The 12th Royal Irish Rifles

Hanging on the old barbed wire ... Somme 1st July 1916 .. the fate of so many. Drawing by Soren http://stores.ebay.co.uk/Passchendaele-Prints-and-Drawings

INTRODUCTION

THE Battle of the Somme is a dead subject - or at least that's what many would have you believe. Or have we become convinced that everything that deserves to be written has been written?

The interest in family history has never been greater, due largely to the development of the Internet. One of the most fruitful areas of research for family historians is the period of the ‘Great War’.

New archives have been opened up to the general public for the first time and thousands are now delving into volumes of documentation from the comfort of their own homes.

For most, the simple discovery of an ancestor’s name and number will satisfy their curiosity. But for many more this will not be enough and there is now a hunger for more information about the man’s battalion, the ground he fought over and the nature of his role.

The following document is the result of a renewed look at the battle in which not just division, brigade and battalion movements are recounted; where the focus is not just on one side of the battle as in most books written on the subject. It is an attempt to look at the events of so many years ago through the eyes of the men who fought on the Somme, whether they were wearing Khaki or Field Grey uniforms.

It is the result of several dedicated individuals taking another look at that momentous day, for both the common British soldier as well as his opponent, the common German soldier.

The men who fought on that hot July day came from Ireland, England, Wales, Scotland, Newfoundland, Prussia, Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and more. Most came to the battle filled with hopes and determination to ‘do well’. Some men on both sides had traveled great distance to participate in the deadliest war in history up to that time. Americans, for example, served on both sides of the wire.

It did not matter if their aim was to defeat the German Army in the field or to defend the territory captured in the offensives of 1914. They were - for the most part - ready to do their duty to King or Kaiser.

These men were basically the same - only language and the color of the uniform worn differentiated them.

Each man was concerned about his family, friends or their comrades in the battalion or regiment they belonged to. They wondered if they would live to see the next day or their loved ones at home. Some were brave; some were not. Few men who fought in the war survive to this day and as they fade away one by one a piece of history is lost forever. By looking at various documents, whether a battalion war diary or a newspaper account, the names and faces of these men will be remembered for future generations. This is an attempt to examine an old, somewhat 'jaded' subject in a new light by integrating accounts from the German and British side to form a single narrative. It is hoped that a similar review of the entire battle on 1 July 1916 can be completed.

Perhaps not everything has already been written on the subject .....

Meet the team ...

In the first part of this project we are looking at a relatively insignificant, little known part of the battlefield, the northern bank of the Ancre. The action fought on this hot July morning is barely mentioned in the British Official History of the War and receives almost as little attention by the Reichsarchivs account of the fighting, both published in the period between the world wars.

Ralph Whitehead            Des Blackadder

American researcher Ralph J. Whitehead has immersed himself in the history of the German troops who served on the Somme front from their arrival in the area in 1914. His knowledge of the ‘German side of no-man’s land’ is widely respected.  Des Blackadder, a keen amateur from Northern Ireland, recounts the story from the viewpoint of the Ulster Division.

The defenders and their defences

Ralph J. Whitehead

German soldiers had come to the Somme region in late September 1914 with the arrival of the units of the XIV Reserve Corps. Men from Württemberg and Baden comprised the bulk of the troops fighting in the corps fought at places that have become well known to many: Fricourt, La Boisselle, Ovillers, Thiepval, Beaumont-Hamel etc.

The German army settled in to the newly captured territory and started to erect entrenchments and defensive works, they were here to stay. Over the next 21 months the German lines took form and expanded in size. What had once been a single trench in 1914 eventually consisted of a series of positions containing up to three trenches each covered in dense belts of barbed wire.

The River Ancre caused an interruption in the German defensive system. Although little more than a large shallow stream, sluggish and bordered by swampy ground, it was still vitally important ground. It formed a natural break in the continuous German lines. Every attempt was made by the German army to protect this vulnerable location, as did the French, followed later by the British.

When the opening bombardment started on 24 June those defending the German positions on the northern bank of the Ancre were men from the I Battalion, 119th Reserve Infanterie Regiment . The four companies of the I Battalion, Nos. 1-4, were positioned in Sectors B5, B6 and B7 of the Beaumont Sector. It was normal to position three companies in the front line trenches while the fourth was held nearby in reserve.

The extensive trench system occupied by the I Battalion had been created by several regiments including men from the 99th Reserve Infanterie Regiment that had a large number of miners in the rank and file.

