The 519th Transportation Association Thailand

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Frontspiece [519 crest]

UNITED STATES MILITARY

MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

IN

THAILAND

1966 – 1968

  
A TERM PAPER

PRESENTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE

U.S. ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER

 

IN PARTIAL FULFULLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT COURSE

 BY

MAJOR GERALD R. GILLIE

 MAY 1969 

CLASS 69-3

BOX # 1530

PREFACE

         From May 1966 to December 1967, I was assigned to the 519^th Transportation Battalion as the Operations Officer.  Within only a few months after reporting to this newly activated battalion, I recognized that it was destined for success because it possessed the essential conditions and resources upon which success is dependent. Although I have worked in a half dozen other organizations that successfully accomplished their mission, they were mediocre in comparison. The euphoria of success stayed with me throughout this 18 month assignment, and at the conclusion of that tour, I could unequivocally declare that it was the most satisfying and professionally rewarding experience of my military career.

        Since then, I have often reflected upon that experience and tried to analyze it to determine what principles of military management could be derived there from and used to insure successful organizations in future assignments. I also wondered in a pessimistic sense, “how long the success would last, and what problems would cause the demise of the battalion?”

       This term paper gives me the welcomed opportunity to seriously analyze the success and problems of the 519^th and to put the analysis in print for the benefit of others, particularly my comrade officers in the Transportation Corps, who hopefully will find some useful ideas for their future assignments.

       A comparison between the 519^th Transportation Battalion in Thailand with similar battalions in Vietnam would be difficult to make because the 519^th did not operate under combat conditions. Therefore, I do not arrogate any glory to the 519^th in deference to the courageous truck units in Vietnam. However, I believe this battalion displayed the high quality that would have made it compare favorably with other truck battalions in Europe, Korea, and CONUS.

       Since this term paper is a labor of love, I solicit the reader’s indulgence in its length, particularly if the reader is a member of the ALMC faculty.

 The Author

TABLE OF CONTENTS   CHAPTER             TITLE                                                   PAGE                            FRONTSPIECE                            PREFACE                                                    i                            TABLE OF CONTENTS                            iii   1                        INTRODUCTION                                      1   2                        THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS                4                       Battalion History and Espirit De Corps                     Dispersed Stationing and Unit Morale                     Organization, Missions and Motivation                      Leadership Climate and Proficiency   3        THE UNIQUE OPERATING CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS    25                       Line of Communications and Road Net                     Local National Truck Drivers                     Augmentation to a Commercial Carrier                     Customer Relations                     Location of the Battalion Headquarters   4           CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS                               39   5            FUTURE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS                     49                 BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                   52                        ANNEXES A.     USARSUPTHAI and Command Relationships B.     9th Logistical Command Organization Chart C.     519th Transportation Battalion Organization Chart D.    Thailand Road Net E.     Roles and Missions of the 519th F.      Comparison of Short Ton Workload G.    Mileage Workload H.    Special Workloads I.       Mileage Table J.      Battalion Distinctive Insignia K.    Local National Authorization

        This term paper discusses the salient features of U. S. military motor transport operations conducted by the 519^th Transportation Battalion (Truck) in Thailand during 1967 and 1968. Firstly, the circumstances which made this battalion particularly successful are described and analyzed. Secondly, the unique operating conditions and problems encountered by the battalion are discussed and evaluated. Thirdly and finally, some conclusions are made about the current problems and some anticipated problems for each of which specific recommendations are offered in resolution.

       The 519^th Transportation Battalion is the only U. S. Army trucking organization in Thailand where it plays an active role in strengthening the defense of Southeast Asia and in supporting U. S. Air Force units which are engaged in the Vietnam conflict.

       The success of the battalion was assured by a variety of circumstances. The history of the 519^th reveals the tradition of outstanding professional accomplishment from which its personnel developed a high degree of esprit de corps. The varied organization, the varied and unprecedented missions, and unit dispersion gave battalion personnel the motivating challenges and opportunities for personal growth. The aggregate leadership at nearly all levels created a climate conducive to maximum productivity.

       The battalion operates under unique conditions which present a variety of problems. First, the length of the Line of Communications (LOC) is over 600 miles and the total road net over which the battalion’s trucks must travel to supply scattered units is in excess of 1,700 miles. These distances are considerably greater than like units have encountered in other countries. The drivers must operate their vehicles on the left side of the highway as in Japan or England. Because the U. S. Army trucks have left hand drive, the driver is at a disadvantage amidst the seemingly reckless stream of commercial and civilian traffic. Therefore, safety must be continually stressed. Second, five of the six line companies are organized as Type B units. Therefore, approximately 50% of the total personnel are civilians hired from the indigenous population. Naturally, the normal problems of communication are compounded by the language barrier. Third, the battalion is primarily utilized as an augmentation to the singular Thai Government-owned commercial trucking monopoly under contract to the U. S. Government. Whenever the contractor fails to provide the promised number of trucks, the 519^th must rush to the rescue, particularly for port clearance operations. Fourth, consignors and consignees have been particularly inept or uncooperative in performing their responsibilities to properly load, block and brace or lash, document, and unload their shipments. Too often, the truck driver performs these functions just to get the job done. Fifth and last, the battalion headquarters has not been stationed at locations from which it could most efficiently control its operations and service its major customers.

       These current problems can be resolved or minimized by specific recommended action at the appropriate level of command. In addition, the future possibilities of open conflict in Thailand or the de-escalation of the Vietnam effort and subsequent withdrawal of U. S. forces are considered in relation to the battalion’s role. Further recommendations are offered for these anticipated problems.

CHAPTER 2
THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS

BATTALION HISTORY AND ESPRIT DE CORPS

       The 519^th Transportation Battalion (Truck) was most recently activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland on 20 May 1966 for the purpose of being deployed to Southeast Asia as soon as it had completed its provisioning and training. The battalion’s officer and no-commissioned cadre came primarily from troop units in Germany which units were being depleted for the Vietnam build-up. Most of the lower grade enlisted filler personnel were impressionable youths fresh from Advanced Individual Training, and a few were castoffs from other units. Therefore, as individuals all were establishing new interpersonal relationships; and as an unproven team, we were creating a functioning organization where before none existed.

       Creating an organization is significantly different from joining an operating organization. We neither had to inherit someone else’s mistakes, nor did we have the benefit of any established system from which to build. We had only ourselves to accredit for any success or failure achieved.

       Yet, like orphaned children who wonder about their unknown parents, so did we wonder about our parent organization. Did it have a previous existence? Did it have a past that we could point to with pride, something for us to live up to, or was it a nonentity? We were pleased to learn from the Heraldry Office several months later that our battalion had seen action during World War II.

       Originally activated as a Port Battalion on 25 June 1943, the 519^th hit the beach at Normandy on 7 June 1944. For this and other action in France, the battalion was awarded two campaign streamers—Normandy with arrowhead, and Northern France—and was decorated with one palm of the French Croix de Guerre. On 14 November 1944, the battalion displaced to Antwerp, Belgium where it participated in the Rhineland Campaign and was decorated with a unit meritorious commendation and was cited I the Order of the Day of the Belgium Army. The 519^th served at Antwerp until its inactivation on 3 October 1946. The battalion also was activated between February 1956 and December 1957 during which time it supported construction efforts for the DEW line in the Artic. The port battalion was re-designated as a truck battalion while in an inactive status.

       This information helped establish a battalion identity with which the personnel could relate. But a borrowed identity was not enough. It had to be earned again and members of the 519^th were trying to do just that. The self-earned identity is ascribed to the Battalion Executive Officer whose staff and company commanders’ meetings were punctuated with a concluding admonition for every man to be a “tiger”. Southeast Asians respect the tiger for its cunning, prowess, and mien. Therefore, battalion personnel united in selecting the tiger as a battalion symbol and nickname. A formal request was submitted to the Heraldry Office for a distinctive insignia (badge) which incorporated the tiger and the emblems of the battalion’s World War II history. (See the frontispiece and Annex J).

       The effect of the tiger identity and the method by which it was applied served as a mild form of self-hypnosis. We were telling ourselves that we were competent to successfully accomplish any task within the realm of our assigned mission, and then we would work hard to live up to that self-image.

       Another source of motivation for hard work was the assumption that our destination would be Vietnam since we had not been initially informed of the Thailand destination. Therefore, the experienced soldiers considered that their lives might depend upon the quality of training and teamwork developed at Fort Meade, and the inexperienced soldiers considered that their lives might depend upon how ell they learned the lesions presented to them. Yet, this motivation was not appreciably diminished by news of the Thailand destination because by that time, the basic patterns of work had be established and the motivation for fear was supplanted by the higher motivation of creating the first U. S. military motor transport service in Thailand.

       In addition to the primary responsibilities of organizing, training, and provisioning the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, and the 291^st and 313^th Transportation Companies which were to belong to the battalion in Thailand, the battalion headquarters was also given the mission to provide operational control and staff assistance for four other Transportation Truck Companies, five Transportation Terminal Service Companies, one separate truck platoon, an Engineer Dump Truck Company, and seven other platoons or detachments. All of these units had been recently activated and were destined for deployment to Vietnam. The challenge of managing the preparation for overseas movement of these 21 units served to mold the battalion headquarters into an effective team.

