carried out in orderly fashion, with covering fire from successive sections. The line then fell back with the French outposts through the wood north of Ligniéres, which was heavily shelled by the enemy.

North of Erches, Captain Miller held his ground till noon, when his trenches were being blown in. On his left what remained of the 1st and 2nd Rifles had fallen back a little after Colonel McCarthy-O'Leary had been wounded. Returned prisoners of war informed Captain Miller, whose diary has been drawn upon in this chapter, that the streets of Erches, through which they were marched, were littered with German dead. So, as he remarks in a letter to the writer, the affair "was not so one-sided as it looked."

For the second time. Captain Miller therefore withdrew upon Arvillers, when he gained touch with Captain Patton, who had about sixty officers and men of the two other battalions. Finally, on the order of General Withycombe, the whole line withdrew upon Hangest-en-Santerre, since large columns of the enemy could be seen advancing towards Davenescourt, and disappearing in the wooded country in its rear. This withdrawal was complete at 5 p.m. By evening a French Division had moved up, and the remnant of the 107th Brigade was ordered to march back on relief, and rejoin the rest of the Division at Sourdon. One party of three officers and sixty-eight other ranks, however, out of touch with the Brigade, remained in action north-west of Arvillers till the morning of the 28th. Constantly pressed by the enemy, they kept him stationary by their rifle fire. Not till 11 a,m. were they relieved by the French.

The achievement of the troops of the 36th Division, a mere handful at this time, almost broken by fatigue, in many cases without food, must take a high place, not alone in the annals of the March retreat, but in that of the war. That men here and there, bowed beneath the weight of a burden almost unbearable, showed weakness, is not controverted. The account of Captain Walker has been purposely inserted - as an instance, to which many might be added - to show in what fashion weakness was overcome by leadership and example. It is the finest type of courage that, in the slang phrase, "comes up to scratch" again and again, beating down in the breast the inevitable weakness as it arises. The individual Briton is at least as brave as the individual of any other race; but men in the mass are not naturally heroic.

It is discipline, training, pride in a unit or a formation, and, above all, in such crises as these, leadership alone which can instil into men who have undergone the strain these men had undergone, the courage to stand firm in the plight wherein they found themselves. These men had stood. Not only to the officers and picked men among them, who made the stand possible, but to the whole group spirit which they created for their weaker brethren in adversity, the adjective "heroic" may fairly be applied.

Best of all, their object had been achieved. There can be no suggestion of hyperbole if that object be described in a phrase from Lord Haig's Despatch. The resistance, he said, of the 36th Division near Andechy played "no small part in preventing the enemy from breaking through between the Allied Armies." If we ponder that phrase and its inferences we shall have small need of further testimony.

After their long and trying march to Sourdon the troops had one more call to answer. An enemy column had found a gap at Montdidier and taken advantage of it. By 8 a.m. on the morning of the 28th it was over two miles west of the town. At 12-30 p.m. General Nugent received an order signed by General Débeney, commanding the First French Army, to the effect that he was massing artillery at Coullemelle, and that he required all infantry at his disposal to cover it. All troops of the 107th and 109th Brigades that could be collected were moved down to Coullemelle, and took up a position covering the French batteries. They were in position at about five in the evening. Subsequently came a message from the French requesting that they should be moved to Villers-Tournelle, two miles south-east of Coullemelle. But the French troops on the spot informed our men that the situation had improved, the enemy having been counter-attacked and driven back. Patrols sent out to Cantigny, another mile and a half east of Villers-Tournelle, found the French infantry solidly placed and unattacked. The night being very wet and cold, the majority of the force was therefore withdrawn into the houses of Coullemelle, piquets being posted south-east of the village, and patrols keeping touch through the night with the French in front.

The following day the march was continued. And now the weary troops saw heartening sights upon the route. Column after column of lorries, little Annamite drivers at the wheel, packed with the dark blue uniforms of the Chasseurs Alpins, roared by them. At some points there were serious blocks in the traffic.

 At Essertaux, where General Nugent had his headquarters for a few hours, he was succeeded by General Mangin, commanding the IX. French Corps. The French were really now in strength. Attack and counter-attack were to rage here a few days longer. Up north, upon the Scarpe, Below's great final thrust had been heavily defeated. The German advance was stayed at last.

On the morning of the 30th, after a night spent in the open in cold and wet, the troops of the 36th Division were entrained at Saleux, south of Amiens, now half-deserted and racked by bomb and shell, and moved north to the area of Gamaches, on the Norman coast, for reorganization.

Remains only to be related the last actions of the Artillery. On the evening of the 25th it had withdrawn with the 62nd French Division through the forest south of the Roye-Noyon Road, coming under the orders of a new French Division, the 77th. on the morrow. On that day, when the infantry was beginning its grapple at Andechy, an important battle opened against the Germans debouching from Noyon, upon the line Cannectancourt - Canny-sur-Matz. Here the Germans made little progress. Attack after attack on the afternoon of the 27th was beaten off, the barrage fire being very effective and earning high praise from the French commanders.

On the 28th the Germans succeeded in entering Canny, but made no progress elsewhere. On the morning of the 30th desperate German attacks penetrated some distance into the French positions, taking the vital height of Plémont Hill. In the afternoon, however, a brilliant counter-attack was carried out, splendidly supported by our artillery. The whole line was restored, and over seven hundred prisoners taken.

The French now had their own batteries in action. On March the 31st the Artillery began its march back to Poix, the concentration area for refitment. It had carried out a great task in a manner worthy of the highest traditions of the Royal Regiment.

If this narrative has been faithful, and if - a task far harder to accomplish - it has appealed to the imagination, there remains little need to discuss the causes of the greatest defeat suffered by British arms since York Town. The German victory was a victory of superior numbers, but it was more than that. It was a victory of training. While our thin-strung battalions were digging, Ludendorff trained his great host, collected astride the Oise. He taught it what armies were forgetting, how to advance without barrage or tanks. He instilled into it the offensive spirit, and saw that it reached the very corporals commanding light machine-gun groups. They it was who won him his battle.

But, if the defence was overwhelmed by superior numbers, it seems clear that it broke down earlier than it need have done, and that the fault lay in its organization. The Forward Zone was little more than a screen, and was so regarded. Yet it was held by three whole battalions on the front of each Division. The orders were that the enclosed keeps, even in the front system, were to resist to the last. The whole position in front of the Battle Zone may be regarded as the outpost line.

This outpost line, manned by a third of the infantry force of each Division, was not to retire and was not to be reinforced. The first shock of the attack swept this third away. It was defence in detail, not defence in depth, and in detail it was defeated. Defence in depth may be defined as successive lines of organized defence, upon which the defenders can fall back in succession, always finding some fresh troops on the new position, so that the line becomes gradually stronger as it falls back, until at last is reached the line upon which the real defence is to be made.

Gallantly as they strove, much as they accomplished, the three battalions in the Forward Zone of the 36th Division were wasted under the Fifth Army scheme.

As for the lines of the St. Quentin and Somme Canals, which might have been very formidable, there had been no preliminary organization of their defence, nor even reconnaissance with that end in view. When the moment came the defence had to be improvised.

This does not detract from, but rather increases, the magnificence of the defence of the 36th Division, and indeed of the whole of the XVIII. Corps, which had sixteen German Divisions, in front and second line, against its four. There is at least every reason to suppose that, had all gone elsewhere as on the front of the XVIII. Corps, the full weight of reinforcements would have arrived before the enemy had forced the lines of the St. Quentin and Somme Canals. In that case the war would undoubtedly have had a speedier ending

FLANDERS: THE 108TH BRIGADE IN THE MESSINES-KEMMEL BATTLE

APRIL TO JUNE 1918

THE 36th Division had a glance only, infinitely tantalising at the beautiful valley of the Bresle, with its pastures woodlands, and snug villages in which the troops were billeted, from Gamaches, several miles inland, to the little pleasure-resort of Ault on the coast. A short rest in these surroundings would have been delightful But there was no rest for anyone for a long time to come, nor could be. The last trains did not arrive in the area till the morning of April the 1st; the last trains left it, bearing the remnants of the Division towards Ypres, on the 4th For the battlefield, still known as the Salient, was its new destination.

The interval had been spent in reorganisation and the absorption of the Entrenching Battalions, originally formed in February from the surplus personnel of the infant which had accompanied the Division north. They did go very far to fill the gaps caused by the prodigious casualties. The word gaps, in fact, is inapplicable. The infantry of the Division had disappeared .

The 108th Brigade had been reduced to a little over three hundred, mostly transport and employed men. The total casualties in the Division in the ten days from March 21st were 7,252 Of these, 185 officers and 5,659 other ranks were reported missing. Perhaps four-fifths of these were prisoners of war, wounded or unwounded It was a very weak Division which detrained at Proven and other stations further west.

From the day of its arrival, however, it began to receive very large drafts from the flood of recruits that now poured across the Channel.

Bitter criticisms have been heard of the policy which had kept so many troops in England till then. Whatever their justice in some cases, they have none where the drafts now received by the 36th Division are concerned; for of these eighty or ninety per cent consisted of boys of nineteen, with far from adequate training In some cases these youths, almost before they knew their officers by sight, were to be put to the severest test, and were to emerge from it with quite astonishing credit.

Divisional Headquarters, in which Lieutenant-Colonel A G Thompson, D.S.O., Indian Army, had succeeded Colonel Place as G.S.O.I, were established at Ten Elms Camp, near Poperinghe, on April the 3rd. On the night of the 6th the Division began relieving the southern part of the front held by the 1st Division By the morning of the 8th the relief was complete, the 107th Brigade being in front line, the 109th in support, and Divisional Headquarters on the Canal Bank a mile north of Ypres.

On this date there died, at Rouen, of wounds received in March, one of the most gallant and popular C.O.'s the Division ever had, Lieutenant-Colonel P E K Blair Oliphant, C.M.G., D.S.O., who had served with it from earliest days, first with the 11th Rifles, and later in command of the 11th/13th Battalion of that Regiment.

There was a railway station at St. Jean, which those who had seen the campaign of 1917 remembered as one of the most unpleasant spots upon the front, and a mass of sidings at Wieltje, which had been infinitely worse Not for long was the area to enjoy these amenities, nor Ypres its unwonted isolation from the enemy. On the 9th the troops heard a tremendous bombardment to the south. The enemy's offensive on the Lys had opened.