The I Line consisted of three rows of trenches connected to one another through a series of communication trenches. Because of the unusual situation posed by the Ancre a series of trenches had been created running parallel to the river up toward Beaucourt as well as across the swampy low ground along the river. One of these defensive locations had been given the name ‘Beaver Colony' (Biber Kolonie) due to the manner in which the position was created above ground. Entrenching was impossible due to the high ground water level along the marshy banks of the river, an occurrence usually associated with the trenches in Flanders. The front line was extended toward the swampy Ancre ground as far as possible through a trench known as the Tal Stellung, literally the Valley position.

The Tal Stellung was also extended to the north running parallel to the railway line much of this position was constructed above ground in the manner of the Beaver Colony.

The trenches were well constructed and equipped with numerous deep dugouts, especially those along the steep hills lining the riverbank. Each trench was protected by dense, wide belts of wire entanglements designed to direct any enemy attacker into the field of fire of the regimental machine guns positioned at intervals along the line. The machine guns were placed in positions where the maximum effect of the gun could be exploited, usually a spot where flanking fire could be directed against any enemy attack.

The dugouts and tunnels driven into the hillside along the Ancre were of unusual depth and in most cases impervious to even the heaviest British shell. The majority of the men sheltering inside them, deep underground, would be safe and ready to repel any attack made against their line.

Above: Modern day view from St. Pierre Divion towards the north bank of the Ancre. The red circle indicates German lines - a white lightning flash of chalk in the soil. This gives a good perspective of the battlefield at this point. The Ulstermen attacked from the left side of the picture.

The trench map above kindly provided by 'Croonaert' from the Great War Forum.

The sectors held by the I Battalion, 119th Reserve were protected by three machine guns from the 2nd Machine Gun Company, the remainder of the guns were positioned near Sector Beaumont-North. The 1st machine Gun Company had been sent to the opposite bank of the river and during the attack on 1 July would be occupied with the attacks against the Schwaben Redoubt and the village of Thiepval.

One of the three machine guns located in Sector Beaumont-South was forced to relocate after British artillery fire had damaged the dugout being used by the gun crew. The new location located in the second line was better suited for use as flanking fire against targets south of the river leaving the sector only two heavy machine guns when the attack came.

Additional reserves were stationed in the vicinity in the form of the 2nd Recruit Company, men who were in the final stages of training before being integrated into the line companies. The recruit company was positioned in Feste Alt Württemberg, a strongpoint on the outskirts of Beaucourt behind Sector Beaumont-South.

Each battalion had an average strength of 850 men, each company averaged 210 – 215 officers and men. This would mean that the front line trenches of Sector Beaumont-South would be protected by approximately 650 men.

During the 7 days bombardment, 24 – 30 June 1916 the positions of the I Battalion were heavily damaged by artillery fire and many trenches were almost leveled, wire entanglements were damaged and a number of dugouts collapsed or were heavily damaged but overall losses were small: 1st Coy 1 man killed, 5 men died from wounds, 2nd Coy 5 men killed, 2 men died from wounds, 3rd Coy none killed, 4th Coy 3 men killed, 2nd MG Coy 1 man killed, 1 man died from wounds with approximately 45 men wounded; some so slightly that they remained with the regiment and were ready to receive the attack on 1 July with their comrades.

The opening day of the bombardment consisted mainly of shrapnel, which was used against the front line trenches. This caused little damage and virtually no losses. However, in the evening heavier guns shelled the routes leading to the rear making any journey extremely dangerous. The soldiers in the front line dug-outs had to tighten their belts as supply columns were often forced to return to base because the ferocity of the shelling.

By 25 June heavy shells mixed with shrapnel, were directed against dugouts, which were being spotted by enemy aircraft, which enjoyed almost total superiority over the sector. This time, damage to the lines was more serious and some losses, mainly trench sentries and carrying parties, had been incurred.

The third day of the bombardment, 26 June, began with a similar fire pattern but between 3 and 4 p.m. gas clouds were sent against Beaumont-South. The fumes came up to the ravine in no man's land but the gas drifted toward the Ancre, never reaching the German trenches. Leiling Schlucht and Beaumont-North were subjected to the heaviest fire during this 24 hour period.

British raids against line held by 2nd Coy early in the morning of 28 June were repulsed by heavy defensive fire from the trench garrison.

Meanwhile, the artillery bombardment continued, causing more damage to the trenches and once again gas was used to little or no effect. Two further raids against the 2nd Coy, in the early hours of both 29th and 30th June, were repulsed with heavy fire.

Above: German dead in trenches in the Albert Sector 1st July 1916. (Imperial War Museum).

By the final hours of the bombardment, the position looked dreadful with much of the wire destroyed by shrapnel and spherical mines. Many of the trenches resembled a crater line, half buried holes marked the entrances to dugouts. The road leading toward the railway station was littered with shattered wagons, dead horses, scattered material, fallen branches and trees.

However, night after night transports still made the trip to the front suffering losses each time.