       Three activities are examples of the competent leadership, effective staff, esprit de corps, and discipline of the Transportation Crops units. Each activity shows a favorable comparison of the 519^th over other deploying units. First, the transportation units voluntarily conducted a retreat review a short time after a deploying Cavalry Regiment held their final review. Although technical service personnel are notoriously poorer performers on a parade field than their counterparts in the combat areas, dignitaries who attended both ceremonies conceded that the Transportation Corps units made a better showing than the Cavalry.

       Second, although training facilities at Fort Meade were limited, and the garrison was not able to provide much assistance, the 519^th executed a rigorous training schedule that culminated in a field exercise for each unit. A deploying maintenance battalion with a larger compliment of officers also conducted a field exercise. It was obvious to observers that the Transportation units were better trained and participated in the exercise with more interest.

       Third, when the Cavalry Regiment departed, its personnel were unruly ad its vacated area was cluttered with refuse and disrepair. By comparison, the Transportation units, exclusive of one Terminal Service Company with weak leadership, all departed in an orderly fashion leaving a clean area behind.

       The August unit readiness dates of the Headquarters Detachment and the 313^th Transportation Company passed without firm information on a deployment date. The actual departure of these two units was delayed approximately three months. The cause of the delay was later discovered to be slow negotiations between the U. S. Ambassador to Thailand and the Thai government for clearance to bring more U. S. troops into Thailand. “Thais have historically guarded their sovereignty from any foreign encroachment.” (1) “Thai officials recognized the effect that the presence of American forces would have on their customs, morals, and economy. They were also becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of Communist insurgency in their own country and the important geographical, political and economical role their nation could play in the containment of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.” (2)

       Thai officials were pleased to learn that the truck unit Tables of Organization and Equipment allowed for both full strength, wholly U. S. manned companies, and for Type B organizations which seventy percent of the truck drivers would be Local Nationals (LNs). This happy compromise would provide employment and good incomes for approximately 600 Thais, give the U. S. Army the units it needed for operations, and minimize the increase of U. S. forces. Negotiations for in-country clearance then proceeded at a faster pace.

       The General Orders directing the truck companies to reorganize as Type B units came as a shock. Unit morale was temporarily undermined as the selection and weeding out process reduced the units to the lower authorized strength. Fortunately, deployment was near at hand and the long wait was almost ended.

DISPERSED STATIONING AND UNIT MORALE

       The 505^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia was the first 519^th unit to arrive in Thailand in October 1966. It was permanently stationed in Camp Vayama (See Annex D) and temporarily attached to the 499^th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) until the arrival of the 519^th Battalion Headquarters.

       The second unit to arrive in country was the 313^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Refrigerated). It arrived just before Thanksgiving Day 1966 and was temporarily attached to the 809^th Engineer Battalion at Phanom Sarakham (See Annex D) because Camp Friendship, near Korat, did not have adequate quarters. In March 1967, the company moved to Camp Friendship and one platoon was rotated on TDY to Bangkok every three months until the arrival of the full TOE 33^rd Transportation Platoon (Medium Truck Refrigerated) which replaced the rotating Type B platoons in early January 1968. The 33^rd came from Fort Lewis, Washington and is permanently attached to the 313^th.

       The entire Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment was air lifted in four C-130s from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland to Don Muang Airport, Bangkok, and then it motored to Phanom Sarakham, closing on 17 December 1966. It was immediately apparent that operations and control would be difficult from this location because it was isolated from major customers and had only two outside telephone lines to be shared with the host Engineer Battalion. Communications were grossly inadequate. Arrangements were made at Camp Friendship to vacate some buildings, renovate and expand them into a headquarters facility. Work on this facility was completed in early February 1967, and the headquarters displaced to Camp Friendship near Korat on 4 February 1967. The headquarters location was changed back to Phanom Sarakham in September 1968 when the 519^th became the sole proprietor of the former Engineer Battalion base camp. An augmentation of single side-band radios to alleviate the shortage of telephone lines made this move possible.

       The 260^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Petroleum) arrived at Utapoe Air Force Base from Fort Riley, Kansas, and was quartered in tents at Camp Vayama until it moved to Phanom Sarakham following the displacement of the battalion headquarters to Korat. The 260^th made its permanent home in Phanom Sarakham although some months were spent at a temporary camp site, K44, approximately 38 miles south of the Inland Road while supporting engineer construction work.

       The 291^st Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) arrived next from Fort Meade on 27 February 1967, landing at Korat Air Force Base near Camp Friendship where the company was to make its headquarters for over a year. One reinforced platoon was sent to Khon Kaen in April 1967 to occupy a small camp in support of the LOC. Platoons were rotated at this site until the last platoon was relieved by another unit in late December 1967. In January 1968, one platoon was displaced to Phanom Sarakham to balance capabilities against movement requirements. The last change of station for this unit occurred in late August 1968 when the company minus joined its platoon at Phanom Sarakham.

       On 9 April 1967, the 53^rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) closed in from Fort Buckner, Okinawa, and made its permanent residence at Camp Vayama.

       The 138^th and 254^th Transportation Detachments (Trailer Transfer Point Operating) arrived together on 30 November 1967 from Fort Lewis, Washington. The 138^th was stationed at Camp Vayama and the 254^th was split into three teams and stationed in Phanom Sarakham, Camp Friendship and Khon Kaen. The platoon headquarters of the 254^th was at Camp Friendship. These detachments were organized at full TOE.

       The last 519^th unit to arrive in Thailand was the 569^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo) from Fort Meade. Its personnel arrived aboard the U.S.N.S. Upshur on 28 December 1967 and were flown to Khon Kaen where the 569^th relieved the reinforced platoon of the 291^st on the following day. This is the only truck company to e deployed and maintained at the full TOE configuration.

       The intent of the stationing just described was to divide the Line of Communications into roughly equal and manageable segments for an equitable distribution of the workload. Such a wide dispersion of the companies and platoons fostered an unusually high degree of autonomy. Therefore, the commanders of the dispersed units enjoyed greater latitude in their decision making and they were charged with greater responsibility. As a consequence, they derived more satisfaction from their assignments, they developed more self-reliance, and they sought more advice from their subordinates. Morale in these units was high. The men worked hard at their mission and at improving their physical surroundings to make them more habitable than those of other units in Thailand, and disciplinary problems were infrequent.

ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS, AND MOTIVATION

       The organization and missions of the 519^th are best understood in the context to the environment. U. S. forces in Thailand were not an occupation force as in Europe or Korea, but were guests of the Thai government.  The presence of these forces and the policies governing Thai-American relations were negotiated by the U. S. Ambassador with ministers of the Thai military government. When Thai officials granted in-country clearance to the U. S. unit, the details of missions, relationships to Thai military counterparts, and other limitations were established between the Commanding General, Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI), who reported directly to the U. S. Ambassador, and the Chief of Staff of the Thai army. “MACTHAI maintained operational control over all U. S. forces insofar as they affected Thailand.” (7) Some units, such as the Engineer Group, served the dual purpose of military assistance to Thailand and support of forces directly or indirectly engaged in the Vietnam conflict. Most units served only in support of the war effort.

       U. S. Army Support Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) is subordinate to the U. S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and it is responsible for all U. S. Army troop units in Thailand (see Annex A). Under SUPTHAI is the 9^th Logistical Command (see Annex B) which is the superior headquarters for the 519^th.

       Military cargo arriving at the ports of Sattahip and Bangkok was discharged by the 499^th Transportation Battalion, loaded on commercial trucks, military trucks, lighters and sometimes rail cars, and delivered to U. S. Air Force bases, the 501^st Field Depot, or other Army units at up country locations. The 172^nd Transportation Detachment (Movements Control) received requirements for movement of cargo from the port or other consignors, gave the mission to the appropriate carrier, and coordinated the delivery of the cargo at destination.

       “The mission of the 519^th Transportation Battalion was to establish and operate the U. S. Military Motor Transport Service for port clearance, local and line haul of all classes of supply (and some unusual commodities not included in the text book classification) to U. S. Forces stationed in Thailand”. (8) Specific assigned roles and missions for the Battalion Headquarters are enumerated in Annex E. The mission to establish a motor transport service demanded a concentration of creative effort to make policies, plans, and procedures, to write standard operating procedures and regulations, to develop working relationships with counterparts in lateral and higher headquarters, and to design and construct facilities to support the operation.

       Working hours commonly were twelve hours per day for six and sometimes seven days per week for supervisors, clerks, drivers, and mechanics alike to create and operate the motor transport service. Supervisors at all levels were well occupied with the essentials of their own jobs. Therefore, except for necessary guidance and coordination, they did not have time to interfere with and usurp the responsibilities of their subordinates.

       The mission workload was a two edged sword. Each level of hierarchy was absorbed in its own creative process and being thus absorbed, it allowed the next lower level greater freedom of action, hence more opportunity to be creative in its own sphere of influence. The challenge of work and the satisfaction derived there from had an electrifying effect on individual motivation. Evidence of this motivation was the way in which clerks found ways to improve office efficiency, the ingenuity of mechanics to improvise repairs on vehicles in emergencies, the originality with which leaders approached operational problems, and the standings of each company in the annual CMMI.