From Givenchy, where they were magnificently held, to the neighbourhood of Gapaard, on a front of some twenty miles, the Germans had broken through. On the front of the Portuguese Corps the line was shattered, and the German wave flowed up the low valley of the Lys. The battered city of Armentières fell. For two or three days no real resistance could be organised across the gap, and the Germans pushed west upon Hazebrouck, a most important railway junction. Estaires, ten miles west of Armentières, was occupied by the evening of the 10th By that time troops of the 36th Division were upon the scene of action.

The 108th Brigade was in II Corps reserve. At noon on the 10th it received orders to move at once to Kemmel, with "C" Company of the Machine-Gun Battalion. 'Buses were provided for dismounted personnel. The 'bus column, moving via La Clytte, reached Kemmel village at 4-15 p.m., the Brigade coming under the orders of the G.O.C 19th Division That Division, with the 9th, had been fighting hotly for the defence of the Messines Ridge.

The admirable steadiness of their young recruits and the gallant fashion in which their counter-attacks had been launched form a brilliant page in the history of the war, and helped to turn the Lys offensive, huge as were its gains, into one of the most expensive and fruitless of the great series of German assaults General Griffith was ordered to put his Brigade into the Kemmel defences His headquarters were established in Kemmel Château.

Shortly after midnight General Griffith received orders to move up to the Messines Ridge, in support of the weak South African Brigade of the 9th Division, which had been thrown into the battle under the orders of the 19th. The 1st Irish Fusiliers took up a line on the Messines - Wytschaete Road, from five hundred yards north of the former village to the neighbourhood of the 36th Division's old acquaintance, Pick House.

The 12th Rifles was on the Spanbroek Ridge in support; the 9th Fusiliers about the old British front line on the Wulverghem-Messines Road. The morning passed fairly quietly, but there was ominous news as to the German advance north of Ploegsteert. General Griffith received a secret warning order that, in the event of the enemy capturing Hill 63, the whole line would have to pivot back across the Spanbroek Ridge and its prolongation east of Wulverghem, south of which village touch would be obtained with the 25th Division.

At half-past three, after heavy bombardment, the enemy launched an attack upon the crest-road. The South Africans on the left were pushed off it, and the line of the 1st Irish Fusiliers broken. A very gallant counter-attack by Fusiliers and South Africans, side by side, restored the position, though subsequent pressure on the left of the latter forced them to bend back somewhat from the road toward Hell Farm.

At 7 p.m. came another assault, in face of which the Fusiliers lost not a yard of ground. None of the officers who took those raw boys into action can have dared to expect of them such steadiness and resolution as they now displayed. At night, however, came orders to carry into effect the movement anticipated in the warning order. The advance of the enemy to the south had made it only too necessary. The ridge must go, though the 9th Division was still to cling to its northern crown, the village of Wytschaete.

The retirement was carried out before dawn, but it was discovered on its completion that there was no touch with the left flank of the 25th Division.

After a great deal of trouble, this was attained by withdrawing the right of the 108th Brigade some hundred yards. All day was heavy shelling, but no infantry attack developed till after six o'clock On this occasion, as always, the Germans placed great reliance upon a local assault delivered as dusk was falling, which just permitted attacked to consolidate a position won, and gave no time for a counter attack before the pall of darkness descended. Such a night as this, which would be lit scarce at all by the thin sickle of a new moon, was peculiarly favourable to these tactic.

They were, however, unsuccessful Once again the defence of the 108th Brigade prevailed. The left of the 9th Fusiliers was driven back. Quickly a counter-attack was launched. The reserve company of the 9th, led by the commanding officer of the battalion, Lieut.-Colonel P E Kelly and a company of the 12th Rifles, led by Major Holt Waring most gallantly restored the position By eight o'clock a was quiet But casualties had been heavy.

The 1st Fusiliers in particular had had very serious losses the previous day on the Messines Ridge. This battalion was reorganise as a company, and attached to the 9th. During the night there was no touch with troops of the 25th Division, the gap having formed owing to the advance of the enemy on Neuve Eglise and the consequent lengthening of the line. In the early hours of April the 13th a battalion of the 178th Brigade, now attached to the 19th Division, was moved up to fill it.

The 13th was a day of continuous alarms. Parties the enemy made attempts at dawn to advance by short rushes on the front of the 12th Rifles, east of Wulverghem but were beaten off with loss by Lewis-gun and rifle fire. A couple of hours later fresh attacks appeared to be brewing. Parties of Germans were dispersed by the fire of machine and Lewis guns. The former were excellently placed by an officer who knew every foot of the ground, Captain Walker, in old positions which he had often held before the Battle of Messines in 1917.

Then, all through the afternoon, small parties of the enemy strove to make ground under cover the old camouflage screens upon the Messines-Wulverghem Road. They were counter-attacked and driven off, suffered considerable casualties from the fire of Lewis guns The position on the right flank was, however, more desperate than ever. At nine o'clock had come from the 25th Division the evil news that the Germans were in Neuve Eglise.

During the night the 9th Fusiliers was relieved by troops of the 178th Brigade, and withdrawn to the dug-outs on Kemmel Hill.

The 12th Rifles remained in line. The relieved battalion was not given long to rest. Before noon it was ordered to man the Kemmel defences, and to send up its company of the 1st Fusiliers to dug-outs behind the old British front line opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret.

The 14th may be accounted a quiet day, since it passed without infantry attack But the volume of artillery fire was immense, and distributed to a great depth in rear of the positions held, "Green Kemmel Hill," as one officer wrote, "was turning brown before our eyes." And the enemy was definitely in possession of Neuve Eglise.

At 10-30 p.m. orders were received from the 19th Division for an immediate withdrawal west of Wulverghem. This was carried out before dawn, the line pivoting back on the left of the 12th Rifles, which joined up with the 178th Brigade west of the village. It was completed only just in time With morning light the Germans opened an intense bombardment on the new position, which, for the greater part of its length, followed no old British trench An infantry attack followed, and bodies of Germans broke through at the junction of the 12th Rifles and 178th Brigade.

A counter-attack by the 1st Irish Fusiliers and the scanty reserves of the 12th Rifles, led by Major Holt Waring, failed to restore the position, but prevented the enemy gaining further ground on the left Major Waring, a most gallant officer and a born leader of men, was killed.

The left and centre of the 12th Rifles were very wisely withdrawn a few hundred yards to a famous communication trench of old days, known as "Kingsway.". From this there was a fairly good field of fire. The 9th Irish Fusiliers had now been moved up from the Kemmel defences, and was ordered to send up two platoons to connect the right flank in "Kingsway" with the original line west of Wulverghem.

At 2-15 a.m. on the 16th the little remnant of the Brigade began to withdraw on relief, covered by small outposts. It then marched back to a camp near La Clytte, suffering numerous casualties on its route from shell-fire. Four machine-guns remained near Kemmel village. The enemy was now indulging in what were known to artillerymen as area bombardments, concentrating upon half a square mile of country for half an hour, then switching his batteries to another.

Such methods are ineffective unless based upon an enormous mass of heavy artillery. With this available, as it was on this occasion, they are extraordinarily noxious and demoralizing. Reserves, tired units withdrawn for a short rest, are kept constantly on the strain, ever wondering when their turn is coming, compelled hurriedly to shift position when it does. Severe loss and disorganization are caused to transport piqueted in the open or bringing up rations and munitions. A spot undisturbed at one minute becomes the centre-point of a hellish tornado at the next.

April the 16th, while the men of the 108th Brigade, wearied out and dazed by shell-fire, snatched what rest they could, was the occasion of furious fighting at Wytschaete, The village was lost in the morning, and retaken by a magnificent counter-attack of those veritable paladins of modern war, the Highland Brigade of the 9th Division. It could not be held on the morrow owing to its isolation, and the line had to be withdrawn to the neighbourhood of the old British trenches of 1917. The 17th, to many observers, appeared the blackest day they had seen.

Almost everywhere the gains of years of desperate fighting had been lost. Passchendaele and Poelcappelle - to which there will be further reference when we return to the fortunes of the 36th Division - were gone.

Huge slices of territory on which the Germans had never stood, or over which they had been hustled in retreat, were now in their possession. Bailleul, which had been at many periods a Corps Headquarters, had fallen. From villages such as Westoutre, where they had lived in comparative peace since 1914, the villagers were rushing out under shell-fire, pushing barrows, staggering under the burden of huge bundles, across the fields. Men asked whether we had any reserves remaining, whether the young American formations would ever be ready, whether the Channel ports could be saved.

And yet, though none who watched can have guessed it, hardly even the great soldier now in supreme command of the Allied Armies, or his British colleague, the day may have marked a turning-point. The French were hurrying north. Their troops were already in line on the right of the 9th Division; their field artillery, the "seventy-fives," rushed up, each at the tail of a lorry which carried the detachment, were lining the hills, the Scherpenberg, Mont Rouge, and Mont Vidaigne. The German infantry was suffering heavy loss. Black as was the night, there was, if as yet no faintest light of dawn, the paler gray on the horizon which is its herald.

On the evening of that day orders were received for the formation of the Brigade, which could now muster about four hundred rifles, into a composite battalion. This battalion, under the command of Colonel Kelly, was ordered to move down behind Kemmel Hill, in reserve, to be in position by 4 a.m. next morning. It encountered a storm of shelling on its way, having seventy casualties. Among the killed here was Captain Despard, 9th Irish Fusiiers, who had shown great tenacity and fine leadership during the retreat of the previous month. All day the battalion remained here, under very heavy fire, from which Kemmel now afforded but slight protection. At evening it was withdrawn, French troops having taken over the defence of this part of the line.

The remnants of the Brigade marched all night, to Siege Camp and Hospital Farm, between Poperinghe and Elverdinghe, rejoining the 36th Division at 5-30 a.m. on the 19th of April. The Brigade had, for the second time in a month, been cut to pieces.

The 12th Rifles alone had had upwards of fifteen hundred casualties in that period. One often saw in our summaries of intelligence reference to reports that such and such a German formation had had particularly heavy losses, followed by a statement that it might be considered negligible for some time to come. Few can have had losses higher than those of the 108th Brigade, which had, as has been recorded, practically disappeared by the end of March.

Yet in ten days' time this Brigade had entered another great battle, to prove itself very far from negligible. The admiration one feels for its achievements is mingled with surprise when one thinks of the youth and lack of experience in its ranks. Well did it merit its share of the commendation expressed in a telegram received from the G.O.C. IX. Corps the day before it was finally relieved.