Despite the shelling, the German soldiers kept a constant vigil along front. Sentries were well aware that an attack could come at any moment. Many stayed in the relative safety of dugout stairwells but they would routinely pop up to look out over no man's land. Others used mirrors on the rear trench wall that provided a view toward the enemy lines.

Keeping this vigil was a dangerous occupation and losses amongst the observers grew steadily.

It was a testament to the effectiveness of the German defenses that the entire regiment had lost just 20 killed and less than 100 men wounded in the preliminary bombardment. These losses were minimal considering the weight of shells and shrapnel fired at the German lines.

Repelling the infantry attack

Intelligence reports obtained through ‘Moritz' listening stations indicated that the long-awaited British attack would take place on 1 July and all commands were duly notified. Many of the telephone lines were intact and communication to the batteries in the rear was secure.

To the eye of any German officer, this section of front may well have been battered but it was far from broken and the unit commander must have regarded his situation with some confidence.

At 6.30 on 1 July, the bombardment rose to an intensity few had experienced before. Smoke and dust filled the air as the ‘hurricane’ barrage tore into the German front line.

‘This was the attack. Everyone sensed it. Everything was made ready for battle, everything was strapped on, the rifles were grasped and hand grenades were in the right place. The officers and Other Ranks waited on the stairways and in the dugouts, ready to take up the defense at the moment the enemy fire was transferred to the rear.

Shortly before 8 o'clock it suddenly grew quiet at Beaumont-South. The English came out of their trenches in dense waves and climbed down walking into the hollow and up the hillside. In seconds the trench garrison was alerted, the positions were occupied and they opened fire. Calls were made to the artillery through the existing telephone lines, red light balls were also launched requesting barrage fire from the field guns and light howitzers located in the rear.

(Although the German defenders were facing soldiers of the Ulster Division, it mattered little to them ... the British soldier was collectively known as ‘English’ amongst the Kaiser’s troops.)

‘The infantry and machine guns mowed the attackers down so that the attackers soon hesitated and threw themselves down."

The English were successful in penetrating individual places of the front line trench only in Sector B5. However the garrison of the 2nd trench, running parallel to the 1st trench, attacked them frontally and threw them out. They captured two Lewis guns that had already been brought into position. Some of the men were probably familiar with the operation of the Lewis Gun and could put them to use against their former owners.

The enemy was also able to penetrate into the Ancre ground and into the Tal Stellung in front of the transverse tunnel gallery. The opposing sides became involved in a hand grenade fight that was swiftly decided in favor of the German garrison. The survivors of the first attack now took up positions in shell holes close in front of the German line and started a firefight while new attack waves broke forth.

The new waves came under heavy artillery fire and the English ranks were soon brought into disorder. Everyone looked for protection in the hollow that ran toward the Ancre stream, now the fire from the erdmörsers struck them down. The erdmörsers fired a 24.5cm shell constructed of sheet iron and weighing 24 kilograms, 12 of which was the explosive charge. The effect of the exploding shells was devastating to the Ulstermen. Finally, the survivors withdrew back to their starting point. At 10 o'clock the attack upon the I Battalion was finished.

It is worth examining the devastating role which the German machine-gun teams played in halting the British attack.

Each machine gunner in the German army went through extensive training before being assigned to a machine gun crew. All machine gunners were considered picked men. Additional training was supplied in schools set up in 1915 in Germany, Belgium and France. Each course usually lasted one month. The main areas of instruction were:

Expert knowledge of the machine gun, which every man must be able to dismantle and put together again.

Making repairs and dealing quickly with all kinds of ‘jams’.

Handling of captured machine guns (especially the Lewis Gun).

Range practice at fixed targets, beginning at 400 and ending at 800 meters.

Firing at moving dummies at various ranges up to 800 meters.

Sustained fire at the rate of 500 rounds per minute, including the addition of fresh water to the jacket at the end of the 4th belt (1,000 rounds).

Signaling and entrenching.

Lessons in the construction of alternative emplacements in the trenches.

Many guns were equipped with the 2 ½ power Goerz prismatic site that allowed the gunner to track targets at considerable distance.

The regimental machine gun officers were given the task of locating gun emplacements for each machine gun that provided the greatest field of fire against enemy targets. Each gun position was heavily fortified and was able to resist enemy fire to a large degree. In the event that one position was damaged or destroyed the officers had already made provisions to bring the guns into one of several alternative sites that had been planned well beforehand. Each alternative site had been prepared in the same careful manner as the primary gun site.

The gun being used at this time was known as the Maxim M.G 08. It was a water-cooled machine gun mounted on a sledge for greater stability during firing. The specifications of the gun were:

Muzzle velocity 2,821 feet per second

Limit of sighting 2,200 yards

Extreme range at 32° 4,400 yards

Rate of fire 400-500 rounds per minute

Number of rounds per belt 250

Weight of filled belt 16 lbs.