       The organization by which the 519^th accomplished its missions is charted in Annex C. Organization of the headquarters staff sections is a composite of the TOE and the civilian augmentation for personnel management and training of Local National employees. During the first year of duty in Thailand, all units submitted the G series of their MTOE and were reorganized the following year under these MTOEs which adapted the personnel and equipment authorizations to local conditions.

       The task organization for each company was three truck platoons of two squads per squad with ten tractors and semitrailers and 20 drivers per squad for a total of sixty tractors and semitrailers and 120 drivers per company. The 313^th was enlarged by 20 tractors and refrigerated semitrailers because of the attached 33^rd Transportation Platoon. Therefore, the authorized task fleet by the end of 1967 totaled 380 tractors, 80 refrigerated semitrailers, 60 petroleum semitrailers and 300 stake and platform (S&P) semitrailers. The 505^th had originally been authorized a WABTOC issue of 60 additional S&P semitrailers which were shipped to Thailand in July 1967, which accounts for the extra 60 semitrailers. WABTOC issue of S&Ps for the other three cargo companies was still pending as of the end of 1968. All S&P semitrailers were transferred from company property books to a consolidated battalion property book in order to facilitate cargo movement through trailer transfer operations.

       Trailer transfer operations permitted the most flexible and efficient utilization of the battalion’s general cargo capability. Each cargo company was assigned a segment of the Line of Communications. These assignments were modified with the arrival of the later units and with the fluctuation in movement requirements. The following description of unit missions is best understood by frequent reference to the map in Annex D.

       The 53^rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Cargo) was nicknamed the “International Tigers” because they were equipped with commercial type International Harvester tractors instead of the 5 ton M52A2 multifuel tactical tractor. These I-H tractors were not powerful or rugged enough for the long haul, but they were more maneuverable than the multifuel tractor. Therefore, this company was given the port clearance and local haul mission in the Camp Vayama, Sattahip new port, and Utapoe area. This company worked on a two shift basis for ten to twelve hours per shift moving cargo from the ships to intransit storage areas, local warehouses, and to the trailer transfer points for cargo destined up country. The double shift spread thin the company’s leadership and precluded keeping two drivers in each cab which safety precautions, discussed in Chapter 3, would otherwise have dictated. This unit performed well under strenuous conditions. Near the end of 1968, the I-H tractors were salvaged and replaced by M52A2 tractors.

       The 505^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Cargo) was a Jack-of-all-trades unit. Being the initial cargo unit, it was used for port clearance, local haul, and line haul until the arrival of other units. In late January 1967, it was given the mission to displace one platoon from Camp Vayama to Udorn Air Force Base and haul aluminum and steel runway matting from the railhead at Udorn to Nakhon Phanom Air Force Base in Northeast Thailand. As the situation developed with the need for an early required delivery date, this commitment was increased to 50 trucks. This company earned the nickname, “Tiger Pacesetters”, for moving 14,100 short tons of matting over 162 miles of rough and dusty road, traveling 136,303 loaded miles and 301,415 total miles in a grueling test of men and machinery. Simultaneously, this unit was training newly employed civilian drivers. When the 53^rd and 291^st arrived, the 505^th’s area of responsibility was reduced to a manageable size. The 505^th provided back up port clearance and local haul for the 53^rd, performed line haul to Bangkok, Chachoengsao railhead, Takhli Air Force Base, Phanom Sarakham, and Korat and operated trailer transfer points at Camp Vayama and Phanom Sarakham. When the 291^st moved to Phanom Sarakham in 1968, the 505^th area of responsibility was reduced further to eliminate Takhli and Korat from its line haul mission.

       Responsibility for the line haul North and East of Korat was given to the 291^st Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Cargo). Inherent in this mission was the operation of a trailer transfer point at Camp Friendship and Khon Kaen. One reinforced platoon stationed at Khon Kaen was responsible for that real estate; the trailer transfer point and line haul to Udorn Air Force Base, Sakon Nakhon, and Nakhon Phanom Air Force Base. However, fluctuating requirements caused this company to be found frequently in Sattahip, Phanom Sarakham and Takhli. Most of these requirements were given on short notice necessitating quick reaction by the 291^st to move long distances to the origin of the cargo. For its quick reaction, the 291^st earned the nickname of “Road Runners”. Upon the arrival of the 569^th and the subsequent relocation of the 291^st to Phanom Sarakham, the Road Runners’ responsibility on the LOC became Phanom Sarakham to Takhli and Korat and backup line haul for the 505^th from Sattahip to Phanom Sarakham.

       When the 569^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Cargo) arrived it assumed the responsibilities of the LOC between Korat and Udorn, Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, and Ubon, and it became the proprietor of the real estate at Camp Khon Kaen which hosted a Maintenance Direct Support Company, a team from the 254^th Transportation Detachment which operated the trailer transfer point, and an Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting).

       The link between each cargo company was a trailer transfer point. The 138^th Transportation Detachment operated three trailer transfer points: one at Camp Vayama, one in the new port area of Sattahip, and one at the ammunition holding area near Camp Vayama. The 254^th operated trailer transfer points at Phanom Sarakham, Camp Friendship, the Korat Ammunition Storage Area, and Camp Khon Kaen. These two detachments were responsible for inventory, periodic maintenance, and emergency repairs for trailers in their area.

       The 313^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Refrigerated) was nicknamed the “Cool Cats” for obvious reasons. It was responsible for port clearance, local and line haul of chilled and frozen subsistence (Class I Supplies) throughout Thailand. (A few isolated units were resupplied by air). One platoon of this company performed port clearance and local haul at Bangkok, and line haul to the Sattahip area, Phanom Sarakham, and Takhli. Another platoon provided line haul between Bangkok and Korat and a third platoon serviced Air Bases and Army camps in the Northeast. The 313^th executed its own trailer transfer operation at Korat to move food through to the Northeast. When the 33^rd Transportation Platoon was added to the company, it merely alleviated a temporary shortage of serviceable semitrailers. In late 1968, the company was relocated to Bangkok where it could better control its operations, and the 33^rd was stationed at Korat to service the Northeast. The 313^th should have been stationed in Bangkok when it first arrived in country, but real estate was not available for more than a platoon’s operation.

       The most unusual mission of all was given to the 260^th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Petroleum). It arrived in country expecting to be issued its complement of trucks from in country stocks. However, the Commanding General of MACTAI had decided that he didn’t need a company of petroleum tankers nearly as much as he needed an Engineer Dump Truck Company, which of course was not on the troop list. So he directed that the 260^th be issued 60 dump trucks and placed in direct support of the 809^th Engineer Battalion which was building the Inland Road between Sattahip and Phanom Sarakham. The 260^th hauled laterite fill for most of its first year of operation. Permission was granted, however, to operate 13 tractors and eight tankers so that drivers could maintain proficiency on their primary mission vehicles. Later, in October 1967, enough tankers were issued to equip one platoon. These tankers provided fuel for construction equipment. Near the completion of the secondary mission, in December 1967 another platoon was converted back to its primary mission with the issue of twenty primary task vehicles (M52A2 tractors and 5,000 gallon semitrailers). Thirty dump trucks were then turned in and the other thirty consolidated in one platoon were moved from K-44 on the Inland Road to Camp Boehle on the Mountain Road to support Engineer rebuilding of a portion of that road which deteriorated in the Monsoons. Men of the 260^th named themselves “The Professionals” because of their ability demonstrated in support of the Engineers. With the gradual reconversion of this company, it began to distribute bulk petroleum and water to an increasing number of customers where before civilian contractor tankers had distributed the fuel. Statistics on the special workloads of the 260^th and 313^th are shown in Annex H.

       The 519^th made one significant and direct contribution in a military assistance and advisory role by training truckdrivers and supervisors in the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force destined for Vietnam. Members of the battalion also delivered U. S. vehicles to these forces in a driveway operation from Sattahip to Kanchanaburi and provided convoy control vehicles with long range communications for the movement of these forces to the port for deployment. The 313^th provided delivery of subsistence to U. S. personnel who assisted in training the Thai forces, and the 291^st supplied the 809^th Engineer Battalion with construction materials for troop facilities used by the U. S. Army training teams. The battalion also conducted a seminar for supervisors of the Express Transportation Organization.

       Following from the earlier discussion of how personnel identified with the Tiger image, it is apparent that within each company, and sometimes within each platoon, was superimposed another identity based on the successful accomplishment of some unusual and seemingly important task of the overall mission. It was psychologically rewarding to be a part of success, to be a little different from others (Don’t we all think of ourselves as being something special?), and hence, to feel some self-importance. This psychology not only motivates individuals, but it also strengthens them collectively so that the total motivation is greater than the sum of its parts.

LEADERSHIP CLIMATE AND PROFICIENCY

       Up to this point, the analysis could lead to the presumption that the success of the battalion was purely circumstantial and that even laissez’ faire leadership could claim credit for success in an organization possessing such self-motivating factors. Recognition must be given to the dissimilarity of missions and the wide dispersion of units which could fractionize the battalion. Judicious leadership was needed to keep a balance between the useful cohesive and fractional factors in the system and the environment. Either of these factors would become dysfunctional if it became dominant over the other, but in balance, the two factors complemented each other. Cohesive factors gave a sense of identity and permitted coordination while fractional factors developed independence and self-reliance in the units.