The message ran as follows: "The C. in C. has just been at Corps H.Q. He would have liked to see all ranks now fighting on the 9th Corps front, and to tell each one of them of his personal appreciation of the magnificent fight they have made and are making. He would like to shake hands with each individual and thank him for what he has done. He has not time for this, but has asked me to give everybody this message."

The 36th Division, when the 108th Brigade departed on its desperate lone venture, was left with its front line east of Poelcappelle, and its headquarters on the Canal Bank. On that very day, March the 10th, the Army Commander decided to withdraw the II. Corps to its Battle Zone, here practically the British front line of 1917. The right of the 36th Division would now be just in front of Wieltje, so well known of old. An outpost line was, however, to be maintained upon the Steenebeek.

The retirement was absolutely essential, nor could it be delayed. By April the 11th the Germans were approaching the Forest of Nieppe. Passchendaele and Poelcappelle now protruded, an incredible salient, that made the old Ypres Salient unremarkable by comparison.

Nevertheless, a few nights' respite was allowed, in order that the enemy might be deprived of the booty, and of the shelter for future operations, that had otherwise fallen to him. The heavy artillery was to move back first, bringing back all the ammunition that could possibly be carried, and tipping that which could not into shell-holes. An extensive programme of demolitions was planned by the C.R.E. Every dug-out or "pill-box" of importance was to be destroyed by explosives at the last possible moment. Craters were to be blown at important road-junctions. Light railways were to be, as far as possible, torn up or otherwise demolished.

There was a feverish rush by the Engineers, assisted by Infantry working-parties, to do the work in the scanty time available. Most of the forward demolitions were carried out by the 122nd Field Company, now commanded by Major W. Smyth, who had greatly distinguished himself during the March retreat as an attaché to the Divisional Staff. They were very effective. The 121st Field Company dammed the Steenebeek in an attempt to make it a more formidable obstacle, and began the construction of a new line behind it. The 150th Field Company prepared ten bridges over the Ypres Canal for demolition. The world knows that none of these bridges was ever "sent up," but may not know by how little their destruction was averted.

On the night of the 11th of April the withdrawal of the heavy artillery to cover the Battle Zone began, being completed three days later. The field artillery also moved back, leaving, however, forward guns in action by night, to deceive the enemy as to the British intentions. All was now prepared in rear. It remained only to withdraw the two battalions manning the outpost positions, firing the charges for the demolitions as they retired. This was carried out on the night of the 15th. Necessary as was the task, it was one which could not but inspire disappointment and regret. In a night the British Army was abandoning ground which had been profusely watered with its blood, and had taken long months in winning.

The enemy advanced very slowly and cautiously on the morrow, heavily shelling Poelcappelle, now a mile and a half from the outposts, before he ventured to occupy it.

The Belgian Army was extending its front, as a helping hand in time of adversity. On the night of April the 18th the 4th Belgian Division relieved the 30th Division, on the left of the 36th, taking over the front of one battalion of the 107th Brigade. The next week passed quietly, the infantry showing aggression against the enemy outposts, capturing six prisoners in patrol affairs on successive nights. Divisional Headquarters were withdrawn from the Canal Bank to Border Camp, in the woodlands north of the Vlamertinghe - Poperinghe Road. For a couple of days the Steenebeek became the line of resistance, with outposts on the east bank.

But Kemmel, so many miles in rear, had fallen, and the Germans were attacking north of it. General Plumer felt himself compelled to order a further withdrawal. The Ypres Canal was now to be the line of resistance. That decision, it is believed, has never been realized by people in England. Battered Ypres, small as was its actual importance of late, had been all through the war a sort of lodestar to the Germans.

 The best blood of England had been spilt in its defence. And now, theoretically, it was in the front line. Theoretically only, however, it may happily be recorded. An outpost line over two thousand yards east of it was maintained, and, as the German troops on the immediate front remained unaggressive - they had had a heavy defeat from the Belgians further north a few days previously - and the Lys Battle died down, lines in rear were gradually improved and dispositions altered, so that they might be held in greater strength in the event of an attack.

The second withdrawal of the 36th Division was evidently anticipated by the Germans, who followed it closely. An officer and two men of the 31st Landwehr Division, over impetuous, were captured. One party of the enemy, pressing swiftly on, entered Juliet Farm, a point which the 107th Brigade had been ordered to retain. Both the "pill-box" and Canopus Trench, in its neighbourhood, were retaken next night, together with an enemy machine-gun.. The 109th Brigade on the right took five prisoners.

On the following day a great attack was launched by the Germans from south of Meteren to Voormezeele, upon the French D.A.N., * and the Second British Army. Everywhere it was completely and bloodily repulsed. To the enemy it was a terrible check. April the 29th, 1918, deserves to rank as high as the following 8th of August  in the history of the war.

It marked the failure of the German northward offensive. For failure that offensive was, as the Somme offensive was not. The tenacity of troops on the flanks, such as the 55th Division on the right and the 9th on the left, had confined and narrowed the thrust. The curious formation of great hills, in almost straight line across the Flanders plain; Kemmel, the Scherpenberg, Mont Rouge, Mont Vidaigne, Mont Noir, Mont Kokereele, Mont des Cats, then, after a gap, Cassel, proved an impassable barrier in later stages of the battle. The first of the series alone fell. Upon the rest French artillery was now massed, pouring death into the Germans below.

A few days earlier Ludendorff had, at a critical moment, struck again at Amiens. That offensive, which might have changed the whole position, had been pushed back before counter-attacks, and nipped in bud by the brilliant recapture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Australian Corps. The Germans were to make new offensives and gain much ground, notably near Rheims, where they cut the main Eastern Railway, and came all too close to Paris at Château-Thierry. But they were the blows of desperation. Week by week drew nearer the great retribution.

The next six weeks passed quietly for the 36th Division. The chief diversion was about a little dug-out near Juliet Farm, in the front line, formerly a Signals testing-point for overhead wires.

Here there was constant bombing and raiding, largely to the disadvantage of the German troops, who were not of first quality and were unable to withstand our men in close fighting. During the month of May fourteen prisoners were taken by the Division on seven separate occasions. One night a German wagon with rations drove into our outpost position in error and was captured, so indeterminate were the opposing front lines.

The 36th Divisional Artillery had returned and taken over the defence of the front before the end of April. Early in May it received, with all other British divisional artilleries in France, a proportion of Indian personnel for its D.A.C., to replace English drivers. These were thereupon sent back for training as gunners.

CHANGES IN COMMAND

During this period there occurred a great change in the command of the Division. Within three weeks three general officers long associated with it returned to England. On May the 6th Major-General O. S. Nugent, C.B., D.S.O., was succeeded by Major-General Clifford Coffin, V.C., D.S.O., in the command of the Division, General Nugent proceeding next day to England, preparatory to taking up a command in India.

As long as the 36th Division is remembered, General Nugent's name will be associated with it. His whole existence was centred upon it; he was intensely proud of its achievements and jealous for its good name. It owed much to him, particularly to his training in the early days after its arrival in France. His successor, General Coffin, was an officer of the Royal Engineers, with a reputation for vigour, and a Victoria Cross gained for great bravery at Ypres.

Just before General Nugent, General Withycombe and, just after him, General Griffith gave up command of the 107th and 108th Brigades respectively. General Withycombe had commanded his Brigade from within a few days of its arrival in France, except for a short period in 1917 when he bad commanded a Brigade in England, and had inspired affection and trust in all its ranks. His headquarters was always a happy family, and a hospitable one, as the present writer would be ingrate were he to refrain from recording. The war leaves few pleasanter memories than those of meals at friendly boards after much perambulating of trenches.

General Griffith had arrived a little later, and his service with the Division was actually longer. His imperturbability and resource in moments of emergency had often served it and his own Brigade well, Their successors were Brigadier-General E. J. de S. Thorpe, D.S.O., in the 107th Brigade, and Brigadier-General E. Vaughan, D.S.O., in the 108th.

 The 36th Division had indeed enjoyed the continuity of tradition and purpose which comes from a long tenour [tenure?tn] of command by senior officers. General Nugent, General Withycombe, General Griffith, General Brock, in the Divisional Artillery, had now commanded for two and a half years. In the 109th Brigade had been more frequent changes, but two of its Brigadiers, Generals Ricardo and Hessey, who between them commanded it for two years, had previously commanded two of its battalions.

In the early days of June came a most welcome relief, just when the country was at its best, Handing over the defence of the line to the 12th Belgian Division, the 36th moved back to the agreeable wooded area between Poperinghe and Proven. It was now in II. Corps reserve, ready if necessary to support the right flank of the Belgian Army. One Brigade, two Field Companies, and two companies of the Pioneer battalion, were at the disposal of the II. Corps for work on rear defences.

There was now, men said, "wire from Ypres to Calais." Between Ypres and Poperinghe, six miles apart, were no less than four well-defended lines: the Brielen defences, and the Green, Yellow, and Blue Lines, In rear of Poperinghe were plenty more. The troops working upon these defences were relieved periodically, the other formations and units carrying out training. The Artillery put one section per battery into positions prepared for the defence of the Blue Line, in the event of another great attack, which still appeared not improbable.

The troops benefited very greatly from this welcome respite, the first the Division had had for a year, if the few days in the snow at Christmas be excepted.

The young soldiers who now for the most part filled the ranks grew strong under the influence of good food, exercise, and life in the open under pleasant conditions. Their fitness for battle increased swiftly under that of steady training. There was plenty of sport, football, cricket, running, and boxing, in all of which their neighbours, the Belgians, took a hand, The only trouble was the extraordinary epidemic of influenza which swept over the world that summer, and visited all the armies in the field. Some German divisions, it was reported, were for a time not in a fit state to move or fight owing to its ravages. In the prevalent fine weather, fortunately, men recovered quickly from its effects.

The 36th Division had great tasks yet before it. It had to swing its hammer in the mighty line of destroyers that was to crush in the German defences and, open the road to final victory. For those tasks that sunny month of June out of line was, as a prelude, of inestimable worth. After the dazing and deadening effect, the abrutissement of a battle, nothing told so much on the dash and energy of troops as long, dreary months of trench warfare, even in a line relatively quiet. They lost not only their physical agility, their power to march and run, but their mental power as well. A spell such as this gave them not only new strength, but new heart, new spirit, new hope. Affairs might be gloomy, but gloom was dispersed by the sun, like the Flanders mists. When the Division next entered the line, it was once again a fine fighting force.

