Legal Framework for Palestinian Security Governance “Security forces and the police shall be regulated by law”. Surprisingly, this article has remained unaltered
since the first drafts of Basic Law (BL) were drawn up for the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
Nevertheless, the mandates, powers and limits of the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) were not governed
by clear and identifiable legislative texts. This fact must be acknowledged in the light of the Israeli-Palestinian
agreements and the on-going conflict. In fact, the birth of most of PSF was related to the establishment
of PNA on portions of Occupied Palestinian Territories
were part of the armed groups of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), who returned to OPT.
By recruiting Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), the majority of whom were activists
and mostly members of Fatah, new forces were created, with the express or tacit approval of Israel
In order to ensure the efficiency and accountability of PSF in protecting citizens from other citizens
and from the ‘state’ apparatus, including the security forces themselves, a legislative framework became
increasingly necessary. Initially reticent, PNA former President Yasser Arafat personally ended up by
inviting the Council, in its session of 18/8/2004 , “to elaborate necessary laws to ensure an efficient and
controlled working of security forces” (Al-Tannini 2005, line 16).
It is true that there is always a big gap between legislative pronouncements and their enforcement;
nonetheless, a presentation of the existing, multifaceted legislation remains of interest, even though it should
be considered in the light of the reality on the ground of PSF, and the presence of non-statutory forces.[2]
Renewed legislative activity of PLC (Part II) was accompanied by a complete deterioration of security in the
Palestinian territories (Part I) under (sometimes virtual) PNA control. This proves that legislating is not enough (Part III).
[1] Although relevant to any SSR efforts, we have not addressed the following two points: i) the status of OPT under international law
and the legal value of Israeli-Palestinian treaties on the domestic level; ii) the applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in
OPT. In fact, there are few doubts regarding the applicability of IHL on Israeli forces, as an occupying authority over an alien people
and territory, although we need to take in to consideration the different ways the Israeli monist system deals with International law.
After Israel Gaza , Israel
(borders, emergency entrances, freedom of movement of goods and peoples…) according to IHL provisions;
however, things are less clear regarding the applicability of these provisions on PSF since they are not alien forces but legitimately
elected institutions. In any case, many arguments can be presented in favour of the applicability of Human Rights’ law and conventions in
the territories under PNA control.
[2] Until recently, there were more than ten different forces, independent from each other that employed a large number of personnel;
besides, within each agency, there is certain autonomy between Gaza West Bank forces (PICCR 2005b, p.14). These agencies and
forces are: The Civil Police, National Security, General Intelligence, Preventive Security, Presidential Security, Civil Defence, Military
Intelligence, and Naval Police. There are also other forces that have particular missions, such as Military liaison Force, Special Security,
and Special Forces. Other members work in relation to security, such as the External Security Office and the Office of National Security
Advisor with a limited number of personnel working in those teams.
- La réforme du Secteur de Sécurité et le rôle de la Communauté Internationale: Le cas Palestinien. Un mémoire pour un master en administration publique - ENA, Janvier 2006.
Résumé du mémoire en Administration Publique
Présenté par Asem Khalil
ENA Janvier 2006
La réforme du Secteur de Sécurité
et le Rôle de la Communauté Internationale : Le cas Palestinien
Le secteur de sécurité fait référence à tous les corps responsables de la protection de l'Etat et de ses
communautés constitutives. Sa réforme signifie d’apporter la gouvernance de ce secteur en conformité
avec les normes démocratiques.
Ce travail se divise en deux parties, dont la première est dédiée à la ‘particularité palestinienne’ en matière
de sécurité tandis que la deuxième aux efforts consacrés pour une majeure gouvernance dans le secteur
de sécurité.
Les Palestiniens vivent une période de transition : d’un mouvement de libération à un embryon d’Etat.
Les institutions représentants les Palestiniens sont aussi en transformation. Ce processus est, d’hors et déjà,
irréversible. Or, si l’Etat Palestinien est à créer, tous, Palestiniens, Israéliens, et Communauté Internationale
(pour des raison différentes, évidemment) ont un intérêt à ce que cela soit un succès.
La viabilité (territoriale, économique et politique) de l’Etat Palestinien est le préalable indispensable pour son
existence objective. Dans le cas contraire, de l’Etat, les Palestiniens n’auront que l’appellation, le drapeau et
le passeport.
La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité devient, ainsi, une priorité, unanimement partagée, mais son contenu reste
vague et les objectifs visés sont variés et parfois même contradictoires. Or, les moyens nécessaires, selon
l’approche, seront totalement différents de même, l’ordre de leur priorités. Or, pour le succès d’une réforme
de telle ampleur, il est indispensable que l’approche soit globale.
Les élections législatives de Janvier 2006 ont changé totalement la donne ; une cohabitation entre un président
de Fatah et un gouvernement de Hamas aura des effets sur la gouvernance des forces de sécurité.
Resume of a Dissertation for a Master in Public Administration
Presented by Asem Khalil
ENA - January 2006
The Security Sector Reform and the Role of the International Community:
the Palestinian Case
The Security Sector refers to all those bodies responsible for the protection of the State and its constitutive
communities. Its reform means to bring the governance of this sector in conformity with the democratic standards.
This work is divided into two parts, of which the first is dedicated to the ‘Palestinian particularity’ in relation
to security, while the second with the efforts consecrated to realize the governance in the Palestinian security sector.
The Palestinians live a transitional period: of a liberation movement to an embryo of State. The institutions
representing the Palestinians are also in continuous transformation. This process is irreversible.
However, if the Palestinian State
(for reason different, obviously) have an interest so that it is a success. The territorial, economic and political
viability of the Palestinian State
the Palestinians will have only the name, the flag and the passport.
The Security Sector Reform becomes, thus, a priority, unanimously shared, but its contents remain vague
and its aims are varied and sometimes even contradictory. However, the necessary means, depending of the
approach, will be completely different; the same apply to their priorities. Accordingly, for the success of
such a reform, it is essential that the approach becomes global.
The legislative elections of January 2006 had changed the political scene, with Hamas sharing power with a
president of Fatah. This cohabitation will inevitably influence the governance of the security sector.
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