       The first commander of the 519^th, Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Middleton, described his philosophy of judicious leadership in the words, “a competent commander and a professional staff.” The commander, as he demonstrated, provides the staff with clear objectives and firm policy guidance based upon his own concept or estimate of the situation. The staff is held responsible to make sound recommendations of available courses of action, to prepare thorough plans to implement the commander’s final decision, and to keep the commander informed of progress in the execution of the plans. This philosophy was more than just an academic exercise with LTC Middleton; it was his natural way of dealing with people.

       He made his influence felt throughout the battalion by holding frequent interviews, particularly with company commanders and platoon leaders to provide counsel, to refine their thought processes, and to elicit their ideas. Generally, he consulted with each company commander before making any major decision which affected the units and frequently he let the company commanders reach a decision among themselves. His willingness to listen, his patience with tolerable error, and his tolerance of human differences permitted an open exchange of information between his staff, his unit commanders, and himself. When tension built up in his staff over work problems, he was able to channel the release of that tension in harmless ways such as a volleyball game, a gathering at the officers’ club, letting the individual express his feelings in the privacy of his office, and ordering a weekend pass, if necessary.

       LTC Middleton used social gatherings such as the monthly officers’ dinner party held in conjunction with a monthly commander’s conference, and a battalion-wide organization day “Truck Rodeo” for the purpose of reinforcing the Tiger image and identification which enhanced the cohesiveness of the organization. Highlighting the monthly dinner party was the C. H. I. Dooey Award for the funniest snafu.

       More purposeful awards were established for the unit with the lowest accident rate, for the best mechanic, for the drivers achieving various plateaus of accident free mileage, for the best unit as determined by a quarterly comprehensive review of all functional areas conducted by the battalion staff. These awards developed a healthy competition between individuals and units and provided an additional source of motivation.

       The development of leadership potential in subordinate officers and enlisted men was critically needed because the rapid promotion system was placing inexperienced personnel in positions of responsibility from squad leader to company commander. Interviews and counseling sessions served this purpose informally and to the extent that the battalion commander was able to hold these sessions. But a formal method was needed to reach more men further down in the hierarchy. LTC Middleton directed that a leadership school be established to provide formal training in Transportation leadership for newly appointed or potential squad leaders. Three months of preparation were used to prepare a program of instruction, assign classes to experienced leaders throughout the battalion, write SOPs and lesion plans, and rehearse the presentations. The eight day school was usually conducted once each month beginning in August 1967. Nineteen to twenty-one men attended each course. One platoon leader was selected to be Officer in Charge of each course and to teach a few of the subjects. This proved to be good experience for the platoon leader and it gave the battalion commander an opportunity to evaluate the officer’s capabilities and potential. This leadership school was the only school for U. S. Army enlisted personnel in all of Thailand.

       The leadership climate established by the first battalion commander (and presumably his successor, LTC Jack Schwartz) using management by objectives, policy, and consultation, and providing open channels of  communications, rewards for consultation, and providing open channels of communications, rewards for excellence, and leadership development permeated the entire battalion. The result was a high standard of proficiency which was frequently verified when superior headquarters called upon personnel of the 519^th to assist in planning and problem solving at higher levels.

CHAPTER 3
THE UNIQUE OPERATING CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ROADNET

       The Line of Communications (LOC) in Thailand stretched from the ports near Sattahip North to Phanom Sarakham, Korat, Khon Kaen, and Udorn and then East to Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom, a distance of 605 miles. A secondary LOC originated in the Bangkok port and joined the main LOC at Korat. Branches of the LOC reached to Takhli and Ubon. The roadnet, including alternate routes, used by the 519^th totaled over 1,700 miles.

       Army doctrine recommends that a truck battalion be responsible for approximately 120 miles of LOC. However, limited cargo through-put tonnages, the availability of a commercial carrier, and troop ceilings precluded the deployment of more battalions. The cargo companies of the 519^th, therefore, were assigned a segment of the LOC normally given to a battalion. In turn, the 519^th was assigned to a task which normally would be given to a truck group considering the distances involved. Since TOEs are designed to accomplish a mission as conceived by Army doctrine, the TOEs were deficient in meeting the operational requirements in Thailand.

       The TOE FM radios did not have sufficient range for external convoy control by the company commander, nor for entering a battalion radio net. This problem was alleviated in November 1967 when a small number of AN/GRC 106 AM-Single Sideband radios were installed on some ¼ ton trucks and at Camp Vayama, Phanom Sarakham, Camp Friendship, and Camp Khon Kaen. These new radios were expensive and required operators with special training.

       The authorized number of ¼ ton trucks was inadequate to provide convoy control and normal administrative transportation because once a vehicle was dispatched for either purpose; it would be gone for two days or even a week. Functional elements which shared the vehicle were left immobilized. This problem was partially solved by leasing seven Fort carryalls from a truck rental firm.

       Vehicle recovery was another problem related to insufficient equipment. Each company was authorized one wrecker and one tow bar. It was impractical to lose the services of the wrecker for long periods just to recover a vehicle with a minor breakdown. A “bobtail” tractor with a tow bar was used for minor recovery missions whenever possible. To solve the recovery problem over the long distances, each unit was given an area of responsibility with the mission to recover any vehicles disabled in that area regardless of parent unit. MTOEs were submitted to obtain authorization for more tow bars, enough for one in each truck squad, so that each small convoy could have its own limited recovery capability.

       In Thailand, all vehicles must be driven on the left side of the road as in England and Japan. Since U. S. Army vehicles are operated from the left side, the driver is not in a good position to see oncoming traffic in front of the preceding vehicle before attempting to pass. An assistant driver must ride in the cab to determine when it is safe to overtake and pass slower traffic. The intent of the TOE is having two drivers assigned to each vehicle was to operate the vehicle two shifts each day with only one driver per shift. Naturally, using two drivers in one shift for safety reasons would reduce the unit’s productive capability by half. Since the battalion did not have the latitude to procure right hand drive vehicles or to hire more than the authorized number of drivers, the only solution for a two shift operation was to permit a waiver of the assistant driver in areas of sparse civilian traffic or within a military installation.

       Poor road conditions caused the usual problems for maintenance and safety. Over half of the LOC was unpaved, bumpy and dusty. Multifuel engine life expectancy was about 16,240 miles. Frames and bodies began to crack after only a few weeks of operation on washboard roads. Fenders had to be reinforced with a brace. Fortunately, the Engineer Battalions and civilian contractors were able to make steady improvement of the roads and pavement was laid on some segments. “By the end of 1968, the average life expectancy of multifuel engines had risen to 21,899 miles.” (9)

       Semitrailers in the 313^th were rapidly debilitated by rough roads in the Northeast and the deadline rate became alarmingly high. The Dunham-Busch model refrigeration unit proved inferior in design to the Thermo-King model. Maintenance support responded to the 313^th’s needs with replacement units, but the long range solution could only be paved roads. Six refrigerated railroad cars were obtained by MACTHAI and given to the Thai National Railway to haul perishable subsistence from Bangkok to Ubon. This relieved the 313^th from operating over the worst road. However, the 313^th became responsible for maintenance of the rail car refrigeration units.

       Civilian and commercial highway traffic in Thailand is notoriously reckless. Trucks and buses commonly pass in the face of oncoming traffic. The naturally defensive U. S. driver has the choice of collision or a dip in the klong (a canal on each side of the road). Ox cart and bicycle traffic challenge a truck driver’s patience and self-control. The highway speed limit of 45 mph is seldom enforced by National Police. Yet, for diplomatic reasons, the military commanders cannot openly or tacitly condone breaking the law. U. S. Army Military Police do not have the authority to patrol the highways to enforce the speed limit for military traffic. Consequently, the 519^th established a Safety Patrol to control the movement of individual vehicles not in convoy, to make on the spot corrections of unsafe driver practices, to provide refreshments at rest stops enroute, and to provide assistance in the event of accident or breakdown. Six of the seven Ford carryalls were used for this purpose. Squad Leaders and Platoon Sergeants were used on these patrols. Each company was assigned to patrol the segment of the LOC corresponding to its area recovery mission.

LOCAL NATIONAL TRUCK DRIVERS

       The 519^th had an authorization to employ 604 Local Nationals (LNs) of whom 468 were truck drivers. The remainder was supervisors, interpreters, clerks, time keepers and mechanics. Specific quantities and skills of these employees are shown in Annex K.

       Hiring of the LN personnel was influenced by long standing practices in the Thai society which controlled an individual’s relative status. Commonly, a man could get a good job only by nepotism, patronymic assistance, or by paying the current market price to bribe a local official to informally grant permission for the man to seek the job. Usually the town mayor or village chief was the control center for employment. If the job required a drivers’ license, that license was not issued unless a chief of police received payment in addition to the legal fee. One young Thai driver told the author in good English that he wanted to be an interpreter but he did not have enough money to get that job, so he settled for a driver’s job.

       The primary purposes of the administrative overhead at battalion headquarters was for safety, drivers training, testing and licensing, and civilian personnel administrative and pay. Every LN involved program established by the battalion was prepared and published in English and then translated and published in Thai. Typewriters with Thai characters were used by the LN clerk typists.