That event came in the first week of July. The French, who, after losing Kemmel, had made a very fine stand at Locre, the vital gateway to the valley between the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge, were now being relieved by the British along the line of the hills. After three days about Cassel, in reserve to the French XVI. Corps, the 36th Division relieved the 41st French Division on the northern skirts of Bailleul. Divisional Headquarters were established at Terdeghem, with a command post on the Mont des Cats prepared for emergencies.

The sudden move had almost, but not quite, succeeded in spoiling a very fine Divisional Horse Show, held at Proven, in beautiful weather and surroundings, on July the 3rd. Upon this the officers of the neighbouring Belgian Cavalry Division, including an Olympic competitor, descended like wolves on the fold, giving a remarkable display of skill and horsemanship, and taking practically all the prizes for jumping events.

The Division was to hold this line for upwards of two months, then to go forward upon the enemy's heels. Nor was it ever again to be forced to give ground. The gray blur on the horizon was brighter now; the light was not far off.

BACK TO THE MESSINES RIDGE: JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1918

THE new sector was at the north-west corner of the great salient made by the Lys offensive. It ran from Fontainehouck, a hamlet north-east of Meteren, which was in the hands of the enemy, to the high ground south of the Croix de Poperinghe. It was about a mile and a half north of Bailleul. Here, as all along the line of hills, the enemy was at heavy disadvantage. His territory was overlooked. Every movement, every gun-flash, could be noted from Mont Noir and the other hills, Bailleul crumbled away before the eyes of our men. St. Jans Cappel, for so long Divisional Headquarters in days that now seemed very far away, was not far behind the front line. It was to a great extent destroyed. Many of the isolated farms, with which that countryside is bestrewn, were, however, undamaged, right up to the front line. The country was deep in crops, the wheat having to be cut round the outposts to prevent surprise attacks and provide a field of fire. As for vegetables, the men had all the potatoes and green peas they could eat without walking a hundred yards from where they slept.

After Ypres, it was a very agreeable position. German artillery fire was not as a rule severe, owing to the fact that the battery positions were overlooked from the hills. The worst disturbance was caused by night bombing, assiduously practised by the enemy. Casualties were low. They would have been lower had our troops been as circumspect in following the hedges, and confining their movement to the night, as their predecessors, the French, had been. But the lesson of "lying low," so well learnt by Frenchman and German, never had been mastered by the British soldier, nor ever was.

On July the 19th the 9th Division, in line on the right, captured Meteren, the Artillery of the 36th Division co-operating in the attack. The 36th Division did not at first strive to improve its position in a similar way, but contented itself with raids on a large scale. One, by the 109th Brigade, resulted in very heavy fighting, the enemy being on the alert. Though the enemy's casualties were estimated at thirty, and a prisoner was taken, the raid hardly ranked as a success, since our casualties were seventeen, including four men missing. The 107th Brigade, on the left, had a more satisfactory venture.

A strong patrol of the 2nd Rifles surrounded a farm in which there was an enemy garrison of ten. Two of these were taken prisoner, the rest killed. The patrol had not a casualty, despite heavy machine-gun fire. Further prisoners were taken by the 107th Brigade on a later occasion, while the only raid attempted by the enemy, from Haagedoorne, where his troops held the old railhead, was beaten off by rifle fire, even though the Germans got within twenty yards of the outposts before being seen.

An interesting event of this period was the visit of His Majesty the King to the area. On August the 6th, at Oxelaere, a little village on the slopes of Cassel Hill, he presented to Lieutenant Knox, 150th Field Company, R.E., the Victoria Cross won by him during the March retreat in circumstances that have been described. On the following Sunday His Majesty attended a parade service at Terdeghem, where were Divisional Headquarters.

The 36th Division, being in the Second Army, was not destined to take part in the early great counter-offensives that raised all men's spirits and showed the world that at last the tide had turned. The first of these had been French, though four of the best British Divisions had played their part in it. In what is now known as the Battle of Tardenois, beginning on July the 18th, the salient of the great German advance to Château-Thierry had been crushed in, and the enemy routed, with great loss of prisoners and booty.

Then, on the 8th of August, came a second mighty blow. The Fourth British and First French Armies began a great offensive down the Amiens - Roye Road. The quality of the resistance with which it was met showed that German discipline and German steadfastness were weakening at last. On the 21st the British Third Army, and a little later the First Army, launched still greater attacks, sweeping swiftly across the waste of the old Somme battlefield, and once more approaching the Hindenburg Line. Before that was reached the 36th Division, up in Flanders, was again in action.

Various local offensives had been planned, to take from the enemy what little good ground he held near the point of his salient.

The 9th Division's capture of Meteren has been mentioned. At the end of July, the 1st Australian Division, further south, had retaken Merris. On August the 18th the 9th Division carried out a further successful operation, capturing the important Hoegenacker Ridge, south-east of Meteren. It was now the turn of the 36th Division to improve its position. On August the 22nd an attack carried out by the 15th Rifles, on the right of the line, advanced it a quarter of a mile on a front of half a mile. Twenty-two prisoners and two machine-guns were captured.

A curious and vastly effective ruse was employed in conjunction with this operation. The demoralizing effect of the Livens projector upon the enemy was well known, but its use, charged with gas, would have prevented any immediate attack by our troops upon the area bombarded. The drums were therefore filled with a scent which resembled the smell of gas. Many of the enemy had run back before our men advanced, while others were caught wearing their respirators.

Two days later an attack on the left by the 1st and 9th Irish Fusiliers, under a barrage of smoke and shrapnel advanced the line to the Haagedoorne - Dranoutre Road on a front of upwards of a mile. So great was the surprise and so swift the assault, that the enemy was "smothered," and did not make a serious resistance. Sixty prisoners and eleven machine-guns were taken here. An enemy counter-attack in the evening was brought to a stop by rifle and machine-gun fire, though the 108th Brigade lost one small post. The line was now a thousand yards only from Bailleul,, and the defences of the town were pierced. An attack upon the salient would now have resulted in a great German rout. The enemy did not await it. Under the skilful leadership, that was never more apparent than in the months of defeat and humiliation which were to follow, he flitted in a night.

The 36th Division, on the morning of August the 30th, was awaiting relief by the 35th Division, to be given a short period of rest and training before being launched upon the great series of final offensives in Flanders. Its right-hand neighbour, the 9th Division, had already been relieved by the 31st Division on the Hoegenacker Ridge, with a like object. That rest the 36th Division was not destined to enjoy.

At ten o'clock that morning came a report from the 31st Division that the enemy was gone from its front, and that its men were entering Bailleul from the south. Before two o'clock patrols of the 36th were in the huge Asylum north of the town, and upon the Neuve Eglise Road. The relief was cancelled and an immediate advance ordered, to be carried out by the 109th Brigade.

This was not the first enemy retirement in the Western theatre. There had been that of 1917, in which some of the troops now in the 36th Division had been the pursuers. No doubt the men who had then tracked the retreating Germans had felt elation. But that had been false dawn. Now, as men sprang up eagerly to set about their preparations, a conviction spread among them that this was the true, that not again would they have to turn back, Some of our present-day pessimists pretend that by the summer of 1918 the horror, the iron ruthlessness, of the war had robbed men of their stores of latent enthusiasm, and that, even for victory, they had none to summon forth.

It is untrue. Were it true, they could not have so swiftly prevailed against an enemy, disheartened indeed, but still disciplined, tenacious and well led, still admirably equipped, and, above all, backed by a series of defences such as the Allies, in their days of adversity, had never dreamed of. All testimony, moreover, is to the contrary. Like a flame the spirit of victory, the bright-hued prospect of deliverance, spread among all ranks. Defeat and retirement had bred melancholy and bad temper. The new atmosphere dissipated them. To go forward, to strike, to make an end - those were the impulses and the hopes that swept through the waiting ranks.

The ground immediately to be recovered had a double appeal, a sentimental interest. It was that which had been the area of the Division for a year. The Château of St. Jans Cappel had been Divisional Headquarters for the greater part of that period. The remains of that pleasant villa - heu quantum mutata ! - were to shelter General Coffin's staff during the advance. * On the Ravelsberg Ridge, the first objective, had been the Divisional School. In Neuve Eglise, the second, had been a Brigade Headquarters.

Not a house, not a lane, not a forlorn camp with shell-punctured hutments, not a machine-gun position further forward in the old battle-line, but was known to some of the officers and men now making ready to advance. There was triumph even, mingled with the pathos, in re-entering poor, battered Bailleul, which had been a good friend in time past. From a handsome town it was become a mass of ruins, so completely destroyed that, across a fine central place of several acres, there was now but a single narrow track for transport through the rubble.

By midnight on the 30th the patrols were half a mile along the Neuve Eglise Road and a mile from the summit of Ravelsberg Hill. To capture that on the morrow was the task of the 109th Brigade.General Coffin was at this time on leave, the Division being commanded by Brigadier-General Brock, the C.R.A

SEPTEMBER

The Brigade had a wide frontage, roughly a thousand yards north of the Neuve Eglise Road, and two thousand south of it. The advance was steady, but made in the teeth of considerable machine-gun fire. The Germans had evacuated their positions, but they did not want to be hurried, nor were they prepared to forego the opportunity of inflicting loss upon our troops which such a height as the Ravelsberg afforded. But, once that hill captured, the enemy rearguards were hustled down the further slope. By night the Brigade had reached the foot of the next hill, a mile east of the Ravelsberg. A mile and a half to the south the 1st Inniskillings had its right upon the main Armentières Road.

Neuve Eglise was the first objective for September the 1st. The 2nd Inniskillings was ordered to extend its left flank as far as the road from that village to Dranoutre, and advance with its left upon Wulverghem. The 108th Brigade had meanwhile moved up in support to Haagedoorne, the 107th being in the area of Mont Noir and Mont Kokereele. Great efforts were being made to bring artillery forward over the very bad roads. Kemmel Hill was once again in British hands, and good news came in the morning from the 30th Division, on the left, which had reached Lindenhoek and south of it as far as the valley of the Douve

The severest resistance was met at Westhof Farm and De Broeken, both well known of old, where German machine-guns caused serious loss. German artillery fire was also heavy. The various strong points were taken one by one. The German rearguards slipped back in each case before our men came upon them, but a number were killed in flight and, outside Neuve Eglise, a machine-gun and two prisoners captured. By afternoon the enemy had been driven back to the western outskirts of the village. Some of the 2nd Inniskillings appear actually to have reached its houses, but the line finally taken up at night was five hundred yards short of it.