Length of gun without

muzzle attachment 43 inches

Length of barrel 28.35 inches

Weight of gun 55 lbs.

Weight of sledge

mounting (Schlitten) 75 lbs.

Weight of water filling 8 ½ lbs.

Weight of fully loaded gun 140 lbs.

Machine Gun details: 2nd machine Gun Company.

Gun no. 7

Position: In front line overlooking the ground between Mary Redan and William Redan in the village of Hamel. The ravine was the only dead ground in front of this gun, otherwise a good field of fire.

Unteroffizier Kaeser, Gun commander

Gefreiter Leuze, gun layer

Schütze Feustel

Schütze Vogt (killed)

Schütze Boessner

Schütze Buehler

At 7 a.m. a smoke screen was formed in front of the gun position. The gun crew observed the British lines by use of a mirror placed on the rear trench wall that allowed a view over no man's land. The gun crew made periodic checks from this mirror to see when the attack started. During one such viewing Schütze Vogt was killed by a shell.

(Vogt, Baptist Schütze 2 M.G. Co. from Arnach, Waldsee)

The commencement of the attack was clearly observed, the gun was taken out of the dugout, placed into position and made ready to fire, all within a few brief minutes. The gun opened fire on the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers before this battalion had time to enter the steep valley between the two positions. There was still artillery fire on the German lines at this point and after 280 rounds had been fired a shell exploded in front of the position, burying the gun and wounding the gun layer Gefreiter Leuze. His wound was slight and he remained with the regiment.

(Leuze, Ludwig, Gefreiter, 2 M.G. Co. from Eningen, Reutlingen)

The gun was quickly restored and opened fire once again as the enemy appeared on the near side of the valley. The gun continued to fire until the attack was over.

Total ammunition expenditure: 2,500 rounds.

Gun no. 8, positioned some 500 yards north of Hamel in German front line.

Schütze Manz, Gun commander

Schütze Balb

Schütze Botmacher

Schütze Schultheiss

Schütze Boss

Schütze Dehner

The dugout in the first line containing the gun was destroyed in the shelling. The gun was moved to the second line. Heavy artillery fire prevented the gun from being used against targets on the north side of the Ancre, instead the gun was directed toward the south bank, the 99th RIR sector and the enemy attacking in front of St. Pierre-Divion at a range of 1,500 meters. The gun fired into the flank of the Ulster Division the entire day.

Ammunition consumption: 3,000 rounds.

Gun no. 9, located in the German second line north of Gun no. 7.

Unteroffizier Huss, Gun commander

Schütze Gess, gun layer

Schütze Bäzner (killed)

Schütze Wuerstle

Schütze Loechner

Schütze Aicroth

The gun crew was alarmed by a trench sentry once the attack was started. The gun was brought up from the dugout and set up in position and opened fire. The gun was also subject to artillery fire and one shell splinter ripped open the skull of Schütze Bäzner.

(Gustav Bäzner, 2nd M.G. Co. from Petersmühle, Nagold)

He was removed to the dugout and he later died from his wound on 1 July. A second shell exploded in front of the gun but did not disrupt its operation. The only interruption in firing was caused by a burst cartridge. The obstruction was quickly cleared and the gun opened fire again. It was used against all worthwhile targets.

Ammunition consumption unknown, Approximately 2,500-3,000 rounds estimated.

Above: A German magazine printed this 1916 picture of the vantage point the defenders had from St.Pierre Divion. It is taken from almost the same spot as the colour picture already published.

Artillery support came primarily from obsolete 9cm guns, modern 7.7cm field guns and 10.5cm light field howitzers and minenwerfer. Additional support was provided by 15cm heavy field howitzers and 21cm howitzers.

In the event of a full-scale enemy attack the field guns and light field howitzers would direct barrage fire upon the enemy front line trenches thereby forming a nearly impassable barrier to fresh waves of enemy troops while the heavier howitzers would fire upon enemy assembly trenches and rear areas. The artillery batteries had practiced for this possibility many times in the past months and were fully prepared to support the infantry in the critical hour of the attack. Large stocks of ammunition were at hand, the artillerymen were ready.

Accounts from the British side of the lines, which we are about to examine, continually refer to the accuracy and ferocity of the MG fire directed against them during the attack. It is now clear that just two German gun teams had the ability to fire into the ranks of the Ulster Division troops in this sector. The German army held their machine gunners in high esteem and expected nothing but the highest courage and weapons skills from them. On this day, the crews commanded by Unteroffizier Huss and Unteroffizier Kaeser lived up to this demanding standard.