       The 313^th began hiring and training its LNs while it was still located at Phanom Sarakham. Personnel were hired from the Korat area and sent to Phanom Sarakham on TDY for the few months preceding the relocation of the unit to Korat. This was considered a better alternative than hiring in Phanom Sarakham and then encountering resistance to moving away from home. The newly hired drivers on TDY from Korat found temporary lodging in Phanom Sarakham. Their presence and behavior was an irritation to the local population; arguments and fights broke out; the drivers were declared persona non grata and given the option of getting out of town or not getting out at all. They got out and the 313^th lost most of its work force in one day before the problem was discovered. A conference was held a few days later between the local Mayor, the civilian personnel officer, and the company commander. An amicable solution was reached and hiring resumed without further incident. Fortunately, local men were being hired by the 260^th and this placated any feelings of jealousy which Phanom Sarakham residents held toward citizens of Korat.

       Sit-down strikes and walk-outs occurred in each company. One was caused by the low processing of per diem entitlements in the finance office. The drivers needed the money to pay expenses incurred while on TDY. Another strike resulted from the requirement that that Thais were responsible to police the motor pool areas and clean their own latrines. Such work in their society was below their station. When they were told that the same unglamorous tasks were required of their American counterparts, the acceded. The other major incident occurred when two drivers were suspended pending investigation of an alleged theft of motor fuel from the gas tanks, the other drivers walked off the job. The motivation for the walk-out was either sympathy for drivers unjustly accused or a Thai manifestation of the philosophy that they must hang together or hang separately. The widespread theft of fuel was suspected but conclusive proof was not found. A spokesman for the walk-out was instructed on the rules of suspension and the prohibition of strikes in their contract. He was warned that the drivers would be fired unless they returned to work. They all returned to work. Later the suspension was dropped for lack of evidence.

       The language barrier was an obvious problem to both Americans and LNs. The barrier contributed to the labor relation’s disputes, and it had an impact on operations. The interpreters, though indispensable, were not mechanically inclined and they had difficulty translating the technical terminology of vehicle maintenance from English to the Thai language. The LN drivers and mechanics were unable to use Technical Manuals and TAERS forms form maintenance. A local bilingual dispatch form was substituted for the TAERS equivalent. LN drivers were unable to verify the correctness of documentation before accepting a shipment and they had difficulty gaining entrance to Air Force bases to deliver the shipment. Insofar as possible, at least one American driver was dispatched with commitments of one or more vehicles to isolated destinations.

       The LN employees could be disciplined only by reprimand, suspension, or dismissal. They could not be held liable for damage to government property. In contrast, the American soldier is subject to military discipline and can be held pecuniary liable. This disparity of controls together with the language barrier and the difference in mechanical knowledge and aptitude between the American and the LN caused the Squad Leaders to place an inequitable share of work on the soldier. Each U. S. driver was responsible for two or three vehicles and three to five LNs. The U. S. drivers did well under the circumstances.

       Thai employees were required to provide their own lodging, clothing, food, and transportation to and from work. Their humble circumstances precluded them from having telephones in their homes. Therefore, their working hours had to be carefully planned against forecasted requirements. Once they went home at the end of a shift, they would not be available in an emergency until their next scheduled work day. Word of mouth was used to round up some off-duty LNs for several emergencies, but each time only a small percentage was reached. This situation limited the battalion’s ability to react quickly at full strength for unexpected commitments.

       The number of labor relations problems and the rate of turnover diminished steadily during the latter part of 1967, and by mid 1968, the LN work force were well stabilized. By Thai standards, their wages and benefits were superior. In addition to economic motivation, the LNs absorbed some of the esprit de corps of the soldiers and they identified themselves with the image of the battalion and their company. The best example of this occurred in the 313^th when the LNs discarded their motley clothing for a stylish commercial work uniform bearing the number and nickname of the company and a personal nametag. These LNs also gave a dinner party for the officers and enlisted men of the company.

AUGMENTATION TO A COMMERCIAL CARRIER

       “The Express Transportation Organization (ETO) is a government owned and operated monopoly which provides general trucking throughout Thailand. ETO also is the legal brokerage of trucks owned and operated by private companies/” (3) Thai officials insisted that all U. S. military cargo, except certain exempt cargo, would be offered to ETO and moved in commercial trucks. The needs of the Thai economy always took precedence over U. S. military cargo so that frequently the cargo caused congestion at the port’s limited intransit storage areas until ETO could provide sufficient trucks. A shortage of trucks made it impossible for the 499^th to discharge vessels in the Camp Vayama port. Cargo which remained in the hold of a ship or in the intransit areas would not be delivered to the consignee by the required delivery date. These problems provided the Army with the leverage to request in-country clearance for the 519^th.

       Thai officials were adamant that general cargo offering still be given to ETO and that the 519^th would function only to move exempt cargo and to augment ETO whenever ETO did not have enough available trucks to pick up the cargo at the required time. The policies of this agreement were established at a meeting between Major General Stillwell of MACTHAI and Lieutenant General Jit, President of ETO. Details of the agreement were reached at a Camp Vayama meeting attended by representatives of the 172^nd, 499^th, 519^th, 9^th Logistical Command, MACTHAI J4, and ETO. The following cargo was exempt from being offered to ETO: Refrigerated Class I supplies, classified cargo, high dollar value PX goods, alcoholic beverages for clubs, impedimenta on a unit move, and general cargo for local haul.

       The General Jit agreement was an irritation to the leaders of the 519^th because it imposed conditions which could keep the battalion’s capability relatively uncommitted and inefficiently utilized. The 53^rd and 505^th were required to keep vehicles and drivers on standby in the event ETO failed to spot a truck “under the hook”. The 291^st was frequently committed on short notice to move from Korat to Sattahip when the availability of ETO trucks was grossly inadequate.

       Early in 1967, the 519^th cargo companies were under-utilized except in emergencies. Fortunately the Thai economy was expanding and ETO’s capital expenditure for new trucks was only enough to compensate for accidents and wear-out. Gradually the frequency of emergencies became steady commitments. The 172^nd gained experience in predicting ETO availability and was able to plan for more efficient commitment of the 519^th. Annex F compares the initial ton workload of the 519^th with an estimated initial ton workload for ETO of the U. S. military throughput tonnage discharged by the 499^th. Annex G shows the combined effect of quick reaction commitments and the one-way flow of cargo on the loaded mileage workload of the 519^th. Loaded miles are less than 50 percent of the total miles traveled in every reporting period.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

       The 519^th was continually trying to resolve customer relations problems. Poor relations caused by factors within the battalion were quickly resolved and seldom repeated. However, most of the causal factors of poor relations with the consignees originated with consignors. Stevedores, laborers, and warehousemen working for the consignors did not know how to properly block and brace a shipment to assure its safe delivery. Often, drivers themselves would perform this task to prevent the cargo from shifting which would cause damage to the sideboards of the semitrailer or even cause the vehicle to turn over. When damaged cargo was delivered, the blame would be placed on the trucker rather than the consignor whose responsibility it was to load, block, and brace.

       Consignors and consignees treated the S&P semitrailers with impunity. Forklift operators caused extensive damage to sideboards in the process of carelessly removing the sideboards. A shortage of sideboards limited the use of the semitrailers and affected the availability of semitrailers. The direct support maintenance company in Camp Vayama had to hire a crew of Thai laborers to repair the sideboards. The availability of semitrailers in turn reduced the throughput capability of port operations.

       Air Force bases, particularly Utapao, were slow in unloading the semitrailers. A backlog of over 30 loaded semitrailers developed at Utapao on several occasions. Some of the semitrailers had been spotted for unloading up to three weeks before the warehousemen got to the job. Again, this reduced the availability of semitrailers for port clearance.

       To solve the loading, blocking and bracing problem, the battalion officers made liaison with all consignors to enlist their support. The problem was made known to higher headquarters, and a Blocking and Bracing Guide was prepared by the battalion and offered to higher headquarters with the recommendation that it be published as a regulation and be binding on all shippers in country. The offer was turned down, so instead, the battalion published the guide as a pamphlet and provided it as a courtesy to the customers. The pamphlet was received with little interest because the battalion could not enforce good practices without the support of higher headquarters.

       Key personnel from company, battalion and 9^th Logistical Command levels visited appropriate personnel at Utapao and other bases to speed the unloading of semitrailer and to obtain gentler treatment of the sideboards. Results were temporary at best and the problem continues.

LOCATION OF THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

       The initial stationing of the 519^th Battalion headquarters at Phanom Sarakham was determined in part by the availability of adequate facilities. The Base Development Plan prepared by IX Corps, Okinawa, in the early 1960’s intended for the major logistical complex, including a truck battalion, to be established in the Sattahip area near the port. However, funding limitations and subsequent adjustments in construction priorities delayed the necessary preparation of Sattahip by nearly two years.

       Temporary arrangements at Camp Vayama could have been made but no action was taken towards these arrangements because of an agreement between the terminal battalion commander and the 9^th Log commander. The 9^th Log commander was in the process of establishing Area Commands for Bangkok, Korat, and Sattahip to coordinate the housekeeping responsibilities in those areas. The position of Area Commander was to be an additional duty for the senior troop commander in the Sattahip area. The terminal battalion commander accepted this responsibility on the basis that he be able to keep the job for the duration of his tour in Thailand. It was known that LTC Middleton was senior to the terminal battalion commander. Therefore, a decision was made that the 519^th would not be deployed to Sattahip as planned. Phanom Sarakham was the only location with adequate quarters, although it lacked sufficient communications facilities at that time.  