The 108th Brigade was ordered to pass through the 109th at night and resume the advance, its objectives being from Red Lodge, in the north-west corner of "Plug Street Wood," to South Midland Farm on the Wulverghem-Messines Road. The artillery was now in a position to give it adequate support.

The attack was carried out by the 12th Rifles on the right and 1st Irish Fusiliers on the left. On its southern flank, Kortepyp Cabaret and the Custom House on the Steenwerck Road gave trouble. * A Stokes mortar here well repaid the labour of bringing it and its ammunition forward, enabling the infantry to rush these places after a short bombardment. Then the line pressed forward to the Nieppe Road running south-east from Neuve Eglise. Machine-gun fire from this village was at first galling, but, after it had been heavily shelled by the artillery, a company of the 12th Rifles took it in most gallant fashion, while two other companies made progress to the south of it. By four o'clock the line was east of Neuve Eglise.

The next obstacle was a fairly formidable one, an old British system, the name of which recalled the days when the British Army had been a very small force indeed - the G.H.Q. Line. The Germans had put up some wire to defend its support trench from the west. At 7-30 p.m., light being still good, our artillery bombarded these defences heavily for an hour, after which the infantry advanced to the attack. The trenches were not taken without fighting, though, in all the circumstances, the enemy's resistance must be reckoned feeble. Desultory encounters continued all night, but by morning the infantry was in possession of the G.H.Q. Line along the whole front. On the left, meanwhile, the troops of the 30th Division had entered Wulverghem.

On the 3rd, as resistance stiffened, the frontage was narrowed. A Brigade of the 29th Division had just relieved the 31st Division troops on the right for the assault on the very important position of Hill 63. The new objective of the 108th Brigade was from White Gates, at the western foot of this hill, to South Midland Farm.

At 9-30 a.m. the 12th Rifles and 1st Irish Fusiliers went forward. In the early stages they had artillery support. Thereafter, owing to constant movement and the difficulty of ascertaining the position of the front line, the only assistance that could be rendered by the artillery was by fire on objectives far in rear, save for occasional opportunities that came the way of single mobile guns. The attack resolved itself into individual assaults upon German machine-gun positions, which were taken in flank by Lewis guns worked forward, and then rushed with the bayonet. Three were thus taken, and their detachments killed or captured, while none of the latter, which ran before the infantry came upon them, escaped without loss from our fire. By evening the line ran from L'Alouette, a mile east of Neuve Eglise, to La Plus Douve Farm, a famous old battalion headquarters of the 36th Division, south-east of Wulverghem. The whole of this front was taken over after dark by the 9th Irish Fusiliers, which battalion had not yet been in action.

The 108th Brigade's attack next morning began at 8-30 a.m. under a creeping barrage. Half an hour prior to it, on the extreme right, the 9th Irish Fusiliers advanced about a hundred yards toward Hill 63, to support an attack on the hill by troops of the 29th Division. The attack was completely successful. Hill 63 was of the greatest importance to the enemy, and was very strongly held, as was proved by the capture of nearly two hundred and fifty prisoners by the men of the 29th Division. The hill being in British hands made affairs far easier for the 108th Brigade. The advance of the 9th Irish Fusiliers met with considerable opposition. Gaps appeared, and there was some loss of direction, not astonishing when it is considered that the battalion was on a frontage of over a mile. Eventually a company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers had to be brought up on the right flank, on the Neuve Eglise - La Basseville Road. Before noon all objectives were attained. On the right the 1st Irish Fusiliers had advanced beyond White Gates, On the left, Gooseberry Farm, a mile east of the starting-line, was in the hands of the 9th.

All had gone excellently so far. But the British were now facing positions which the Germans desired to hold for some time longer, for which they were prepared to fight. An immediate local counter-attack down the Douve valley was repulsed with the aid of artillery fire. But at 4-15 p.m., after a heavy bombardment the enemy launched a counter-attack from the south-west on this part of the line. Gooseberry Farm and Stinking Farm * were lost, and the line driven back five hundred yards.

On the following day the 36th Division actually lost a little ground instead of gaining it. An attack carried out at dawn by the 1st and 9th Irish Fusiliers, under a light artillery barrage, insufficient to keep down the very heavy machine-gun fire, was unsuccessful. A heavy hostile counter-attack drove our troops back beyond their original line. The 108th Brigade had now been fighting for four days, with no shelter but that of old and dirty trenches, in persistent rain. The men were in good spirits still, but fatigue was beginning to tell upon them. It was decided that the 107th Brigade should relieve them after dusk, to continue the attack upon the morrow. The 108th Brigade had captured thirty-five prisoners and three machine-guns. Its casualties, however, especially during the last two days, had been very heavy, numbering upwards of four hundred. The 29th Division, on the right, was again being relieved by the 31st.

The night of the relief was very unpleasant. The Germans, beginning about ten o'clock, deluged all the low-lying valleys with mustard and other gas shell. The new advance was to be supported by the fire of two Machine-Gun Companies, instead of the one which had been in action hitherto. Captain Walker describes how he rode out in the darkness to find his sections, scattered among battalions of the 109th Brigade in reserve, and came into the cloud at Neuve Eglise, forced to keep his eyes uncovered to find his way, but keeping the nose-clip and mouth-piece of his respirator in position. When dawn broke he discovered that the pool of gas lying in the basin in which 107th Brigade Headquarters were situated almost lipped the entrance floor of the dug-out. Most fortunate it was that the dug-out was half-way up the side of the basin. When, later, he walked down the main road to Wulverghem, he found the occupants of the dug-outs which bordered it "being sick by the score." A good many casualties were caused during the relief, but for the most part the gas was not of the most noxious sort, and many of those who had inhaled it were able to take part in the action of September the 6th. It had the effect, however, of delaying the relief. When dawn broke all the companies of the 2nd Rifles were not in position; nor was it possible to move them forward afterwards, owing to the forward slope on which that position lay being in full view of the enemy.

The 36th Division Artillery was now prepared to put down a really effective barrage, to advance at the rate of a hundred yards in three minutes, then to form a protective curtain two hundred and fifty yards in front of the objective, till an hour and a half after Zero. This objective was the old British front line, from the Douve on the right to the Wulverghem-Messines Road on the left.

At 4 p.m. the attack was launched. The companies of the 2nd Rifles not already in position began to move up in little columns as the bombardment opened, continuing this method of advance as the barrage lifted. On the right, troops of the 31st Division attacked simultaneously. Despite heavy German artillery fire the infantry went forward with great spirit. After heavy fighting, all objectives, except Gabion Farm on the right, were taken. Nineteen prisoners were captured, and many Germans killed. How strongly the line was held was shown by the capture of eight machine-guns, as well as a trench mortar. The troops of the 31St Division also had reached their objectives. Early on the morning of the 7th the advance was rounded off by the capture of Gabion Farm, where a post was established.

The enemy was not yet resigned to the loss of the position. At dawn on the 8th, after an intense bombardment, two groups advanced to recapture the advanced posts. They were literally annihilated by machine and Lewis-gun fire, a wounded survivor of each being captured. That night the 30th Division took over the front to Gabion Farm, while the 107th Brigade extended its right to Hyde Park Corner, in "Plug Street Wood," becoming responsible for the defence of Hill 63.

Comparative stagnation ensued, broken only by two small attacks upon the 15th Rifles, which had now taken over the line. The period was marked by one distressing accident. General Thorpe, commanding the 107th Brigade, had gone up with General Brock on the night of the 13th to visit Hill 63 and the sentry-posts north of it. Moving along "Winter Trench" he was suddenly fired at from point-blank range by one of his own men and severely wounded in the arm, his elbow-bone being shot away. It was a stroke of cruel ill-fortune, which prevented General Thorpe from leading the Brigade to final victory. He was able to return to the command of his regiment after the war, but with an arm well-nigh useless for life, from which he has since suffered incessant pain.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. MacKenzie, C.R.E. of the Division, took over command of the Brigade till the appointment of his successor. That successor was General Brock, who, after bringing the Divisional Artillery to France and commanding it in the field for more than two and a half years, was to finish his career with the 36th Division by leading an Infantry Brigade with equal success. He was succeeded as C.R.A. by Brigadier-General C. St. L. Hawkes, D.S.O. Another senior officer of the Division lost to it a short time before was Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Knott, D.S.O., commanding the and Inniskillings, severely wounded by a shell which killed the Intelligence Officer of the 109th Brigade, Lieutenant J. J. Fox, and wounded the Brigade Major R.A., Major H. F. Grant Suttie, D.S.O., M.C., by his side.

Another calamity was the bombing of the wagon lines of the Divisional Train near St. Jans Cappel. Here a single bomb killed five men, wounded nine, and killed no less than fifty valuable horses, besides injuring about twenty more. A bomb or big shell in crowded horse-lines was always one of the ugliest sights of many very ugly that the war had to display.

On the night of September the 15th the 109th Brigade took over the front, now slightly extended on the right toward Ploegsteert. There was constant patrol activity in the days that followed, but no further ground was to be gained by those methods. The enemy was maintaining himself very stoutly and his line bristled with machine-guns. It was evident that only a great "full-dress" assault would retake the Messines Ridge.

The tide of victory meanwhile had continued to flow strongly on other fronts. On the 12th of September the Third Army had crashed through the Hindenburg trenches at Havrincourt. Three days later the Balkan offensive, so long awaited that men had come to doubt its possibility, had been launched, and attended with overwhelming success. Within a few days Bulgaria was prostrate and Turkey out of the war.

It would have been poetical justice had it fallen to the lot of the 36th Division to have a hand in the second capture of the Messines Ridge, as the 62nd Division had taken Havrincourt for the second time. If that were denied it, it was only because it had a task even more important to perform, a task the successful prosecution of which would render to the enemy the famous ridge of no avail. As a necessary complement to the great convergent thrusts of British, French, and American armies further south, a powerful offensive, mainly Anglo-Belgian, but in which a French force also took part, had been planned in Flanders, from Voormezeele northwards. It was to be under the supreme command of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, so that co-ordination between the three nationalities should be assured. For this the 36th Division was required. For the third time in its career, but in circumstances vastly different to the two first, it was directed upon Ypres.

For the new battle some training had been obtained by the 107th and 108th Brigades during the days that the 109th held the line. The movements were carried out with greatest secrecy. All marches took place after dark, on the nights of September the 21st and 22nd. The 107th moved thus to Wormhoudt, north of Cassel, the 109th Brigade to Eecke, east of that town, and the 108th to Houtquerque. The Divisional Artillery moved straight to the neighbourhood of Ypres. The Infantry of the Division was not to take part in the first day's attack, and, for the preliminary barrage, the 153rd Brigade R.F.A. was to be attached to the 9th Division, the 173rd Brigade to the 29th Division, on its right, the troops of which were in line slightly over a mile east of the famous ruined town.