The attackers - Des Blackadder

Facing the German defenders were two service battalions of the 36th (Ulster) Division. Essentially, this is the story of how they were almost annihilated as they tried to advance against the positions held by the 119th Reserve Infanterie.

While their comrades south of the Ancre were storming their way into the Schwaben Redoubt and into history, the 12th Royal Irish Rifles (Central Antrims) and the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers (Armagh,Cavan and Monaghans) took part in an attack which was short in duration and horrendous in its consequences for many Ulster homes.

The 12th Rifles and the 9th Fusiliers were fighting a separate action from the remainder of the Division and indeed of their own 108th Brigade. They were no less brave than their more successful comrades who attacked from Thiepval Wood. Indeed, they demonstrated their courage when they reformed no less than three times under heavy fire and made desperate but doomed attempts to break into the German trench systems facing them.

Much has been written about July 1 and the Ulster Division. Most of it has been culled from newspaper accounts, which played up the jingoistic spirit of the time. Another historical resource which has been used time and again is Captain Cyril Falls' 'History of the Ulster Division'.

But for a cold, objective military view of what happened in just a few minutes after zero hour, there can be few better research sources than the actual report of the 12th Rifles commanding officer, Lt. Col. G. Bull.

It was written on 8th July, five days after the Ulster Division had been relieved from the Somme front. It is remarkable not only for its historical accuracy but also for the matter-of-fact nature of the writing.

For Col. Bull, the destruction of his battalion for no success whatsoever must have been heartbreaking. Yet he takes up his pen and writes a cold, hard chronicle of the tragedy. It has proved interesting to compare Bull's account which matches almost perfectly the report of the action compiled from the other side of no-man's land.

12th (S) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles 1st July 1916.

The bombardment, which had lasted seven days without ceasing reached its climax at 6-25 a.m. on the morning of the 1st July, and from 6-25 a.m. until 7-30 a.m. the German trenches were treated to a perfect hurricane of shells.

The companies, who had already been in the trenches (Hamel Sub- Sector) two days, were in the following order: - 'B' Company had one platoon (No. 8) on the right made responsible for the marsh.

Immediately on its left was another platoon (No. 6) responsible for the Railway Sap.

The other two platoons of 'B' Coy. were in support behind the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 9th Bn. Royal Ir. Fus. were in between 'B' Coy. and 'C' Coy.

'C' Coy. Being on their immediate left.

'C' Coy. had 'D' Coy. on its left and 'A' Coy. was on the left of 'D' Coy.

Starting from platoon on the right, the attack, as far as it has been possible to gather from the information of eye witnesses remaining went as follows:-

During the last ten minutes or so of the intense bombardment, No. 8 Platoon under. Sergt. Hoare left the Crow's Nest (a 'forming up point in the British trenches) and lay outside their own wire.

At zero, and under cover of the barrage of smoke put up by the Trench Mortar Officer they commenced the advance. This platoon was divided into three parts, one under Sergt. Hamilton who went to the left, one under Sergt. Bennison who went to the right and one under Sergt. Hoare who remained in the centre. (German accounts clearly mention the use of smoke).

This platoon was very heavily shelled going out and while out were under very heavy machine-gun fire from both right and left, and Sergt. Hoare's party soon all became casualties.

The left party under Sergt. Hamilton also suffered very heavily but he managed to get into the German Sap with three or four men, but owing to the heavy machine-gun fire were unable to remain and had to leave the Sap.

On the right Sergt. Bennison was killed and this party with its Lewis Gun came under very heavy Machine-gun fire from the right and were unable to get forward at all. The casualties were heavy, and Sergt. Hoare sent back a man to Lt. Col. Blacker for orders as he could not advance. He received orders to retire; he did so with what was left of the Platoon.

But an even worse fate was in store for their comrades in No. 6 platoon.

The diary continues:-

This platoon was under Lieut. Lemon and was made responsible for the Railway Sap.

The platoon left our own trenches before zero at the same time and on the right of the 9th Royal Ir. Fus. but before reaching the Ravine the whole Platoon with the exception of Lieut. Lemon and twelve men were all casualties.

Analysis: Thus within a few minutes a platoon of 50-60 men was reduced to an inexperienced young Lieutenant and a dozen men. But the slaughter did not stop there.

Once again the diarist takes up the story:-

On reaching the Ravine, Lemon looked for some supports, but as none were available he advanced with his twelve men to enter the Sap. When he reached. the Sap he had only NINE men left, but he entered the Sap at the Railway bank.

L.Sergt. Millar and three men moved to the right to bomb down the Sap, but, these were soon all casualties.

Lieut. Lemon and the remainder of the men advanced up the main Sap. The thick wires running into the first large tunnel was cut by Rfmn. Gamble who was the first bayonet man.