       The move from Phanom Sarakham to Camp Friendship was only a partial solution to the communications problem because the most critical mission of the battalion was port clearance. Port clearance is best managed with a continual interface between the port operators; the movements control detachment, and the truck operator. Telephone coordination was not always effective and busy telephones delayed the process for hours and even days. To provide daily contact at the port meetings, the battalion commander appointed the 505^th commander as the Assistant S-3, Sattahip, and authorized him to make necessary coordination and commit vehicles against requirements. Action taken was then transmitted to battalion headquarters together with the daily operations report. This solved the problem for the port operator and the movements control people, but it was a source of conflict within the battalion to have one unit commander tell another what to do. In December 1967, the commander of the 138^th Transportation Detachment was given this additional duty. Thereafter the conflict subsided.

       When the 809^th Engineer Battalion moved to Sakon Nakhon, the 519^th Battalion Headquarters returned to Phanom Sarakham and the AN/GRC radios were used to compensate for the deficiency of telephone lines. The 519^th also has a teletype capability, but the cable circuit was not installed as of the end of 1968. Phanom Sarakham was then closer to the focal point of logistic activity because the 501^st Field Depot had expanded its facilities in Sattahip and Headquarters, 9^th Logistical Command had moved from Korat to Sattahip’s new cantonment area.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PRINCIPLES FOR FUTURE APPLICATION

       Many useful principles of management can be derived from an analysis of the factors which made the 519^th Transportation Battalion so successful. These principles did not originate in the 519^th; they have been known to the behavioral scientists and practiced by astute managers for many years. The contribution of this term paper is to show these principles operating together in a real life situation as proof that the practical application of these principles can produce success.

       Too often the essential elements of success are present but inadequate or misdirected leadership fails to apply one or more principles which would have capitalized on the available potential. Also, we mortals commonly fail to explicitly analyze the causes of success, mediocrity or failure and to transpose the knowledge gained to new situations (with appropriate tailoring). Therefore, we are continually relearning old lesions. If an analysis is made, it is frequently based on superficial observations of only a few aspects of the problems involved rather than viewing the problems in context to the entire organization processes. Therefore, the analysis lacks depth and leads to premature decisions or decisions not tailored to the new situation.

       The following principles should be considered as being mutually interdependent and interacting in context of the total organizational processes.

1. Personnel must be able to identify with a successful organization. Past success has some value as long as it doesn’t lead to maudlin reminiscence. Current success has the greatest value because it is a stimulus towards future success. Success is achieved by careful planning, hard work, and cooperation.
2. Personnel should have organizational symbols to communicate their unique identity and identification with the organization. If you don’t believe this, then consider for a moment the American flag or the Christian cross.
3. Personnel must be constructively engaged in useful work. The challenge of a reasonable overload is better than not enough work. People become restless and indolent if they do not have enough to do, because unconsciously they feel guilty being idle. “Make-work” projects are not a proper solution for idle time.
4. Work should require some creative input from all participants. This is easily provided in new or expanding organizations. But in a stable organization of routinized processes, the manager must encourage his subordinates to be critical of their jobs to the extent they will seek new and better methods.
5. The manager should set clear and obtainable objectives for his organization, establish sound policies to support these objectives, and devise high but fair standards against which progress will be measured. Objectives, policies and standards must be communicated to subordinates and they must be clearly understood by them.
6. Personnel must be permitted the freedom of action to determine how their work will be done within organizational goals and policies. This freedom includes the latitude to make tolerable mistakes. If the consequences of a mistake are not tolerable, the authority and latitude to make a wrong decision should not be given. The manager should set controls upon himself to insure that he does not usurp the authority which he previously delegated.
7. Decision making effecting only the internal operation of a work group should be delegated to the work group. Again, the limits of objectives and policies apply. Decision making effecting both the internal operation of work groups and their external or inter-relations should at least be submitted to the groups involved for consultation. When a manager is not given the latitude for a broader decision making base, he must chose between assuming greater latitude and the consequences thereof, or accepting mediocre performance.
8. The manager must determine the useful but opposing factors that influence his organization and keep these factors in balance. If the cohesive factors dominate, the organization will become rigid and unable to adapt to changes in the environment. If the fractional factors dominate, the organization will become a collection of uncoordinated parts working toward separate goals.
9. The manager must provide opportunity for dialogue between himself and his subordinates. The dialogue permits the free exchange of information, allows appropriate counseling for subordinate development, facilitates the release of tension, and gives the manager some influence in decision making at lower levels without having to make the decisions himself.
10. The manager must provide a system of rewards, other than salary, to promote competition and give formal recognition for outstanding achievement. The power to reward implies the power to withhold rewards and even to punish. When rewards are withheld or when punishment is administered, the basis of judgment must be clearly related to the policies and standards described in item five.
11. Formal managerial and technical training is frequently essential to maintain or elevate individual and group proficiency. Although the initial cost in money and productive effort may seem prohibitive, the cost to train must be weighed against the risk of failure to keep pace with requirements and failure to adapt to changes in the environment.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

1.      The length of the LOC and conditions of the roadnet imposed requirements upon the truck units which requirements exceed the equipment and personnel capabilities of the authorized TOEs. Modified TOEs were submitted to correct these deficiencies, but this action took over 12 months to complete.

CONCLUSION:  Procedures for tailoring an organization to its environment should provide a rapid response. The tailoring concept has already proven successful in creating larger organizations, but the concept has not yet been applied for changes within an established TOE.

RECOMMENDATION:  Department of the Army should appoint a study group to make recommendations for an improved and expedited procedure to tailor organizations to a new environment.

2.      Although safety and driver training, testing and licensing have generally been considered additional duties within truck battalions, the experience of the 519^th confirms other truck units’ experience that these two functions are full time jobs. The safety function includes processing accident reports, preparing statistics, maintaining safety files, administering an awards program, analyzing accident trends, conducting remedial drivers’ training, preparing and publishing regulations, policies, and periodicals, attending safety council meetings, and coordinating with Military Police and safety offices at higher headquarters. The commercial trucking industry and major commands of military services have all recognized the importance of the safety function by supporting a full time safety staff. Considering the number of task vehicles in a truck battalion, the safety function cannot be adequately covered as an additional duty.

CONCLUSION: Truck battalion headquarters need full time staffing to perform the safety and the drivers’ training, testing and licensing functions.

RECOMMENDATION:  The Combat Developments Command should revise TOE 55-16 to include one Sergeant E6 as Safety and Training NCO and one clerk/driver E4 as part of the operations section in the battalion headquarters.

3.      The M52A2 tractor with the multifuel engine is a costly, sophisticated tactical vehicle with an off-road capability. The 519^th never operated its task vehicles in an off-road mission because the Engineer construction units provided passable roads. Less costly and more easily maintained commercial vehicles were operated over the same roads as the M52s and their life expectancy was equal to or greater than the Army’s vehicles. The commercial vehicles also had a limited off-road capability.

CONCLUSION:  The sophisticated capabilities of tactical vehicles are not utilized in non-combatant transportation truck battalions. Therefore, the utility of performance and the life expectancy is not worth the investment cost when compared to commercial vehicles performing the same mission.

RECOMMENDATION:  Department of the Army should establish a study group to determine the feasibility of provisioning non-combatant truck units with commercial vehicles.

4.      An improvement in labor relations is needed to obtain maximum utilization of the LNs and to make the truck units more effective. Newly assigned squad leaders, platoon sergeants and truckmasters are ill prepared to assume supervisory responsibilities for LNs, let alone civilians. Improved supervision could obtain more productivity from LNs and would give the Thais closer ties to their units. Each of the companies could benefit from the 313^th’s example of putting the LNs in a standard commercial work uniform. These uniforms instill more pride, strengthen identification with the unit, and facilitate recognition of LN drivers by Air Force Base security personnel. The LN drivers and mechanics could be more effective if they were better trained. The training programs in being are adequate except that the communication of technical terms is blocked by the language barrier. An accurate translation of appropriate Technical Manuals could solve this problem. Since the commitment of U. S. equipped Royal Thai Army forces to the Free World Forces in Vietnam, we have additional justification to provide these manuals.

CONCLUSION:  A supervisory training program is needed for NCOs. This program would include civilian personnel supervisory responsibilities, labor relations in the Thai society, limited technical language training, and policies on the utilization of interpreters and LN driver supervisors.

RECOMMENDATION:  The SUJPTHAI, G-1, G-3, and Civilian Personnel Office should prepare a practical supervisory training program and assemble a training team to present this training program to unit NCOs.

CONCLUSION:  A distinctive work uniform is needed for LN drivers, mechanics, and supervisors.

RECOMMENDATION:  Ninth Logistical Command should obtain funds from the SUPTHAI Comptroller and have the Purchasing and Contracting Officer procure an initial supply of uniforms and establish a Blanket Purchase Agreement for small purchases thereafter.

CONCLUSION:  Thai editions of appropriate Technical Manuals are needed to improve training and insure a higher quality of maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION:  MACTHAI should have appropriate Technical Manuals translated into the Thai language and published for distribution to RTA forces in Vietnam and to Type B U. S. units in Thailand.