After a few days of rest and training, the concentration took place on the nights of the 26th and 27th. By the morning of the 28th, the date of the attack, the three Brigades were in camps between Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe. Headquarters were at Vogeltje Château, near the better-known Lovie Château, in the woodlands west of Poperinghe. The Division was again in General Jacob's II. Corps, under which it had served in April, May, and June. It was in Corps Reserve, its mission being to hold itself in readiness for a move forward to assist in the exploitation of any success gained by the first-line Divisions.

The late operations had been heartening. Despite, however, their difficulty and costliness, they represented, at least till the final stages, no more than hard and steady pressure upon a rearguard. No great number of prisoners could be taken in such fighting, while the casualties to be inflicted upon the enemy were comparatively small.

The Division had not yet had a hand in one of the great offensives. All ranks knew that the attack about to open ranked in that category, and that resistance of far more serious quality was to be expected. For that they were prepared. It is no exaggeration to say that they looked forward to the coming struggle, just because they believed it would be the last. Officers who came back from England the day after the opening of the attack, when the news that from Ypres to the sea the whole line was advancing had been flashed abroad, describe the returning leave-boat as being so full of cheerful faces that it might have been taken for one homeward bound.

Some were less ambitious than others. In one officer's diary is expressed the opinion that the Passchendaele Ridge, if captured, would serve as a good "jumping-off" ground for an offensive the following spring! But for the most part, men, beholding victory upon victory, had come to believe that the war could be ended this year. For that speed was essential, else winter would come to the aid of the enemy and give him time to collect himself. That reasoning could be grasped by all, and acted upon all as an added spur to endeavour in the days that followed

THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY SEPT. 28TH TO OCT. 17TH, 1918

The attack of the II. Corps was to be carried out with the 29th Division on the right and the 9th on the left. The left flank of the latter Division lay on the Zonnebeke Road at Mill Cott. On its left was the 8th Belgian Division. The Belgians did not desire to attack without preliminary bombardment, and for three hours before Zero their artillery shelled the German positions and battery areas. The artillery on the II. Corps front fired for five minutes only before Zero, which was at 5-30 a.m. on the 28th of September. The preliminary attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage, with a large proportion of smoke-shell. In density this was far less than the "creepers" of 1917, there being a gun to upwards of fifty yards. The German defences, however, owing to the drain caused by reverses elsewhere, were no longer manned in the strength of those days, nor was the resistance likely to be of a quality so high. The task, however, was formidable enough, the ground being only less difficult than during the Battles of Ypres, 1917.

The attack, launched in heavy rain, was a complete success. The German infantry was left in the lurch by its artillery, and, save at isolated points, made no serious resistance, The attacking troops, Belgians and British, went forward with the greatest dash and determination. The Belgian infantry, which had not been involved in the great reverses of the British and French, was by this time of excellent quality, its ranks filled by young men of good physique. Neither wire nor shell-pocked waste could check the assault. The Frezenberg Ridge, that had resisted so many attacks of old, was in the hands of the 9th Division a little more than an hour after the beginning of the advance. By night the 29th Division had Gheluvelt, with its heroic memories of the 2nd Worcesters' charge on the 31st of October, 1914, and was astride the Menin Road a mile east of it. The Belgians had Zonnebeke, and were in touch with the 9th Division on the Broodseinde Ridge. But it was the 9th which had most accomplished. Passing its third Brigade through in early afternoon, it had seized the village of Becelaere. At its greatest point the day's advance exceeded six thousand yards. Verily were times changed in these regions.

By an early hour it had been apparent that affairs were marching swiftly, and at eleven in the morning the II. Corps ordered the 36th Division to move forward, with its Infantry Brigades in echelon. The 109th was ordered to entrain first, and was carried by light railway to Potijze, where it detrained at 3 p.m. It then received orders to march to the neighbourhood of the Bellewaarde Lake. The 108th Brigade was moved east of Ypres at noon; the 107th to Potijze later in the afternoon. So fast had been the advance that the 107th Brigade's first orders were to move no further than Vlamertinghe, but on arrival the men were told to keep their places in the trucks, which bore them forward another three miles before dusk. Headquarters of the Division were established in the old dug-outs of the Ypres Ramparts at 2 p.m.

The plan for the 29th of September was that one Brigade of the 36th - the 109th - was to come into line between the 29th and 9th Divisions. The 109th Brigade was to be supported by the 153rd Brigade R.F.A., hitherto under the orders of the 9th Division, if its batteries could be got into action in time. As a matter of fact, owing to the shocking state of the roads, they were not able to fire a shot till the next day. The 109th Brigade was to pass through the 27th Brigade in Becelaere, the latter Brigade then following in rear of the assaulting Brigade of its own Division. The objective of the 109th was Terhand, but, if this were easily attained, the intention was to exploit the success.

 It was attacking with the 2nd Inniskillings on the right, the 9th on the left, and the 1st in support. A dawn assault would have been desirable, but, owing to the difficulty the 109th Brigade experienced in advancing by night across broken country on roads so damaged and thronged, it was postponed till 9-30 a.m. The Brigade's difficulties were increased by heavy bombing of the approaches to the line by enemy aircraft during the hours of darkness.

The rain continued all night, accompanied by great cold, and in this blasted area there was no shelter for the troops. By a stroke of fortune, however, the weather improved in the morning, the sun appearing just about the hour of Zero. The advance was at first very rapid. If the 109th had no artillery support, it had small opposition from that arm. Its difficulties were caused by machine-guns, singly or in nests of from two to five, cleverly disposed in depth behind hedges or in buildings. For hedges there were now, and, though the ground had been heavily shelled, it was no longer the sea of mud and shell-holes of the old Salient battle-ground.

These German machine-guns were attacked with greatest élan. Often the leading infantry put them out of action by rifle-fire before the Lewis guns, a serious burden on such ground, could be brought into action against them. Still, there is no reason to doubt that the rate of advance could have been swifter had artillery support been available. The left battalion, the 9th Inniskillings, aided by the magnificent rush of the 9th Division to north of it, found matters considerably easier than did the and Inniskillings on the right. From two o'clock onwards the latter was held up by machine-gun fire from Terhand, while the former pressed forward north of the village. Terhand fell at last at a quarter to four. By this time the 9th Inniskillings was on the southern outskirts of Dadizeele, which was captured by the 9th Division a few minutes later. Then, at six o'clock, the 9th Inniskillings forced its way into Vijfwegen, a road-side hamlet a mile south of Dadizeele.

The day's advance had been once more remarkable, but much more so on the left of the II. Corps than on its right flank. The 9th Division, from Becelaere to Dadizeele, had gained well-nigh three miles of ground. From Vijfwegen, however, the line ran almost west - that is to say, it faced south - to Terhand, and thence to south of Becelaere, where the 29th Division had been held up.

At 4 a.m. the 108th Brigade had moved off in support to the 109th, being upon the high ground west of Becelaere by 7 p.m. It was ordered to move forward again, pass through the 109th at dawn, and advance with as objective the great Menin-Roulers highway from Kezelberg northward. The 29th Division, meanwhile, was to make a great effort to force its way up into line on the right. "D" Company of the Machine-Gun Battalion was attached to the 108th Brigade, together with its own Stokes Mortar Battery.

The position to be attacked had few artificial defences - the German wired line defending Menin and Roulers was just west of Dadizeele and Vijfwegen, and had already been pierced - but it was naturally strong. The embankment of the huge main road formed good protection to the enemy. But the key to the position was a hillock half-way between the road and Vijfwegen - Hill 41. Sixty feet above the surrounding country, crowned with several farms and their outbuildings, which had been strengthened with concrete, it was at once invaluable to the enemy and an excellent defensive position in fighting of this nature, when very little artillery was available to shake its machine-gun detachments prior to the infantry assault. With plenty, even of field artillery, it would not have been a very formidable obstacle, while a concentration of heavy artillery would have blown the defenders off its crest. But the big guns were still far behind.

At 7-30 a.m. the 108th Brigade passed through the troops of the 109th. The 9th Irish Fusiliers was on the right, the 12th Rifles on the left, and the 1st Irish Fusiliers in reserve, eight hundred yards behind the leading battalions. Each had one section of machine-guns and one Stokes mortar attached. The advance encountered considerable machine-gun fire from Hill 41 and the Menin-Roulers Road. Despite this, north of the hill it went forward in splendid fashion. The men of the 12th Rifles fought their way through the Zuidhoek Copse, and reached the Menin - Roulers Road by 10-30 a.m..

Touch being gained here with the 9th Division, the 12th Rifles, according to previous agreement, took over from its troops as far north as Klephoek Cross Roads. On the right the 9th Irish Fusiliers reached the Gheluwe-Vifwegen Road, and pressed on south of the latter village and past the southern flank of Hill 41. But upon the hill itself the German machine-gunners resisted all attacks. On the right of the 9th Irish Fusiliers the 29th Division made great strides, despite machine-guns distributed in depth all along its front. Though it did not take Gheluwe, and was unable to do so all day, its left flank reached the Gheluwe-Vijfwegen Road in touch with the 108th Brigade.

At last the 9th Irish Fusiliers also reached the MeninRoulers Road, at Kezelberg, and attempted to work up it and obtain touch with its comrades of the 12th Rifles, a thousand yards further north, thus surrounding Hill 41. One strongly held farm-house, with twelve prisoners, was taken at 12-30, but thereafter fire from the hill prevented any move northward.

The capture of Hill 41 evidently required a serious effort. General Coffin arranged with the 9th Division that its 50th Brigade R.F.A. should support an attack with a barrage of smoke and high explosive. Behind this one company of the 12th Rifles was to advance at 4 p.m.

The Riflemen, in face of heavy fire, went forward most gallantly. The German resistance was equally determined. For every hedge there was a battle, the bayonet being frequently used. Thirty-one prisoners were taken, and about the same number of dead Germans counted after the attack. The crest, however, could not be reached, a line being established lust short of it. But the strength of the German defence had been under-estimated. The story of Moeuvres was repeated with regard to this battalion. Before reinforcements could move up a heavy German bombardment came as prelude to a counter-attack, estimated at three hundred strong. Atop the hill it was held by the fire of Lewis guns, but, with their superiority of numbers, the Germans pushed round on either flank, rendering the position untenable. At six o'clock the company was compelled to fall back. Its casualties had not been heavy considering the fierce nature of the fighting.