There was a machine- gun firing across the sap from the small tunnel. Lieut. Lemon, however, climbed above the small tunnel with some bombs in order to catch any Germans who might come out and sent the men on.

Lieut. Lemon was then shot by two German officers who fired their rifles at him from the top of a dug out which apparently led into the tunnel. The two German officers were afterwards killed by a bomb which exploded right at their feet.

The remaining men got cut off between the 1st and 2nd German line and only two of them escaped.

No. 7 Platoon advanced behind. the 9th Royal Ir. Fus., but as the Fus. were held up, this platoon only got just beyond our own wire. No. 5 was the carrying platoon and did not leave our own wire. Capt. C.S. Murray was in command of these two Platoons, but was wounded at the very start.

The two Machine-guns which caught No. 6 Platoon so badly were right outside the German trench and the shelling was also very severe in the Ravine.

The Lewis Gun Team which was with No. 6 Platoon became casualties before reaching the Ravine and the gun was put out of action by shrapnel.

Corpl. Burgess and Rfmn. McNeilly were the two men who escaped from the Sap.

Rfmn. McNeilly lost Corpl. Burgess on the way back and reported to two N.C.O.'s of the 9th Royal Ir. Fus.

Before zero, 'C' Company who were on the left of the 9th Royal Ir. Fus. left our wire and immediately came under very heavy machine Gun fire.

At zero the company advanced led by No 10 Platoon and followed by No. 11. No. 10 were held up by the wire, which had only two small gaps cut in it at this point.

No. 10 Platoon at once split in two, each half going for a gap. Some of this party succeeded in getting into the German line, but as there was a German machine-gun opposite each gap the casualties were very heavy.

No 11. Platoon immediately reinforced No. 10 and at once rushed the gaps and a few more men succeeded in getting through. The casualties were very severe, but Captn. Griffiths collected Nos. 9 and 12 Platoons and gave orders to charge. He was killed immediately he had given the order.

Above: Cpl. (later Sergeant) Herbison from Hill Street, Ballymena, was killed in August 1916. His bravery on 1st July was remarked upon by his company officer, Capt. W. B. Stuart (MC, KIA Nov.22 1916).

At the same time an order came to retire. The remaining men retired with the exception of Sergt. Cunningham, Corpl. Herbison and L.Cpl. Jackson who remained and fired at the Germans, who were standing on their parapet firing and throwing bombs at our men.

They killed or wounded at least ten Germans. Rfmn. Craig with a Lewis Gun kept up a good fire by himself, all the rest of the team having been killed or wounded.

L.Cpl. Harvey then rallied all the men he could find and rushed the gaps again but had to retire for the third time. The Company had then to retire to the Sunken Road.

Sergt. Cunningham and Corpl. Herbison again did good work by helping wounded men to get cover in the Sunken Road. The road was being shelled very heavily all the time.

Analysis: ‘C’ company’s fate was repeated all over the Somme battlefield that morning. They were under fire almost from the moment they left their trenches and the weight of fire steadily increased. Those who made it to the German wire found only ‘canals of death’.

'D' COMPANY'S ATTACK

'D' Company's attack was led by 2/Lieut. Sir Harry E.H. Macnaghten Bart., and No. 16 Platoon. Sir Harry was on the right of his Platoon and Sergt. McFall on the left.

At zero this Platoon rushed the German front line and entered it. Sergt. McFall found some dugouts on the left and detailed two bombers to attend to each . The German second line was very strongly held and the machine-gun fire from the salient on the left (Q.17.B) was very heavy.

The Germans stood up on the parapet of their second line and threw bombs into the front line, while they kept a steady fire up against the other advancing platoons (13, 14, and 15) These suffered very heavily as they approached the German wire and line.

No 14 Platoon lost half its men before No. 16 had gained the German front line. An order to retire was shouted out and Sir Harry got out of the trench to order the men not to retire but to come on and just as he got out he was shot in the legs by a machine-gun only a few yards away, and fell back into the trench.

Above: Rfn. (Later Sergeant) Kane. He was to be killed in action in 1917.

Rfmn. Kane who was quite close to Sir Harry bayoneted the German who was firing the machine-gun. 'D' Company then fell back behind the ridge and were at once reassembled with the remains of 'A' Company by 2/Lieut. Dickson, who ordered a second charge at the German trenches. (However no German gunner was killed in this manner and neither gun crew was approached by enemy troops).

He was very severely wounded almost as soon as he had given the order, but carried on for a time until he fell, and then Sergt. McFall at once rallied the companies and they advanced a second time. The Machine-gun fire from the Salient was very severe, and they had to eventually fall back on our own trenches.

'A' Company who were on the extreme left of the Battalion front, were in touch with the 29th Division. They left their new Trench before zero and assembled along the Sunken Road.