5.      A Type B organization staffed with civilian LNs is not as responsive and flexible as an all military organization. The inequity of controls and utilization between U. S. and LN drivers increases the difficulty of supervisory problems. If the U. S. Army units in Thailand become a target for guerrilla forces, the entire civilian workforce could quit, leaving the 519^th without sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission. In Korea, the staffing of Type B organizations is accomplished by the Korean Augmentation to the U. S. Army (KATUSA) program. In that situation each LN position is filled by a Korean soldier who is subject to military discipline, who is obligated to complete a term of service, who is trained to fight, and who is immediately available for emergency requirements.

CONCLUSION:  For the best long range employment of Type B truck units in Thailand under any contingency, each LN position should be filled by a Thai soldier.

RECOMMENDATION:  The U. S. Ambassador to Thailand should negotiate the establishment of a Thai Augmentation to the U. S. Army (TATUSA) program and arrange for the earliest possible conversion of the truck units from civilian to military personnel.

6.      The current diplomatic relationship between Thailand and the United States precludes freeing the 172^nd and 519^th from the terms of the General Jit agreement.

CONCLUSION:  The General Jit agreement forces sole source procurement of transportation services and inhibits the efficient utilization of the 519^th.

RECOMMENDATION:  No action can be taken.

7.      The careless destruction of sideboards and the misutilization of semitrailers will continue unless a commander, common to both Army and Air Force organizations in Thailand, is willing to bring pressure to bear on offending organizations. In Europe and Vietnam this problem was solved by establishing a traffic management agency which reports to the highest commander in the theater. The operation in Thailand is too small to warrant another separate agency. However, the 172^nd Movements Control Detachment which services all U. S. forces in Thailand, including MACTHAI, could perform as a traffic management agency if it reported to MACTHAI directly.

CONCLUSION:  The 172^nd should be elevated to report to the highest command in Thailand.

RECOMMENDATION:  Ninth Logistical Command should take appropriate action to have the 172^nd reassigned from 9^th Log to MACTHAI where the detachment would report through the MACTHAI Transportation Officer.

8.      In its current location at Phanom Sarakham, the 519^th Battalion Headquarters is forced to over-rely on the AN/GRC radio for the majority of its operational communications. Radio communications are insecure, easily jammed, and subject to technical interruptions. The face-to-face communication between the battalion, the port operator and movements control is restricted by the physical isolation of the 519^th. The 138^th Detachment Commander, although designated as an Assistant S-3, cannot act with full authority and does not have the experience to deal with the more complex movements problems.

CONCLUSION:  The 519^th Battalion Headquarters should be located in the Sattahip area.

RECOMMENDATION:  Nineth Logistical Command should make necessary arrangements to provide adequate facilities for the 519^th Battalion Headquarters in the Sattahip area.

CHAPTER 5
FUTURE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

       The 519^th Transportation Battalion completed its growth and reached maturity during 1968 when the operations became relatively static. Third generation personnel replacements will not experience the satisfaction of creating an expanding organization. Therefore, their involvement will not be as great. The natural inclination of its officers will be to turn their attention inward to review, revise and refine internal operations with an accompanying increase of control measures. Improved vigilance and control of maintenance will become increasingly important as the task vehicles reach the end of their life expectancy.

       On the surface, operations will appear more efficient than before. Unfortunately, the lower level of involvement, the boredom of routine dispatch or motor stables in a static situation, and the stifling effect of increased controls will cause the U. S. personnel to turn their attention to outside interests. Thereafter, the incidence of disciplinary problems and social disease will rise, particularly if a reduced workload permits idle time. The imposition of either laissez’ faire or authoritarian leadership will only accelerate the deterioration of morale.

CONCLUSION:  In a static situation a commander must discover new motivations for his troops and provide sufficient, purposeful work.

RECOMMENDATIONS:  The battalion and company commanders should:

1.      Be slow to rehire against LN vacancies if the workload is reduced and if the mission permits an under-strength. This will provide more mission oriented work for available personnel.

2.      Conduct purposeful formal training to improve technical and tactical proficiency and increase competitiveness for advancement.

3.      Establish approved extra-curricular programs such as sports contests, crafts, or civic action projects.

4.      Increase the frequency of dialogue between each level of supervision to keep channels of communication open, to influence the selection of activities for work and leisure time, and to permit more opportunity for consultation.

5.      Add greater emphasis to competitive programs between individuals and units.

6.      Prevent the proliferation of unessential controls. “Communist insurgency action against U. S. forces in Thailand has thus far been limited to relatively isolated incidents of little consequence.” (4) The Thai Army has the responsibility for the protection of U. S. forces so weapons are not normally carried by U. S. personnel. Until the latter part of 1967, the Army had not planned, organized, or trained for the defense of any installation against ground attack. A general attitude of complacency prevailed. The planning, organization, and training for perimeter defense in October 1967 was a major step forward. Unfortunately buffer zones, trenches and shelters were not constructed, probably because the appearance of this action would be received unfavorably by the Thais. The 519^th had not conducted any ambush defense training.

CONCLUSION:  The 519^th was not prepared to defend itself. Khon Kaen and Phanom Sarakham are particularly vulnerable to attack because of their small size.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1.      The 519^th should plan, organize and train for defense against ground attack and against ambush of vehicles. Training should not exceed the limits of propriety established in diplomatic channels.

2.      The 519^th should plan for the reconstitution of its LN workforce in the event the civilians fail to report in an emergency. Finally, at this writing the possibility of a reduction or withdrawal of U. S. forces in Thailand, coinciding with a withdrawal from Vietnam, has become apparent. Under these conditions the 519^th would be fully utilized with retrograde movements and limited forward movement in support of remaining forces. This may require a reorganization of the LOC with more coordination at up-country bases. Eventually a phase-out of battalion units with a corresponding redistribution of LOC responsibilities will be necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:  The 519^th should plan for its own withdrawal or inactivation so that it can expire as successfully as it lived.

       The following principles should be considered as being mutually interdependent and interacting in context of the total organizational processes.

1. Personnel must be able to identify with a successful organization. Past success has some value as long as it doesn’t lead to maudlin reminiscence. Current success has the greatest value because it is a stimulus towards future success. Success is achieved by careful planning, hard work, and cooperation.
2. Personnel should have organizational symbols to communicate their unique identity and identification with the organization. If you don’t believe this, then consider for a moment the American flag or the Christian cross.
3. Personnel must be constructively engaged in useful work. The challenge of a reasonable overload is better than not enough work. People become restless and indolent if they do not have enough to do, because unconsciously they feel guilty being idle. “Make-work” projects are not a proper solution for idle time.
4. Work should require some creative input from all participants. This is easily provided in new or expanding organizations. But in a stable organization of routinized processes, the manager must encourage his subordinates to be critical of their jobs to the extent they will seek new and better methods.
5. The manager should set clear and obtainable objectives for his organization, establish sound policies to support these objectives, and devise high but fair standards against which progress will be measured. Objectives, policies and standards must be communicated to subordinates and they must be clearly understood by them.
6. Personnel must be permitted the freedom of action to determine how their work will be done within organizational goals and policies. This freedom includes the latitude to make tolerable mistakes. If the consequences of a mistake are not tolerable, the authority and latitude to make a wrong decision should not be given. The manager should set controls upon himself to insure that he does not usurp the authority which he previously delegated.
7. Decision making effecting only the internal operation of a work group should be delegated to the work group. Again, the limits of objectives and policies apply. Decision making effecting both the internal operation of work groups and their external or inter-relations should at least be submitted to the groups involved for consultation. When a manager is not given the latitude for a broader decision making base, he must chose between assuming greater latitude and the consequences thereof, or accepting mediocre performance.
8. The manager must determine the useful but opposing factors that influence his organization and keep these factors in balance. If the cohesive factors dominate, the organization will become rigid and unable to adapt to changes in the environment. If the fractional factors dominate, the organization will become a collection of uncoordinated parts working toward separate goals.
9. The manager must provide opportunity for dialogue between himself and his subordinates. The dialogue permits the free exchange of information, allows appropriate counseling for subordinate development, facilitates the release of tension, and gives the manager some influence in decision making at lower levels without having to make the decisions himself.
10. The manager must provide a system of rewards, other than salary, to promote competition and give formal recognition for outstanding achievement. The power to reward implies the power to withhold rewards and even to punish. When rewards are withheld or when punishment is administered, the basis of judgment must be clearly related to the policies and standards described in item five.
11. Formal managerial and technical training is frequently essential to maintain or elevate individual and group proficiency. Although the initial cost in money and productive effort may seem prohibitive, the cost to train must be weighed against the risk of failure to keep pace with requirements and failure to adapt to changes in the environment.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

1.      The length of the LOC and conditions of the roadnet imposed requirements upon the truck units which requirements exceed the equipment and personnel capabilities of the authorized TOEs. Modified TOEs were submitted to correct these deficiencies, but this action took over 12 months to complete.

CONCLUSION:  Procedures for tailoring an organization to its environment should provide a rapid response. The tailoring concept has already proven successful in creating larger organizations, but the concept has not yet been applied for changes within an established TOE.

RECOMMENDATION:  Department of the Army should appoint a study group to make recommendations for an improved and expedited procedure to tailor organizations to a new environment.