The 107th Brigade had reached the line of Becelaere by the morning, and had been ordered to push up a battalion on the right of the 108th Brigade in the afternoon. The 2nd Rifles had attempted to advance upon Klythoek, on the Menin-Roulers Road, but had been held up by heavy machine-gun fire. Another attempt to advance was planned for the morning of October the 1st. This time there was more effective artillery support, two batteries of 6-inch howitzers being able to shell Hill 41 at long range. To attack the hill, two companies of the reserve battalion, the 1st Rifles, were brought up.

The 12th Rifles was to co-operate on the left, and the 2nd Rifles of the 107th Brigade on the right. The 9th Division was to endeavour to cross the Menin-Roulers Road and capture Ledeghem, on the Menin-Roulers Railway. The new attack was launched at 6-15 a.m. in heavy mist. On the right the leading companies of the 2nd Rifles lost direction, The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bridcott, was killed while attempting to reorganize them.

On the left also the attack failed. On Hill 41, however, the companies of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, fighting their way desperately forward in face of heavy resistance, reached Twigg Farm, just short of the crest, and captured that place with twenty-two prisoners. Further they were unable to go in face of the machine-gun fire. The fire from the eastern slope of the hill was also causing serious trouble to the troops of the 9th Division, now approaching the Menin-Roulers Railway. After capturing Ledeghem the Lowland Brigade made an attempt to turn Hill 41 from the north, to aid the 36th Division, but was beaten off in turn by the irrepressible machine-guns.

One more attempt finally to clear the obstinate hill was made that day by the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade, swinging in from the north. It was unsuccessful in its object, but it achieved another not less important. The Germans were about to launch a heavy counter-attack on the exposed right flank of the 9th Division, when this diversion checked them.

The affair is thus reported in the History of the 9th (Scottish) Division:"Lieut.-Colonel Smyth saw the Germans collecting troops for a great counter-stroke, and the K.O.S.B. were bracing themselves for a desperate resistance at Manhattan Farm, when the timely arrival of the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, who made a most heroic attack on Hill 41 from the north, scared the enemy and turned his efforts solely to defence. Though the Inniskillings failed to capture the hill, their plucky effort probably saved the K.O.S.B., and so great was the admiration of the latter and the troops of the Ninth Division who witnessed the attack, that the G.O.C. at their request wrote at once to the Thirty-sixth Division expressing the admiration and thanks of the officers and men of the Ninth."

Local counter-attacks did come against Twigg Farm, to be beaten off with loss by the company of the 1st Irish Fusiliers which held it. That night the 109th Brigade relieved the 108th.

The action of this day and of those following cannot be understood without a brief survey of the general situation. The British advance of the first two days, at its greatest point, from east of Ypres to the Menin-Roulers Road, had been eight miles. The Germans had been broken and thrown into confusion. But the very rapidity of the Allied advance, over such roads as those which crossed the welter of the old Ypres Salient, had created new difficulties. It was hard enough, as has been related, to bring guns forward. But that was by no means the main difficulty, even where the artillery was concerned. Batteries in an advance go forward only.

The limbers which feed them, the lorries which feed the limbers from the train, must go forward and backward. Therein lay the real trouble. The roads were choked. The only tolerable among them, because, bad though they were, the remains of the old pave held them together, were the Menin and Zonnebeke Roads. Upon each was a solid mass of transport, which often for hours at a time remained immobile. A few days after the events already recorded, wagons of the 107th Brigade took thirty-six hours to proceed from Potijze Château to Terhand.

Captain Walker thus describes the Zonnebeke Road on the night of the 30th of September: "I had never previously realized the number and variety of vehicles which move in support of three Divisions; indeed, I think this road fed only the 9th and 36th Divisions.  There were limbers by scores with rations; there were G.S. wagons with forage for the battalion transports forward; there were R.E. wagons, mess-carts, guns and ammunition; there were lorries stuck in shell-holes in the road, and the cause of most of the trouble. On every odd bit of ground bordering the road were French cavalrymen. The surface and the language were equally bad, and there was mud everywhere.

I had to wind my way through these troubles for several miles. During my journey there was practically no movement of the traffic. It had taken 'C' Company's transport fourteen hours to do the six miles from Ypres to the Ridge, and the Company bivouacked on the road for a night. A Gotha flew down that road at midnight, dropping bombs at regular intervals. I'm glad I missed that. There must have been many casualties, for that road was a mass of animals and men. Why only one Gotha was out that night beats me.

'D' Company, which was supposed to be with the advancing infantry, was held up with everybody else. Major Wood, the O.C., was panic-stricken, having the General's orders to be in action at a stated time and place, and, putting eight guns on pack mules, set off across the desolation. I believe about four guns did eventually come into action, but a couple of mules got into shell-holes from which they could not be extricated; and had to be despatched."

On the one hand, then, the Germans, now driven back to the fringe of civilized and unbroken country, with roads and railways behind them, were enabled to make some hasty attempts at reorganization; on the other, the Allies, having overrun their supplies, were yet under the necessity of keeping up steady pressure, to prevent the enemy from improving and settling down upon those positions. Doubtless the enemy had expected to be driven back and eventually to form up upon the line of the Lys, but he had been driven back much more quickly than he had anticipated, and was now anxious lest his troops should fall back piecemeal upon the river, and its line be prematurely forced, as the British line of the Somme had been forced in March. He was therefore bringing up fresh troops, and, above all, artillery, with the support of which a complete change had appeared in the fighting quality of his infantry.

The next fortnight was to be marked by a constant see-saw, by desperate, if minor, stroke and counter-stroke. Little more ground was to be won by the Allies till they had mastered the difficulties behind them, pushed forward adequate artillery and ammunition for a new "full-dress" attack to provide the initial momentum for a great new advance.

On October the 2nd, the day after its relief of the 108th Brigade, the 109th experienced the strength of the enemy's artillery and his determination. At 5 p.m. a heavy barrage of artillery of all calibres fell upon the front line, upon Dadizeele, and all approaches. Half an hour later the German infantry advanced to the attack. The force of the barrage had caused a withdrawal from some forward positions. These the enemy penetrated, but was quickly driven out with the bayonet. By night the line was completely restored.

It was during this attack that Captain G. J. Bruce, D.S.O., M.C., Brigade Major, 109th Brigade, making his way forward through the barrage to ascertain the position, was killed.

Captain Bruce was one of the Division's original officers, and his total service with it now amounted to over four years, except for a few months in 1917, when he had been Brigade Major of the 47th Infantry Brigade, 16th Division. His quickness and cleverness, and his wonderful eye for country, which filled many a good professional soldier with envy, made him a very fine example of the "civilian" staff officer. His personal bravery was quite proverbial among all ranks of the Division. He was one of those rare and fortunate men who do not seem to require a mental effort, a summoning of resolution, to face great danger. He walked into it as-naturally and as unconcernedly as he walked into his office. By all who knew him well George Bruce will long be remembered as a sagacious soldier and a fine spirit.

The next three days passed without further attempt at progress on the front of the 36th Division. All along the line, indeed, the advance was held up, and preparations were in train for an important new attack. For this it was necessary that the troops should have some preliminary rest. On the night of the 4th the 108th Brigade again relieved the 109th, while the 107th was relieved by troops of the 35th Division. On the 7th the 109th Brigade moved back across the devastation to a camp between Ypres and Poperinghe, where baths and clean clothes could be provided, and training for the new battle carried out. The 107th Brigade had not such good fortune, as it was retired as far only as Polygon Wood, and accommodated in canvas trench shelters.

Meanwhile artillery had moved up in force. By October the 7th there was in position covering the 36th Division's frontage its own Divisional Artillery, the 113th Army Brigade, and three batteries of the 4th French Cavalry Division. Medium trench mortars, including the 6-inch Stokes, had also been brought forward in face of extraordinary difficulties. The enemy's artillery was very active, and the shelling in its intensity now recalled the days of the big battles of trench warfare.

On October the 11th, after an intense artillery preparation, in which the trench mortars took part, two platoons of the 9th Irish Fusiliers captured Goldflake Farm, with fourteen prisoners and three light machine-guns. This very strong "pill-box," on the southern slope of Hill 41, had defied all previous attempts. It did not on this occasion remain long in our hands. At evening, after a tremendous bombardment, the enemy launched an attack on the hill. Not only was, Goldflake Farm retaken, but from Twigg and Mansard Farms, on the crest, our men were driven out. An immediate counter-attack caused Twigg Farm to change hands for the third time. Next morning before it was light a patrol got back Mansard Farm, with another prisoner and another machine-gun. That was the last of the local fighting. All things were now prepared for attack upon a very different scale

The 35th Division, it has been recorded, had come into line on the right of the 36th. At the same time the 29th, its old right-hand neighbour, had been moved up to its left flank, from Klephoek northward, and now separated it from the 9th Division. The Second Army and the Belgians were now to attack with the objective of the Lys. This operation, if successful, would almost certainly cause the enemy to evacuate the great industrial cities of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing.

The first general objective of the II. Corps was the Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway. Upon this the 36th Division was directed, from the Lys on the right to the northern skirts of the town of Heule. It had also upon its front two other small towns, Moorseele and Gulleghem.

The three were in a straight line from west to east; Moorseele being about two and a half miles from the present position, Gulleghem four and a half, and Heule six. The attack was to be carried out by the 107th Brigade on the right, and the 109th on the left. To the former was attached the 121st, and to the latter the 150th Field Company, while each had a company of the Machine-Gun Battalion. A section of each Field Company was in readiness to bridge the Heulebeek if necessary.

The Divisional Reserve consisted of the 108th Brigade, the 36th Machine-Gun Battalion (less two companies), the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), the 122nd Field Company, two platoons of VIII. Corps Cyclists, and a company of the 104th Machine-Gun Battalion. Each Brigade was to attack with one battalion in line, one in support, and one in reserve. The Division's frontage was about a thousand yards, though on the objective of the Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway it grew to fifteen hundred.

With the artillery now at the disposal of the Division, and the considerable heavy artillery at that of the II. Corps, the barrage was to be something like the barrage of old days. There was, in fact, one field gun or howitzer to a little more than twenty yards. There was to be no preliminary bombardment.