At Zero they began to advance, and at once came under very heavy Artillery and machine-gun fire. No. 4 Platoon led the attack, and were badly cut up, but what men remained entered the German front line.

They were closely followed by No. 3 who at once reinforced them. The wire was well cut here but there were two machine-guns on each side of the gap and three or four in the Salient, as well as a German bombing party.

Lieut. McCluggage at once collected his men and tried to rush on to the German second line but was killed in the attempt. The Germans in the front line it was noticed all wore caps while those in the second line wore helmets.

The German second line was full of men and there was a very considerable number at the back of the large mound on the left. All these men fired at Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons while they were advancing and threw bombs at Nos. 3 & 4 while in the German front line.

The men of Nos. 3 & 4 Platoons bombed three Dugouts and shot a good many Germans. All these four Platoons suffered very heavily from exceedingly intense Machine-gun fire. An order to retire was passed along, and as there were no supports on the spot 'A' Company did so.

Lieut. T. G. Haughton had been wounded in the leg soon after leaving our front line but led his Platoon on. He was wounded a second time during the retirement and killed.

The Company then retired to the SUNKEN ROAD when 2/Lieut Dickson, who was the only officer left assembled the men there and ordered another advance.

The men advanced again but were met with a terrific fire from all the Machine-guns in the Salient (Q.17.B.) and had to ultimately retire to the New Trench.

Rfmn. McMullen, being the only man left of his team of Lewis Gunners, entered the German line with Lewis Gun and two magazines and fired from his shoulder at the Germans in the second. line. He retired with the company and brought the Gun with him.

Bull concluded his report:-

All companies had now been badly cut up, and had very few men left. We were ordered to attack again at 10-12 a.m. with what men we could collect.

Major C.G. Cole-Hamilton D.S.O. took command of the front line, collected all the men he could find (about 100) and assembled them in the New Trench and prepared to launch the attack.

Sergt. McFall and Sergt. A Smith of 'D' Company and L.Cpl. W Harvey of 'C' Coy. were conspicuous for their coolness and skill under a very heavy fire in helping Major C.G. Cole-Hamilton D.S.O. to form up the men and carry out the attack.

The attack was made under very heavy shrapnel fire from the time of the assembly and was finally stopped by Machine-gun fire.

When in advance of the Sunken Road, the same three N.C.O.s did magnificent work in steadying the men, while L.Cpl. Harvey brought a wounded man in on his back.

About 11 a.m. another attack was ordered for 12-30 p.m. in conjunction with the 29th Division. Every available man was collected and assembled in the New Trench.

The total number this time was 46.

The men went forward before 12-30 p.m., and were lying in cover by 12-30 p.m. Major C.G. Cole-Hamilton D.S.O. , finding that 29th Division did not launch an attack at 12-30 p.m. and not having a sufficient number of men to carry out an attack, sent a message to the Commanding Officer to this effect.

The Commanding Officer ordered the men to be brought back and the front line to be re-organised and held. Sergt. McFall, Sergt. A. Smith and L.Cpl. W Harvey again did splendid work in getting the men back and re-organised under very adverse conditions.

By 2 p.m. all the men were back and sentries were posted all along the line. This state of affairs continued until the few men who were left in the line were relieved by the York and Lancs at 6-30 p.m.

G Bull

Lieut. Col.

Commanding

12th (S) Bn Royal Irish Rifles.

9th Royal Irish Fusiliers - attack report.

Composition and Format for attack.

The Battalion moved at 12.5 a.m. from Mesnil to take up its position for the attack, in the right of the Hamel Sector, no special assembly trenches had been prepared, and existing trenches were occupied.

The Battalion was on a 4 Platoon front in the following order:- Right Company "A", Captain C. Ensor, Right Centre Company "B", Major T.J. Atkinson, Left Centre Company "C", Captain C.M. Johnston, Left Company "D", Captain J.G. Brew, each Company being on a platoon front, making 4 waves: each wave advancing at 60 yards distance. The two leading waves assembled in the front line trench.

Captain (later Major) J. G. Brew

The 3rd wave consisting of supporting platoons in communications trenches.

The 4th wave consisting of consolidating Platoons in 2nd line trench.

Lewis Guns accompanied the leading wave.

2 Stokes Mortars accompanied the second wave.

5 Vickers M Guns accompanied the third wave.

The Battalion was reported in position at 3 a.m. Between which hour and the hour it moved out the Btn suffered some 50 casualties from large H.E. shell.

Four lengths of Bangalore tubes accompanied the leading waves of each Company.