2.      Although safety and driver training, testing and licensing have generally been considered additional duties within truck battalions, the experience of the 519^th confirms other truck units’ experience that these two functions are full time jobs. The safety function includes processing accident reports, preparing statistics, maintaining safety files, administering an awards program, analyzing accident trends, conducting remedial drivers’ training, preparing and publishing regulations, policies, and periodicals, attending safety council meetings, and coordinating with Military Police and safety offices at higher headquarters. The commercial trucking industry and major commands of military services have all recognized the importance of the safety function by supporting a full time safety staff. Considering the number of task vehicles in a truck battalion, the safety function cannot be adequately covered as an additional duty.

CONCLUSION: Truck battalion headquarters need full time staffing to perform the safety and the drivers’ training, testing and licensing functions.

RECOMMENDATION:  The Combat Developments Command should revise TOE 55-16 to include one Sergeant E6 as Safety and Training NCO and one clerk/driver E4 as part of the operations section in the battalion headquarters.

3.      The M52A2 tractor with the multifuel engine is a costly, sophisticated tactical vehicle with an off-road capability. The 519^th never operated its task vehicles in an off-road mission because the Engineer construction units provided passable roads. Less costly and more easily maintained commercial vehicles were operated over the same roads as the M52s and their life expectancy was equal to or greater than the Army’s vehicles. The commercial vehicles also had a limited off-road capability.

CONCLUSION:  The sophisticated capabilities of tactical vehicles are not utilized in non-combatant transportation truck battalions. Therefore, the utility of performance and the life expectancy is not worth the investment cost when compared to commercial vehicles performing the same mission.

RECOMMENDATION:  Department of the Army should establish a study group to determine the feasibility of provisioning non-combatant truck units with commercial vehicles.

4.      An improvement in labor relations is needed to obtain maximum utilization of the LNs and to make the truck units more effective. Newly assigned squad leaders, platoon sergeants and truckmasters are ill prepared to assume supervisory responsibilities for LNs, let alone civilians. Improved supervision could obtain more productivity from LNs and would give the Thais closer ties to their units. Each of the companies could benefit from the 313^th’s example of putting the LNs in a standard commercial work uniform. These uniforms instill more pride, strengthen identification with the unit, and facilitate recognition of LN drivers by Air Force Base security personnel. The LN drivers and mechanics could be more effective if they were better trained. The training programs in being are adequate except that the communication of technical terms is blocked by the language barrier. An accurate translation of appropriate Technical Manuals could solve this problem. Since the commitment of U. S. equipped Royal Thai Army forces to the Free World Forces in Vietnam, we have additional justification to provide these manuals.

CONCLUSION:  A supervisory training program is needed for NCOs. This program would include civilian personnel supervisory responsibilities, labor relations in the Thai society, limited technical language training, and policies on the utilization of interpreters and LN driver supervisors.

RECOMMENDATION:  The SUJPTHAI, G-1, G-3, and Civilian Personnel Office should prepare a practical supervisory training program and assemble a training team to present this training program to unit NCOs.

CONCLUSION:  A distinctive work uniform is needed for LN drivers, mechanics, and supervisors.

RECOMMENDATION:  Ninth Logistical Command should obtain funds from the SUPTHAI Comptroller and have the Purchasing and Contracting Officer procure an initial supply of uniforms and establish a Blanket Purchase Agreement for small purchases thereafter.

CONCLUSION:  Thai editions of appropriate Technical Manuals are needed to improve training and insure a higher quality of maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION:  MACTHAI should have appropriate Technical Manuals translated into the Thai language and published for distribution to RTA forces in Vietnam and to Type B U. S. units in Thailand.

5.      A Type B organization staffed with civilian LNs is not as responsive and flexible as an all military organization. The inequity of controls and utilization between U. S. and LN drivers increases the difficulty of supervisory problems. If the U. S. Army units in Thailand become a target for guerrilla forces, the entire civilian workforce could quit, leaving the 519^th without sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission. In Korea, the staffing of Type B organizations is accomplished by the Korean Augmentation to the U. S. Army (KATUSA) program. In that situation each LN position is filled by a Korean soldier who is subject to military discipline, who is obligated to complete a term of service, who is trained to fight, and who is immediately available for emergency requirements.

CONCLUSION:  For the best long range employment of Type B truck units in Thailand under any contingency, each LN position should be filled by a Thai soldier.

RECOMMENDATION:  The U. S. Ambassador to Thailand should negotiate the establishment of a Thai Augmentation to the U. S. Army (TATUSA) program and arrange for the earliest possible conversion of the truck units from civilian to military personnel.

6.      The current diplomatic relationship between Thailand and the United States precludes freeing the 172^nd and 519^th from the terms of the General Jit agreement.

CONCLUSION:  The General Jit agreement forces sole source procurement of transportation services and inhibits the efficient utilization of the 519^th.

RECOMMENDATION:  No action can be taken.

7.      The careless destruction of sideboards and the misutilization of semitrailers will continue unless a commander, common to both Army and Air Force organizations in Thailand, is willing to bring pressure to bear on offending organizations. In Europe and Vietnam this problem was solved by establishing a traffic management agency which reports to the highest commander in the theater. The operation in Thailand is too small to warrant another separate agency. However, the 172^nd Movements Control Detachment which services all U. S. forces in Thailand, including MACTHAI, could perform as a traffic management agency if it reported to MACTHAI directly.

CONCLUSION:  The 172^nd should be elevated to report to the highest command in Thailand.

RECOMMENDATION:  Ninth Logistical Command should take appropriate action to have the 172^nd reassigned from 9^th Log to MACTHAI where the detachment would report through the MACTHAI Transportation Officer.

8.      In its current location at Phanom Sarakham, the 519^th Battalion Headquarters is forced to over-rely on the AN/GRC radio for the majority of its operational communications. Radio communications are insecure, easily jammed, and subject to technical interruptions. The face-to-face communication between the battalion, the port operator and movements control is restricted by the physical isolation of the 519^th. The 138^th Detachment Commander, although designated as an Assistant S-3, cannot act with full authority and does not have the experience to deal with the more complex movements problems.

CONCLUSION:  The 519^th Battalion Headquarters should be located in the Sattahip area.

RECOMMENDATION:  Nineth Logistical Command should make necessary arrangements to provide adequate facilities for the 519^th Battalion Headquarters in the Sattahip area.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.      Blanchard, Wendell and Henry C. Ahalt, Thailand, It’s People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven: HRAF Press, 1966.

 

2.      Nuechterlein, Donald E., Thailand and the struggle for Southeast Asia, Ithica, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1965.

 

3.      Silcock, T. H. (ed.), Thailand; Social and Economic Studies in Development, Durham, N. C., Canberra Australian National University Press in association with Duke University Press, 1967.

 

4.      “Outlook: Thailand”, Armed Forces Management, 14:61, April 1968.

 

5.      Krix, Ernst, “Thailand in the Shadow of the Vietnam War”, Military Review, 48:54-58, July 1968.

 

6.      Nui, Sien-Chong, “Thailand, The Strategic Centre in Southeast Asia”, NATO’s Fifteen Nations, 13:14-19, October-November 1968, (Illustrated).

 

7.      Lohr, Chester H., CDR, “What is the Outlook for Thailand?” (Naval War College Thesis), Naval War College Review, 21:92-125, September 1968.

 

8.      Middleton, Harry F., LTC, “Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending --- RS CSFOR-65 (U)”, (four reports):

a.       31 January 1967 (FOUO)

b.      30 April 1967 (C)

c.       31 July 1967 (S)

d.      31 October 1967 (S)

Headquarters, 519^th Transportation Battalion (Truck), APO San Francisco, California 96233.

 

9.      Schwartz, Jack J., LTC, “Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending --- RCS CSFOR-65 (U)”, (four reports):

a.       31 January 1968 (C)

b.      30 April 1967 (U)

c.       31 July 1968 (U)

d.      31 October 1968 (U)

Headquarters, 519^th Transportation Battalion (Truck), APO San Francisco, California 96233 and 96389.

10.  Bechamp, Edward, LTC, currently assigned to DCSLOG, Dept of Army, formerly C.O. 499^th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) provided Throughput Tonnages for cargo arriving in Thailand by vessel for U. S. military consignees in Thailand.

 

 

1. Provide command and control over the operation of all Transportation Truck Units in Thailand.

 

2. Promulgate standing operating procedures to be followed by subordinate units.

 

3. Receive and translate commitments from higher headquarters for local and line haul highway transportation into specific units of vehicles required.

 

4. Evaluate highway traffic plans for determination of best routing.

 

5. Plan and schedule tasks to conform with the overall movement program and with operational requirements.

 

6. Assign hauling tasks to specific subordinate units on the basis of their capabilities.

 

7. Direct and supervise the carrying out of operational assignments by subordinate units.

 

8. Supervise, coordinate, and assist subordinate units in matters of administration, supply, maintenance, training and communications, to include utilization of Local Nations employed as personnel fill in type B. units.

 

9. Control and supervise the transfer of personnel and cargo from one mode of transportation to another at established truck terminals.

 

10. Provide personnel and assistance as required by the Staff Transportation Office, 9^th Logistical Command, in making route surveys or inspections, and establishing reports.

 

11. Provide liaison with Royal Thai Government agencies, as required, to insure the smooth flow of cargo by highway through Thailand.

 

 

 

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