The barrage was to come down two hundred yards in front of the forming-up line of the infantry three minutes before Zero, and to begin to creep forward at that hour. It was to move at a rate that would have seemed incredible a year ago, one hundred yards in two minutes, with a pause of fifteen minutes every fifteen hundred yards. East of Moorseele the field artillery barrage was to halt from Zero plus 115 minutes to Zero plus 132 minutes, then to cease. Upon this line the infantry was to remain an hour, to allow the support battalions to pass through the leaders, and batteries of field artillery to move up west of the town and aid the next advance.

At two o'clock on the morning of October the 14th the attacking troops were formed up east of the Vijfwegen-Zuidhoek Road, in trenches hastily dug by the Pioneers and 122nd Field Company.

At the same hour the 108th Brigade began a quiet withdrawal, leaving its outposts on Hill 41 in position. The batteries of the field artillery were in position close up to the front line. Even then their final barrage east of Moorseele would be at almost extreme range for the 18-pounders.

At 5-32, on a morning most fortunately fine, but foggy, the thunder of the barrage broke out all along the line. Three minutes later it began to move forward, followed by the infantry. The mist made the keeping of direction difficult, and the attackers eventually fell behind the barrage. It had served its purpose, however, in keeping down fire from the German front-line "pill-boxes," which had been the cause of so much trouble in the last fortnight. Behind it the infantrymen swept in with the bayonet, and the struggle that had so long endured was ended in a few fierce moments.

East of the Menin-Roulers Railway the enemy had ample opportunity to stop the advance, had he been the grim-fighting German of old. But this he certainly was not, though the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division, opposed to the 36th, was one of his best. By eight o'clock the 15th Rifles, the leading battalion of the 107th Brigade, were upon the outskirts of Moorseele.

Their neighbours, the 1st Inniskillings, were slightly ahead, having reached the Rolleghem - Cappelle Road north of the village. Here they were held up by machine-gun fire from the town, till the latter was captured by the 15th Rifles. Then a line was swiftly consolidated east of Moorseele, while the support battalions, the 1st Rifles on the right and 2nd Inniskillings on the left, made ready to pass through, and the batteries were rushed forward into action close to the western outskirts of the town.

This operation was splendidly accomplished. The first action of Major R. R. Sharp, D.S.O., M.C., commanding A/173, on reaching Moorseele, now being heavily bombarded, was to ascend the church steeple. From there he saw German 77-mm. battery doing great damage. Fire opened by his battery, under his observation, killed the detachment and horses of this battery and blew up its ammunition, dumped beside the guns. The latter were captured in the subsequent advance.

A GREAT DAY

All had gone excellently so far. Casualties had been light, and strong positions had been taken with surprising ease, Prisoners numbered over a hundred and fifty, while:#ten field guns and five horses had also been taken. As for light machine-guns, with which the whole German front had bristled, they were now tossed in heaps, too large to be counted for the time being. It was a fine achievement to have accomplished between half-past five and ten o'clock, But it was the beginning only of the day's work

At 10-35 the advance was resumed, in weather still misty. Once more all went well. There had been no trouble with the Heulebeek, the bridges across which had not been destroyed by the enemy. For over a mile the two battalions went forward almost unchecked, driving in or capturing the machine-gun groups that disputed their passage. Then, a thousand yards west of Gulleghem, came resistance more severe. The machine-gun fire had greatly increased, and the town was defended by three lines of wire. Attempts were made to outflank the town from north and south. They were partially successful, some of the wire being negotiated, but not all. By midnight a line three hundred yards west of Gulleghem was being consolidated, and arrangements were in train for an attack at nine the following day with a fresh barrage.

On the right the troops of the 36th Division were in touch with those of the 35th Division; on the left with those of the 29th, held up in front of the village of Salines. To the north the attack had been equally successful, and the whole line ran almost due north and south, the Belgians, who had fought magnificently, having their heads slightly in front. It had been a splendid day's work; for the Allies one of the great days of the war. With casualties comparatively light, they had driven back the enemy four miles upon a wide front, capturing ten thousand prisoners and over a hundred guns.

The barrage for the 15th, in view of the events of the preceding day, was slowed down slightly, to a hundred yards in three minutes. East of Gulleghem there was to be a halt of three-quarters of an hour, to allow the third battalion of each Brigade to pass through and advance upon Heule.

With the first onrush resistance was swept aside. Twenty minutes after Zero the 1st Rifles was across the Gulleghem-Wevelghem Road. A few minutes later the 2nd Inniskillings had the whole of Gulleghem in its area, save a few "pockets" of machine-guns which could be cleared at leisure. On the left the 87th Brigade took Salines about the same time. The 1st Rifles, destined to pass through its sister battalion on the front of the 107th Brigade, did not move up quite swiftly enough, and, as a consequence, lost the barrage. The 9th Inniskillings, on the left, with the advantage of a good main road in its area, pushed ahead north of the Heulebeek. By two o'clock its troops were through Heule, and upon the objective of the Courtrai-Ingelmunster Railway, east of the town. It had advanced a mile and a half in two and a half hours.

The 1st Rifles, meanwhile, without artillery support, had been brought to a halt by machine-gun fire from farms and hedges. A new barrage was arranged, to commence at 4 p.m. Under its cover the 1st Rifles quickly overran the enemy machine-guns. By 7 p.m. the battalion was on the railway embankment, in touch with the 9th Inniskillings. On the left the 29th Division had likewise reached the railway, while further north the 9th Division and the Belgians, who had made one of the greatest advances of a day in face of opposition, were miles east of it, in possession of Cuerne and Bavichove. The left flank of the 35th Division, on the other hand, was a thousand yards in rear of right of the 107th Brigade.

The original intention had been to pass the troops of the 108th Brigade, the head of which was on Moorseele at the time the morning's attack was launched, through those of the other Brigades that afternoon, to advance upon the Lys at Courtrai. The slight delay above recorded caused a change in this arrangement.

COURTAI ENTERED

The 108th Brigade was now ordered to pass through at dawn on the 16th, and establish itself upon the Lys. During the night the 107th Brigade was ordered to send out a patrol to discover whether the Germans were going to make a stand west of the great canalized river.

By a curious coincidence there happened to be in the 2nd Rifles an officer, Lieutenant F. Adams, who was a native of the city of Courtrai. He was naturally chosen to make the reconnaissance, but his intimate knowledge of Courtrai may not have been altogether an advantage, for he made an investigation so thorough that he was not back till the following morning, when the barrage for the advance of the 108th Brigade had commenced.

He had discovered that the Germans had evacuated all the quarter of the city north-west of the river, and blown up the five bridges which spanned the latter. When this news, and also the information that the troops of the 29th Division were on the Lys, north of the city, was received, the barrage was instantly stopped and the 12th Rifles, with no other protection than that of advanced and flank guards, marched down. the road from Heule into Courtrai.

There were scenes of great enthusiasm among the citizens, who came forth into the streets from their cellars to greet the troops. But the Germans were not far off. As the first British troops appeared on the quays of the Lys, here eighty feet wide, heavy machine-gun fire burst out all along the opposite bank. Anything more difficult than to force a crossing, in the heart of a city full of friendly civilians, to whom and to whose property it was desired to do as little damage as might be, against German troops of the old mettle, could not well be imagined. But the Germans opposite were not of the old mettle, and General Vaughan decided to attempt to throw a bridge across in broad daylight. The 122nd Field Company with its pontoons had moved forward in readiness.

At 2 p.m. a smoke-screen was put down. Five minutes later, under its cover, the first boat-load was across. The men leapt ashore exultingly and drove the Germans from the bank. They had had scarce a casualty. Another boat-load followed, and in an incredibly short time the bridge was practicable for infantry. But the German artillery soon had its range. The men of the 122nd Field Company, who displayed the greatest gallantry, suffered heavy loss, and eventually the bridge was destroyed. The party on the other shore, however, held its ground without difficulty. The machine-gunners of "C" Company, attached to the Brigade, distinguished themselves particularly in this day's operations.

The obvious course now was to await darkness, throw another bridge across, clear the city of Germans, and be ready to advance eastward at peep of day. But news arrived meanwhile which altered these plans. The Allies were not going to batter Courtrai. They were going to force the Lys to northward, swing half-right, and drive down upon the Scheldt, or Escaut, as this portion of the river is called by French-speaking people, thus turning all the great industrial towns. As a fact, the evacuation of Lille, the westernmost, was proceeding at this very moment. The 36th Division was required for the new thrust, and was to be relieved at once by the 123rd Brigade of the 41st Division.

In these circumstances, as the bridgehead - without a bridge - was useless to the relieving Brigade, the bridgehead party was quietly and skilfully withdrawn at dusk and ferried across, together with six captured Germans. The relief was complete by eight o'clock, and the 108th Brigade marched back through new-won Heule and Gulleghem, to the village of Drei Masten, north of the latter town. The other Brigades had begun to move back earlier in the afternoon.

If the troops had been cheerful before, they were jubilant now. They knew themselves infinitely better men than the enemy, who, still supported by huge masses of artillery and by machine-gun fire which General Jacob later described as "the heaviest ever experienced in this war," never awaited their onslaught long. It was evident to all now that the war would be over by Christmas. A little longer and the German Army would be beaten to its knees

DIFFICULTIES OF SUPPLY

The worst danger, the greatest obstacle to the launching of the death-thrust, was now, in fact, behind, not in front. It lay in those terrible roads of the devastated area far behind, with which the troops, now upon the untouched soil of the richest agricultural land in Europe, might feel they had no connection, but across which every mouthful of food they ate and every bullet they fired had to come. The strain upon the mechanism of the lorries was tremendous, and they were constantly breaking down. The strain upon their drivers was no less, and at this period they were less easy to replace than their wagons. The loss of horses, too, from bombing, in the Artillery and the Supply Services, had been very serious and could not be replaced at the moment.

To add to the difficulties of communication, rations had to be brought up for the Belgian civilians, many of whom had been left stripped bare and in danger of starvation by the Germans, who took horses, carts, cattle, fowls, arid all stores they could lay hand upon, in their retreat. In the hardest work they were ever called on to perform, the A.S.C., both mechanical and horsed services, scored a triumph. The success they achieved was due in part to good organization and industry.

But it was due, above all, to the grit and determination of the Junior officers and drivers in the performance of their tasks. The lorry-driver, who stuck for fifteen hours at his wheel amid the ruts and turmoil of the Menin Road, as many of them did, with bombs crashing down at night; the section of the Divisional Train bringing up its wagons through valleys wreathed and stinking with gas, these men in truth deserved well of the infantrymen facing the bullets further forward, and were in truth their companions-in-arms.