Objectives

The German 1st, 2nd, and 3rd line trenches from Railway Sap to A 25 in 1st line - Beaucourt Station and the Trench north of it and some detached houses near this station, the left boundary being a line drawn from A 25 to one of these detached houses thence S.E. to the River Ancre

Troops on flank of Battalion.

2 Platoons of 12th R.I.R. on Right flank.

3 Coys of 12th R.I.R. on Left flank.

2 platoons 12th R.I.R. in support of 9th R. Ir. Fus.

Apparent effect of Artillery Bombardment in Enemy's position (a) Wire cutting was well carried out and effective lanes were cut.

( From the research carried out by Ralph J. Whitehead, it is now clear that the German trenches composing the objective of both 9th R. Ir. Fus and 12 R.I.R. , while undoubtedly damaged, were still perfectly defensible.)

Nature of the ground

The opposing lines of trenches were approximately 400 yards apart with a Ravine some 70 yards in width about half way between the opposing tenches, the banks of which were 15 ft to 20 ft high in places and steep. The whole terrain sloping towards the Railway Sap.

The Advance

Owing to the distance to be traversed and the necessity of the leading wave being within 150 yards of the German line at Zero time (7.30 a.m.), the

1st wave crossed the parapet at 7.10 a.m.

2nd wave crossed the parapet at 7.15 a.m.

3rd wave crossed the parapet at 7.20 a.m.

4th wave crossed the parapet at 7.30 a.m.

The 1st wave suffered little loss getting through our wire, lanes in which had previously been cut, but during the advance to the Ravine casualties were numerous, more especially to the left, from M.G. fire from the flanks.

(Once again, it must be stressed that the German Btn. defending this sector had only two MG crews operating in this sector)

The 2nd wave suffered more severely crossing our wire, and also came under the M.G. fire from the flanks.

The majority of the Officers of the 2 left Companies were casualties before reaching the Ravine, where the two leading waves were reorganized in one line and the advance continued.

The 3rd and 4th waves were caught by severe M.G. fire both frontal and flanking, and also by an artillery barrage which the Germans had now placed between our wire and the Ravine, and were practically annihilated.

Some 150 yards from the German line the assaulting line again came under heavy M.G. fire and suffered severely: notwithstanding this, small bodies of men of the Right and the two left Companies reached the German wire and charged he trenches, in places the Germans held up their hands to surrender, but realising there were no supporting troops resumed the contest till there were only a handful of our men left.

The Right Centre Company appears to have suffered less severely, and was seen to penetrate the 3 German lines and a small body of them was reported to have reached Beaucourt Station.

(German post action reports make no mention of such a deep penetration. It may be possible that a small party did infiltrate into a communication trench but it is most unlikely that any reached the vicinity of Beaucourt Station.)

Owing to the intensity of the fire only 1 Runner got through, he came from the Left Centre Company Commander, from a spot about 30 yards short of the Ravine, with the message "Cannot advance without support".

The supporting platoon of the 12th R.I.R. was sent out but was wiped out.

(Analysis: The very fact that only one runner ‘got through’ and that the requested supports were ‘wiped out’ is a clear indication of the complete domination of German fire in this small sector.)

Information

Previous to the attack the Intelligence Officer Captain Menaul and five Battalion Scouts proceeded to Shooters Hill whence a view could be obtained of all the attacking ground up to the front line, except on the extreme right. This officer kept Battalion H.Q. accurately informed of the progress of events by means of his Scouts acting as Runners from 7.30 a.m. to 4 p.m.

This information was at once passed on to Brigade H.Q. by telephone as soon as received.

Action by the enemy.

The main features of the Enemy's defence were the handling of his M. Guns whereby he brought an accurate cross fire on the lanes cut in our own wire and on the gaps made by our artillery in his wire and subsequently the artillery barrage he placed between our front line and the Ravine.

Action against possible counter attack by the enemy

When the extent of our casualties was realized every available man left in the Battalion was sent under the command of Major Pratt to hold the front line: the situation was reported to Brigade H.Q. and a request made for reinforcements, and 2 Coys York & Lancs Regt were sent up to assist in holding the line against a possible German counter attack.

Action subsequent to July 1

During the night of July 1st - 2nd the remnants of the Battalion were withdrawn into the village of Hamel, the front line being held by 2 Coys 5/6 York & Lancs Regt.

Several parties were organized to search No Man’s Land to bring in casualties, their search was continued by parties sent up to Hamel on nights of July 2/3, 3/4, 4/5. On July 2 while carrying out this duty Lieut & Adjt G Cather was killed.

(Cather was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross)

Early on 2 July orders were received to hand over the line to the 87th Bde and for the Battalion to withdraw to Martinsart.

General remarks

The outstanding features of the day were the fine leading by the Company Officers, and the gallant spirit and magnificent dash by the men which carried them on in spite of the severity of the casualties.